

*Christ in Christian Tradition*

Volume One: *From the Apostolic Age to Chalcedon (451)*

Volume Two: *From the Council of Chalcedon (451) to Gregory the Great (590–604)*

Part One: *Reception and Contradiction. The development of the discussion about Chalcedon from 451 to the beginning of the reign of Justinian*

Part Two: *The Church of Constantinople in the sixth century*

# CHRIST IN CHRISTIAN TRADITION

VOLUME TWO

*From the Council of Chalcedon (451)  
to Gregory the Great (590–604)*

PART TWO

*The Church of Constantinople  
in the sixth century*

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*in collaboration with*

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MOWBRAY



WJK



Published in Great Britain by **Mowbray**, A Cassell imprint, Wellington House, 125 Strand,  
London WC2R 0BB

Published in the United States by **Westminster John Knox Press**, 100 Witherspoon Street,  
Louisville, Kentucky 40202-1396

German original published as *Jesus der Christus im Glauben der Kirche*,  
Band 2/2, © Verlag Herder, Freiburg im Breisgau 1989  
English translation © Mowbray, a Cassell imprint, 1995

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English translation first published 1995

*Imprimi potest:* Jörg Dantscher SJ  
*Praep. Prov. Germ. Sup. SJ*  
Monachii, die 13 Aprilis 1989

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data  
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

ISBN 0-264-67261-5

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data  
(Revised for volume 2, part 2)

Grillmeier, Aloys, date.

Christ in Christian tradition.

Author statement varies.

Edition statement varies.

Includes bibliographical references and indexes.

Contents: v. 1. From the apostolic age to Chalcedon (451) — v.

2. From the Council of Chalcedon (451) to Gregory the Great (590–604). Pt. 1. Reception and Contradiction. Pt. 2. The Church of Constantinople in the sixth century.

1. Jesus Christ — History of doctrines — Early church, ca. 30–600.

I. Title.

BT198.G743 1975 232'.09 75-13456

ISBN 0-664-21997-7 (v. 2, pt. 2)

The publication of this book has been assisted by a contribution from Inter Nationes, Bonn.

Typeset by Colset Private Ltd, Singapore  
Printed and bound in Great Britain by Mackays of Chatham plc

DOMINO FRANCISCO CARDINALI KOENIG  
DIALOGI CUM ECCLESIIS ORIENTALIBUS PROMOTORI  
ET  
INSTITUTIONI 'PRO ORIENTE'  
AB IPSO FUNDATAE

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## ABBREVIATIONS

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ABAW.PH	<i>Abhandlungen der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften</i> , Munich, Philosophisch-historische Abteilung, NF 1, 1929ff.
ABG	<i>Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte</i> , Bonn 1, 1955.
ACO	<i>Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum</i> , ed. E. Schwartz, Strasbourg, Leipzig, Berlin: T. IV, vol. 1ff. ed. J. Straub (1971ff.); 2nd series ed. R. Riedinger (1984ff.).
AGWG.PH	<i>Abhandlungen der Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen</i> , Göttingen, Philologisch-historische Klasse NS 1, 1986/87ff.
AHC	<i>Annuaire Historiae Conciliorum</i> , Amsterdam 1, 1969ff.
ALW	<i>Archiv für Liturgiewissenschaft</i> , Regensburg 1, 1959ff.
AnBoll	<i>Analecta Bollandiana</i> , Brussels 1, 1882ff.
AnCl	<i>Antiquité classique</i> , Brussels 1, 1932ff.
AnGreg	<i>Analecta Gregoriana</i> , Rome 1, 1930ff.
ASS	<i>Acta Sanctorum</i>
Aug	<i>Augustinianum</i> , Rome 1, 1961ff.
BBA	<i>Berliner byzantinistische Arbeiten</i>
BHO	<i>Bibliotheca hagiographica orientalis</i> , ed. soc. bollandiani, Brussels 1910.
BHTb	<i>Beiträge zur historischen Theologie</i> , Tübingen 12, 1950ff.
BiblMus	<i>Bibliothèque du Muséon</i> , Louvain 1, 1929ff.
Bibl.SS	<i>Bibliotheca sanctorum</i> , Rome 1961–1969.
BKV <sup>2</sup>	<i>Bibliothek der Kirchenväter</i> , Kempten 1, 2nd edn 1911ff.
BLE	<i>Bulletin de Littérature Ecclésiastique</i> , Toulouse, NS 10, 1899ff.; 20, 1899 (= 3rd series 1)ff.; 30, 1909 (= 4th series 1)ff.
BO	J. S. Assemani, <i>Bibliotheca Orientalis Clementino-Vaticana I–III</i> , Rome 1719–28.
BSAC	<i>Bulletin de la Société d'Archéologie Copte</i> , Cairo 1, 1938ff.
Burg	<i>Burgense</i> , Burgos 1, 1960ff.
Byz	<i>Byzantion</i> , Brussels 1, 1924ff.
ByzF	<i>Byzantinische Forschungen</i> , Amsterdam 1, 1966ff.
ByzSlav	<i>Byzantinoslavica</i> , Prague 1, 1929ff.
ByzZ	<i>Byzantinische Zeitschrift</i> , Leipzig, Munich 1, 1892ff.
BZ	<i>Biblische Zeitschrift</i> , Freiburg, Paderborn NS 1, 1957ff.
CA	<i>Collectio Avellana</i> = <i>Epistulae imperatorum pontificum aliorum</i> . . . I and II, ed. O. Guenther, Vienna 1895, 1898 = CSEL 35/1–2.
CAG	<i>Commentaria in Aristotelem graeca</i> , edita consilio et auctoritate Academiae litterarum regiae borussicae.
Cath	<i>Catholica</i> , Paderborn 1, 1932ff.
CCG	<i>Corpus Christianorum</i> , series graeca, Turnhout 1, 1977ff.
CCL	<i>Corpus Christianorum</i> , series latina, Turnhout 1, 1953ff.
CCT	A. Grillmeier, <i>Christ in Christian Tradition</i> , Vol. 1, London, Oxford 2nd edn 1975; Vol. 2, Part 1, London 1987.
CE	<i>Codex Encyclicus</i>
Chalkedon	A. Grillmeier/H. Bacht (eds), <i>Das Konzil von Chalkedon. Geschichte und Gegenwart</i> , 3 vols, Würzburg 1951–54, 5th edn 1979 (=unaltered impression of the 4th edition with a new preface).

- COD Conciliorum Oecumenicorum Decreta, ed. Istituto per le scienze religiose, Bologna, curantibus J. Alberigo et al., consultante H. Jedin, Bologna 3rd edn 1973.
- CollCist *Collectanea Cisterciensia*, Seourmont 1, 1939ff.
- Conc *Concilium*, Zürich, Mainz, 1965ff.
- CPG *Clavis Patrum Graecorum*, vols I-IV, Turnhout 1979ff.
- CPL *Clavis Patrum Latinorum* . . ., ed. E. Dekkers, Steenbrugge 2nd edn 1961.
- CrSt *Crustanesimo nella storia. Ricerche storiche esegetiche teologiche*, Bologna 1, 1980.
- CSCO *Corpus scriptorum christianorum orientalium*, Rome 1903ff.
- CSEL *Corpus scriptorum ecclesiasticorum latinorum*, Vienna 1, 1866ff.
- DACL *Dictionnaire d'Archéologie Chrétienne et de Liturgie*, Paris 1, 1924ff.
- DEC *Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils*, ed. N. P. Tanner, London, Washington 1990.
- DHGE *Dictionnaire d'Histoire et de Géographie Ecclésiastique*, Paris 1, 1912ff.
- DOP *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, Cambridge, Mass. 1, 1941ff.
- DOS *Dumbarton Oaks Studies*, Cambridge, Mass. 1, 1950ff.
- DP *Doctrina Patrum de incarnatione verbi*, ed. F. Diekamp, Münster 1907, 2nd edition 1981 ed. E. Chrysos.
- DS H. Denzinger / A. Schönmetzer, *Enchiridion symbolorum, definitionum et declarationum de rebus fidei et morum*, Barcelona 36th edn 1976.
- DSp *Dictionnaire de spiritualité, ascétique et mystique*, Paris 1, 1932ff.
- DTC *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique*, Paris 1903-72.
- EKL *Evangelisches Kirchenlexikon*, Göttingen, 3rd edn, 1, 1986.
- EO *Echos d'Orient*, Bucharest 1, 1897/98-39, 1940/43.
- EphThLov *Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses*, Louvain 1, 1924ff.
- EstEcl *Estudios Eclesiásticos*, Madrid 1, 1922ff.
- EvTh *Evangelische Theologie*, Munich NS 1, 1946/7ff.
- FCLDG *Forschungen zur christlichen Literatur- und Dogmengeschichte*, Paderborn 1, 1905-18, 1938.
- FKGG *Forschungen zur Kirchen- und Geistesgeschichte*, Stuttgart 1, 1932ff.
- FlorCyr *Florilegium Cyrillianum*
- Frend W. H. C. Frend, *The Rise of the Monophysite Movement*, Cambridge, 1972.
- FRLANT *Forschungen zur Religion und Literatur des Alten und Neuen Testaments*, Göttingen 1, 1903ff.
- FrThSt *Freiburger Theologische Studien*, Freiburg, Basel, Vienna 1, 1910ff.
- GCS *Die Griechischen Christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten drei Jahrhunderte*, Berlin 1, 1897ff.
- GOF *Göttinger Orientforschung*, Wiesbaden.
- GOTR *Greek Orthodox Theological Review*, Brookline, Mass. 1, 1954ff.
- Greg *Gregorianum*, Rome 1, 1920ff.
- Grumel, *Regestes* *Les Regestes des Actes du Patriarcat de Constantinople* I, I, par V. Grumel, 2nd edn 1932.
- HDG *Handbuch der Dogmengeschichte*, Freiburg, Basel, Vienna, 1956ff.
- HE *Historia Ecclesiastica*
- HeyJ *Heythrop Journal*, Oxford 1, 1960ff.
- HistJb *Historisches Jahrbuch der Görres-Gesellschaft*, Munich, Freiburg 1, 1880ff.
- HThR *The Harvard Theological Review*, Cambridge, Mass. 1, 1908ff.
- HTS *Harvard Theological Studies*, Cambridge, Mass. 1, 1916ff.
- Irén *Irénikon*, Amay, Chevetogne 1, 1926ff.
- ITS *Innsbrucker Theologische Studien*, Innsbruck, Vienna 1, 1978ff.
- JAC *Jahrbuch für Antike und Christentum*, Münster 1, 1958ff.
- JEH *Journal of Ecclesiastical History*, London 1, 1950ff.



JLH	<i>Jahrbuch für Liturgik und Hymnologie</i> , Kassel 1, 1955ff.
JLW	<i>Jahrbuch für Liturgiewissenschaft</i> , Münster 1, 1921–15, 1941.
JÖB	<i>Jahrbuch der österreichischen Byzantinistik</i> , Vienna 1, 1951ff.
JSS	<i>Journal of Semitic Studies</i> , Manchester 1, 1956ff.
JTS	<i>Journal of Theological Studies</i> , Oxford 1, 1899ff.; NS 1, 1950ff.
JW	<i>Regesta Pontificum Romanorum</i> , ed. P. Jaffé, ed 2a auspiciis G. Wattenbach curaverunt S. Loewenfeld/F. Kaltenbrunner/P. Ewald, Tomus 1, Leipzig 1888.
Kl.Pauly	<i>Der Kleine Pauly. Lexikon der Antike</i> , 5 vols (ed. K. Ziegler/W. Sonnentleitner), Stuttgart 1964–75.
KlT	<i>Kleine Texte für (theologische und philosophische) Vorlesungen und Übungen</i> , Bonn 1, 1902ff.
KlWbChrOr	<i>Kleines Wörterbuch des Christlichen Orients</i> (ed. J. Assfalg/P. Krüger), Wiesbaden 1975.
Lampe, PGL	<i>A Patristic Greek Lexicon. With Addenda and Corrigenda</i> , ed G. W. H. Lampe, Oxford 2nd edn 1968.
LexMA	<i>Lexikon des Mittelalters</i> , Munich, Zürich 1, 1980ff.
LQF	<i>Liturgiewissenschaftliche Quellen und Forschungen</i> , Münster 1, 1909–32, 1957ff.
LThK	<i>Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche</i> , ed. J. Höfer/K. Rahner, Freiburg 2nd edn 1957ff.
Mansi	<i>Sacrorum Conciliorum nova et amplissima Collectio</i> (ed J. D. Mansi) Florence 1769 (often reprinted).
MémTrav	<i>Mémoires et travaux</i> , Lille 1, 1905ff.
MGH	<i>Monumenta Germaniae Historica</i> inde ab a.C. 500 usque ad a. 1500, Hanover, Berlin 1, 1877ff.
MSR	<i>Mélanges de science religieuse</i> , Lille 1, 1944ff.
Mus	<i>Le Muséon</i> , Louvain 1, 1882ff; p. 34, 1921ff.
NAWG.PH	<i>Nachrichten der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen</i> , Philologisch-historische Klasse.
NHSt	<i>Nag Hammadi Studies</i> , Leiden 1, 1971ff.
NRT	<i>Nouvelle revue théologique</i> , Louvain 1, 1869–72, 1940ff.
OCA	<i>Orientalia Christiana Analecta</i> , Rome 101, 1935ff.
OCP	<i>Orientalia Christiana Periodica</i> , Rome 1, 1935ff.
OLA	<i>Orientalia Lovaniensia Analecta</i> , Louvain, 1975ff.
OLP	<i>Orientalia Lovaniensia Periodica</i> , Louvain 1, 1970ff.
OrChr	<i>Oriens Christianus</i> , Rome 1, 1901ff; Wiesbaden 37 (= 4th series 1), 1953ff.
OrSyr	<i>L'Orient syrien</i> , Paris 1, 1956–12, 1967.
ÖstlChr	<i>Das östliche Christentum</i> , Würzburg NS 1, 1947ff.
ParOr	<i>La Parole de l'Orient</i> , Kaslik 1, 1970ff.
PatSorb	<i>Patristica Sorbonensia</i> , Paris 1, 1957ff.
PG	<i>Patrologiae cursus completus. Series graeca</i> (1–161), accurate J.-P. Migne, Paris 1857–1912.
PL	<i>Patrologiae cursus completus. Series latina</i> (1–221), accurate J.-P. Migne, Paris 1841–64.
PLS	<i>Patrologiae latinae supplementum</i> , Paris 1, 1958–5, 1970
PO	<i>Patrologia Orientalis</i> , ed. R. Graffin/F. Nau, Paris 1, 1907ff
POC	<i>Proche-Orient chrétien</i> , Jerusalem 1, 1951ff.
PRE	<i>Realencyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche</i> 3rd edn, Leipzig 1, 1896–24, 1913.
PS	E. Schwartz, <i>Publizistische Sammlungen zum Acacianischen Schisma</i> (Munich, 1934).
PTSt	<i>Patristische Texte und Studien</i> , Berlin 1, 1964ff.

- PWK* Paulys Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft. Neue Bearbeitung Bd. 1-6 ed. G. Wissowa, Stuttgart 1894-1909; Bd. 7-35 ed. W. Kroll, Stuttgart 1912-37; Bd. 36ff. ed. K. Mittelhaus/K. Ziegler, Stuttgart, Munich, 1947-72.
- RAC* Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum, Stuttgart 1, 1950ff.
- RevBén* Revue Benedictine, Maredsous 1, 1884ff.
- RevBibl* Revue Biblique, Paris 1, 1892ff.; NS 1, 1904ff.
- RevÉtAug* Revue des études augustinienes, Paris 1, 1955ff.
- RevÉtByz* Revue des études byzantines, Paris 4, 1946ff.
- RevHistRel* Revue de l'histoire des religions, Paris 1, 1880ff.
- RevSR* Revue des sciences religieuses, Strasbourg, Paris 1, 1921ff.
- RevThom* Revue Thomiste, Paris NS 1, 1918ff.
- RHE* Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique, Louvain 1, 1900ff.
- RivArcCr* Rivista di Archeologia Cristiana, Rome/Vatican City 1, 1924ff.
- ROC* Revue de l'Orient chrétien, Paris 1, 1896ff.
- RömQ* Römische Quartalschrift für christliche Altertumskunde und für Kirchengeschichte, Freiburg, 1887ff.
- RSJB* Recueils de la société Jean Bodin pour l'histoire comparative des institutions, Brussels 1, 1936ff.
- RSLR* Rivista di Storia e Letteratura religiosa, Florence 1, 1965ff.
- RSPt* Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques, Paris 1, 1907ff.
- RSR* Recherches de science religieuse, Paris 1, 1910ff.
- SBAW* Sitzungsberichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Munich, Philosophisch-historische Abteilung.
- SC* Sources Chrétiennes, Paris 1, 1944ff.
- SL* The Sixth Book of the Select Letters of Severus, ed. E. W. Brooks, Vol. II/1, London, Oxford, 1903.
- SpicFrib* Spicilegium Friburgense. Texte zur Geschichte des kirchlichen Lebens, Fribourg 1, 1957ff.
- SpicSLov* Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense, Louvain 1, 1922ff.
- ST* Studi e Testi, Vatican City 1, 1900ff.
- StRiOrCr* Studi e ricerche sull'oriente cristiano, Rome 1, 1978ff.
- StudEph'Aug'* Studia Ephemeridis 'Augustinianum', Rome 1, 1967ff.
- StudPat* Studia Patristica, Berlin 1, 1957ff. (= TU 63ff.).
- StudTestAnt* Studia et Testimonia Antiqua, Munich 1, 1966ff.
- SubsHag* Subsidia Hagiographica (= suppl. *AnBoll*), Brussels 1, 1886ff.
- SymbOsl* Symbolae Osloenses, Oslo 1, 1922ff.
- TD* Textus et Documenta (ser. theol.), Rome 1, 1932ff.
- ThéolHist* Théologie historique, Paris 1, 1963ff.
- TheolPhil* Theologie und Philosophie, Freiburg 41, 1966ff.
- ThLZ* Theologische Literaturzeitung, Leipzig 1, 1876ff.
- ThQ* Theologische Quartalschrift, Tübingen, Stuttgart 1, 1819ff.
- TR* Theologische Revue, Münster 1, 1902ff.
- Trad* Traditio. Studies in Ancient and Medieval History, Thought and Religion, New York 1, 1943ff.
- TravMém* Travaux et mémoires, Paris 1, 1965ff.
- TRE* Theologische Realenzyklopädie, Berlin 1, 1977ff.
- TU* Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der althristlichen Literatur, Leipzig 1, 1882ff.
- TZ* Theologische Zeitschrift, Basel 1, 1945ff.
- VC* Vetera Christianorum, Bari, 1964ff.
- VigC* Vigiliae Christianae, Amsterdam 1, 1947ff.
- WdF* Wege der Forschung, Darmstadt 1, 1956ff.

<i>WuW</i>	<i>Wort und Wahrheit</i> , Vienna 1, 1946ff.
<i>WZ(R)</i>	<i>Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift der Universität Rostock</i> , Rostock 1, 1951ff.
<i>ZDMG</i>	<i>Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft</i> , Leipzig 1, 1847ff.
<i>ZKG</i>	<i>Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte</i> , Gotha, Stuttgart 1, 1877ff.
<i>ZkTh</i>	<i>Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie</i> , Innsbruck, Vienna 1, 1876/7ff.
<i>ZNW</i>	<i>Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und die Kunde der älteren Kirche</i> , Berlin 1, 1900ff.
<i>ZPE</i>	<i>Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik</i> , Bonn 1, 1967ff.
<i>ZSavSt.K</i>	<i>Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte</i> , Kanonist. Abteilung, Weimar 1, 1911ff.
<i>ZSem</i>	<i>Zeitschrift für Semitistik und verwandte Gebiete</i> , Leipzig 1, 1922–10, 1935.
<i>ZThK</i>	<i>Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche</i> , Tübingen 1, 1891ff.

## INTRODUCTION

In terms of theology and ecclesiastical politics the years between 451 and 604, namely between Chalcedon and the year Pope Gregory the Great died, are dominated by the Fourth Ecumenical Council. They represent the first epoch of its subsequent history, which attains its climax and special form in the era of Justinian. The Council of Chalcedon was definitively acknowledged by the Church of the Latin West; in the East by the Patriarchate of Constantinople, by almost half of the Patriarchate of Antioch and by the majority of the Patriarchate of Jerusalem. In contrast it was recognized by only a minority in Alexandria, to whose sphere of influence the large regions of the Sudan and Ethiopia belonged.

The efforts to maintain or re-establish the unity of the Church on the basis of Chalcedon were all the more futile the more the opponents of the Council could either seize the existing ecclesiastical structures or create new ones. Soon after 431 the Nestorians were driven out of imperial territory. Although Chalcedon seemed to offer the possibility of their reconciliation with the Great Church, this hope was not fulfilled. Thus the Church of Nestorius arose. In Syria, within the imperial territory, the so-called Jacobite (Syrian Orthodox) Church was organized. The activity of the monk Jacob (born c. 490, died 578) was decisive here. His epithet was Burd'ānā, the ragged one or the beggar. In Constantinople in 542/543, at the request of the Ghassanids and with the contrivance of the Empress Theodora, he was ordained as the bishop of Syria. This Church expanded beyond the borders of the Empire into Persian Mesopotamia.

Under Patriarch Paul of Beit Ukkāmē (564-577) there was a temporary convergence with Chalcedon. However, it was precisely at this time that the two lines of patriarchs in Syria came to exist, the Old-Oriental Syrian and the Chalcedonian-Byzantine hierarchies. From 551 there was also a Jacobite see for the Arabs. The anti-Chalcedonian propaganda had also reached Armenia, which had already adopted the *Henoticon* of Zeno with approval. At the Synod of Dvin (506/507 and 552) the Armenian Church had professed Severan christology, rejecting that of Julian of Halicarnassus. Together with the Armenian hierarchy

at the Synod of Dvin (506/507), Georgia had accepted the *Henoticon*. About 600, however, the Georgian Catholicos, Cyrius, split with the Armenians and accepted the Council of Chalcedon with a strong leaning towards Byzantium. The heaviest loss for the Chalcedonian imperial Church occurred with the decision of the Patriarch of Alexandria against the Fourth Council. We have already followed the development of this struggle to the year 518. Through his flight to Egypt in 518 Patriarch Severus of Antioch became there an immensely powerful resistance figure and was the symbol of opposition to the Fourth Council. This opposition was so persistent that the anti-Chalcedonian hierarchy could definitively establish itself beside that of the Melkite Patriarch Paul of Tabennisi (538–540), who was loyal to Chalcedon. This anti-Chalcedonian hierarchy considered itself as the only legitimate heir of the Patriarchate. Thus from that time on there were two separate ecclesiastical administrations and even two separate Churches.<sup>1</sup> The condemnation of Patriarch Severus at the Synod of Constantinople in 536 completed this development.

This extrinsic process in church history has already been well investigated and may be presupposed as explained. Thus we are able to concentrate entirely on the depiction of the christological movement itself. Its first clearly defined epoch is the period from 451 to 604, the year Pope Gregory died, especially as far as the Latin West is concerned. But also in the East with these first years of the seventh century there was a noteworthy pause, until the appearance of Muhammad heralded a new era. In this way the first phase of post-Chalcedonian christology received a recognizable unity. Even so, we can also establish a clear *division* between 451 and 604. In the first period which we have already described, the question of the reception or non-reception of the Fourth Council was at the forefront of the discussion. 518 marks a change, and the *Henoticon* era is over. Between 451 and 500, besides the question of the reception, whatever occurred in the factual christological discussion could also be treated without special effort in the context of this exposition. The reader will recall the names of Leo I, Gelasius I or Patriarch Gennadius of Constantinople. The strife about the *Henoticon* in no way intended to place the positive proper statement of the Chalcedonian formula in the forefront. On the contrary. Indeed, it was passed over in silence. In the struggle to develop Chalcedonian christology this could only be a disadvantage. Linguistic and conceptual reflection on the

1 C D G Muller, *Geschichte der orientalischen Nationalkirchen* (Göttingen, 1981), 327, cf J Maspero, *Histoire des patriarches d'Alexandrie* (Paris, 1923), 135–81

formula of faith of 451 was condemned to a standstill.

In the last decade of the *Henoticon* era, nevertheless, the foundation for the new had already been laid. However much the battle against the detested Council of 451 inflamed the monk Severus, who from 508 to 511 dwelt in Constantinople for that purpose, now opponents appeared who directly compelled discussion of the language and doctrine of the formula of two natures, bypassing completely the conciliar policies of Emperor Anastasius I. We are fortunate that, in the extant polemical theological work of Severus arising from the altercations with his opponents, the whole spectrum of christological positions is sketched which (more or less — modified or expanded) persists throughout the whole of the sixth century. Three of the victims of his polemic belonged to the Chalcedonian camp, while two adhered to the anti-Chalcedonian one. In this settling of accounts, which tolerated no concessions, Severus himself became the father of the 'Severan' christology which was named after him. 'Severan' means without exception 'Cyrillian'. *Severus Antiochenus* — *Cyrillus Alexandrinus redivivus!* Yet the copy, when contrasted with the original, will exhibit quite a few highlighted lines and a selective narrowing of the picture of Christ. Thus there is good reason to pursue in a detailed analysis Severus the polemicist in his reckoning with his individual opponents and, in doing this, to determine the content of the opposing positions. Altogether, then, we are dealing with the period between 508 and 528, that is, to the year in which the works of the Patriarch that we want to analyse were translated into Syriac and thus were completed. The predominantly thematic altercation between Chalcedon and Severus lasted, however, at least until 536, the year of the condemnation of the Patriarch and his flight to Egypt, which occurred shortly before this. What follows after 536 can — without great effort, some variations being noted — be placed in the framework which had been created by Severus and his opponents on both the Chalcedonian as well as on the anti-Chalcedonian side. The rest of the Justinianic era had expanded this framework but had not breached it. For even such noteworthy affairs as the Origenists' dispute and the condemnation of the Three Chapters, with the Second Council of Constantinople (553) as the culmination, only promoted that neo-Chalcedonian conciliatory theology which had first become evident in the struggle with Severus.

Even though we are capable of grasping completely the christological development between Chalcedon and the death of Gregory the Great in the way just indicated, nevertheless from this analysis not all of the light and shade in the sixth century picture of Christ in the East and West would be visible. For in the first instance we have been concerned with

elevated theology. Even if this speculative conceptual discussion furnishes the main lines of the picture of Christ of such a group, still the particular colour tone has not been captured. One need only think of the difference between the *Christus gloriae* of the East and the *Christus patiens* of the West, as the history of art presents this. To enter into this aspect will not be possible in this work. However, it is precisely in the sixth century that the multiplicity of Byzantine hymns offers a rich substitute for this, as do homilies and the liturgy.

In the period with which we are concerned, the form of the Latin West, emerging from the turmoil of the barbarian invasions, becomes visible to a great extent for the first time. In the East, however, on one side Byzantium and Palestine develop as predominantly Chalcedonian regions, whereas on the other Syria, Armenia and Egypt with the Sudan and Ethiopia develop as Severan churches; finally, in Persia Nestorian theology and the Nestorian Church attain great significance. Everywhere it was the question of how Christ is to be understood that still taxed people's minds. Before the invasion of the Arabs the *Orbis christianus* presented itself in singular wholeness as *Orbis christologicus*, the last vision that history allowed. Hence it appears mandatory not to destroy this vision in our presentation by proceeding according to systematic themes, but rather to allow it to light up during a comprehensive, if arduous, research journey, region by region. Perhaps then the result will be that Christianity was more at one in its faith in Christ than it itself was conscious of in the confusion of the conflict.

First, then, we will wander through the *Orbis christologicus orientalis*, from patriarchate to patriarchate, and finally we shall devote ourselves to the *Orbis christologicus occidentalis* in its entirety.

## THE PATRIARCHATE OF CONSTANTINOPLE (500-600)

### PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATION

Our purpose is to push forward, from the historical regions of the patriarchates as these had been established definitively in the East in 451, to an understanding of the faith in Christ held by the Old-Oriental/Orthodox Churches, which formed themselves out of these in the sixth century, and of the Nestorian Church, which had been separated since Ephesus. Certainly we would rightly begin in Constantinople.<sup>1</sup> Before its gates, across the Sea of Marmara, lay Chalcedon

1. The following works provide comprehensive information about Constantinople as a patriarchate. H-G Beck, *Kirche und theologische Literatur*, 60-92, 156-88 (on the hierarchical structure of the Patriarchate), R. Potz, *Patriarch und Synode in Konstantinopel Das Verfassungsrecht des ökumenischen Patriarchats = Kirche und Recht* 10 (Vienna, 1971), 17-21, H-J Schulz and P. Wiertz, 'Die Orthodoxe Kirche [Ökumenisches Patriarchat]' in W. Nyssen, H-J Schulz and P. Wiertz (eds), *Handbuch der Ostkirchenkunde*, Vol. I (Düsseldorf, 1984), 13-17, J. Darrouzès, *Notitiae episcopatum ecclesiae Constantinopolitanae Texte critique, introduction et notes* (Paris, 1981); M. Le Quien, *Oriens christianus in quattuor patriarchatus digestus* I (Paris, 1740; new impression Graz, 1958), 1-350; G. Fedalto, *Hierarchia Ecclesiastica Orientalis*, I *Patriarchatus constantinopolitanus* (Padua, 1988). On the title 'Ecumenical Patriarch' see H-G Beck, *Kirche und theologische Literatur*, 63 with literature; R. Potz, *op. cit.*, 29. This expanded title was first used by John IV Neseutes (582-595) on the occasion of a synod towards the end of 587. John IV used this occasion to attempt 'to contrast his patriarchal see to the other three sees and to make it an oecumenical one, which in essence was primarily intended to say that he was the imperial Patriarch' (*ibid.*). Thus it was a matter of extending the imperial status of the Patriarch. Originally the development in the East proceeded differently. There were five ecclesiastical administrative units which corresponded to the political organization: Egypt, Oriens, Asia, Thrace and Pontus. For this reason the bishops of Alexandria and Antioch possessed old customary rights to their respective regions. The first Churches of the other three units, namely Ephesus in Asia, Heracleia in Thrace and Caesarea in Pontus, either could not acquire such prerogatives or could acquire them only in a restricted manner. Constantinople appeared alongside them as a sixth unit, with a bishop at the top, 'who in precedence, as second behind the bishop of Old Rome, now comes before the bishops of the other Oriental dioceses' (*ibid.*, 20). On the basis of the old division Constantinople thus had neither a patriarchal territory nor a metropolitan one with suffragans attached to it. In the period before the Council of Chalcedon there emerged 'an institution which would be of great significance for the future of the episcopal see. This is the *Synodos endemousa*, a synod whose composition was not predetermined by the ordinary ecclesiastical constitution. Corresponding to the name, the bishops, who at the time were sojourning (*endemountes*) in the capital, participated. This synod convened only very seldom, it is an extraordinary element of the ecclesiastical constitution which arose through custom' (*ibid.*, 21). Originally it had little to do with the episcopal throne, but in contrast more to do with the Emperor, who, depending upon the occasion, could for serious reasons summon together the bishops who were residing



itself. If a patriarchate were called upon to confess Chalcedonian faith, then it was the Ecumenical Patriarchate. It preserved it and passed it on to the Greek national Church, which only evolved in the nineteenth century.<sup>2</sup> Immediately after the Fourth Council its main territory and its ecclesiastical future still lay in Asia Minor. The loss of this territory through the advance of the Seljuks and the *halosis* by the Turks in 1453 prepared the end of this Asian-Chalcedonian Church, which into the eleventh century had constituted the centre of the Byzantine Empire. It was in the sixth century with Emperor Justinian that it attained its acme. There is a particular fascination in researching faith in Christ in this era.<sup>3</sup> From the ecclesial viewpoint this large area between Byzantium and Antioch contained all of the great conciliar sites of the Imperial Church from 325 (Nicaea I) to 787 (Nicaea II). Against such a row of historically significant synods and sites, every other patriarchate, Rome included, had to retreat. What a future Greek-speaking Christianity could await — beyond the Patriarchate of Constantinople! Already from 325 the name of Christ was central to this future. It was not for nothing that in Chalke in the atrium of his palace, which was fitted with bronze doors, Emperor Constantine ordered that a statue of Christ be erected.<sup>4</sup> It also signified a programme when Emperor Zeno (474/475; 476–491) characterized the Eastern capital as *mater nostrae pietatis et christianorum orthodoxae religionis omnium*.<sup>5</sup> With this phrase he expressed the self-

right there at the court. It was only natural that the presidency of the synod fall to the bishop of Constantinople. 'With the constant participation of the bishop of Constantinople and because naturally there was a greater proportion of bishops from sees surrounding the capital, the *Synodos endemousa* quickly acquired the character of a synod of the bishop of Constantinople' (*ibid.*, 22). On the basis of this development one can appreciate that the Ecumenical Patriarch had a completely different relationship to the Greek-speaking Church than, for example, his Alexandrian colleague to his region, which on account of its nature and history was so closed.

2. On this see P. Charanis, 'On the Question of the Byzantine Church into a National Greek Church', *Byzantina* 2 (1982), 97–109. The link between the Byzantine 'Rhomaens' is, according to Charanis, not ethnic continuity, but Greek language and culture and, let us add, also the continuation of Chalcedonian faith. Cf. H.-J. Schulz, 'Die Ausformung der Orthodoxie im byzantinischen Reich', in *Handbuch der Ostkirchenkunde*, Vol. I (Düsseldorf, 1984), 49–132 (with literature).

3. For the period 600–800 see CCT III. A help for understanding the Greek Orthodox Church is offered by the work of H.-G. Beck, *Kirche und theologische Literatur*, and subsequently G. Podskalsky, *Griechische Theologie in der Zeit der Türkenherrschaft (1453–1821). Die Orthodoxie im Spannungsfeld der nachreformatorischen Konfessionen des Westens* (Munich, 1988). The unfolding of the orthodox theology of this period is illustrated in the second major part of the work, devoted to the history of theology, using over a hundred authors as examples.

4. See H. Hunger, *Reich der neuen Mitte. Der christliche Geist der byzantinischen Kultur* (Graz, Vienna, Cologne, 1965), 47. This work offers in an outstanding fashion a total picture of that development, which here we want to consider only for the first epoch of the post-Chalcedonian period, with the Justinian era in the centre.

5. *Cod. Iust.* I.2, 16 [a. 477]: Krüger, 14.

awareness of Christian Constantinople. 'As the Jews were the chosen people of God in the Old Covenant, so the Byzantines conducted themselves as the chosen people of God in the New Covenant. That was the incontestable principle of their state constitution and world-view.'<sup>6</sup> The city on the Bosphorus was thus not only a city 'protected by God' but also the 'chosen city' of God.<sup>7</sup> Such a claim was calculated not only to surpass the status of the other Eastern Churches, but also to restrict Rome's claim of primacy.

History appears to confirm this trend. Within the period we are concerned with (451-604)<sup>8</sup> there occurred events which signified a change for the Eastern Empire and consequently also for the Patriarchate of Constantinople. The Western Empire ended in 476 with the sack of Rome by Odoacer.<sup>9</sup> The rule of Byzantium was restricted to the Eastern Mediterranean and the East. The significance of the Church of Constantinople, however, increased with this clear shift of the centre of the Empire to the Bosphorus. Indeed Justinian I achieved a temporary recapture of Italy, Africa and southern Spain. Of this renewal of the old Roman Empire the invasion of the Lombards into Italy (568) and of the Slavs into the Balkans (c.580) left for Byzantium only the exarchates of Carthage and Ravenna, together with southern Italy and Sicily, and

6. H. Hunger, *op. cit.*, 52-3. Byzantium measures itself not only by Rome, but also by Jerusalem. The *vita* of Daniel the Stylite reports this. When he wanted to move into the Holy Land in order to live there on a pillar, he was referred through the vision of a holy man to 'the second Jerusalem, with the name Constantinople'. Cf. R. A. Markus, *Christianity in the Roman World* (London, 1974), 168-9; H. Delehaye, *Les saints stylites = SubsHag* 14 (Brussels, Paris, 1923), p. XLVI and *S. Danielis stylitae Vita antiquior*, no. 10, 12, 10-16 (Delehaye). We shall encounter the idea of the 'new Jerusalem' with a strange justification in the Ethiopic imperial Church, whose kings are ready to find their point of contact, together with Byzantium, in Jerusalem.

7. H. Hunger, *op. cit.*, 53, who refers to Theodoros Prodromos (twelfth century).

8. The Byzantine era as a whole is divided into the 'early Byzantine' epoch (from the founding of Constantinople to the beginning of the Arabian invasion [634]), the 'middle Byzantine' epoch (634-1071), and the 'late Byzantine' period (1204-1453). Cf. E. Kornemann, *Weltgeschichte des Mittelmeerraumes. Von Philipp II. von Makedonien bis Muhammed*, ed. H. Bengtson (Munich, 1967), 893-947 (III.5: From the Collapse of the Western Empire to the Death of Justinian . . .); 947-75 (III.6: From the Death of Justinian to the Victory of the Arabs . . .); H.-G. Beck, *Das byzantinische Jahrtausend* (Munich, 1978), 29-32: 'Epochs of Byzantine History'; K.-H. Uthemann, art. 'Byzanz', in *EKL*, 610-16.

9. On the significance of this year see the literature in G. Weiss, *Byzanz = HistZ Sonderhefte* 14 (Munich, 1986), section 4.7.2, 39-41. Also H.-G. Beck, *Das byzantinische Jahrtausend* (Munich, 1978), 28-9: 'Recently the reactions of the East to these events have been carefully collated. The impression remains that here, in contrast to the West, one did not believe that an apocalyptic event had to be confirmed. Regret was there, but one would almost like to believe that relief was greater.' Cf. A. Demandt, *Der Fall Roms. Die Auflösung des römischen Reiches im Urteil der Nachwelt* (Munich, 1984).

Thessaloniki in Greece.<sup>10</sup> In order to determine the unique contribution of this Patriarchate to christology, we must first clarify certain presuppositions.

### 1. The Christianization of the capital and the Asian region

We will take over some of the conclusions from the research on this topic.<sup>11</sup> This research indicates facts which can provide information on the state of Christianization. Such facts are: (a) the necessity of imperial edicts against paganism even well into the sixth century<sup>12</sup> and the completion of processes against pagans in 529, 546 and 562;<sup>13</sup> (b) the closing of the academy of Athens in 529 by Emperor Justinian, which was linked to a general ban on philosophical education and juridical instruction by pagans. Both of these tasks were to be reserved for Christians and state officials. The teachers who had been dismissed in Athens moved at first with Damascius, the head of their academy, to the court of the Persian King, Chosroes I. After the disillusioning failure of this exodus they found acceptance in Byzantium in 532, as the historian

10. See E. Kornemann, *Weltgeschichte des Mittelmeerraumes* (above n. 8), 859–975, also maps X and XI.

11. Cf. J. Geffcken, *Der Ausgang des griechisch-römischen Heidentums* (Heidelberg, 1920), 189–92, W. E. Kaegi, 'The Fifth-Century Twilight of Byzantine Paganism', *Classica et Mediaevalia* 27 (1966), 243–75. In this article, 249, Kaegi comments with regard to the fifth century: 'Theodosius I did not eradicate paganism. Pagans did constitute a substantial minority of the population in the eastern provinces of the Roman Empire. In my estimation, at the beginning of the [fifth] century pagans comprised somewhere between 10 per cent and 30 per cent of the population, while by 500 they appear to have diminished to no more than 1 per cent or 2 per cent and perhaps even less than that.' This can be regarded as the situation in our timespan. However, see the reservations in K. Holl, *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Kirchengeschichte, II. Der Osten* (Tübingen, 1928), 245–7. Similarly H.-G. Beck, *Geschichte der orthodoxen Kirche im byzantinischen Reich* (Göttingen, 1980), 47–51; *idem*, *Das byzantinische Jahrtausend*, 260–2, on paganism in Byzantium, where it reads in conclusion: 'The Empire in the sixth century was clearly not yet totally christianized [p. 261] . . . Despite everything, the Christian faith must be reckoned with as being typically the dominating form' (262). Important is the study of G. Dagron, 'Le christianisme dans la ville byzantine', *DOP* 31 (1977), 3–25, with reference to D. Claude, *Die byzantinische Stadt im 6. Jahrhundert* (Munich, 1969). On the following see J. Irmscher, 'Paganismus im Justinianischen Reich', *Klio* 63 (1981), 683–8.

12. Cf. J. Irmscher, *ibid.*, 684–5: decrees from the year 527 (*Cod. Iust.* I.5, 12: Krüger, 53–5). According to Irmscher, paganism lived particularly in the old 'large land-holding senate aristocracy'. In the earlier bans on careers (*Cod. Iust.* I.5, 18: preamble) teachers were also expressly included (*Cod. Iust.* I.11, 10, 2: Krüger, 64).

13. See I. Rochow, 'Die Heidenprozesse unter den Kaisern Tiberios III. Konstantinos und Maurikios' in *BBA* Vol. 47 = *Studien z. 7. Jh. in Byzanz* (Berlin, 1976), 120–30. In the trials of pagans in the years 579–582, the majority involved baptized Christians, particularly from the higher public service class, who had fallen back into paganism and for this reason were condemned to death (*ibid.*, 125).

Agathias reports;<sup>14</sup> (c) the personal politics of Justinian in his work of restoration in Constantinople. Paramount significance was attributed to the jurist Tribonian, then still a pagan, about whom his contemporary, Hesychius Illustrius, wrote: 'This Tribonian was a pagan and godless and the Christian faith was completely alien to him.'<sup>15</sup> Apart from this jurist we encounter John of Cappadocia, a lukewarm Christian, who had been made head of the imperial administration.<sup>16</sup> The jurist John Laurentius Lydus also displayed an ambiguous attitude, for although he was a Christian, he advocated Neoplatonic and teratological ideas.<sup>17</sup> Concerning the personality of Procopius of Caesarea and his Christianity there has also been a lengthy debate without clearly unequivocal solutions being found.<sup>18</sup> To be noted, however, is the fact that besides the relatively small number of men of the type described, Justinian also found collaborators and propagandists in circles that were clearly clerically orientated, among whom in particular was the deacon of Hagia Sophia.<sup>19</sup> Finally, we can also indicate that the Emperor was not satisfied with the state of Christianization which he found at the time when he came to the throne, but demanded further missionary effort. To this task he appointed a significant man, namely John of Ephesus, who indeed was no supporter of Chalcedon, but who in loyalty to the Emperor fulfilled his stipulation to lead the pagans to Chalcedonian faith. According to Michael the Syrian, allegedly 70,000 pagans were converted to Christianity.<sup>20</sup> Later we shall have to discuss the missionary effort in the Sudan.

14. Agathias, *Hist.* 2, 30 and 31: Niebuhr. See J. Irscher, 'Die geistige Situation der Intelligenz im Zeitalter Justinians', in F. Altheim and R. Stiehl, *Die Araber in der Alten Welt* IV (Berlin, 1967) (334-62), 349-51. The closed academy of Athens and the paganism advocated by it had 'for some time become quite insignificant, so that the Emperor could allow lenience to prevail'. Thus J. Irscher, *Klio* 63 (1981), 685.

15. *Suda* Lexicon, s. n. *Τριβωνιανός*: A. Adler, Vol. 4 (Leipzig, 1935), 588; J. Irscher, 'Christliches und Heidnisches in der Literatur der justinianischen Zeit', *Revue des Études sud-est européennes* 18 (1980) (85-94), 87.

16. J. Irscher, *art. cit.*, 88.

17. *Ibid.*, 88-9. According to Irscher, the view of history of John Laurentius was determined solely by the developments of Roman history. In this pagan and Christian were combined

18. *Ibid.*, 89-91.

19. On this see R. Frohne, *Agapetus Diaconus. Untersuchungen zu den Quellen und zur Wirkungsgeschichte des ersten byzantinischen Fürstenspiegels* (Diss. Tübingen, 1985). As sources, pagan and Christian works are named, particularly the speeches of Isocrates and the corpus of letters of Isidore of Pelusium. On the significance of this corpus and its compilers for ecclesiastical life in Byzantium at that time, see R. Riedinger, *art. 'Akoimeten'*, in *TRE* 2, 151f.

20. See *CCT* II/1, Ad Fontes, 36-7, with the dates of John's life according to E. Honigsmann, in opposition to J. Irscher, *Klio* 63 (1981), 683-8.

## 2. The leading forces of theology in Byzantium in the sixth century

As is the case with every capital of a country, so the city on the Golden Horn also required a constant flow of intellectual forces from the province of the Patriarchate and from the whole Empire to be able to satisfy the demands of the Empire and the Imperial Church. A particular impulse for this was not really needed, but rather the flow had to be slowed down and there had to be careful selection. At that time people wandered considerably to and fro in the whole Empire, and the attraction of Constantinople for bishops, priests, monks and ascetics was well known. Naturally this attraction also took hold of lay people, whether Christian or pagan. Let us adduce some of the more famous names: Agathias from Myrina in Asia Minor (536–582), John Laurentius Lydus from Philadelphia, and John of Ephesus; furthermore Anthemius, the co-founder of the new Hagia Sophia after the old had been destroyed in 532 on the occasion of the Nika riot; Paul the Silentiary,<sup>21</sup> and above all Procopius of Caesarea, the historian and adviser to General Belisarius.<sup>22</sup>

Of particular interest to us are the theologians. Only a few names can be adduced if Byzantium is to be either their place of birth or their adopted city. In searching for theologically more significant figures among the patriarchs between 451 and 600 we soon exhaust the list. Only Gennadius (458–471) and Eutychius (552–565; 577–582)<sup>23</sup> appear worth mentioning as the authors of larger works. In the turmoil of the years of the strife concerned with the *Henoticon* under Emperor Anastasius I and then in the Justinianic era, it was difficult for a leader of the Church of the capital to gain status theologically and in terms of ecclesiastical politics. In the power triangle — Pope, Emperor, Patriarch — it was the last who was the quickest to be ground down, as especially the lot of the above-mentioned Eutychius will indicate. The office of safeguarding orthodoxy to which the Patriarch was entitled — this office being especially relevant at the profession of faith by new

21. Cf. J. Irmscher, 'Die geistige Situation der Intelligenz im Zeitalter Justinians' F. Altheim and R. Stiehl, *Die Araber in der Alten Welt* IV, 357–9; P. Friedländer, *Johannes von Gaza und Paulus Silentiarius* (Leipzig, 1912).

22. See B. Rubin, *Prokopios von Kaisareia* (Stuttgart, 1954), also published in *PWK*, Vol. XXIII, 1 (Stuttgart, 1957), 273–599; J. Irmscher, *art. cit.*, 345–9.

23. On Patriarch Gennadius see *CCT* II/1, 166–72; on Patriarch Eutychius see *CPG* 6937; 6940; Grumel, *Regestes* I<sup>2</sup>, nos. 244–249, 260–263. Somewhat more numerous are the patriarchs whose importance lies in the area of ecclesiastical politics. Their activity was considered in *CCT* II/1 and will also be considered here.

emperors on the occasion of ascending the throne — could only seldom come to expression. For the group of theologians from the class of priests and monks there are also only a few names of significance that can be cited in the fifth and sixth centuries.<sup>24</sup> It will take some effort to assign the leading figure among them, Leontius of Byzantium, to the capital. Even if he was really a Byzantine, as his epithet indicates, the Imperial City on its own, however, did not form him. He found his role in the sixth century only after twice having transferred from there to Palestine and back.<sup>25</sup> The encounters which were formative for him undoubtedly occurred in the Holy Land. His works were composed, it would seem, only in the short period between 543 and 544 in the Imperial City.<sup>26</sup> Despite all of the positive things that we will record, he was not the sole peak of theology before Maximus the Confessor, as some have attempted to represent him. Admittedly we have to accept that in Constantinople itself a great deal of theological work was done. But for this purpose there was no proper academy. Theology could be learned by way of non-academic instruction in individual contacts or in monasteries. In general, in the Ecumenical Patriarchate from the Bosphorus to Syria below, there was nothing that corresponded to the schools as these existed in Antioch and Beirut, or then in Gaza and Alexandria, and beyond the borders of the Empire among the East Syrians.<sup>27</sup>

For our period particular significance is attached to monasticism.<sup>28</sup>

24. Apart from Leontius of Byzantium (CPG 6813-6820), CPG III indicates only a few names with the denotation *Constantinopolitanus*, if we do not take the patriarchs into account; the works of those named, moreover, are hardly of significance for christology.

25. On the tension 'Constantinople-Jerusalem' see G. Dagron, 'Les moines et la ville', *TravMém* 4 (1970) (229-76), 260-1; *idem*, *DOP* 31 (1977), 6.

26. Thus B. E. Daley in the introduction to his Leontius edition.

27. See H. Hunger, *Reich der neuen Mitte*, 299-369, especially 345-55: The university system. In the curriculum of the university, which according to Hunger can compete with Western teaching in the thirteenth century, there was only one faculty missing — theology. In spite of the significance which in many ways was attached to theology in Byzantium, it was also in later centuries seldom the object of instruction. 'For a theological college there are to be found now as ever no direct witnesses; if a Byzantine speaks of one, he adduces the Syrian city of Nisibis as an example of a theological college' (349), with reference to F. Fuchs, *Die höheren Schulen von Konstantinopel im Mittelalter = Byz. Archiv* 8 (Leipzig, Berlin, 1926), 5.

28. Cf. H. Bacht, 'Die Rolle des orientalischen Mönchtums in den kirchenpolitischen Auseinandersetzungen um Chalkedon (431-519)', in *Chalkedon* II, 193-314; D. J. Chitty, *The Desert a City* (Oxford, 1966), in which, however, monasticism in Constantinople is in the background in comparison with that of Egypt and Palestine; cf. 123-42. See as well H. Hunger, *op. cit.*, 229-98: Monasticism and asceticism as shaping forces. For Constantinople cf. 255-61, 266-85. Those who came from monasticism to the patriarchal throne included Atticus (406-425), Nestorius (428-431), Eutychius (552-565, 577-582), among others; H.-G. Beck, *Das byzantinische Jahrtausend*, 207-31, where on 214-22 critical statements are also made about Eastern monasticism; *idem*, *Geschichte der orthodoxen Kirche im byzantinischen Reich* (Göttingen, 1980),

Since the middle of the fifth century the monastery of the Sleepless Monks of Eirenaion, which was situated opposite Sosthenion in the middle Bosphorus, had become a significant spiritual and intellectual centre.<sup>29</sup> When the patrician Studios planned the foundation of a new monastery, he turned to the Sleepless Monks and requested monks and a religious rule. The monastery of Marcellus thus received the rôle of being a mother house for Eastern monasticism, as then the monastery of Studion itself would be for further foundations after the ninth century.<sup>30</sup> The monastery of the Sleepless Monks must have stood out for this purpose precisely because it had created a monastic tradition that was specific to Constantinople. To this tradition belonged the 'active apostolate' as well as the 'rebellious agitation' that was prepared to fight for 'orthodoxy' above all.<sup>31</sup> According to G. Dagron, these monks had conceived from a particular understanding of Christendom that Constantinople had a unique calling, as the great city of Eastern Christianity and as the new centre of the Empire.<sup>32</sup> They gazed into the future. To what extent the fact that they belonged to certain social classes also played a rôle in this is difficult to prove. In any case, in contrast to them the episcopal hierarchy had committed itself to a political organization which preceded the foundation of Constantinople and which in great part corresponded to the division of the Empire and of

29. On the Sleepless Monks see G. Dagron, 'La Vie ancienne de saint Marcel l'Acémète', *AnBoll* 86 (1968), 271-321, with further literature; *idem*, 'Les moines et la ville', *TravMém* 4 (1970), 229-79, where the topic is the pre-Chalcedonian monasticism in Constantinople; R. Riedinger, art. 'Akoumeten' in *TRE* 2, 148-53. Riedinger notes at the beginning that the name *akoumetoi* (sleepless) was first given to the monks when they settled in Eirenaion, the third settlement overall (around 430-440). G. Dagron, 'Les moines et la ville', *TravMém* 4 (1970), 253, n. 125, says that round the middle of the fifth century there were about 10,000 to 15,000 monks in the neighbourhood of Constantinople, and he comments on their organization.

30. Cf. G. Dagron, 'La Vie ancienne de saint Marcel l'Acémète', *AnBoll* 86 (1968), 274; *idem*, 'Les moines et la ville', *TravMém* 4 (1970), 254, where he emphasizes that from the end of the fourth century onwards Constantinople attracted and integrated monks from the provinces, from Syria, Egypt and Armenia. He says that the foundation of the Sleepless Monks was from the very beginning 'cosmopolitan and polyglot' in its organization. Only in Constantinople of the sixth century was there a blossoming of national monasteries: *ibid.*, 255, with reference to R. Janin, 'Les monastères nationaux et provinciaux à Byzance', *EO* 32 (1933), 429-38; *idem*, *Les Églises et les Monastères des grandes centres Byzantins* (Paris, 1975).

31. Cf. G. Dagron, 'Les moines et la ville', *TravMém* 4 (1970), 257, where the tense relationship between the hagiographical and sociological consideration of monasticism is set out for Constantinople. For Constantinople in general the following holds: 'révolution urbaine et révolution chrétienne sont concomitantes'. Thus *idem*, 'Le christianisme dans la ville byzantine', *DOP* 31 (1977) (3-25), 15.

32. G. Dagron, 'Les moines et la ville', *TravMém* 4 (1970), 276; cf. P. Charanis, 'The Monk as An Element of the Byzantine Society', *DOP* 25 (1971), 61-84; D. Savramis, *Zur Soziologie des byzantinischen Mönchtums* (Leiden, Cologne, 1962).

the dioceses by Diocletian; because of this it limped behind the real development of the East. The consequence shows itself in two ways. Institutionally, it was not until fifty years after the first tentative appearance of the idea (at the Council of 381), viz. at the Council of 451, that Constantinople's primacy of honour after Old Rome could announce itself with the Emperor's help on the political level. Psychologically, this would mean for men like Chrysostom and Gregory Nazianzen, even when they occupied the patriarch's chair, that they were and remained 'provincials', while the monks, as soon as they arrived from the provinces, became absolute representatives of the population of Constantinople.<sup>33</sup>

The Sleepless Monks had only a short heyday. It lasted from their foundation by Abbot Marcellus (448-before 484) to their condemnation as Nestorians by Pope John II on 25 March 534. They were decided Chalcedonians, as were the monks of the Studion monastery that was founded with their help, and were well known because of their outstanding library, which also contained the *acta* of the Council of Chalcedon.<sup>34</sup> This could be used by Facundus of Hermiane in the years 546-548 and the Roman deacon Rusticus in 565. According to admittedly contested suggestions, there are traces pointing to the monastery of the Sleepless Monks which are linked with forgeries, historically pregnant, that were produced there and belong to our sources.<sup>35</sup> In spite of everything, the monastery of the Sleepless Monks was no substitute for a theological academy.

The circus parties (the *demes*) are a final, if not unimportant, factor in the ecclesiastical and political life of Constantinople. It is not our task to explain the relationship of the circus parties to the religious groupings in the post-Chalcedonian period. The proper business of the *demes* was the organization of races in the racecourse. In Constantinople in 602

33. G. Dagron, 'Les moines et la ville', *TravMém* 4 (1970), 276. Besides Constantinople, the west coast of Asia Minor possessed great monastic centres. For the post-Justinianic era see F. Winkelman, 'Kirche und Gesellschaft in Byzanz vom Ende des 6. bis zum Beginn des 8. Jahrhunderts', *Klio* 59 (1977), 477-89.

34. On the library of the Sleepless Monks see E. Schwartz, *PS*, 206: 'It was their [the Sleepless Monks'] belligerence, averse to compromise, which drove them to procure and gather copies of all the documents that were important for ecclesiastical politics, so that their library became nothing short of an arsenal for propaganda, the most important weapon for which at that time was the publication of documents.'

35. R. Riedinger, art. 'Akoimeten' in *TRE* 2, 148-53, connects this library with the author of the Ps. Dionysian writings, whom he would like to consider as Peter the Fuller, and also the authors of the forged letters to Peter the Fuller and the compilers of the *Erotapokriseis* of Ps. Caesarius and of the letters of Isidore of Pelusium, and the revisers of the homilies of Ps. Macarius/Simeon.



there were 1,500 registered members in the Greens, and 900 in the Blues, which permits one to make a judgement about the Justinianic era also. The most recent research denies any delimitation of the demes according to particular city areas or certain classes of the population and their religious point of view, for example in the sense that the Blues would belong to the upper class and advocate Chalcedonian orthodoxy, while the Greens belonged to the middle and lower classes and were orientated in an anti-Chalcedonian direction. Originally, it is suggested, the demes were 'fan clubs'. Their engagement and action in religious, social and political demonstrations are said to be determined by the fact that in the Byzantine milieu there was little freedom of speech, yet the demes were suited in outstanding fashion to serve as a mouthpiece for public concerns according to the circumstances. Although they may have had their significance, both in terms of ecclesiastical politics and as a means of propaganda, theology as such was neither enriched nor changed through their intervention.<sup>36</sup>

### 3. The Empire and the ideology of the Imperial Church

From the beginning of the Constantinian Empire the history of theology and especially of christology had to take into account its entwinement with the idea of the Imperial Church.<sup>37</sup> The reign of Emperor Justinian I signified a climax that had not previously been attained.<sup>38</sup> However, this ruler, the theologian among the emperors, in comparison with his predecessors and their interventions, introduces not only power and authority to carry through a particular ecclesiastical political course of action in questions of faith, as in particular the *Henoticon* of Emperor Zeno and the *Henoticon* politics of his successor Anastasius have shown us, but also contributions to content and attempts at solutions. In doing this he consciously employs the Constantinian idea of unity of faith, and welfare of the Empire. This idea now foundered definitively. The separa-

36 See G. Weiss, *op. cit.* (n 9), no 11 28, 267–8, with a short history of research. As the major works of opposing interpretation, the following are named: J. Jarry, *Hérésies et factions dans l'empire byzantin du IV<sup>e</sup> au VII<sup>e</sup> siècle* (Cairo, 1968) and Alan Cameron, 'Demes and Factions', *ByzZ* 67 (1974), 74–91, *idem*, *Circus Factions: Blues and Greens at Rome and Byzantium* (Oxford, 1976). There is a brief overview by P. Schreiner, art. 'Demen', in *LexMA* III, 686, who takes the side of Alan Cameron. G. Weiss occupies a middle position.

37 See *JdChr* I<sup>3</sup>, 388–403, *CCT* I<sup>2</sup>, 250–64 (Emperor Constantine), *JdChr* II/1, 231–8, *CCT* II/1, 204–10 (individual bishops in the CE).

38 This comes to expression in the 'mirror for princes' of Agapetus Diaconus, *Capitula admonitoria* (CPG 6900) PG 86, 1164–85, especially chs 21, 37, 45–46, 51, 61–63. Cf R. Frohne, *op. cit.* (n 19), 125, 133, 137, 139, 145 (German translation), with summary 151–8.

tion could no longer be healed with previously applied methods and previously employed motives; the unity of the Imperial Church could no longer be saved. For the first time Christendom prepared not only to suffer fairly small splits, but to be divided into rather large institutionalized entities. Was this necessary because of the cause, i.e. the content of the formulas of faith that were pitted against each other? Is it possible that in the first stage of this separation a basis of unity could still have been found that provided a fundamental *komonia* of faith for centuries?

In spite of this failure, the Justinianic era is permeated with its own unique brilliance, which also gives style and luminosity to the picture of Christ. What is the source of this Byzantine *splendor mysterii*, which is expressed so impressively in the liturgy, hymns and in painting that it is utterly impossible for us to capture it in the framework of this depiction? Is this picture of Christ Byzantinized, i.e. falsified with inauthentic elements, to such an extent that it must once again be freed from these with every effort? 'Byzantine' stands for a particular understanding of the mystery of Christ which must be tested with regard to its universal validity.<sup>39</sup>

39 On the following E Kornemann, *Weltgeschichte des Mittelmeerraumes*, 927-30, H Hunger, *Reich der neuen Mitte*, 61-107 (II The Byzantine Emperors as the Imitation of God), H-G Beck, *Das byzantinische Jahrtausend*, 78-86 (II 8 The Ideology of Dominion), 87-108 (III Political Orthodoxy), *idem*, 'Senat und Volk von Konstantinopel Probleme der byzantinischen Verfassungsgeschichte' in H Hunger (ed.), *Das byzantinische Herrscherbild = WdF 341* (Darmstadt, 1975), 353-78

PART ONE

THE ANTI-CHALCEDONIAN POLE  
THE CHRISTOLOGY OF PATRIARCH SEVERUS  
OF ANTIOCH

Even though the discussion concerning the Council of Chalcedon and its dogma about Christ had begun immediately on the ending of the Council, it reached its culmination, however, only with the emergence and activity of the monk Severus, Patriarch of Antioch (512–518). His epoch-making intervention was a reaction to the attempt by supporters of Chalcedon to snatch back the theological initiative in the Greek-speaking region, after it had progressively slipped from them during the struggle about the *Henoticon*. The rebound was so powerful that the Chalcedonians were once again quickly put on the defensive. The outward course of this event, which occurred principally in the reign of Emperor Anastasius, is already familiar to us. We shall now turn to the theological discussion proper, its course and its results, first during the time between the Council of Chalcedon (451) and the death of Gregory the Great (604). Chalcedonians and anti-Chalcedonians will have the floor in like manner. But first we will concentrate on the christology of the leader of the opponents of the Council, the monk and patriarch Severus. It represents the anti-Chalcedonian pole at its strongest. He became the challenger for the entire sixth century, which christologically would attain its highpoint in the Second Council of Constantinople (553). Although the works of the Patriarch are extant mainly only in Syriac translation, with him we still remain in the Hellenistic-Byzantine region. The extent to which his theology penetrated the concrete form of the Old-Oriental Churches will be depicted in detail for each of them. On the whole Severus was the disputatious *polemicist*, but also the enthusiastic, sometime fanatical *herald*, and finally the *theologian* and *synthesizer* of the anti-Chalcedonian picture of Christ.

## CHAPTER ONE

### THE DISPUTATIOUS POLEMICIST

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#### SECTION ONE

#### SEVERUS AND HIS ADVERSARIES

With his becoming a member of the monastery of Peter the Iberian, Severus had inherited the opposition to Chalcedon.<sup>1</sup> Still, special impulses were needed for this opposed position to become differentiated thematically and to assume a propagandist character. Quickly, however, in addition to the controversy with the supporters of the Fourth Council, there resulted a repeated disputation with friends in the same party, which indeed, in the case of Julian of Halicarnassus, led to a deep division. Although Severus had to fight against opposed fronts, still all the individual phases and themes of the discussion had a consistent point of reference, namely Cyril of Alexandria and his *mia-physis* christology. The Alexandrian is for Severus simply 'the king of the explication of dogmas' (*rex explicationis dogmatum*).<sup>2</sup> His pupil will do nothing else than think through logically the formulations of the model, and if necessary also intensify them. All partners in the dialogue will be measured by how they stand towards this great teacher. Among the Fathers there is for Severus no higher authority than Cyril. Even Athanasius or the Cappadocians recede before the Alexandrian.

1. On the life and conduct of *Severus of Antioch* see L'ébon, *Chalcedon I*, 426f., n. 4; Frend (1972), 201-8; W. A. Wigram, *The Separation of the Monophysites* (London, 1923), 57-60; R. C. Chesnut, *Three Monophysite Christologies* (Oxford, 1976), 4-5. We have three biographies of Severus, those of: (1) Athanasius of Antioch; (2) John of Beth Aphthonia; (3) Zacharias Rhetor; further there is A. Vööbus, 'Découverte d'un memra de Giwargi, évêque des arabes, sur Sévère d'Antioche', *Mus* 84 (1971), 433-6; *idem*, 'Discovery of New Important Memra of Giwargi, the Bishop of the Arabs', *JSS* 18 (1973), 235-7. On the influence of *Peter the Iberian* on Severus see Brooks, *SL* II, sect. V, 11, 328: '... the highest assurance and a fixed mind, when our holy father Peter the bishop from Iberia was offering and performing the rational sacrifice', is a model for Severus in his stance against Chalcedon and all heretics.

2. See Severus Ant., *C. imp. Gram.*, *Or. III*, 2, cap. 22: CSCO 102, p. 4, 20-3.

## § 1. The discussion with the supporters of Chalcedon and the reasons for it

Though naturally dynamic, the monk Severus still needed external stimuli to intervene in the theological debate. We will now present three of these, which originated from the Chalcedonian side.

### I. THE FLORILEGIUM CYRILLIANUM AND THE PHILALETES OF SEVERUS

The first inducement for Severus to take up his pen came from an (Egyptian) monastic cell or scholar's study: one or several supporters of Chalcedon, well and truly familiar with the works of Cyril, were not of the opinion that the great opponent of Nestorius also had to be considered rightfully as the enemy of the two-natures doctrine. Comprehensive extracts from his writings were intended to prove that he could also have accepted the Chalcedonian formula, because for Cyril too the two natures remained unmingled after the union. In this way he was to be reclaimed and vindicated as a witness to Chalcedon.<sup>3</sup> This claim severely nettled Severus. The florilegium, which in all probability was compiled about 482 in Alexandria, came into the hands of Severus in Constantinople during the years 508–511, after it had travelled via Rome in the luggage of John Talaia.<sup>4</sup> His response was the *Philaletes*, the friend of truth, which he composed while still in the Imperial City.<sup>5</sup>

3. See Hespel, *Le Florilège Cyrillien*.

4. *Ibid.*, 29–33. On John Talaia see C. Pietri, 'D'Alexandrie à Rome: Jean Talaia, émule d'Athanase au V<sup>e</sup> siècle', in *AAEEZANAPINA = Mélanges Claude Mondéserti* (Paris, 1987), 277–95.

5. See R. Hespel, *Sévère d'Antioche, Le Philaète*: CSCO 133 (T), 134 (V) (Louvain, 1952); foreword to the Syriac edition, I–VII, where the structure of the work and its manuscript tradition are explained. Hespel had first of all to clarify the relationship of the *Cod. Vat. syr.* 139 to the text of the Cyrillian florilegium (= *FlorCyr*). J. Lebon had assumed that this codex (and with it also *Cod. Marc. gr. Venet.* 165), which had previously been regarded as an authentic witness of the *FlorCyr*, had nothing to do either with this collection or with its refutation, the *Philaletes* of Severus. According to Lebon, *Cod. Vat. syr.* 139 was a Syriac translation of a writing directed against the *Philaletes*, this writing being in the form of a Cyrillian florilegium. In it John of Caesarea is said to have fixed the interpretation of Cyril in the *Philaletes*. After this writing there followed then (according to Lebon, who could not examine *Cod. Vat. syr.* 139 itself) the '*Apologia* for the *Philaletes*', composed by Severus. In *Cod. Marc. gr. Venet.* 165, Lebon saw the original text of the florilegium, compiled by John of Caesarea, to refute the *Philaletes*. Cf. Lebon, 130–3. Dragnet, *Julien d'Halicarnasse*, was the first to be successful in clarifying the relationships and the historical course of events. Cf. Hespel, *Le Florilège Cyrillien*, 48–51. According to this interpretation *Cod. Vat. syr.* 139 contains the whole text of the *Philaletes*, composed between 508 and 511, and of the anonymous Chalcedonian *FlorCyr*. *Cod. Vat. gr.* 140 contains the '*Apologia* for the *Philaletes*' of Severus, in which there are important citations from the

This name stands for Cyril, and the text counts as a masterpiece of anti-Chalcedonian christology. Severus had the opportunity to explain his relationship to Cyril's christology. According to him the 244 chapters of the work of the Chalcedonians were gathered from Cyril's writings with the intention 'of showing that the teacher of orthodox faith had thought and expressed the same things as those who wish after the inexplicable unification to divide our one and only Lord and God Jesus Christ into two natures'.<sup>6</sup> The monk challenged the right of the Chalcedonian compiler(s) of the florilegium to lay claim to Cyril because in his opinion he was an unambiguous witness for the contrary.<sup>7</sup> It was the purpose of the *Philalethes* to demonstrate this.

The intention of both works, the florilegium and its refutation, is to make out of Cyril a 'dyophysite' as well as a 'monophysite', whereby a differently accentuated understanding of Christ — be it in the sense of the *dyo physeis* or the *mia physis* — can be illustrated. The historical development of Cyril was in fact so ambivalent that his works could become a common arsenal for contrary christologies depending upon what one sought in them. Anti-Arian and anti-Apollinarian in the beginning, anti-Nestorian after 429 — Cyril's works guaranteed a twofold leitmotif, not only for the compiler of the florilegium and the *Philalethes* but also for the whole christological development between 510 and 604.

## II. THE EMERGENCE OF THE MONK NEPHALIUS AND HIS FIGHT AGAINST SEVERUS

That Severus came to Constantinople in 508 with a large entourage of monks resulted from the aggressive activities of Nephalius, who had been born in Nubia and was a monk in Egypt.<sup>8</sup> Initially he was a radical

*FlorCyr*. In *Cod. Marc. gr. Venet.* 165 Draguet found the original Greek text of the *FlorCyr* up to no. 231 (230). As also in the *Cod. Vat. syr.* 139, before the florilegium proper there is found here the definition of Chalcedon, as well as the parallel placing of conciliar forms and texts of Cyril, and finally the 230 excerpts from Cyril. For nos. 231–244 of the *FlorCyr*, *Cod. Vat. syr.* 139 is the sole witness. Cf. Hespel, *Le Florilège Cyrillien*, 208–216. See Zacharias Rhetor, *Vita Severi*: PO 2, pp. 105, 18–106, 7.

6. See Sévère d'Antioche, *La polémique antijulianiste III, L'apologie du Philalèthe*, tr. R. Hespel = CSCO 318 (T), 319 (V) (Louvain, 1971), p. 12, 34–37.

7. *Op. cit.*, *Apologia* to no. 52 of the *FlorCyr*: CSCO 319 (V), p. 29, 8–9: '... I have proceeded along the line of the teachings and texts of blessed Cyril'. More strongly: *op. cit.*, Severus' introduction: CSCO 319, pp. 1, 31–2, 1: 'If you had believed the writings of *Philalethes* [=Cyril], similarly you would have believed in me; and if I name myself, I speak of the wise Cyril and of the other holy Fathers whose teachings are cited in the *Philalethes*.'

8. See Lebon, 118–75; C. Moeller, *Chalcedon* 1, 670–1. For further literature, see below.

supporter of the anti-Chalcedonian movement and an intransigent extremist, as the opponent of the more moderate *Henoticon* politics of Peter Mongus of Alexandria (482–490). He became just as passionate in his defence of the Fourth Council, which came to expression in an *apologia* of the Synod; this is lost as such but its sequence of ideas is discernible in its refutation by Severus.<sup>9</sup> He transferred from Egypt to Palestine and harassed the monastery of Severus near Majuma so severely that Severus, as mentioned, had to take flight and seek protection (508–512) from Emperor Anastasius I. But the Chalcedonian convert, who was the first to attempt thematically to combine the language of dyophysite christology with that of the monophysites in a dialectical synthesis, also followed him there. The name coined for this attempted synthesis is ‘neo-Chalcedonianism’.<sup>10</sup> It will be a particular task to track down this *nouvelle théologie* in its representatives and variations.

### III THE APOLOGIA FOR THE SYNOD OF CHALCEDON OF JOHN THE GRAMMARIAN

With this work we encounter one of the leading figures of the initiative mentioned above, for he was the first to try to present a relatively structured system for it.<sup>11</sup> The vehement response of Severus to this work, which is also lost, was published in 519 only after his deposition as Patriarch of Antioch (512–518): *contra impium grammaticum*! To some extent from this response the *apologia* can be reconstructed.<sup>12</sup>

In its first part the dyophysite teaching is expounded and the critique of the opponents of the Council of 451 presented (nos. 1–28). A first section of this offers an analysis of general concepts (nos. 4–8) and a second the Grammarian’s critique of the ‘monophysite’ theses (nos. 9–28). In the second part we find a historical and theological presentation of Cyril’s relationships to the Orientals (nos. 29–49). However, the end of chapter 37 and chapters 38–57 of the second book of Severus’ refutation are lost, and with them a number of texts between nos. 29 and 30

9. Cf. Severus Ant., *Orationes ad Neph. ii* (CPG 7022): J. Lebon, *Severi Antiocheni orationes ad Nephaliū, eiusdem ac Sergii Grammatici epistulae mutuae* (Louvain, 1949) = CSCO 119 (T), pp. 1–69; 120 (V), pp. 1–50. John of Beth Aphthonia says that Severus destroyed this *Apologia* like a spider’s web, this occurring around 519. Cf. PO 2, 232. Cf. Evagrius, *HE* III, 33; Bidez-Parmentier, p. 132,4–15.

10. On the significance of Severus (and Philoxenus of Mabbog) for the emergence of neo-Chalcedonianism during their sojourn in Constantinople see C. Moeller, *Chalcedon* I, 669.

11. See CPG 6855; M. Richard, CCG 1, 6–46; Lebon, *C imp. Gram.*: CSCO 111, 93.101 (T), 112, 94.102 (V) (Louvain, <sup>2</sup>1952); Greek excerpts in Richard, CCG 1, 49–58; on this A. de Halleux, ‘Le “synode néochalcédonien” d’Alexandrette (ca 515) et l’ “Apologie pour Chalcédoine de Jean le Grammairien”’. A propos d’une édition récente’, *RHE* 72 (1977), 593–600; C. Moeller, *Chalcedon* I, 672–4.

12. See the overview in Richard, CCG 1, 2–5.



(particularly about Theodoret). In the third part John offers a critique of the first treatise of Severus: *Ad Nephaliūm*. In the fourth part there is a florilegium (nos. 70–118), attached to which there would certainly have been a theological summing-up.

John the Grammarian wanted to find a *via media* between the teaching of Chalcedon and its opponent Severus, with Cyril in the background. But it was Severus who won the initial battle. With his assaults on the Grammarian he could make him look so ridiculous that he was utterly discredited among the learned and not so learned.<sup>13</sup> However, the neo-Chalcedonian intent did not disappear; but that would take us beyond the person of Severus.

With these paragraphs we have presented only the major anti-Chalcedonian works of Severus. The polemic against Chalcedon naturally found expression also in the famous cathedral homilies and his letters, which deserve not to be passed over.

## §2. The controversies of Patriarch Severus within his own party

The anti-Chalcedonian movement, whose undisputed leader Severus had risen to be because of his activities (see CCT II/1, Part Two, Ch. Four) and his writings, was severely affected externally by the change of 518, and internally by misunderstandings between friends and the splits that resulted from these.

### I. THE QUARREL WITH JULIAN, BISHOP OF HALICARNASSUS

This struggle was carried on under the theme of the 'uncorruptedness of the body of Christ' and was already becoming apparent in Constantinople in 510. But in 520 its stage became Egypt after both Severus and Julian fled there from Justin I. Only in 527 was peace restored. The thesis of Julian was that the body of Christ, even before the resurrection, was 'uncorrupted' and 'incorruptible'. Was this a new Eutyches? In any case this was what Severus suspected and objected to.

13. Cf. Severus Ant., *Letter to the Deacon Misael, in 537*: Brooks, *SL* II, 198; John of Beth Aphthonia, *Vita Sev.*: PO 2, 249–50. Anastasius of Sinai had falsely ascribed this success to the *Philalethes*. On account of its authority this new work replaced the entire Scriptures and the Fathers among the supporters of Severus and James of Baradai. Cf. *Hodegos* IV 1: CCG 8, p. 98, 90–106. Cf. on this Hespel, *Le Florilège Cyrillien*, 43–4.

The discussion was opened by the *Tomus* of Julian<sup>14</sup> At first there was an exchange of letters between the two bishops<sup>15</sup> Then Julian expanded the second edition of his *tomus* with *additiones*<sup>16</sup> Finally, in order to add strength to his *tomus*, he composed an *apologia*<sup>17</sup> and a sort of treatise 'Against the blasphemies of Severus'<sup>18</sup> Severus found the debate so important that he responded to each of these writings<sup>19</sup> Particularly significant is the title *Censura tomi Iuliani*, thus a critique of the *tomus*, the third letter to Julian is a précis of this (CPG 7027 and 7026), then there followed a *Refutation of the theses of Julian* (CPG 7028), an argument about the *additiones* (CPG 7029) and about the *apologia* of Julian (CPG 7030) In the *Apologia for the Philalethes* Severus defended himself against the suggestion that he had advocated 'Julianist' ideas in this work, which he had already composed in Constantinople (CPG 7031)<sup>20</sup>

Severus did not succeed in convincing Julian. The opposition became increasingly fierce and led finally to a break between the two, and with this to a split in the anti-Chalcedonian movement. In a second series of strongly polemical writings Julian continued the battle, after the *Censura tomi Iuliani* in particular had nettled him intensely. Against this writing he composed a large work of ten *logoi* in which against the florilegium of Severus he placed another, compiled of biblical and patristic texts, and defended the terminology of his tome. From this Severus produced four fragments in his *Apologia for the Philalethes*. With this writing just mentioned the series of works by Severus against Julian comes to an end. They occurred before 528, because in that year the Syriac translation of Paul of Callinicum was published in Edessa. There is no indication that this controversy was continued beyond that date.

## II THE CONTROVERSY WITH SERGIUS THE GRAMMARIAN

In this controversy, as in the discussion between Severus and Julian; once again the *mia-physis* christology becomes apparent as the source

14 See Severus Ant, *Censura tomi Iuliani* (CPG 7027) On the course of the controversy, with writings and counter-writings, see R. Hespel, *Sévère d'Antioche La polémique antijulianiste I* = CSCO 244 (Louvain, 1964), I-II, *idem*, *op cit* IIA = CSCO 295 (Louvain, 1968), I-III, *idem*, *op cit* III = CSCO 318 (Louvain, 1971), pp V-IX The major work is that of Draguet, *idem*, art 'Julien d'Halicarnasse', in DTC 8b (1925), 1931-40

15 Severus Ant, *Epistulae tres ad Iulianum* (CPG 7026) R. Hespel, CSCO 244 (T), 245 (V) Ep I, pp 6-7, Ep II, pp 9-14, Ep III, pp 163-214

16 Cf Severus Ant, *Contra additiones Iuliani* R. Hespel, *op cit* IIA = CSCO 295 (T), 296 (V) (both Louvain, 1968)

17 Cf Severus Ant, *Adversus apologiam Iuliani* R. Hespel, *op cit* IIB = CSCO 301 (T), 302 (V) (both Louvain, 1969)

18 Hespel, CSCO 244, I

19 See CPG 7026-31

20 Lebon, 128, believed that this *apologia* could be considered to be an anti-Chalcedonian work See Hespel, *Sévère d'Antioche La polémique antijulianiste III* CSCO 318 (T), VII-VIII, 319 (V) (both Louvain, 1971)

of misunderstandings among its supporters.<sup>21</sup> Sergius seems to have arrived at his errors, sharply attacked by Severus, by taking over Apollinarian errors, which for their part assume the Aristotelian doctrine of mixture.

Thus Severus fought not exclusively against Chalcedon and its supporters, but also against particular opinions and groups which had developed in his own movement. This process continued until 557 in the *tritheist controversy*,<sup>22</sup> with regard to which Severus could no longer take up a position. But here once again it would have been evident, as in the polemics against Julian and Sergius, (1) what a burden the *mia-physis* ideology, resting on the Apollinarian forgeries, constituted for the Old-Oriental Alexandrian tradition; (2) that Severus also was not successful in undoing this bundle, indeed that he was incapable of doing this, undoubtedly because in no way was he even prepared to think through the possibilities of the way indicated by Chalcedon in its choice of terminology. Consequently he cut himself off from the possibility of presenting the problem differently, namely by showing where and how in Christ the unity, and where and how the distinction of God and human being, should be placed. It would however be false because of this to speak simply of the failure of his christology. With the Alexandrian tradition he inherited a rich treasure of christological ideas which he utilized in his own way. We will have to examine whether this led to a deepening and clarification or to a constriction and one-sided solidification of christological thought.

21 The writings of Sergius Gram CPG 7102-5, on these see Lebon, 163-72, 538-51, I R. Torrance, *Christology after Chalcedon Severus of Antioch and Sergius the Monophysite* (Norwich, 1988)

22 See A. Van Roey, 'La controverse trithéite jusqu'à l'excommunication de Conon et d'Eugène (557-569)', OLP 16 (1985), 141-65

## SECTION TWO

### THE CHRISTOLOGICAL RESULT OF THE POLEMICS OF PATRIARCH SEVERUS

Under the pressure of the controversy between Chalcedon and Alexandria the relationship of Cyril to Chalcedon necessarily became the theme of christology after 451: how did the principal formula of the Fourth Council relate to the teaching of the *mia physis* of the Word incarnate? Chalcedon had to lead to a *rélecture* of the great Church Father, or — according to the other side — Cyril would lead to a correction or abolition of the Council.

#### § 1. The discussion with the Chalcedonian opponents and the Severan response

##### I THE INTENT AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE *FLORILEGIUM* *CYRILLIANUM* (*FlorCyr*)

The compiler based himself on the Fourth Council. He intended to read Cyril along the line of the Council's principal formula, and this in two stages. In the first, the definition is divided into individual statements over against which references from Cyril are placed as parallels (nos. 1–10). In this way the character of novelty or heresy was to be taken from the principal formula of Chalcedon. In the second, much more lavish process the compiler proceeded thematically and presented the two most controversial themes of Chalcedon as the foci for his selection: (a) the distinguishing of the two natures and (b) the theopaschite statement (God has suffered) and its correct interpretation.<sup>23</sup> In this process it was presupposed that it was precisely Chalcedon with its teaching of the two natures which offers the possibility of confessing the divinity of the Logos (here concretely, God Word) as incapable of suffering and free from suffering and immortal, and of expressing in contrast the suffering and mortality of the human nature (here concretely, of the temple). Is this formulation felicitous? It is strongly reminiscent

<sup>23</sup> See Hespel, *Le Florilège Cyrillien*, p. 111, 17–21 (title) 'Various excerpts (*chreseis*) from Cyril, Archbishop of Alexandria, in which it is shown that the distinction of the two natures and the impassibility and immortality of God-Logos, (on the other side) the passibility and mortality of the temple are proclaimed by him'

of the way in which the Antiochenes warded off Apollinarian 'theopaschitism' and thus riled Cyril; this indeed with the phrase 'the temple'! Certainly this does not mean that the excerptor is Chalcedonian in the sense of retreating to Antiochene christology. He had before his eyes the whole controversy after Ephesus with its documents, and retained its style.

On the first stage

(R. Hespel, *Le Florilège Cyrillien*, 103–11)

In this the Chalcedonian definition in its individual phrases is compared with Cyrillian statements. Accordingly the expressions of the two natures (no 4) in the one hypostasis (no 7) had to stand in the centre. Basil of Seleucia, with whose part in this formula we are already familiar,<sup>24</sup> would here certainly have cast a wider net. Here would have been the great opportunity to analyse the intent of Chalcedon with its distinction between *hypostasis* and *physis* and to demonstrate the unity with Cyril despite the new step in terminology. This was no longer to be achieved with texts which in fact speak of two natures, but rather by showing that Cyril could combine the *mia physis* formula with these. It is precisely this point, then, that Severus fastened on to. As useful and as justified as the first series of texts might be, without an accompanying hermeneutic it was not convincing.

On the second stage

(*ibid.*, 111–216)

In this process, as we said, the themes are confined to the two offensive points ('two natures' – the communication of properties), and the attempt was made with a multiplicity of references to prove the agreement of Chalcedon with Cyril. For us it is not so important to re-enact this process and thus once again to present an interpretation of Cyril, seeing that we have already attempted this in the framework of our depiction of the pre-Chalcedonian period. Our focus is on the reaction of Severus of Antioch and his relationship to Cyril, from which indeed the Cyrillianism of the Old-Oriental Churches is derived. Nevertheless the Cyrillian florilegium has value for us because of its Chalcedonian-motivated selection from his works. Here it is appropriate to ask some critical questions and to make a few remarks.

(1) It is not difficult to cite many places in Cyril in which the distinction between the two natures (τῶν δύο φύσεων τὸ διάφορον) is expressed. Equally the Patriarch let there be no doubt that this distinction remains preserved too in the uniting of the two natures. For this reason the conclusion would also be clear that the Logos made flesh in the incarnation 'has two natures' or 'is in two natures'. Cyril had some passages that almost lead to this assumption and that could make Severus nervous.<sup>25</sup> But an explicit statement about this is not found.

(2) It is one thing to establish the *real* presence of unmingled godhead and unchanged

24 See *JdChr* I<sup>3</sup>, 755–9, *CCT* II/1, 230–2, with notes 122–7.

25 Cf. *JdChr* I<sup>3</sup>, 679–86, 755–9, *CCT* I<sup>2</sup>, 478–83. Worthy of serious attention are the remarks of M. Simonetti, 'Alcune osservazioni sul monofisismo di Cirillo di Alessandria', *Aug* 22 (1982), 493–511, in n. 26 on 500f, Simonetti refers to Cyril Alex., *De recta fide ad reginas* or 2 ACO I, 1, 5, p. 36, PG 76, 1360C: τῆς ἐνωθείσης αὐτῷ φύσεως, ὁῦλον δέ, ὅτι τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης. This writing is excerpted in the *FlorCyr* in nos 165–75. The passage cited by Simonetti, however, is not to be found there. Simonetti also refers to Cyril's *De Incarnatione Unigeniti* (CPG 5227), which is a transliteration of the *De recta fide* into the form of a dialogue. Simonetti establishes this text later as *De recta fide* (against G. M. de Durand, SC 97). See as well PG 76, 1192A, 1197B, 1169C (Simonetti, 500).

humanity, but another to apply to this the *formal* predication of 'twoness'.<sup>26</sup> Even if Cyril perhaps in the course of time may have found his way to this point, Severus fundamentally refused to go that way.

(3) The obstacle was the *mia-physis* formula, which was indispensable for christology and traditionally maintained. It demanded that Cyril see the two natures unconditionally in the state of union (*henosis*) and acknowledge that the twoness was present only in the abstract consideration (*theoria*) and as *ratione prius* (never real). The compiler of the florilegium thought that he had done enough when he cited places which expressed a *real* differentiation of God and human being in Christ,<sup>27</sup> but had not yet advanced to the *formal* statement of a twoness after the union. Severus could fasten on here. He always avoided the logical deduction of the Chalcedonian 'in two natures'.

(4) The salient point would have been to show from the formula of Chalcedon that Cyril (and Severus) sought the unity and the differentiation on one and the same ontological level, that is on the level of nature, which of necessity had to lead to a contradiction. He would have had to explain that the unity 'in the hypostasis or the prosopon' represented a *real* union which excluded the dreaded twoness of the 'person', yet maintained the *real* duality of the natures.

(5) For this purpose he would also have had to examine critically, in terms of their cogency, the images and comparisons which Cyril adduced for the unmingled unity in Christ, the body-soul analogy and the images of the 'burning thornbush' and the 'glowing coal'. These attempts would also have to be placed within the history of philosophy. But that would place excessive demands on the excerptor, and admittedly too would have meant his renouncing a telling argument against the Alexandrians.

(6) As much as the Alexandrian monophysite terminology contained irreconcilable elements and aspects dangerous for understanding Christ, the Cyrillian florilegium signified nothing more

26. N. A. Zabolotsky, 'The Christology of Severus of Antioch', *Ekklesiastikos Pharos* 58 (1976) (357-86), 373, articulates this distinction well: 'According to Severus, one can count only things that have their originality; to count means to consider an essence as "hypostasis", or as the highest expression of a peculiarity — "person" (πρόσωπον). Thus, the aversion for a cipher, for a duplicity, reflected in the formula "one incarnate nature" contains the formal side of the ideas of Severus and of other opponents of the Chalcedonian Council. But in a material sense, essentially, Chalcedon's adversaries did not and could not refute the duplicity in the one Person of the Lord.' Severus had no misgiving about allowing numeration in the theology of the Trinity. Cf. *Ep. ad Iohannem presb. et archim.*: PO 12, 215: 'The Holy Trinity is capable of numeration in respect of hypostases; but in that it is one and of the same essence, it stands outside number.' Cf. *Hom.* 125: PO 29, 239. He could refer to Basil, *Ep. 214 ad Terentium*, no. 4: Y. Courtonne, *S. Basile, Lettres*, vol. 2 (Paris, 1957), 205: ἀριθμεῖσθαι. On the problem see R. Arnou, 'Unité numérique et unité de nature chez les Pères, après le Concile de Nicée', *Greg* 15 (1934), 242-54. In the spirit of Severus, Patriarch Paul the Black of Antioch (564-577), in his synodal letter to Patriarch Theodosius of Alexandria (535-566) (CPG 7203), still chided the Chalcedonians on account of their love for duality which they had inherited from Leo I. His Tome 'split the one Christ through the duality of the natures after the union. He allocated to each (nature) forms, predicates, activities and general qualities corresponding to this number (*aequales eis numero*) . . . It is characteristic of them to divide through intellectual vision, because in a subtle self-deception of the intellect they see two, from which the inexpressible unity is constituted. They should not remain in this intellectual hallucination, but accept the true union and reject the *number* of the natures, because the *number* is expression for a host of subjects, but not for the nature of the things.' Cf. CSCO 103, pp. 226,23-26; 227,33-38.

27. See Cyril Alex., *Ep. 45 ad Succensum I*: PG 77, 232CD = ACO I. 1, 6a, p. 153,16-20; cf. Severus Ant., *Philal.* nos 38-41: CSCO 134, 21-2; no. 39: *ibid.*, p. 22,1-8. In addition there are works from the pre-Ephesian works of Cyril, the *Thesaurus* and *C. Synousiastas*, where he had to speak differently against the Arians and radical Apollinarians than he would later have to do against Nestorius. See below.

than a stimulus for reflection for the opponents, a certain justification of the Chalcedonian position, but still not a compelling argument. For this reason Severus, starting with his presuppositions, could draw contrary conclusions from the same Cyrillian material. We want to depict in broad strokes how in his critique of the florilegium the Patriarch justified and also sharpened his Cyrillian understanding of Christ.

## II. THE CYRILLIAN CHRISTOLOGY OF THE *PHILALETHES* OF SEVERUS

A florilegium is necessarily selective, not only on account of its compass, but also simply because of its purpose. It was not difficult to find sufficient texts of Cyril which express the 'unmingled distinction' in Christ. Through the accumulation of these the impression could be given that Cyril was very close to the two-natures teaching, if indeed he could not be regarded as its defender. Severus sought to destroy this suspicion entirely. This is the negative side of his refutation of the florilegium. The positive side is that he for his part highlighted many of the facets of Cyril's understanding of Christ, and consequently placed Cyril as the unconditional representative of the *mia-physis* christology.<sup>28</sup> Thus from the same timber a different Christ could be carved. It is strange that no attempt was made to find common ground with an opponent and to emphasize this.

### 1. 'Sacrilegious plunderer of the inspired words of Cyril'

Many an author can object to a critic: 'You do not cite me completely. Had you taken my words in context, then you would have come to another judgement.' This was the constant complaint of Severus, applied to the method of selection employed by the excerptor. In a general way he raised it at the very beginning of his critique of the thematic part of the collection.<sup>29</sup> He also gives a good reason for saying that the author of the florilegium can almost always be found guilty of using

28. Thus in his critique of the *FlorCyr* nos 37–40, where the two natures seem to be proximate, Severus comes elegantly to the 'one nature of the incarnate Word'. Cf. *Philal*, nos 37–40: CSCO 134, 210–12.

29. Cf. Severus Ant., *Philal.*: CSCO 134, 150–3. Also in the 'Apologia for the *Philalethes*', he criticizes the *FlorCyr* fiercely: CSCO 319, 12, 37–13, 10: he maintains that it is a compilation, made by several authors, but put in circulation as if it is by one person; the suspect John Talaia brought it to Rome; an extreme supporter of Nestorius, John, treasurer in the days of Patriarch Macedonius (496–511), then gave it to the patrician, Appion, with the intention that it serve as an instrument in an action against Severus, who at that time was in Constantinople (508–511).

the scissors too quickly: Cyril always combines two trains of thought when he speaks of the two natures. The question that must be asked is: is it a matter of the time before the union (which exists only in *theoria*), or is it the time after the union when one may no longer speak of a duality? Besides establishing the integrity of divinity and humanity in the one Emmanuel, Cyril also considered the event of the union and incorporated it in the end-result. And there Christ is no longer two, but *one physis, one hypostasis*. The excerptor, delighted at having discovered statements in Cyril about the material integrity of the two natures, leaves aside the remarks about the event of the union and believes in this way to have found a confession of Cyril to the two natures. This would have been correct only if the Patriarch had confessed to a duality also *after* the union, which for him, however, means the same as a twoness of persons. The confession to twoness in Christ was made dependent on two conditions: (1) it must be seen *in fieri*, which is why Cyril always says, 'the two natures from which (ἐξ ὧν) Christ becomes one', which (2) has the same meaning as the demand to accept the twoness only in the *theoria*. Thus Severus' constant critique of the excerptor's Chalcedonian technique of cutting concerns not simply the length of excerpts but relates to a substantial abridgement of Cyril's line of thought.<sup>30</sup> If one takes the whole process as a unity, then the twoness (intellectually conceived) before the union is no longer present after the union. This is shown by a response of Severus to no. 4 of the first part of the florilegium:

In fact whoever assigns to God the Word a one and only incarnated hypostasis and a one and only person also attributes to him a one and only nature of the incarnated God the Logos. For that which with whatever two (elements) as a starting-point has been gathered together

30. In the eyes of Severus, the author of the *FlorCyr* revealed himself in his Nestorian colours in no. 10: Hespel, p. 115,7–14, by omitting in the text an important *ὁ αὐτός* which was intended by Cyril to place a special accent on the unity in Christ. On this see *JdChr* 1<sup>3</sup>, 705f.; *CCT* 1<sup>2</sup>, 500. Severus noticed the omission immediately: *Philal.* on no. 10, *Apologia*: 'N'oublant pas, une nouvelle fois, de pratiquer un vol sacrilège sur les textes, il a supprimé ici aussi le mot qui exclut la séparation en deux, comme suit: "Parfait qu'il est selon la divinité et parfait qu'il est, 'le même', selon l'humanité". Ainsi donc, après avoir retranché "le même", il pense, dans sa sottise, que chacune des natures est parfaite dans l'isolement de sa subsistance . . .' Cf. *CSCO* 134 (V), p. 176,23–29. Since the *FlorCyr* does not contain any commentary, one cannot decide with complete certainty whether the omission was intentional or a mistake. The former can perhaps be accepted because of the fact that the excerptor was of the opinion that the *mia physis* of the anti-Chalcedonians was in point of fact understood as a mixed nature. This emerges from his title which stresses that he wants to prove from Cyril 'the distinction of the natures' (cf. Hespel, *Le Florilège Cyrillien*, p. 111,18–19). With the 'one and the same' omitted, the text certainly spoke more strongly in its dyophysite sense which, however, on that account also proved itself heretical in the eyes of Severus.



has on the one hand ceased to be 'two', but remains (on the other hand) 'one' after being put together: even if he, without giving up anything, lets appear the elements out of which he is constituted [cf. the 'recognized in two natures' of the definition of Chalcedon], because they have been united without mingling, so he remains still in a definite way 'one', and it is impossible that in the future he is 'two', this being because of the inseparable character of the union.<sup>31</sup>

From all this one must recognize that (if) the union brought about the ending of the duality and separation of the two natures, still it did not wipe out the difference of the natures from which Christ is one.<sup>32</sup>

Whether Severus criticizes the Cyrillian florilegium for its procedure or its theological cogency, or whether he develops his christology positively in his own explications (*apologia*), he constantly aims at a rehabilitation of Cyril. We could really be satisfied with this. Nevertheless it is useful to consider the Cyrillian picture of Christ somewhat more closely, along the heightened lines of Severus, so that the preconditions can be created for us to understand better the discussion with Severus within Byzantine theology.

## 2. On the christology of the *Philalethes* of Severus

The Cyrillian florilegium is characterized by the intention to prove the permanent difference of the two natures in Christ from Cyril himself, in order to be able to lay claim to this undisputed authority for Chalcedon. Severus seeks to escape this danger by opposing a dynamic consideration of Christ to the static one of the Chalcedonians. The material duality of divinity and humanity in Christ ought to be only the *transitory* phase of the consideration, this being removed by the vision of the unified unity. Only here may the viewing intellect find rest. This intention serves the emphasis of the formula rejected by Chalcedon: 'from two natures one (person)!' The execution of this line of thought belongs, according to Severus, to the correct statement about Christ, because otherwise this statement would stop at the *material* duality of God and human being and would necessitate the acceptance of a *permanent formal* duality. The constant hammering of this necessity makes the christology of Severus even more heavily weighted towards 'unity' than that of his master Cyril. Severus pursues his preoccupation in two ways: (a) explanation through analogies; and (b) language and depiction that are directly conceptual.

31. Severus Ant., *Philal.* (part 1), no. 4: CSCO 134 (V), p. 139,9-18. *Ibid.* (part 2), no. 42, *Apologia*: CSCO 134, p. 213.

32. *Ibid.* (part 1), no. 4: CSCO 134 (V), p. 140,4-7; in a similar way already in no. 2 *ibid.*, pp. 135,28-136,2; as well on no. 14: *ibid.*, pp. 184,34-185,4. The 'duality' destroys the unity if one speaks of it after the uniting of the natures.

(a) *Analogies for the unity in Jesus Christ*(i) *The body-soul comparison*

The body-soul analogy in its application within christology has attracted special attention particularly in recent times.<sup>33</sup> Although utilized in christology since Eusebius of Emesa, through Cyril and Severus it gains a not innocuous intensification because it is enlisted in the proof of the *mia-physis* formula.<sup>34</sup> Likewise both teachers confess the acceptance of a soul in Christ — in constantly repeated rejection of Apollinarius. As an example we can take the *apologia* of Severus to no. 42 of the Cyrillian florilegium, which he substantiates with two further texts from his master, doing this because the excerptor used the scissors too soon. We will concentrate upon these texts,<sup>35</sup> present them first, and then let the *apologia* of Severus follow.

We are composed of body and soul, and we see two natures (*kyana*), the one that of the body, the other that of the soul; but the human being is one from the two due to the union. And the fact that he is composed out of two natures does not permit us to conclude that he who is one is two men, but rather one single man, as I have said, on account of the composition from body and soul.<sup>36</sup>

And the man that we are may serve us as an example. For with regard to him we comprehend two natures, one that of the soul and the other that of the body. However, although in subtle reflection we distinguish or in the imagination of the mind perceive a distinction, we still do not juxtapose the natures and do not allow in them the power of the separation to exhaust itself entirely, but we understand that they belong to a single unique being in such a way that from then on the two are no longer two, but through the two a single living being has been formed.<sup>37</sup>

33. See K.-H. Uthemann, 'Das anthropologische Modell der Hypostatischen Union. Ein Beitrag zu den philosophischen Voraussetzungen und zur innerchalkedonischen Transformation eines Paradigmas', *Kleronomia* 14 (1982), 215–312; F. Gahbauer, *Das anthropologische Modell. Ein Beitrag zur Christologie der frühen Kirche bis Chalkedon* = *ÖstChr* 35 (Würzburg, 1984), 348–419. K.-H. Uthemann, *Anastasi Smatae Viae Dux* = CCG 8 (Turnhout, Louvain 1981), 273–5; 277–8. On Severus, *ibid.*, 277, 55–66. Many ideas are furnished by R. A. Norris, 'Christological models in Cyril of Alexandria', in TU 116 (1975), 255–68; P. Stockmeier, 'Das anthropologische Modell der Spätantike und die Formel von Chalkedon', *AHC* 8 (1976), 40–52; *idem*, 'Die Entfaltung der Christologie und ihr Einfluß auf die Anthropologie der Spätantike', in H. P. Balmer et al. (eds), *Im Gespräch der Mensch* (Düsseldorf, 1981), 248–55.

34. See F. Gahbauer, *op. cit.*, 32–55 (Eusebius of Emesa); 348–419 (Cyril of Alexandria).

35. Severus Ant., *Philal.*, no. 42: CSCO 134 (V), 213f.

36. *Op. cit.*, p. 214, 6–12 = Cyril Alex., *Ep. 45 ad Succensum I*: PG 77, 233A.

37. *Ibid.*, p. 214, 14–23 = Cyril Alex., *Ep. 46 ad Succensum II*: PG 77, 245A. Some other passages on this: *Ep. ad Valent. ep. Icon. 4*: ACO I 1,3, p. 92, 15–21: 'As consequently the human being is one from body and soul, he [Christ] too is confessed in faith as one Son and Lord. For it is assumed that there is one *physis* and *systasis* of the human being, even if it is thought of (as coming from) different and differently formed natures. For, as one generally concedes, the body possesses another nature than the soul, but its specific nature contributes to completing the *hypostasis* of the one human being. The difference of the things named remains hidden neither

Although in these texts Cyril himself did not employ the *mia-physis* formula, but spoke only of the one Christ, Son and Lord, the Word become flesh, Severus comes expressly to this formula and as a result intensifies the text of Cyril.

For it is only because we examine in precise reflection the elements of which Emmanuel is constituted that we say that there are two natures that have been unified; by entertaining in our mind the idea of union we conclude that the *one single nature of the Word incarnate* has been formed. For the hypostatic union means these two things: that there has been a union of two or more realities to become one and the same thing, and that this from this time on no longer breaks up into them [the elements] which have naturally united, for they have united to become a single being. For in fact these elements which have naturally united no longer subsist in the isolation of their own subsistence, but are obviously in a *single nature and a single hypostasis*; they allow only the starting-point to appear from which the single being is constituted, because they have been united without mingling and thus escape division into two or more.<sup>38</sup>

Were we to take these texts together, then Cyril and Severus appear to see in the application of the body-soul comparison to 'Emmanuel' (= unity from God and human being) univocity and not an analogy. Anyway, in both cases the same result is arrived at: a substantial unity, a *ἐνωσις φυσική*, which at the same time remains an 'unmingled unity', a *ἐνωσις ἀσύγχυτος*.<sup>39</sup> But there are important texts in the same *Philalethes* in which this unity in both cases is still not placed on the same level. It is Cyril himself who in the *Scholia on the Incarnation of the Only-begotten*<sup>40</sup> differentiates more strongly. The question is to what extent Severus accepted this.

Cyril maintains that the 'business of the union' is enacted in various ways. Firstly he mentions the moral agreement, for example in the friendly reconciliation of people who were separated from each other in feeling and thought. Then there is unity in the natural domain between elements which are different from each other but are joined through (a) juxtaposition

in thought nor in knowledge. Their matching or coming together with inseparable character completes a living thing, the human being.' Cf. F. Gahbauer, *op. cit.*, 355, 358-60. Cyril uses the expression *σύστασις* for the unity of body and soul, as Plato previously, *Epinomis* 981A, whereby ensues 'one form and one living being'. Gahbauer refers to Athenagoras, *De resurr. cadaverum* 15, and Methodius, *De resurr.* 34 (here once again in connection with Plato, *loc. cit.*) *σύνθεσις* can also take the place of *σύστασις*.

38. Severus Ant., *Philal.*, no. 42, *Apologia*: CSCO 134 (V), p. 213, 15-31

39. On the early history of this terminology see H. Dörrie, *Porphyrus' 'Symmiktá Zetemata'* = Monograph. z. klass. Altertumswissensch. 20 (Munich, 1959), 166-225, L. Abramowski, 'ΣΥΝΑΦΕΙΑ und ΑΣΥΤΧΥΤΟΣ ΕΝΩΣΙΣ als Bezeichnung für trinitarische und christologische Einheit', in *eadem*, *Drei christologische Untersuchungen* (Berlin, New York, 1981), 63-109.

40. Cyril Alex., *Scholia de incarn. Unig.* (CPG 5225): PG 75, 1376C-1377B = ACO I 5, 1, pp. 220, 13-221, 6 = Hespel, *Le Florilège Cyrillien*, no. 99, pp. 153f. On this see M. Richard, 'Le pape saint Léon le Grand et les "Scholia de incarnatione Unigeniti" de saint Cyrille d'Alexandrie', *RSR* 40 (1951/52), 116-28 = *Op. Min.* II, no. 53.

(*παράθεσις*), (b) mixing (*μίξις*), and (c) blending (*κρᾶσις*). *Parathesis* remains a purely external union which Cyril identifies with the *synapheia* of Nestorius.<sup>41</sup> It exists, for example, in the purely moral bond between Peter and John. Admittedly, *per se* the becoming one of the Logos of God and our nature transcends human conceptualization. It does not conform to any of the mentioned processes of joining; rather it is inexpressible and beyond the knowledge of all created being. Even the union of body and soul in us ourselves transcends our intellect. If we have to work with comparisons in order, with the help of lower realities, in some way to bring utterly subtle things close to our conceptualization, then Cyril believed that he was able to have recourse to this *unity of body and soul*, although even it remained utterly inadequate. Nevertheless this comparison does express some aspects: 'For the soul appropriates everything that belongs to the body, although in its own nature it is saved both from the passions which are natural (to the body) as well as those that come from without. The body in fact is driven by natural desires and the soul feels these with it on account of the unity with it, without of course itself participating with it in any way in these' (pp. 261, 31-262, 1). The soul certainly feels pain with its tormented body because it is its body, 'but it itself in its own nature need endure nothing of that which affects it [the body]' (*ibid.*, p. 262, 5-7).

There is still more to say concerning the *unity of Emmanuel*. He has a soul that is united to him; this has consciousness of the suffering of the body so that it bows docile before God, although it itself is spared the blows. The soul is thus united to the body and yet distanced from it. This holds even more of the divine Logos *vis-à-vis* his human nature. He has full power over the weaknesses of the body and can suspend these. But he makes them his own because it is precisely his body which suffers.

Cyril is thus conscious of the analogy which prevails between the unity of body and soul in human beings and between godhead and ensouled body in Emmanuel. In the *apologia* to no. 99 of the *FlorCyr* Severus does not examine this critique of the body-soul comparison in Cyril. He emphasizes only the one point which his master also holds on to: as the unity of body and soul is a substantial unity, so also is the unity of Emmanuel a 'hypostatic unity', not simply a moral relationship, such as that of friendship, of pleasure, of agreement in will, of equality in status and power — as Nestorius proposes! But, according to Cyril and Severus, in what does the 'substantiality' of this unity subsist? In terms of effect both cases are the same in that there is a single concrete existence which Cyril and Severus characterize as a single *physis*, *hypostasis*. Is this same result, however, also arrived at in both cases in the same way? Is the way in which union happens the same in 'Emmanuel' as in human beings? Cyril allows us a certain insight into his understanding through the introduction of the concept *ιδιος* (*ιδία σὰρξ*, *ιδιον ὄψωμα*), thus of the relationship of ownership which prevails between their components in Emmanuel and in human beings. The body, and consequently also all the affections of the body, the Logos makes his own in the strong

41. In the Syriac translation of the *FlorCyr* in the *Philalethes* the latter two Greek expressions are rendered as follows (CSCO 133, p. 320,3): *mixis*: *ḥūlṭono*, *krasis*: *mawzogo*. Cf. I. R. Torrance, *op. cit.*, 249, Appendix C.

sense of the word (*ἰδιοποιεῖν*), as is stated at the end of no. 99 of the *FlorCyr* (CSCO 134, p. 262, 14–15). We shall quote a few other passages from Cyril.<sup>42</sup>

That is why we say that the body was the possession of the Logos, not of any other man separate from him who was conceived as Christ and Son. As one says, however, that the body of each individual belongs to his person, so one must also think about Christ.<sup>43</sup>

For when Christ says: 'I will raise him up', he has the capability of raising up those who have fallen asleep, not only wrapped in his own flesh but being in unity with his own flesh does the God-Logos in him say 'I', and this perfectly justifiably. For Christ is not cut into a duality, nor ought anyone think that the body of the Once-born is foreign to him as also, so far as I know, no one would claim that the body is foreign to our soul.<sup>44</sup>

And as well one must also consider that. The divinity is one thing and our human nature is also something different, at least according to the mode which is in the natures, but in the union which occurs according to true unity there is a single Christ from both, as we have frequently said. But if the *hypostases*, as you [Nestorius] say, are separated and thought of as existing each for itself, how then could the unity amount to one person, if one does not presuppose that the one belongs to the other, as one also thinks of the soul of the human being as the possession of its body, although it possesses a nature different from this? For certainly there is no doubt that body and soul are not the same.<sup>45</sup>

Cyril is thus prepared even in the discussion with Nestorius to concede certain limitations in the interpretation of the body-soul analogy and its application to Christ as the connection of God and human being. One should not be led astray by expressions like 'physical union'. One has to attempt to determine more closely his notions of that. We can approach that only gradually. Let us return to the concept of possession or the relationship of ownership which prevails between body and soul in human beings and between divinity and humanity in Christ. Cyril can make the latter understandable more easily than the relationship of possession between body and soul. For he can call upon the creative power of the Logos to explain his appropriation of the body. What is created is the possession of the one creating, the creator.

Already in the *Thesaurus*, an early writing, Cyril comes to speak of this, and in his disputation with the Arians and their interpretation of Prov 8,22: 'Yahweh created me when his purpose first unfolded, before the oldest of his works' (PG 75, 253C–292A). Here we can presuppose the history of the interpretation of this verse (see CCT I<sup>2</sup>, Index for Prov 8,22). While the Arians refer the being created to the Pre-existent, it is interpreted by the Nicenes as referring to the humanity of Christ: 'He is begotten by the Father before the ages, as he says; but he is created as human, as he became flesh for our sakes, as the evangelist says' (PG 75, 280C).

42. Cf. F. Gahbauer, *Das anthropologische Modell*, 348–54.

43. Cyril Alex., *Apolog. c. Orient.* 96: ACO I. 5, p. 137,24–28; F. Gahbauer, *op. cit.*, 349.

44. Cyril Alex., *In Ioannem lib. X., cap. II*: Pusey, *In D. Io. Ev. II*, p. 543,20–7; F. Gahbauer, *op. cit.*, 348f.

45. Cyril Alex., *C. Nestor.* III 6: ACO I. 1, 6, p. 73,1–8; F. Gahbauer, *op. cit.*, 353.

From this being created arises immediately the relationship of possession between the Logos and the humanity united to him. Cyril establishes this connection explicitly: 'He [the Logos] states of himself that he is created, on the basis of the creation of the body, although he is by reason of his nature uncreated. Because the flesh belongs indeed to him and not to another, he can call that his own whatever happens to this (flesh) [namely being created]' (PG 75, 281C).

One should not pass over such argumentation too quickly. The reference to the creator-creature relationship for divinity and humanity in Christ relates christology to the biblical teaching of creation (as is particularly clear right at the beginning of his comments on Prov 8,22 [PG 75, 280BC]). Only the creative power of God and the Logos can realize anything like the incarnation. Consequently also the depth of relationship of possession between humanity and divinity of Christ is of a completely different proportion from that in the body-soul relationship of the human being. In Christ it is a question of the appropriation of a created nature by the uncreated Logos. Precisely because of this infinite distance the *FlorCyr* (no. 203) cites our passage from Cyril's *Thesaurus* to demonstrate the continuation of the two natures even after the union. Severus examines this. But while the excerptor emphasizes from this the distinction of the two natures, Severus in his *apologia* on this places the accent on the unity in the difference.

We call the same one created and mortal according to the flesh, uncreated and immortal according to the godhead. In fact it is the characteristic of the flesh on account of its nature to die and to be created. We do not deprive the Logos, however, of these things, this being because of the union, wherefore we can say of him that he had been created and died, while on account of his nature he is uncreated and immortal.<sup>46</sup>

The special feature of this God-human unity was already strongly underscored by Severus in the introduction to the *Philalethes*: the flesh had not been created in the first place for itself independent of the union with the Logos, but 'it had been constituted *for him* without ever being separated from him; in its being constituted and in its becoming reality the created flesh had already been united to the Word who was before the ages and uncreated, up to the point that we distinguish from him, only through a (mental) trick, the human things and speak of the two natures of the single Christ'.<sup>47</sup>

Whether consciously or unconsciously, in this way an Augustinian idea is taken up which excludes any temporal distinction between creation and assumption of the humanity by the Word.<sup>48</sup> The assumption of the human nature of Christ happened in the act and at the time of its creation. With this reference to the *henosis* as the creative act, the foundation for the relationship of ownership has been given without there necessarily having to be an ontological doctrine of *henosis* submitted as well. In this way the act of union is grasped at the same time as personal event, and thus removed from the domain of material-physical mixing. Thus the integration into the doctrine of creation signifies a correction to the application of the Greek teaching of mixture to the union of God and human being in Christ.

Such a creative activity, as it is seen at work in the explication of the 'appropriation' of the human nature by the Logos, naturally cannot be accepted where it is a question of the relationship of ownership between soul and body. The former is not the creator of the material part of the human being. If the soul possesses this as its own, then this occurs

46. See Severus Ant., *Philal.* on *FlorCyr*, no. 203, *Apologia*: CSCO 134 (V), p. 283,25-31.

47. *Idem*, *Philal.* on the two-natures formula: CSCO 134 (V), p. 108,8-14; *JdChr* I<sup>3</sup>, 771; not in CCT I<sup>2</sup>.

48. More information in A. Grillmeier, *loc. cit.* (n. 47).

because it has been given to the soul by the transcendent creator. For Cyril and for all *Christian* advocates of the body-soul analogy this is a self-evident presupposition.<sup>49</sup> It is for this reason too that the difference in the relationship of ownership is not analysed in the two *analogata*. There is also no reflection on the fact that in both cases the 'possession' is very different. Thus it was used only to establish that Logos-body and soul-body form a substantial unity. The body-soul unity can be for that reason a help to understanding the unity of God and a human being in Christ. It should, however, have been necessary to clarify to what extent this analogy held up in general.

(ii) *Burning thornbush (Ex 3,2-3) and glowing coal (Is 6,6-7)*

These images too are already familiar to us. Their employment transcends party boundaries.<sup>50</sup> While the second image emphasizes only the reciprocal penetration, that is, the becoming one, the first stresses as well the unmingledness in becoming one, or rather the imperishability: the thornbush is not consumed. Thus we have an 'unmingled unity', represented, however, in physical processes. With this we return to the Stoic *krasis*. Nevertheless the materialism of the Stoics has to be excluded. The Neoplatonists emphasized this in their taking over of physical images to explain the 'unmingled unity' of body and soul. Two things may not be taken over: (1) a *synchysis*, understood as the erasure of previous characteristics; (2) the *συμφθαρῆναι*, which means the doctrine of the mutual spoiling or erasure of soul and body as such.<sup>51</sup> What is still reminiscent of the Stoic teaching of *krasis* in the comparisons mentioned was, however, still very different from it and led well beyond Stoic materialism, independent 'of all notions of space, place, materiality'.<sup>52</sup> In Christ it is still a matter of *perichoresis*, the unmingled penetrating/permeating of the 'incorporeal Logos' in the spiritual-bodily human nature.

49. This is treated under the theme of the pre-existence of souls. See C. Dratsellas, *The Problem of pre-existence of souls in St. Cyril of Alexandria*, offprint from ΠΟΝΗΜΑ ΕΥΤΥΝΟΜΟΝ = FS B. M. Vellas (Athens, 1968), where there is an overview of the various positions adopted by the Fathers with regard to the pre-existence of souls, from Origen to its clarification in the Origenists' strife under Emperor Justinian; especially, however, with regard to Cyril's teaching. On the theory of the pre-existence of souls in Origen (especially in *De princip.* [CPG 1482]: H. Crouzel/M. Simonetti, SC 252 [Paris, 1978]), cf. H. Crouzel, *Théologie de l'image de Dieu chez Origène* (Paris, 1955), 130-3: L'anthropologie d'Origène.

50. See *JdChr* 1<sup>3</sup>, 722-6; *CCT* 1<sup>2</sup>, 515-19.

51. Explained in more detail in H. Dörrie, *Porphyrios' 'Symmiketa Zetemata'* (Munich, 1959), 173.

52. L. Abramowski, *art. cit.* (above n. 39), 70, n. 30.

Because, however, physical processes had been chosen or could have been chosen at all as the starting-point of the comparison, so now also 'direct language' must be assigned a rôle in the interpretation of the incarnation, just as in their body-soul teaching among the Neoplatonists. Here we come to the terminology of mixing. We shall enquire briefly about the position of Severus, as interpreter of Cyril, in the use of such language.

(b) *Direct, conceptually demarcated language*

The linguistic problem is centred on the concept of 'unmingled unity' (*ἀσύγχυτος ἕνωσις*) in its application to christology. With this term the result of the union is indicated. But if one wants to know what conception of oneness is associated with this, then one must specify the act of union and investigate its terminology, and here the verbs of 'mixing' play a special rôle.

The philosophers have already played out the problem and distinguished various levels of *henosis* according to the assumed types of mixing. The lowest level is the *παράθεσις*, the *iuxtapositio*, the simple one beside the other in external contact. Then follow *μῆξις* (Hespel: *combinaison*, combination) and *κρᾶσις* (Hespel: *mélange*, blending).<sup>53</sup> *Parathesis* exists in a collection of individual things of the same type (a heap of grain) from which the individual grain can easily be taken out. *Mixis* is realized when qualities thought to be corporeal permeate the bodies to be united. Examples of this are fire in iron and light in the air. The Stoic Chrysippus applied this *mixis* concept to the relationship of soul and body. *Krasis* is mingling with partial weakening of the original qualities. An example is the pouring together of fluids which, for instance, produce perfume. A separation is only possible with special means. *Synchysis* is the most intense degree of union. From two material elements there results a third with completely new qualities. Examples are medicines. This is a step towards 'distinguishing in the sense of modern chemistry compounds from mixtures'.<sup>54</sup> A separation into the component parts is no longer possible.

In the *Scholia de incarnatione unigeniti* Cyril takes up this terminology; *FlorCyr* no. 99 reproduces an extensive extract from this.<sup>55</sup>

53 Cf H Dörrie, *op cit*, 25-7, L Abramowski, *art cit*, 79f

54 Cf H Dörrie, *op cit*, 26f

55 *FlorCyr*, no 99 from Cyril Alex, *Scholia de incarn Unig cap VIII* PG 75, 1376C-1377B, ACO I, 5, 1a, pp 220,13-221,6 Severus Ant, *Philal* no 99 CSCO 134, 261f



After he has spoken of the union on the inter-human moral level, he proceeds to the connection of things in nature and names the three grades just mentioned *parathesis*, *mixis*, *krasis*. Then he immediately excludes the possibility that one of these three grades could be applied to the God-human unity in Christ. In this way Cyril in the *Scholia* allows only the general term *henosis* to apply. For the application to anthropology and christology he demands that there be both an 'unmingled' as well as a 'substantial' unity. Cyril has become very circumspect with regard to comparisons. He no longer finds in the creaturely domain any appropriate and adequate model for the union.<sup>56</sup> Consequently the Patriarch rejects in this writing, certainly composed after the Union of 433, all the terms apart from *henosis* to characterize the substantial and unmingled unity demanded for christology — *mixis*, *krasis*, but also *synapheia*. The last can express only a moral connection.<sup>57</sup> For the divine-human unity in Christ does not result from the 'assumption' of a human being already previously existing (*homo assumptus*). It is to be understood rather as a process of becoming which proceeds from the Logos as Logos, the subject in his 'own nature' — as John 1,14 demands.<sup>58</sup>

In this way the Patriarch disclaims all philosophical *henosis* terminology as this corresponds to the character of the letter composed only after the Nestorian struggle, and sent to Rome in Greek and Latin.<sup>59</sup> Hence we must assume that in the question of the applicability of philosophical terminology to christology Cyril has become more moderate. Remarkably, however, the *FlorCyr* exploited also older writings of the Patriarch, which were composed before the Nestorian controversy, and made them useful for its purpose of supporting the two-natures doctrine of Chalcedon. For in these there also appears a greater emphasis on philosophy and its conceptual language, also with regard to terms which Cyril in the struggle with Nestorius would reject. What is particularly important for the excerptor is this: as a consequence the reality of the two natures is so nonchalantly emphasized that Severus is clearly in a predicament. It concerns two quite large series of excerpts from the *Thesaurus* written about 412 and from the writing against the *Synousiasts*, a radical group of Apollinarians. In the *Thesaurus* Cyril argues with the

56 *FlorCyr*, no 99 Hespel, *Le Florilège Cyrillien*, p 153,10-12 ἀπόρρητος δὲ παντελῶς καὶ οὐδενὶ που τάχα τῶν ὄντων διεγνωσμένος πλὴν ὅτι δὴ μόνῳ τῷ πάντα εἰδῶτι

57 Cf Cyril Alex, *Scholia de incarn Unig cap XIII* PG 75, 1385A 'Also we investigate and wish to learn what it means then to be incarnate and that God's Word has become a human being, we see that it does not mean assuming a human being as in a uniting in the equality of dignity or of authority, or only in an homonymous sonship, rather, according to us it is a question of becoming human, yet admittedly so that no alteration or transformation occurs

' This text is not included in the *FlorCyr*. Cf the text of nos 103-4 Hespel, *op cit*, 156f

58 Cf on this especially *Scholia, cap XXV* PG 75, 1396B-1399B, where the necessary demarcations for this becoming are made, particularly 1397B. On this text see M. Richard, *Le pape saint Léon le Grand et les Scholia de incarnatione Unigeniti de saint Cyrille d'Alexandrie*, in *Op Min II*, no 53 (116-28), 118. Severus comments on this text in *C. imp Gram III* 35 Lebon, CSCO 102 (V), 154f

59 M. Richard, *art cit*, 121-8

Arians,<sup>60</sup> thus defending the unity of the Logos with the Father on the basis of the one nature; in the other writing he has to emphasize the completeness of the humanity in Christ. In all passages the discussion is dependent on 1 Timothy 2,5 — 'the mediator between God and humankind'. Against the Arians, in the foreground stands the 'union' with the Father; against the Synousiasts,<sup>61</sup> it is the unity with us humans. Hence it is certainly a question of the terminology of union, not, however, immediately with regard to the one Christ, but rather to his twofold unity with God and with us. It is clear that in this way too the 'one' Christ himself comes into focus, as Severus, basing himself on the concept of mediator, rightly says:

For because He is mediator between God and humankind, and out of two natures, namely godhead and manhood, He is one Emmanuel, thus He has reconciled to the Father who is in heaven human nature, that is, the whole race of human beings (Severus Ant, *Or 1 ad Nephth* CSCO 120 (V), p 35,18–21)

(1) *Thesaurus*, ass XV

*FlorCyr*, no 205 Hespel, 197, PG 75, 284B

If the Logos of God, according to you, you discoverer of all godlessness, is a creature (*κτίσμα*), how are we through union with him (*συναφθέντες αὐτῷ*) joined to God (*κολλώμεθα*, lit stuck on) and (thus) divinized? How is Christ mediator between God and humankind? He adheres to us (*ἀπτεται ἡμῶν*) as a human being. But if he is a creature and not God, how can he adhere (*ἀψεται*) to God? What manner of adhering is there in him? Things that are different according to their essence (*ἀνόμοια κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν*) must not adhere to each other in a physical way (*οὐκ ἂν ἀλλήλοις φυσικῶς συναφθῇ ποτέ*)

(2) *C Synousiastas*

*FlorCyr*, no 80 Hespel, 143,25–144,10, Pusey, 482–483,18

[cit 1 Tim 2,5–6] As the same he mediates at once God and humankind by reconciling us to the God and Father through himself and in himself, and he joins (*συνείρων*, *conserere*, adds) into a unity (*εἰς ἑνωσιν*) that which on account of its nature in unmeasurable distance (*διαφορά*) was brought to otherness (*πρὸς ἑτερότητα*). In Christ it runs together to an unmingled and inseparable unity (*συνδεδραμηκότα πρὸς ἑνωσιν ἀσύγχυτόν τε καὶ ἀδιάσπαστον*). In godhead he adheres namely to the Father (*σύνηπται θεικῶς*), but he also adheres to us as a human being (*συνήφθη δὲ καὶ ἡμῖν ἀνθρωπίνως*). But if his flesh is really damnable (i.e. it must be thrown off him), as he [the Synousiast] says, he is wholly distant from mediating between us and his Father.

(3) *Thesaurus*, ass XXXII

*FlorCyr*, no 228 Hespel, 206–207, PG 75, 504AC

[cit 1 Tim 2,5] If Jesus the Christ, mediator between God and humankind, does not physically (*φύσει*) and essentially (*οὐσιωδῶς*) be together with God and human beings, but

60 Cf J Liébaert, *La doctrine christologique de saint Cyrille d'Alexandrie avant la querelle nestorienne* (Lille, 1951), cf *JdChr* I<sup>3</sup>, 605–9, *CCT* I<sup>2</sup>, 414–17. See chs 22–24 and 28 of the *Thesaurus*.

61 Severus Ant, *Or 1 ad Nephthum* CSCO 120 (V), p 4,25–27. Synousiasts are 'people who have mingled the flesh of the Lord with the divinity and foolishly said it was transformed into the substance of God'.

only joins (*συνάπτων*) in friendship that which is far from reciprocal communion (*κοινωνίας*), namely humanity and divinity, how can Paul call him *one*? (Moses and Jeremiah and the prophets were also mediators) How was the *one* Christ mediator, if there were not something foreign (*τί ξένον*) in him? But he is one as Paul says in accordance with the truth, indeed foreign (*ξένος*) and unlike the others. Hence as that which lies in the middle between two in fact touches both with its own extremes and holds what is separated together in unity (*τοῖς ἰσίοις ἀκροῖς ἐφάπτεται, συνέχον εἰς ἐνότητα τὰ διηρημένα*), and Christ is the mediator between God and human beings, so it is clear that he is by nature united (*ἀπτεται φυσικῶς*) to God as God, but to human beings as a human being. He is namely our peace (Eph 2,14) and binds human nature on account of his likeness to us into unity and communion with the divine being.

The three texts are closely related to each other, and this from various viewpoints. (1) They all begin from the mediator text of 1 Timothy (2) The primary intention of the three texts is not to interpret the unity of Christ in himself, thus not with the question of how Christ is one in himself; rather the theme is unity with the Father and union with us, because both are endangered by contrary heresies. If one professes the Arian denial of the godhead of Christ, our union with God is destroyed because our mediator would be united with God only in the manner of a creature, that is, he thus remains estranged and distant from God. If one follows the Synousiasts, there is no true union with us because they do not take seriously the reality of the body of Christ. Strangely there is no reference to the fact that the Apollinarians, the ancestors of the Synousiasts, maintained that Christ had no soul and thus surrendered as well a communion in essence between Christ and us. But if in contrast one professes the true divinity and true humanity of Christ, whose substantial unity is here presupposed and not drawn into focus, then the nature of Christ as mediator, according to 1 Timothy 2, is fulfilled in its entire breadth and in its significance for salvation (3) The three texts belong to a physical doctrine of redemption which is grounded completely ontologically. The being of Christ decides our communion with God. The surrender of Christ in his human freedom does not enter the picture.

On the basis of this formulation of the question the three texts are most opportune in many respects for the excerptor of the *FlorCyr*

(1) The distinction of the natures in Christ is strongly emphasized, this is particularly the case in text 2, no. 80. The distance between divinity and humanity in Christ, their *diaphora*, is immeasurable. If the incarnation is taken seriously, then it leads to otherness (*ἐτερότης*)<sup>62</sup>

62 On this concept see W. Beierwaltes, 'Andersheit Grundriß einer neuplatonischen Begriffsgeschichte', *ABG* 16 (1972), 166-97, *idem*, *Proklos, Grundzüge seiner Metaphysik* (Frankfurt, 1979), 310-13 with n 33. Here 'otherness' is brought into connection with

Cyril speaks outrightly of a movement which takes place between two poles, from the godhead to the true and whole human being. He calls them *ἄκρα*, the furthest points, extremes that stand opposite each other as contraries, and hence as foreign (*ξένον*) (cf. texts 2 and 3), indeed as 'separate' (text 3). One can hardly depict the *diaphora*, the difference of the natures, more strongly. The redemptive act of Christ now resides in the fact that these poles are brought together; this happened precisely in the person of the mediator. Here the three texts agree in a new regard, namely (2) in the choice of the terms with which the becoming one is signified. First, it is still to be noted that Cyril is arguing here soteriologically and not christologically: the two poles which are now to be joined in the mediator are God and humanity, the total humanity. The event of union, insofar as it had taken place in Christ himself, moves to the background; but it is necessarily presupposed and implied. This is now described with a complex of words which for the later Cyril would be nothing short of questionable, namely with verbs of the stem *ἄπτω*, *συνάπτω*, *ἐφάπτω* — to stick, to adhere, to fasten. In addition there are some synonyms such as 'to stick on', 'to join', 'to hold together' (cf. texts 1 and 3). That leads of course to the 'physical *koinonia*' of realities which are properly 'according to their essence unlike', thus indeed are not *homousia* (cf. text 1). There is no doubt that now the true unity of God and humanity is established. In Cyril's sense this is the case only because in employing the *synapheia* terminology his starting-point is an older tradition. This concept is in fact in an old tradition a synonym for *henosis*, or rather *συνάφεια* is recognized as *τρόπος ἐνώσεως* or the way to unmingled unity, *ἀσύγχυτος ἔνωσις*. The most important witnesses for this are found in the Latin West. Namely Tertullian and Novatian describe the 'unmingled unity' unhesitatingly with the words *coniungere*, *cohaerere*; this happens in both trinitarian doctrine and in christology.<sup>63</sup> Also in Ambrose there appears 'a trace of the equation *συνάπτω-ἐνώω*'.<sup>64</sup> The Antiochenes are thus not the discoverers of the christological *synapheia* terminology, but rather its

middle-being and the mediator Christ. See also *idem*, *Denken des Einen. Studien zur neuplatonischen Philosophie und ihrer Wirkungsgeschichte* (Frankfurt, 1985). For the history of the subsequent influence of this philosophy Beierwaltes mentions Ps. Dionysius and John Scotus Eriugena. See *idem*, *Proklos*, Index. We shall discuss later the significance of Cyril for Ps. Dionysius expressly. Of interest is the combination in Proclus of the two words so important for Cyril, *ἐτερότης* and *συνάντην*: *Theologia Platonica* IV 28: Saffrey-Westerink (Paris, 1981), 81,8.

63. See L. Abramowski, *art. cit.* (above n. 39), 80-93.

64. *Ibid.*, 89; Ambros., *De fide ad Grat.* I 9: CSEL 78, 61.

defenders. With it, however, they intend more than a purely accidental or moral unity.

Thus one could undisputedly denote an 'unmingled unity' (*ἀσύγχυτος ἔνωσις*) in Christ or also in the Trinity as *synapheia*. For this one does not at all need auxiliary notions as these were tied to the words for 'mixture' (*μίξις, κράσις*); they could even be excluded because one was so sure of the expressiveness of *synapheia* in relationship to the *henosis* of God and humanity in Christ (thus Tertullian, Basil, Ambrose, and in their way also the Antiochenes, and even Nestorius). An extended version of 'unmingled unity', however, could also incorporate *mixis* and *kraasis* (Augustine, Novatian).<sup>65</sup> Cyril was admittedly more and more allergic to the use of 'mixture words'<sup>66</sup> although he conceded: 'Some Fathers have also employed nouns of mixing (*τῆς κράσεως ὄνομα*).'<sup>67</sup> But as Cyril excluded the vocabulary of mixture, so he also finally decided against the *synapheia* group and returned to the term *henosis*.<sup>68</sup>

### *The reaction of Severus of Antioch*

It is immediately striking that the Patriarch does not comment on any of the excerpts nos. 80, 205, 228 of the *FlorCyr*. He passes over all of the excerpts from the text *Contra Synousiastas*, which comprise nos. 76–90 in

65. L. Abramowski, *art. cit.*, 93f. Severus too refers to a few Fathers with such a terminology of mixing: for example, to Ps. Julian (Apollinarian forgery!), to Cyril with a passage that proves little. Cf. *Or. 1 ad Nephaliū*: CSCO 120 (V), pp. 44,34–45,10. More interesting is his reference to Greg. Naz., *Ep. ad Cledonium I*: PG 37, 184BC, where Gregory applies the terminology of mixing to the combination of spiritual, incorporeal and inseparable natures either with each other or with corporeal natures, within which the incarnation can be understood. Severus cites this passage in the *Or. 1 ad Nephaliū*: CSCO 120 (V), p. 27,2–19, and praises Gregory greatly on account of it: 'See how lucidly he shows how the incorporeal is united unmingled and unseparated to the body, and yet suffers no mixing (*confusio*) which occurs in the case of mixing together with transformation: that is the property, namely, of fluid bodies that flow together and are mingled with an influence each on the other (*ex mutua implicatione*) and lose their own nature.'

66. Cf. Cyril Alex., according to the *FlorCyr*, nos 12, 35 and 99.

67. Cyril Alex., *Adv. Nestor. I*: PG 76, 33B, quoted by Severus Ant., *Ep. 2 ad Sergium*: CSCO 120 (V), pp. 84,20–85,15; cf. pp. 61,35–62,2. According to Severus the Fathers used such expressions, 'because they wanted to express the highest degree of unity of things uniting'. Cf. also Severus Ant., *Ep. ad Oecumen.*: PO 12, 179f. He censured the misuse of such terminology in the alteration with Sergius (see below).

68. Cyril Alex., *Scholia, cap. XIII*: PG 75, 1385A; particularly clear in *Apol. c. Theodoret. pro XII cap., anath. X*: PG 76, 445B: the Antiochenes would only confess the *henosis* for the purpose of deception; in reality, however, they would proclaim an external *synapheia* of relationship, as this is common among human beings. In spite of the *henosis*, as Cyril professes it, the difference (*diaphora*) of the natures, however, remains preserved (*Scholia, loc. cit.*: PG 75, 1385BC). In order to bring the strict unity in Christ to expression, Cyril has recourse to the schema of becoming which speaks of the 'economic' assumption of flesh and blood (1385A). On this model see R. A. Norris, 'Christological Models in Cyril of Alexandria', in *TU* 116 (1975) (255–68), 259ff.

the florilegium.<sup>69</sup> He dismisses the texts from the *Thesaurus* less radically. But even then he has nothing to say with regard to no. 205.<sup>70</sup> He appears embarrassed that the older Cyril delivered such weapons to the Chalcedonians by stressing so much the difference, the otherness, the strangeness of divinity and humanity, also in reference to the one Christ, and on the other hand by depicting the 'unity' with the vocabulary of *synapheia* which was so dubious. Furthermore, there is not a single reference to the *mia physis*, although — most annoying with regard to the Chalcedonians — it is conceded that the *synapheia* can effect a physical union, and hence there is nothing missing in the 'unmingled unity'.

Through the *FlorCyr* Severus had stumbled upon the fact that christological language had a greater breadth than he was happy with in the battle against Chalcedon. He reacted resolutely to the embarrassing declarations of Cyril's excerptors with the demand for a purification of language which should thrust into the background and exclude from further use all words and formulas of earlier Fathers, but especially Cyril himself, which could speak for the acceptance of a 'duality' in Christ. We observe this reaction of Severus both in the discussion of the *FlorCyr* and as well as with his next opponent, who will challenge him still more strongly than a purposeful selection from Cyril, namely the presbyter and grammarian, John of Caesarea. On top of that came the short controversy with the amateur theologian Sergius, where again it became necessary to eliminate the linguistic terminological stumbling-blocks from the inheritance of Cyril. In this case, from the compilers' point of view they were on the opposite side of the street. It was not a question, that is to say, of liquidating the final remains of the christology of separation, but of misunderstandings which resulted from the use of the words 'mixture' and 'mixing' and synonyms. Hence it will be possible to describe Severus' work of purifying language in its final completeness only after unfolding the further controversies.

69 Cf Severus Ant, *Philal*, on nos 76–90 CSCO 134 (V), 250f His comment 'Dans les chapitres qui suivent celui-ci [sc, no. 75] jusqu'au quatre-vingt-dixième, l'adversaire a perdu de vue qu'il frappait dans l'air et luttait en vain'

70 See Severus Ant, *Philal*, where there is a hiatus between no 204 and no 221, cf R. Hespel, CSCO 134 (V), 285 Also with regard to John of Caesarea, Severus is annoyed by his adducing evidence of the fact that Fathers have used the word *synapheia* Cf Richard, *Iohannis Caesariensis Opera* = CCG 1, p 24,526–532

### III SEVERUS OF ANTIOCH AND THE THEOLOGY OF MEDIATION OF NEO-CHALCEDONIANISM

The Cyrillian florilegium signified a new highly organized attempt to construct a bridge between Chalcedon and Alexandria, this occurring simply through the confrontation of purposefully selected texts from Cyril with the definition of 451, in particular with the two-natures formula. The excerpts were intended to speak for themselves and to be intrinsically effective. They presuppose a benevolent reader which Severus, however, was not prepared to be. He did not even get involved in attempts where such texts were subjected to the necessary analysis and interpretation. The two names Nephalius and John the Grammarian show us this. Unfortunately their works are preserved only in extracts for which, for the great part, we are indebted to the critic Severus.

#### 1. Nephalius: from monophysite to supporter of Chalcedon

Nephalius<sup>71</sup> seemed to live for conflict and opposition: at first the opponent of his Patriarch Peter Mongus in Alexandria, he found a new adversary in Palestine, where he emigrated after not having been accepted by the clergy of Egypt. But just as quickly this zealot created a disturbance in the friendly atmosphere of this patriarchate. No doubt with the agreement of Patriarch Elias (494–516),<sup>72</sup> he began where the strongest fortress of the opponents of Chalcedon was, with the successors of the great Peter the Iberian and the monasteries around Majuma near Gaza. He secured for himself the support of the clergy of the individual towns.<sup>73</sup> The debate began certainly on the intellectual level in public discussions which were intended to serve the defence of Chalcedon. This may have led to the written version of a speech on the two natures in Christ which

71 See the literature mentioned above, n 8, in addition, S. Helmer, *Der Neuchalkedonismus Geschichte, Berechtigung und Bedeutung eines dogmengeschichtlichen Begriffes* (Diss. Bonn, 1962), P. T. R. Gray, *The Defense of Chalcedon in the East (451–553)* = *Studies in the History of Christian Thought* XX (Leiden, 1979) 105–11, *idem*, 'Neo-Chalcedonianism and the Tradition from Patristic to Byzantine Theology', *ByzF* 8 (1982), 61–70, L. Perrone, *La chiesa di Palestina* (1980), 148–151, A. Grillmeier, 'Das östliche und westliche Christusbild', *TheolPhil* 59 (1984), 84–96 (on P. T. R. Gray) The ideas of Nephalius can be derived with some effort from Severus Ant., *Or 1 et 2 ad Nephalius*, edited and translated by Lebon in CSCO 119 (T), 1–69, 120 (V), 1–50, in addition Zacharias Rh., *Vita Severi* PO 2, 102–4, John of Beth Aphthonia (BHO 1061, CPG 7527), PO 2, 231–3

72 Cf. E. Schwartz, *Kynilos von Skythopolis* = TU 49,2 (Leipzig, 1939), 377f. Elias is said to have betrayed the spirit of union of Martyrius

73 Zacharias Rh., *Vita Severi* PO 2, 103,9–13

was circulated. This *apologia* and the violent course of action of this new supporter of Chalcedon against the monks around Majuma challenged the leading figure among them, Severus, to respond. We possess — sadly, not completely — his two addresses to Nephalius.<sup>74</sup>

The new apologist of the 'two natures' was not blind to certain, as he expressed it, apologetically determined strong statements of the Council. The Fathers of 451, in accordance with the manner of combating heretics, here used 'somewhat large words' (*melē abyāṭā*)<sup>75</sup> to tear out by the roots the docetism of Eutyches and to plant pure doctrine in its place. As a former radical Cyrillian, Nephalius also no doubt felt that with regard to Chalcedon the idea of the unity in Christ *vis-à-vis* the distinction of the two natures, intended to stress the truth of the incarnation, should have been more strongly safeguarded. The objection that the Council favoured Nestorius suggested itself to him. But despite this public criticism Nephalius placed himself entirely in the service of the Council, and this in two ways: (a) through the florilegium which substantiated the formula of Chalcedon with patristic authorities;<sup>76</sup> and (b) through an expansion of this formula with a few additions intended to support it. Both were a contribution to the spirit of the tradition, to a continuation of the new interpretation of Chalcedon.

(a) We can pass over the individual *patristic passages*. For Severus it was settled that a patristic proof for 'two natures' could not be provided. Of course he conceded that the reality of divinity and humanity in Christ, the latter expressed through the *incarnata* of the *una natura* formula, continues to remain unmingled. Thus the 'two natures' are also in Cyril within easy reach, as the large *FlorCyr* indeed wanted to prove to us. But here Severus remained the staunch traditionalist: the great master Cyril had never formally applied 'two' to Christ, and this was the gospel for his pupil.<sup>77</sup> His altercation with John the Grammarian

74 The title used by Severus reads not 'against' but 'to' Nephalius, which he himself comments on towards the end of *Or 1* 'That, however, is written by us to Christians for the purpose of defence, not as an attack (*antilogia*)' CSCO 120, p 7,18-19

75 Cf Severus Ant, *Or 1 ad Neph* CSCO 119, p 3,24, 120, p 3,10-19 According to Lebon, 121, the Greek expression was perhaps *παχυμερής*

76 The entire dossier of Fathers can no longer be ascertained From the *Or 2* of Severus we know that the following were adduced by Nephalius as authorities Gregory Nazianzen (CSCO 120, 31-32), Proclus of Constantinople (*ibid*, 33, 14ff), John Chrysostom (*ibid*, 34-35) and previously Cyril of Alexandria (*ibid*, 15,31-33, 22,25-23,12, a further passage from Cyril is cited in n 77) Severus replies as well with patristic authorities (35-36) and then adds a longer florilegium (36-42)

77 Severus Ant, *Or 2 ad Neph* CSCO 120, p 21,1-5 Cyril says in *Ep 40* to Acacius of Melitene 'It is absolutely certain that there is only one nature of the Son, we know, however, that it has become flesh and a human being' (PG 77, 192D-193A) But 'What would he have



will make this even more clear to us than the addresses to Nephalius, as Leontius of Jerusalem will point out to us (PG 86, 1845A). The patristic *rélecture* of Chalcedon has also become a linguistic, terminological issue. The proposals of Nephalius are not revolutionary, but they are still worth noting.

(b) *Two concessions to Cyril*: One concerns the expression 'united natures'. Nephalius wanted to bring close together once again the two formulas which were contested at Chalcedon and seem to be in opposition to each other, viz. 'out of two natures' and 'in two natures'; this was to occur through speaking of the 'united natures' (*φύσεις ἐνωθεῖσαι*). 'In two united natures' should signify as much as 'out of two one' (*ἐκ δύο εἰς*). We can recognize these trains of thought from Severus' refutation.<sup>78</sup> He argues not unskillfully with the acts of Chalcedon. There the Fathers had rejected the first suggested proposal for a *horos*, a proposal composed by Patriarch Anatolius of Constantinople, precisely because it contained the formula 'out of two natures'. At the forefront of this action were the two Roman legates of Pope Leo I who had threatened their departure should the 'out of two' continue to be retained. In its place the new *horos* with its profession of 'in two natures' was then composed and accepted.<sup>79</sup> Thus — so argued Severus — even now the 'out of two natures' cannot be made to coincide with 'in two natures', even if the state of being united is expressly emphasized.

See how they [the Fathers of Chalcedon] characterize the formula 'out of two' as heretical but define as orthodox the formula 'two united [natures]', whereby they have prepared the ground for Christ's being called two natures after the union.<sup>80</sup>

had to have said, if Christ were to be in two natures? "There are two natures of the Son he has indeed become flesh and a human being" ' Only with this formal affirmation of the duality would Severus have allowed himself to be convinced

78 Cf the following passages *Or 2 ad Neph* CSCO 120, p 9,16–18 'It is not the same to say that Christ is "out of two [natures]" and "in two [natures]" after the union, even if the expression is added "united natures" The Synod itself testifies to that' *Ibid*, p 13,27–30 'The crafty hearer will, however, respond immediately "See, Cyril forbids the separation of the natures after the union, I [Nephalius] call them then also united (*illas unitas dico*)"', *ibid*, p 22,25–28 with reference to Cyril Alex, *Ep 45 ad Succensum I*, Nephalius says 'Why should we not thus say Christ is in two united natures?', *ibid.*, p 23,13–14 (Severus) 'Do not come to me again and say to me "We too do not separate them [the natures], but call them united"'

79 See ACO II 1,2, p 128, no 34, p 129,30–130,3 Cf *JdChr* I<sup>3</sup>, 753–4, CCT I<sup>2</sup>, 543–4, *Chalcedon* I, 396–8

80 Severus Ant, *Or 2 ad Neph* CSCO 120, p 9,27–30 It is said that with the 'out of two' the following were also rejected by the Fathers 'one through *synthesis*' and above all the 'one nature of the incarnate Word' Were the Fathers of Chalcedon to have acknowledged the two formulas as really having the same meaning, they would not have condemned Dioscorus, but would have had to have characterized as a wrangler the one who conducted an unnecessary fight against equally valid expressions (*ibid*, pp 9,30–10,3)

Thus for Severus not even 'in two united natures' is sufficient to achieve in efficacy his preferred 'out of two'.<sup>81</sup> From the texts of Nephalius, which are more intimated than literally cited, it is impossible to decide whether with his suggestion he wanted to make the 'out of two natures' superfluous or to recommend the simultaneous use of both formulas, which would correct each other. For Severus even this could not be considered, as his concluding words on this topic signify.

'If you consider all this so you will cease to say: the two natures and the two forms are one Christ after you have professed the union.' That that does not suffice is apparent with Theodoret and Andrew of Samosata, who also speak of the union of natures and yet split up the mystery of the *oikonomia*.<sup>82</sup> Hence according to Severus even the 'two united natures' cannot compete with the expressiveness of the *mia-physis* formula.<sup>83</sup> It sounds like the judgement after a judicial process when he says: 'Should we thus declare as innocent those [i.e. the 'Antiochenes' Theodoret and Andrew of Samosata and naturally Chalcedon] because they call the union undivided (*indivduam*) and (characterize) it at the same time as highest and indissoluble and eternal, or should we not turn our face away from them (as from the convicted) who speak of two natures also after the union and contradict their own utterances and sway towards both sides?'<sup>84</sup>

The first attempt of Nephalius to mediate thus found no favour. How does it stand with the second, if this as such were really made by Nephalius? It is a question of the formula 'hypostatic union' (*ἐνῳσις ὑποστατική*). This formula was just as offensive to the Antiochenes as the one of 'physical union' (*ἐνῳσις φυσική*) which for Cyril was equivalent. For 'physical' signified for them as much as 'necessary by nature', while the incarnation after all is purely 'from grace'. *Unio hypostatica* was also unacceptable to them. If this expression, however, finally still found its way into post-Chalcedonian language and especially into scholastic theology, then an intrinsic change in interpretation had to have occurred. Ought we to attribute the initiative for this certainly not insignificant step of introducing a new linguistic ruling to Nephalius, as has been assumed?<sup>85</sup> For this purpose may we call upon the following text in Severus?

81. Similarly in *Or 2 ad Neph.*: CSCO 120, p. 35,22-7 as a summary of a patristic argument, which Severus characterizes as manipulated: 'This is thus the sum of your authorities. While you ruin them and explain them according to your whim, and deceive the simple by mentioning the natures out of which the one Christ is, you say insidiously: "If two natures are brought together and united, we must say that this one Christ is recognized as being two natures".'

82. Severus Ant., *Or 2 ad Neph.*: CSCO 120, p. 45,28-34.

83. *Ibid.*, p. 46,10-12. Cf. also p. 49,21-34.

84. *Ibid.*, p. 47,6-10.

85. See R. Helmer, *op. cit.* (n. 71), 158.

But you can say that the Chalcedonian Synod meant the *hypostatic union*. It says namely in its definition that 'the one and same Christ . . . is known in two natures; yet on account of the union the distinction of the natures is not annulled; rather the characteristic of each of the two natures was preserved [Lebon translates literally: *uniuscuiusque ex duabus naturis*], which, however, came together in one person and hypostasis'.<sup>86</sup>

It could be that Nephalius introduced *unio hypostatica* into the discussion. One has the impression, however, that it is Severus who wants to impute something to his opponent so that he can then divest him of the right to speak of a 'hypostatic union' — or so that he can bring him to accept along with it the *mia-physis* formula. For he says to his partner: 'Whoever namely talks of one *hypostasis* must also necessarily speak of the one nature.'<sup>87</sup> If Nephalius does not take this step, then his 'two united natures' will also not result in a 'hypostatic union'. One sees that if theologians embark on a compromise with the language of the *mia-physis* christology, then the day is not too far away when the simultaneous corrective use of both the one-nature formula and the two-natures formula can be recommended. There is no evidence that Nephalius had already taken this step; it is also not probable. For Severus certainly would have immediately taken issue with this attempt, which in his eyes was futile.

It is surprising that Severus also had to defend himself against the accusation of theopaschi(tism), which attributes suffering to the godhead of Christ as such. The opponents of the *mia-physis* formula took care to raise this issue. As a former 'monophysite', Nephalius, in contrast to Severus, would have become considerably more cautious. For the latter also does not attempt to explain how the impassible God in the flesh, remaining impassible, can really suffer. He defends himself, however, against the suggestion that God suffers in the godhead by calling upon his usual witnesses.<sup>88</sup> He certainly did not wish to follow the manner of interpretation indicated by Leo of Rome, nor did he want to allow the question 'which nature was hanged on the cross'.<sup>89</sup> Without the solution of this difficulty, however, Severus could not really repudiate the reproach of theopaschi(tism). We shall meet this problem again. The extent to which Severus knew himself to be obligated to the ecclesial kerygmatic tradition is indicated by a beautiful text from his first address to Nephalius, with which we shall end.<sup>90</sup>

86. Severus Ant., Or. 2 ad Neph.: CSCO 120, pp. 12,29–13,1.

87. *Ibid.*, p. 13,1–5, where Severus ends with the words: 'Qui enim unam hypostasim dicit, necessario et unam naturam dicet.'

88. *Ibid.*, p. 42,4–13.

89. *Ibid.*, p. 44,8–16; p. 36,19–24 (with reference to Pope Leo: PL 54, 775).

90. Severus Ant., Or. 1: CSCO 120, pp. 6,28–7,17.

If anyone says that the flesh of the Lord descended from heaven or passed through the Virgin as through a channel, and describes it not rather as from her in accordance with the law of conception, even if formed without man, he is condemned. Neither the conception nor the birth from Mary, nor the dealings with human beings, nor cross, tomb, resurrection from the dead, ascension into heaven happen according to appearance, but all according to truth: for we needed real healing, because we had really sinned. Thus we await in truth the coming Christ in exactly the body in which he bore the suffering of the cross which brought salvation; thus namely will he be seen by those who have pierced him (Jn 19,37). We hold in our mind not the so-called theopaschism — far be it — but we say that the Lord of glory, as stands written, suffered in the flesh (cf. 1 Pet 4,1; 1 Cor 2,8). Although it is namely proper to the body to suffer, so the impassible Word was united to one capable of suffering; and because the body is proper to him, thus too the suffering is stated of him. But according to our faith the incarnation of the Lord is neither without soul nor without spirit, rather ensouled, endowed with spirit and understanding. We impose the ban on the appearance doctrine (*phantasia*) of Eutyches and Valentinus and the ungodliness of the Manichaeans and the foolishness of Apollinarius and the dreadful division of the *oikonomia* by Nestorius

## 2. John of Caesarea, presbyter and grammarian

The next opponent with whom Severus of Antioch took up the fight was the presbyter and grammarian John of Caesarea, with his *Apologia for the Council of Chalcedon*.<sup>91</sup> Whether this amateur theologian, as Severus regarded him, had anything to do with the author of the Cyrillian florilegium or with Nephalius or not, he ought to be regarded as the real promoter of the attempt to mediate between Cyril, the theological authority dominating everything, and Chalcedon with its

91. Cf. CPG 6855–62. Richard, *Iohannis Caesariensis ... Opera* = CCG 1; in this are: 1. *Apologia concilii Chalcedonensis*, a) Lat.: pp. 6–46; cf. J. Lebon, *Severi Antiocheni liber contra impium Grammaticum* = CSCO 111, 93.101 (T); 112, 94.102 (V Lat.); b) *Excerpta graeca*: Richard, *op. cit.*, 49–58; C. Moeller, 'Trois fragments grecs de l'Apologie de Jean le Grammairien pour le concile de Chalcédoine', *RHE* 46 (1951), 683–8. The effort that Severus had made in composing the work against the Grammarian he describes in the letter to the Presbyter and Archimandrite, Elisha, from the years 519–521(?): PO 12, no. XXXIV, 272ff. 2. *Capitula XVII contra Monophysitas*: Richard, *op. cit.*, 61–6. On this, K.-H. Uthemann, 'Rezension zu M. Richard, CCG 1', in *ByzZ* 73 (1980), 70–2. Of the *XVII Capitula* Uthemann denies that nos XII–XVII belong to John the Grammarian, because in them the concept of *enhypostasis* which is important for John is missing. On the person of the Grammarian: according to C. Moeller, 'Un représentant de la christologie néochalcédonienne au début du sixième siècle en Orient', *RHE* 40 (1944/45) (73–140), 103, n 1 and according to Richard, CCG 1, p. VI, n. 12, with Caesarea the city of the same name in Cappadocia and not in Palestine is meant. However, this is uncertain; as is shown by A. de Halleux, 'Le "synode néochalcédonien" d'Alexandrette (ca 515) et l' "Apologie pour Chalcédoine" de Jean le Grammairien', *RHE* 72 (1977), 593–600. He shakes the major argument of C. Moeller. Studies: Moeller, *Chalcedon I* (637–720), 672–4; S. Helmer, *op. cit.* (n. 71), 160–76; P. T. R. Gray, *op. cit.* (n. 71); L. Perrone, *op. cit.* (n. 71) 249–60 among others; P. Allen, 'Neo-Chalcedonism and the Patriarchs of the Late Sixth Century', *Byz* 50 (1980), 5–17; A. Grillmeier, 'Das östliche und das westliche Christusbild. Zu einer Studie über den Neuchalcedonismus' (= P. T. R. Gray), *TheolPhil* 59 (1984), 84–96.

fresh start. More clearly than with his two predecessors, there are two methodological levels that can be discerned in his writings, on the basis of which reconciliation could be brought about: (1) work on the 'concept' and (2) diplomacy in the use of formulas. How does Severus react to this?

(a) *Work on the concept*

At last it is recognizable that the effort to clarify contested concepts had begun, something that would already have been timely with the Council of 451. The chances of success for the new initiative were not very great. Most of all Severus was responsible for that. The monk received the suggestions of the Grammarian coolly, and remarked that a Homeric philologist and crammer would do better to keep his finger out of theological affairs.<sup>92</sup> He was particularly angered over the Grammarian's doubt about the authenticity of certain texts.<sup>93</sup> This is a reference to the *Symbol* of Gregory the Wonderworker, which the Grammarian declared to be inauthentic because in it *homoousios* occurs, a word which had been unknown before Nicaea (325). Severus cites the contested verse.<sup>94</sup> One would now have expected that the much more pressing problem of the Apollinarian forgeries in general would also have come up for discussion, something that would have suggested itself with the name of Gregory the Wonderworker and its misuse perpetrated by the Apollinarians. Nevertheless it will become apparent why the Grammarian himself could hardly have had an interest in pointing out the inauthenticity of texts with the *mia-physis* formula. In the excerpts which have been passed on by Severus there is also no reference to this.

92. Cf. Severus Ant., *C. imp. Gram., Or. I 9*: CSCO 112, p. 37,14-15: Et forsitan putas te ad iuenculos, qui apud te instituuntur, loqui; *Or. II 12*: CSCO 112, p. 89,11-18: Quomodo enim haec non sint lacrymis digna: quod (scilicet) ii, qui in explicanda pueris ira apud Homerum (cantata) omnem aetatem triverint, minimeque forsan feliciter rem gesserint, cum ineruditionis pallio, illotis pedibus, ut dicitur, irruant in divina [sc. in theology] eaque perperam explicant. After that Severus criticizes the method of the Grammarian, using the texts of the Master, i.e. Cyril, partly through abbreviating and partly through adding. On the rôle of a 'grammarian' in Greek *paideia* and his significance for Christian exegesis and theology, see C. Schaublin, *Untersuchungen zur Methode und Herkunft der antiochenischen Exegese* = Theophaneia 23 (Cologne, Bonn, 1974), 34.

93. Cf. Severus Ant., *C. imp. Gram., Or. II 9*: CSCO 112, p. 78,26-33.

94. Cf. Greg. Nyss., *De vita Gregori Thaumaturgi* (CPG 3184): PG 46, 912D-913A. Cf. on this L. Abramowski, 'Das Bekenntnis des Gregor Thaumaturgus bei Gregor von Nyssa und das Problem seiner Echtheit', *ZKG* 62 (1973), 145-66. There is a short account of her arguments against the authenticity of the symbol known to us today in J. M. Rist, *Platonism and its Christian Heritage* (London, 1985), no. XII: Basil's 'Neoplatonism': Its Background and Nature, reprinted from P. J. Fedwick (ed.), *Basil of Caesarea: Christian, Humanist, Ascetic* (Toronto, 1981) (137-220),

His critique relates to other weaknesses of the opponent's argumentation and its foundations.

(i) *A surprise attack by the Grammarian: the distinction between physis and ousia*

For Chalcedon, as for Severus, the controversy about concepts revolved around the word *physis* and its meaning. In order to prove the legitimacy of the 'two *physeis*' of Chalcedon, John called in, not at all clumsily, the concept *ousia*. By precise definition he attempted to contrast it with the concept *hypostasis* and to give to it its own function in establishing the two-natures formula. In fact Severus was in no slight quandary. For the Grammarian, Basil of Caesarea had already performed important preliminary work, admittedly not in any way complete; this is in the context of the discussion about the trinitarian formula of the three hypostases in the one divine *ousia*. This historical recourse did not greatly please Severus. He denied that the Grammarian had understood correctly the principal document, viz. letter 214 to Terentius.<sup>95</sup> The following passage is the one in question.

On the one hand each of us participates in the general way of being of the essence, on the other hand each is 'this' or 'that' through the peculiarities each possesses [Then follows the application to the divine trinity] Hence the essence is also common there as, for example, the goodness of the godhead or whatever else can still be thought. The hypostasis, however, is discernible in the particularity of fatherhood, sonship or in the power to sanctify.<sup>96</sup>

<sup>95</sup> Cf. John Gram., *Apol.* 14. Richard, CCG 1, I 1, pp. 8,72-9,110.

<sup>96</sup> Basil Caes., *Ep.* 214,4 ad Terentium. Courtonne, II, p. 205, PG 32, 789A4-15. *Περὶ δὲ τοῦ ὅτι ὑπόστασις καὶ οὐσία οὐ ταυτὸν ἐστὶ ἐκεῖνο ἐροῦμεν, ὅτι ὃν ἔχει λόγον τὸ κοινὸν πρὸς τὸ ἴδιον, τοῦτον ἔχει ἡ οὐσία πρὸς τὴν ὑπόστασιν. Ἐκαστος γὰρ ἡμῶν καὶ τῷ κοινῷ τῆς οὐσίας λόγῳ τοῦ εἶναι μετέχει καὶ τοῖς περὶ αὐτὸν ἰδιώμασιν ὁ δεῖνός ἐστι καὶ ὁ δεῖνα*

On this see A. de Halleux, "Hypostase" et "Personne" dans la formation du dogme trinitaire (ca 375-381), *RHE* 79 (1984), 313-69, 625-70, on Basil 318-30. Basil wants to protect the comes, Terentius, from the forgeries of the old-Nicenes of Antioch (Paulinus), for whom *ousia* and *hypostasis* are synonymous and who consequently speak only of the one *hypostasis* of the godhead and the three *prosopa*. For the acceptance and further development of this linguistic rule see Gregory of Nyssa. CPG 3196 = *Ad Petrum fratrem de differentia essentiae et hypostaseos* (Ps. Basil, *Ep.* 38), CPG 3138 = *Ad Graecos ex communibus notionibus*, CPG 3139 = *Ad Ablabium quod non sint tres dei*. On the topic itself see C. Stead, 'Ontology and Terminology in Gregory of Nyssa', in *idem, Substance and Illusion in the Christian Fathers* (London, 1985), IX, reprint from H. Dorrie et al. (eds), *Gregor von Nyssa und die Philosophie* (Leiden, 1976), 107-27 with a report of the discussion. For the Latin linguistic usage it is to be noted that from Tertullian the first category of Aristotle, *ousia*, was translated by *substantia* and not *essentia*, which etymologically would have been more appropriate. The reason for this presumably lay in the fact that the Latins considered *essentia* as the bearer of the accidents, which could find no application to God. Marius Victorinus certainly refers to this in *Adv. Arum* I, 31. A. Locher, *Mari Victorini Afri Opera Theologica* (Leipzig, 1976), p. 65,16-19 *sed dicunt scripturae lumen esse deum, spiritum esse haec autem substantiam* [οὐσίαν] significant non enim accidens. Cf. no 30, p. 64,1-15.

The presbyter of Caesarea now applies this distinction to the Chalcedonian christological formula. In so doing he does not deny the concept of *physis* in favour of the concept of *ousia*, but pushes it into the background.<sup>97</sup> Behind this is the following line of thought: together with Severus, the Grammarian is prepared to accept the formula 'from two natures' (ἐκ δύο φύσεων). For this involves a graded process of thought which he can perform: at first glance the 'two natures' are still considered in the state of not-being-unified, whereby it is presupposed that here it is only a matter of an abstract *theoria*. For the humanity of Christ ought never to be assumed as real outside the *henosis*. This first *actio* is sufficient, however, to enable precisely this reality so to come into sight that it can also be recognized as persisting in the state of being united with the godhead. In this way the Grammarian intends to create the possibility of speaking of a duality in Christ. For this, however, the concept of *ousia* was more appropriate than the concept of *physis*, at least with Severus in view. For *physis* means for Severus 'that which is there from birth', thus the hereditary being or essence which is the bearer of all life acts. In Christ this is the God-nature. It is so much his own that even the substantially united humanity cannot receive the name of a *physis*. For this reason too there cannot be a duality of *physeis*.

It is different with the word *ousia*, especially if Basil's analysis of concrete being, as present in the letter to Terentius, is assumed. For it offers the possibility, which Severus had given up, of grasping conceptually and characterizing the unmingled humanity in Christ also in the state of being united, without allowing it to come to the feared teaching of the two hypostases. If Jesus is both true God as well as true human

97 Severus Ant, *C imp Gram, Or II* 17 CSCO 112, p 118,7-14, notes the intent of the Grammarian to shift from the concept of *physis* to the concept of *ousia* 'The duality of the natures (*physeis*) which cuts the one Christ into two you make into essences (*ousia, substantia*) understood in the universal sense, and you say that they [the essences of godhead and humanity] understood in the universal sense are united according to the hypostasis or — to use your word — hypostatically Thus explain to us how these essences, I mean in so far as they express what is common (*koinon*) with the godhead and the humanity, are able to be united to each other and to be placed together hypostatically, so that they form one hypostasis' Admittedly the line of thought of the Grammarian is twisted in this account What he wanted to take only on the logical level, Severus transfers to the ontological See the whole of no 14 in Richard, CCG 1, 8-9 The same difficulty in understanding the Grammarian's line of thought — and this is once again on account of the lack of distinction between abstract essence and concrete nature — Severus shows in *C imp Gram, Or II* 22 CSCO 112, pp 146,33-147,2 'Thus we have clearly pointed out how with our way of speaking of "out of two natures" we do not understand that the natures themselves are in the universal sense essences which comprehend many hypostases, whereby in your foolish godlessness it would result in the sacred Trinity being incarnate in the whole of humanity and the whole human race' The whole of ch 22 speaks in this sense

being, understanding which proceeds by way of abstraction ought rightfully to discover in him on the one hand the God-essence and on the other the human-being-essence. One ought also to speak of two *ousiai* to the extent that the *ousia* only becomes *hypostasis* through the *idiomata* added to it. If Severus wanted to forbid the application of this conceptual word to the humanity of Christ, he would run the danger of denying its reality. Because with *ousia* only the general (be it of divinity or humanity) is denoted, thus the *koinon* without the *idiomata*, so the assumption of two hypostases or persons is excluded. Severus can even use the formula 'from two natures (*physeis*)' with good conscience only because by *physis* he can understand *ousia*.<sup>98</sup> The usage introduced by the Fathers of maintaining in Christ a twofold *homoousion* — with the Father namely on the basis of the one godhead, with us on the basis of the common humanity — leads to the same result. A twofold *homoousion* means two *ousiai*.<sup>99</sup>

98. Cf. John Gram., *Apol.* 19: Richard, CCG 1, I 1, p. 10, 128–130: *Quomodo autem Christum etiam 'ex duabus naturis' dicemus, si 'naturarum' nomen loco 'substantiarum' [ousiai] ab illis non intelligatur?*

99. It is precisely this reference to the twofold *consubstantialis* that Severus finds annoying. For this reason he cites and rebuts it often, not, however, without interpreting the text in a way which is dangerous for the Grammarian. It is found for the first time in the *Apologia*, frag. 19: Richard, CCG 1, p. 10, 137–139: *Quomodo autem Christum et Patri consubstantialem et nobis consubstantialem statuunt et duos quidem consubstantiales confiteri non cessant, duas autem substantias negant?* (How can they [the Fathers] characterize Christ as consubstantial with the Father and consubstantial with us and not cease to confess two consubstantialities [masculine] and to deny two *ousiai*?) Cf. Severus Ant., *C. imp. Gram.* II. 21: CSCO 112, p. 140, 8–11. The text returns in II. 29: pp. 177, 6–9; 178, 22–25. Fortunately we have a Greek text, independent of Severus, passed on through the DP and the fragments transmitted there, fragments falsely ascribed to Eulogius of Alexandria (CPG 6972). A comparison of the Syriac-Latin version with the Greek makes utterly clear — what neither J. Lebon nor M. Richard noticed — that Severus in the three words 'et *duos quidem consubstantiales*' used the masculine while the Greek text is composed with the neuter: Πῶς δὲ καὶ ὁμοούσιον τῷ πατρὶ καὶ ἡμῖν ὁμοούσιον τὸν Χριστὸν μετὰ τὴν ἐνωσιν ὑποτίθενται καὶ οὐ ναρκῶσι δύο μὲν ὁμοούσια ὁμολογούντες, ἀρνούμενοι δὲ τὰς δύο οὐσίας (Richard, CCG 1, p. 51, 77–79), where instead of ἀρνούμενοι it mistakenly reads ἀρνούμεναι. Cf. DP, p. 71, 13–15. In this way Severus ascribes to the Grammarian a profession of two *hypostases* or persons in Christ, i.e. he makes him a Nestorian. A. Van Roey kindly brought to my attention the fact that the Syriac text of *C. imp. Gram.* II. 21 and 29: CSCO 112, pp. 140, 10; 177, 8; 178, 24 has a masculine expression which is such that it can also be rendered in the neuter. One could thus translate: *duos quidem consubstantiales* or: *duo quidem consubstantialia*. A. Van Roey refers to the Syriac translation of Cyril Alex., *Ep. 46 ad Succensum II*, in *C. imp. Gram.* I. 7, CSCO 112, p. 72, 4–5, where in Greek there is the neuter *homoousia*, which is rendered in the Syriac by the masculine. The Greek text, now known, of our section demands the neuter, however: *dvo homoousia* = *duo quidem consubstantialia*. But by these means Severus could not have gained the respect of the Grammarian. In fact what it amounts to is that the Grammarian said *homoousia* (neuter) for which Severus placed in Greek *homoousioi* (masculine), and hence accused his opponent of Nestorianism. There is no doubt that John consciously chose the neuter form, because indeed he cites the expression of Gregory Nazianzen: In Emmanuel there is indeed an *aliud et aliud*, but not an *alius et alius* (ἄλλο καὶ



The presbyter John now attempts to illustrate this conceptual analysis with examples taken from various areas.

(1) From the Greek teaching about the elements: the four elements represent four 'differentiated essences' (*διάφοροι οὐσῖαι*). They can, however, combine in an 'inseparable union' (*ἀδιαίρετος ἔνωσις*) to become 'one hypostasis', thus wood, stone and so on. This example from nature, however, has the disadvantage that in the one *hypostasis* there was a *κρᾶσις*, a mixing, even a *σύγχυσις*, a blending.<sup>100</sup> For this reason it is better to draw examples from another domain, namely

(2) From anthropology:

In each of us the *ousia* of the soul is other than the *ousia* of the body; at the same time, however, the two *ousiai* in coming together to a single thing (*καθέκαστον*) form one *proson*, for example, that of John or of Paul or that of another, and yet remain two.<sup>101</sup>

Nevertheless John confesses that even the body-soul analogy has its limits in its application to Christ:

... Thus there occurred in Christ the uniting of the two *ousiai* to become one *hypostasis*, one *proson*, when this is shown only dimly through examples. The *oikonomia* in Christ, however, runs away from every type of uniting [taken from the earthly domain] and outstrips all human understanding.<sup>102</sup>

The Grammarian attempts to secure this preference of his for the *ousia* concept in two directions. With his choice of words and concepts he moves simultaneously on two levels, namely on that of the abstract (*ousia*) and on that of the concrete (*hypostasis*). If he places the concept of *ousia* at the forefront he can come under the suspicion that the

ἄλλο, οὐκ ἄλλος καὶ ἄλλος) (cf. Greg. Naz., *Ep.* 101, 4: PG 37, 180A16-B3; in Richard, CCG 1, no. V, p. 57,241-242). Moreover the text reads in fragment 21 of the *Apologia*, in Richard, p. 11,160-163: 'Thus where the Fathers place "*physis*" in the singular without adding "[the *physis*] of the God-Logos", they describe the *ousia* and say that there are two natures in Christ; they recognize him [Christ] namely according to the "one thing and another" and as "consubstantial with the Father and with us".' One can hardly avoid the conclusion that Severus undertook the alteration described consciously in order to place his opponent in the wrong. Just as the Chalcedonian formula of two natures, so too according to Severus the formula of two *ousiai* leads to Nestorianism which, particularly in chs 27, 30 and 32 of Book II (CSCO 112, 168-170, 180-183 and 191-196), he explains with repeated arguments. '*Scito ergo quod dicendo duas substantias [= two ousiai], duas quoque hypostases dicis, etiamsi latere velis*' runs the concluding word of Severus on this problem (cf. II. 33, p. 209,23-24), which had concerned him particularly in chs 23-28. Here he is not completely sincere. As we shall see later, in the altercation with Julian of Halicarnassus and Sergius he could very well employ exactly this argument of the Grammarian concerning the two *ousiai*.

100. Cf. John Gram., *Apol.* IV. 2: Richard, CCG 1, I 2, p. 53,136-140.

101. *Ibid.*, pp. 53,141-54,145.

102. *Ibid.*, p. 54,156-160, especially 157-158: τῶν δύο οὐσιῶν γέγονεν ἔνωσις εἰς μίαν ὑπόστασιν καὶ ἐν πρόσωπον.

humanity of Christ is not an objective reality, but a mental construction, hence appearance. For this reason he stresses too the real existent content of the *ousia*. But in this way he brings it closer to the *hypostasis* concept and courts the danger of introducing with 'Nestorius' two hypostases. In a rather long fragment of his *apologia* which is transmitted in the DP in Greek under the name of Eulogius of Alexandria, he tries to escape this dilemma. He clarifies how he understands the reality of the *ousia*, particularly as far as the humanity of Christ is concerned. But in the same fragment he also takes pains to show that being real on its own does not yet make the humanity of Christ into a *hypostasis*, that is, into a second person. To this end he emphasizes, with reference to Cyril of Alexandria and Athanasius, the closeness of the *hypostasis* concept to 'reality', 'existence', and so on. Thus he gives to it a meaning through which what is common to *ousia* and *hypostasis* is brought into relief and what is special, which differentiates both, is bracketed. The important section is cited in translation because it is at the same time important for a new concept which the Grammarian here introduces into the discussion, namely that of the *enhypostaton*.<sup>103</sup>

(4) One should know that for the holy Fathers *hypostasis* is used in the place of *ousia*, as Cyril also assumes. In the third Anathema he says, namely 'If in the one Christ anyone separates the hypostases after the union' *Hypostasis* signifies here what exists (*ὄφεισθηκός*), for the 'Godbearer' who constantly fought against the blasphemies of Nestorius would not have named two hypostases in the one Christ if he had not used them in the place of *ousiai*.

(5) [John wanted to derive the same result from Athanasius, *Ep. ad Afros*, PG 26, 1036B 5-9, with reference to Jer 9,9, hence he reasons.] The *hypostasis* is *ousia* and has no other meaning than that of the being itself which Jeremiah calls *hyparxis* in saying: 'And they heard not the voice of the *hyparxis*' [LXX] [According to the Masoretic text it is a question of people in devastated Jerusalem no longer hearing the voice of the herds. They had been robbed indeed with the whole 'possession' of the people, of its *substantia*.] The *hypostasis* and the *ousia* thus mean *hyparxis*, existence, it is namely and exists.

(6) If now anyone characterizes according to this meaning the *ousiai* as real (*ἐνυποστάτους*), that is, as existent, then one too would not deny that. For the *hypostasis* differentiates itself from the *ousia* not according to being, but through being general (*τῷ μὲν κοινῶς εἶναι*) with which I mean the *ousia*, in contrast the *hypostasis* is the being one's own (*ιδικῶς*) when it has with the general also its own. Thus we do not characterize our *ousia* in Christ in the sense of being real (*ἐνυπόστατον*) as a *hypostasis* which exists for itself in its characteristics and is a *prosopon*, but insofar as it exists and is. Sometimes namely *hypostasis* signifies (reveals) that which *ousia* is, as has been shown namely when it has been stripped of the characteristic *idionata* and of what becomes visible in the *prosopon*.

The argumentation of the Grammarian admittedly is not convincing. In the third Anathema, Cyril speaks only conditionally of two *hypostases*,

103 John Gram, *Apol. IV* 4-6. Richard, CCG 1, I 2, pp. 55, 189-56, 211. On this Severus Ant., *C. imp. Gram.*, Or. II. 24. CSCO 112, pp. 150-156.

namely for the case that one sees them bound to each other only in a moral way and thus in the sense of Nestorius in Cyril's interpretation. Only in a christology of separation, not for Cyril himself, are there two *hypostases*. Hence John cannot prove from the third Anathema that Cyril intended to speak of two *hypostases* or *ousiai*. Even his recourse to Athanasius and his synonymous use of *ousia* and *hypostasis* is of no use. For the Alexandrian is an old-Nicene and cannot at all perform that upon which the Grammarian builds his entire argumentation, namely Basil's distinction of *ousia* and *hypostasis* as general in contrast to special. Thus if John intends to construct being real or existence as the bridge between the concepts of *ousia* and *hypostasis*, he confuses two conceptual systems, the Athanasian (old-Nicene) and the Basilian (neo-Nicene). In any case his historical examples for the legitimacy of speech about two *ousiai* fade away. Despite this, however, his whole attempt of calling upon the concept of *ousia* to justify the Chalcedonian formula of two natures is not worthless. For in the reality of the one Christ the abstract essence of humanity and divinity must be determinable even for Severus, if there is to be any sense at all in speaking of an unmingled unity.

Severus does not enter, however, into this really legitimate reflection of the Grammarian. He is not prepared to accept the latter's distinction of *ousia* and *hypostasis*, but rather attempts to tie him in knots and to characterize his depiction of the incarnation as absurd. But this does not happen without distorting the words of the opponent. He finds two weak passages in John's remarks:

(1) '*Tota humanitatis substantia in illo [= in Christo]*'. As in the Son the whole essence (*ousia*, *substantia*) of the godhead is, so in Christ, in the Son become human, is also the 'whole human essence'. In this way the Grammarian wants expressly to give a rebuff to Apollinarius, who teaches that the Son assumed only a part of this humanity, namely flesh without a spiritual soul. The Son 'assumed (rather) the whole human essence which is flesh animated by a rational spiritual soul' because these are generally completely present in each and every human being, they are rightly called essence. For among themselves the individually constituted human beings are separated not through the essence, but through the peculiarities they have, height, colour, and in general terms, through the peculiarities of personal features'.<sup>104</sup>

(2) The distinction of *ousia* and *hypostasis* as the 'general' in contrast to the special through the 'individual' features

Now Severus consciously interprets the Grammarian differently from the way in which the latter understands himself. For when the latter emphasizes the assumption of the 'whole essence of the human being', he means by that the *integra essentia hominis* in contrast to the assumption

<sup>104</sup> John Gram, *Apol* I 4 Richard, CCG 1, I 1, p 9,100-110 Cf *ibid*, no 57, p 23,510-512, no 65, p 27,623-624, *JdChr* I<sup>2</sup>, 484 (Apollinarius)

of a partial substance. It is a question of the *natura completa*, of the complete human nature. Severus, however, interprets this assumption of the *tota natura* as the assumption of the *natura universalis*, of the universal essence of humanity. He argues against John in the following way:

God's Word himself participated fully in that which belongs commonly to the *ousia*, because it is united to one single body endowed with a rational soul, but not to the whole *ousia* and to all flesh endowed with a rational (soul). But your utterances lead you to this, for you say: 'He assumed, however, the whole *ousia* which consists of flesh endowed with an intelligent and rational soul'.<sup>105</sup>

Severus was striving to evade the attempt of the Grammarian to postulate that one had to accept two essences in Christ. For this reason he sought to make out that the stressing of the *ousia* by his opponent was a false tack. If, according to John, the Son of God assumes the 'universal essence of the human being', he takes up the whole human race into the hypostatic union. Every single human being is then, on account of his assumed *ousia*, a real Son of God. This reproach certainly does not touch the real thought of the Grammarian, who rightly establishes in Jesus of Nazareth the universal humanity as he finds it elsewhere in every individual human being. The censure of Severus would then also fall, for example, on the incarnation doctrine of Gregory of Nyssa, to whom, in point of fact, renowned historians of doctrine have attributed this teaching of the assumption of the whole human race.<sup>106</sup> If the presbyter of Caesarea, however, wants to defend himself against the interpretation of his teaching by Severus, he must point out that the humanity of Jesus is individually formed as is that of each and every human being. Then on account of his Cappadocian teaching on *ousia* and *hypostasis* only with difficulty can he avoid the necessity of

105. Severus Ant., *C. imp. Gram., Or. II. 17*: CSCO 112, p. 128, 22–28. Cf. the letters XV (PO 12, 210–221), XVI (211), II (186ff.): the *henosis* was not a *henosis* of the *humanitas* i.s. *generico* ('*nāśūthā*) with the Godhead.

106. Cf. R. Seeberg, *Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte II* (Erlangen, Leipzig, <sup>3</sup>1923), p. 201, n. 1. Seeberg names W. Herrmann (1875), A. Ritschl and A. von Harnack, *Dogmengeschichte II*<sup>4</sup>, 166: The Logos is said not to have assumed a human individuum, but the species humanity. In opposition was F. Loofs, *PRE VII*<sup>3</sup>, 152; definitive rebuttal by K. Holl, *Amphilochius von Ikonum in seinem Verhältnis zu den drei großen Kappadokiern* (1904), 222ff. Seeberg says with regard to this, *op. cit.*: 'It is the old relationship of the first of humanity to the race which directed Gregory's thoughts, not a Platonic idea. Moreover, the very thought that in Christ all are physically divinized would exclude the effort of individuals for salvation, which is so strongly stressed.' Fundamentally, it must be said of the inadequacies of the conceptual language introduced in this context that not all the consequences which occurred in the course of reflection and discussion on it were really recognized or wanted by the Fathers. For this reason all the attempts to master the mystery of the incarnation or trinity conceptually must always be measured by the kerygmatic statements of faith of the individual Fathers or of the Church at their time.

accepting in the human being Jesus a second *hypostasis* beside the 'Son of God'. For the *ousia* cannot be realized as universal essence, but only as individualized, concrete *physis*, that is, as *prosopon*. Thus he comes to hear from Severus: 'There is no *prosopon*-less *physis*.'<sup>107</sup> With this comment the Grammarian is challenged to present a theory of incarnation which represents a *via media* between the alleged assumption of the whole of humanity and a doctrine of two *hypostases*. Will he be able to achieve this with his Cappadocian assumptions? He attempts the solution by way of a concept which had already been introduced before him, but which receives from him a new application.

(ii) *The concept of enhypostaton*

In order to reply to the objections of Severus, the Grammarian coins the formula of the 'two natures enhypostatically united'.<sup>108</sup> Let us first take up only the word *enhypostatos*.

John the Grammarian did not himself introduce this concept into theological discourse.<sup>109</sup> It found particular importance in the theological discussions about the Trinity in the fourth century, as Jerome and Epiphanius testify.<sup>110</sup> In the question of the trinitarian formula the monk of Bethlehem stood on the side of the old-Nicene Paulinus of Antioch, and hence against Meletius. The Meletians demanded from him confession of the three *hypostases* in the one godhead, a formula which was for him a neologism,<sup>111</sup> but aroused in him in particular the suspicion of Arianism. For this reason he asked his opponents, the Meletians, for an explanation of this formula, which was interpreted by them as

107. Cf. John Gram., *op. cit.* IV. 2: CCG 1, I. 2, p. 53,121-122: καὶ φασιν, οὐκ ἔστι φύσις ἀπρόσωπος.

108. *Ibid.*, p. 53,118-120: Ἡμῶν γὰρ ἐνυποστάτως ἡνωμένας δύο φύσεις λεγόντων ἐβελοκωφοῦσι καὶ περιζύοντες τῆς ὁμολογίας ἡμῶν τὸ ἐνυποστάτως ἡνωμένας, προβλήματι κέχρηνται . . .

109. According to Lampe, *PGL*, 485b, *ἐνυπόστατος* is found in the sense of 'real', 'actual', 'existent' as early as Iren., *Frag.* 19 (PG 7, 1240C), as well as Origen, Didymus, Ps Athanasius, etc.

110. On Jerome see A. de Halleux, ' "Hypostase" et "Personne" ' (above n 96), 331-41, on Epiphanius cf. *Panarion*, *haer.* 72,11: Holl III, 265-266. In question is a profession of faith which the Marcellan community of Ancyra addressed to the Egyptian bishops banished to Diocaesarea. In this in continuation of Marcellan teaching the community professed the 'three *prosopa* of the holy Trinity which are unlimited, *real*, one in essence, equally eternal and perfect' (τρία πρόσωπα ἀπερίγραφα καὶ ἐνυπόστατα καὶ ὁμοούσια . . .) (p. 266,4-5). Cf. W. Gericke, *Marcell von Ancyra* (Halle, 1940), 23, where besides other inaccuracies, *enhypostaton* is taken not in the sense of 'real', but in the sense of the inexistence, i.e. the perichoresis of the three divine persons.

111. Jerome, *Ep.* 15,3: Hilberg, *CSEL* 54 (Vienna, 1910), 64: *trium υποστάσεων . novellum a me, homine Romano, nomen exigitur.*

*tres personae subsistentes* or, in Greek, *τρία πρόσωπα ὑφεστώτα*. Jerome says for this: *τρία ἐνυπόστατα*.<sup>112</sup> Here this expression means nothing other than 'real', 'existent'.

Marius Victorinus too refers in the same direction; in his 'theological works'<sup>113</sup> it is true that he does not have *enhyposaton*, but employs rather often for it the cognate term *ἐνούσιος*.<sup>114</sup> As for John the Grammarian and his conceptual reflections, the Chalcedonian definition was the starting-point, so for the comments of Marius Victorinus it was the *homoousios* of Nicaea. Thus for him the noun *οὐσία* together with the abstractions, adjectives and verbs associated with it come into his world of vision. Thereby the Latin *substantia* corresponds to the Greek *οὐσία*.<sup>115</sup> *Hypostasis* and *ousia* are synonymous.<sup>116</sup> In this regard he could be characterized as an old-Nicene, although for the difference of Father, Son and Spirit in the one God he accepts the formula: *una substantia (οὐσία), tres subsistentiae*.<sup>117</sup> The *substantia* (*οὐσία*) is the being of the divinity itself (*id ipsum, quod est esse*); this being, however, subsists in a threefold way, as God Father, as Logos and as Holy Spirit. Father and Son (and Spirit) have the same hypostasis or — as the Latins say — the same substance (*οὐσία*); for this reason they are only one God, but as *esse formatum* they are threefold (*tres subsistentiae*).

112. Jerome, *loc. cit.*, who transmits the demand of the Meletians of Antioch, clothed in an anathema: *si quis tres hypostases ut tria ἐνυπόστατα, hoc est ut tres subsistentes personas, non confitetur, anathema sit* (65). For the Meletians the formula of the 'three subsistent *prosopa*' was not sufficient to be able to exclude Sabellianism definitively. Cf. Basil Caes., *Ep. 236 ad Amphil.* no. 6; Courtonne III, 54; PG 32, 884C: 'Those who say that *ousia* and *hypostasis* are the same thing see themselves forced to confess only different *prosopa*, and while they avoid speaking of three *hypostases* they find themselves inevitably caught in the web of Sabellius.' Jerome himself suspected the Meletians of Arianism, i.e. the division of the one godhead into three separate substances. Cf. *Ep.* 15,3 and 4, cited in A. de Halleux, *art. cit.* (above n. 96), 336, n. 4.

113. Cf. A. Locher, *Marci Victorini Opera theologica* (Leipzig, 1976) with indices.

114. To be compared are: *ὑπερούσιος*, *supra substantiale*, quintessential; *ἀνούσιος*, *sine substantia* (p. 100,17). Cf. *Adv. Arium* II. 1: Locher, pp. 100,16–101,19. Many call the *hyperousios* also *anousios*. Cf. also Locher, p. 7,15–16; p. 18,18: *anousios* = *insubstantiale* (for God) (negative theology). *Ἐνούσιος*, what has being and substance, which he also translates by *insubstantiatum* (p. 59,6–7 bis).

115. On the whole topic cf. H. Dörrie, *Ἐνότητα. Wort- und Bedeutungsgeschichte* = NAWG.PH 1955, no. 3, 74–84; admittedly *ousia* is mentioned only occasionally.

116. Cf. Marius Vict., *Adv. Arium* II. 6: Locher, 106–7. Starting from the parable of the prodigal son and the designation of the estate of the father as *hypostasis* (*substantia*), he speaks of the transmission of the divine *hypostasis* or *ousia* from the Father to the Son. He can establish the *homoousios* between Father and Son from both words.

117. Marius Vict., *Adv. Arium* II. 4: Locher, pp. 105,24–106,2: Here he distinguishes *ousia* = *substantia* = that which is grasped purely under the aspect of *ὄν*, being. There is, however, an *ὄν formatum*, in which the form is to be distinguished from that which is formed by it. One calls the formed being *hypostasis* or in Latin *subsistentia*: *iam enim formatum esse subsistentia est* (p. 105,26–27).

Perhaps from Marius Victorinus and his concept of *ἐνούσιος* something can also be gained for understanding *ἐνυπόστατος*, even if this is not found in his writings. The first of these words is found five times in the *opera theologica*.<sup>118</sup>

*Enousios*: It is to be translated as: in being, in essence, in reality, in substance. Because God 'is', God is *enousios*.<sup>119</sup> In Latin one would certainly have to say for this: *insubstantiatus*, as *Adv. Arium* I 26 shows: 'If everything is one, namely in the substance [that is, in a chain of being which stretches from God, Jesus, Spirit, over the *nous*, the soul, the angels to the corporeal], so are nevertheless God and the Son not only an *insubstantiatum*, but a *consubstantiatum*. *Insubstantiata* are namely all beings (*ὄντα*) in Jesus, that is, in the Logos, as it says: "All things are created in him" (cf. Col 1,16). *Ὁμοούσια* [*consubstantialia*], however, these are not."<sup>120</sup> All things have their ground of being and their 'being in the essence' in the divine Logos as their exemplary and efficient cause. For this reason they participate in his essence, but nevertheless are not one in essence, *homoousia*!

*Substantia-subsistentia*: Existing 'in essence', however, are always individual beings. They are effected through the fact that the 'form' (*forma*) comes to the universal essence: *quod est esse principale cum forma subsistentia dicitur*.<sup>121</sup> A 'subsistence' is for Marius Victorinus the final and highest realization of being. Even in God being is realized as *ousia*, substance and even more as subsistence.<sup>122</sup> The concepts of *οὐσία* and *ὑπόστασις* are for him still synonymous, so much so that he can deduce the *homoousion* for Father and Son from the fact that they have the same *hypostasis*.<sup>123</sup> From this it follows that Marius could also have formed or understood the concept of *enhypostaton*. But then it would also have no other meaning than that of *enousion*, namely 'in being, to be in reality'.

### *The significance of enhypostaton in John the Grammarian*

The word *enhypostaton* appears in only a few places.<sup>124</sup> We shall ask first of all about the general, fundamental meaning of the word, and then about its application to christology.

(1) Fundamental meaning: it is existence, reality, in the sense of *ὑπαρξις*. This emerges from the struggle of the Grammarian for his 'formula of two *ousiai*'. For what concerns the reality, *ousia* is equivalent

118. Cf. the index in Locher with reference to the *Op. theol.*, pp. 100,17; 101,5.8.21.23.

119. Marius Vict., *Adv. Arium* II. 1: Locher, pp. 100,17; 101,5.8.21.23.

120. *Idem*, *Adv. Arium* I. 26: Locher, p. 59,5-8.

121. *Idem*, *Adv. Arium* II. 4-6: Locher, pp. 104-7, esp. p. 105,30.

122. In the formed being Marius distinguishes *existentia*, *substantia*, *subsistentia*. *quod enim ὄν est, et existit et subsistit et subiectum est* (p. 105,15-16).

123. *Idem*, *Adv. Arium* II. 6: Locher, p. 107,3-10: *ergo lectum est de deo vel ὑπόστασις vel οὐσία, hoc autem et de Christo intellegitur. dictum est: ego in patre et pater in me* (cf. Jn 14,10). *quod quidem ideo bis dictum, quia in patre esse potuit filius, non tamen et in filio pater, sed ut plenitudo atque idem unum in singulis esset. si autem eadem ὑπόστασις, ὁμοούσιον ergo. eadem autem; nam Christus deus de deo et lumen de lumine. ergo ὁμοούσιον. id autem si ex aeterno et semper, necessario simul; ergo vere ὁμοούσιον.*

124. Cf. the index in Richard, CCG 1, p. 153: I, 96, 108, 182, 201, 206, 256; II, 109; also adverbially, I, 118, 120, 133; II, 25, 66, 122, 123.

to *hypostasis*.<sup>125</sup> The distinction lies not in more or less reality, but only in the mode of existing: the *ousia* exists as the universal in the individuals, while the *hypostasis* signifies the final, concrete individual substance.<sup>126</sup> It is clear that thus the *enhypostaton* is present most definitely in the *hypostasis*. This means: to be real as *hypostasis*.<sup>127</sup> The prefix *en* does not refer to another being in which this *hypostasis* would inexist, but rather to the proper reality of this concrete *enhypostaton*.

(2) *Enhypostaton* in the christology of John the Grammarian: ought one to use the predicate *enhypostatos* also of the human nature of Christ? John attempts to limit the application, this again confirming the meaning just arrived at.

Consequently we do not say that our *ousia* is enhypostatically in Christ as a *hypostasis* which is characterized *per se* and is a *prosopon* (οἷον ὑπόστασιν καθ'ἑαυτὴν χαρακτηριστικὴν καὶ πρόσωπον οὖσαν), but insofar as it has existence and is (ἀλλὰ καθὸ ὕφ'ἑστῆκε τε καὶ ἔστιν) For sometimes the *hypostasis* reveals what pertains to the *ousia* as is shown when it is deprived of the characteristic *idiomata* and all of those things which are seen in the *prosopon* <sup>128</sup>

On this account John the Grammarian is cautious in his application of the predicate *enhypostatos* to the humanity of Christ, because he does not want to represent it as an independent *hypostasis*; this would have inevitably brought upon him from Severus the reproach of Nestorianism. Yet he wants to retain this concept for the human being of Christ, and indeed in its fundamental meaning 'to be real, actual', certainly not in the sense that it is *ousia*, and indeed not as *hypostasis*. At this point it would have been best for him to have introduced the word *enousios*. For the human nature of Christ, his *ousia*, does not have those characteristic features from which it would constitute a purely human *hypostasis*, a 'mere human' in the sense of Paul of Samosata or Photinus. For then, *vis-à-vis* the Logos, it would be an *allos*, an other. Thus we recognize that the prefix *en* is not yet pointing the way to a subject that lies outside the human *ousia* of Christ, but rather into this very *ousia*, into the reality that is proper to it as such.

125 Johannes Gram, *Apol* IV 5 Richard, CCG 1, I 2, p 55,199–200 ἡ γὰρ ὑπόστασις καὶ ἡ οὐσία ὑπαρξίς ἐστιν ἔστι γὰρ καὶ ὑπάρχει The *ousia* is an objective reality, even if it is only discovered by the abstracting intellect as universal in individual things

126 Cf *ibid*, IV 6, p 55,202–5 'The *hypostasis* is differentiated from the *ousia* not by being "what is" [the *quid esse*], but through the universal being, I mean the *ousia*, while the *hypostasis* exists individualized (ἀλλὰ τῷ τὴν μὲν κοινῶς εἶναι, φημί δὲ τὴν οὐσίαν, τὴν δὲ ὑπόστασιν ἰδικῶς, ὅταν μετὰ τῶν καθόλου καὶ ἰδικόν τι ἔχῃ)'

127 *Ibid*, p 55,205–7 ἐνυπόστατον, οἷον ὑπόστασιν καθ'ἑαυτὴν χαρακτηριστικὴν καὶ πρόσωπον οὖσαν

128 *Ibid*, pp 55,205–56,211



John the Grammarian, however, cannot escape the axiom with which Severus confronts him: there is no *prosopon*-less *ousia*! Hence he must show that the unmingled *ousia* of Christ nevertheless finally becomes the *hypostasis* or also that it participates in the reality of the *hypostasis* and does this through the *idiomata* peculiar to the Logos. This participation is mediated to the human *ousia* of Christ by way of the 'enhypostatic union' or of the *synthesis*.<sup>129</sup> With this a new formula has been coined which differs from the Cyrillian 'hypostatic union' through the prefix *en*. With this formula have we already arrived at the concept of *enhypostasis* which so quickly attracted the attention of historians of doctrine and has been interpreted in the sense of insubistence of the human nature of Christ in the *hypostasis* of the Logos? In answering this question one must note that the Grammarian understands this 'enhypostatic *henosis*' in the framework of the Basilian teaching of *ousia* and *hypostasis*. It is a question of the human essence of Christ which, according to the *koinon*, the general, does not differ at all from the essence of other human beings, but which can have its specialness only in the manner that it does not stand beside the Logos as an *allos*, as an other. Hence it can become hypostasized through the communication of the *idiomata* of the Logos as Logos. Through this communication it participates in the *hypostasis*-being of the Son, in his *idiomata*, and attains the degree of a hypostatic actualization. In this connection John the Grammarian appears to look only at these *idiomata* which are due to the human nature of Christ from the Logos. He does not ask about the purely human qualities such as size, colour, appearance, which nevertheless cannot be denied to the individuality of this human being, Jesus of Nazareth. This emerges from a fragment of his *apologia* preserved in Greek.

To him [i.e. Christ as Logos-subject] belongs according to his nature the divine, to him and not to another also the human on account of the enhypostatic union (*διὰ τὴν ἐνυπόστατον ἔνωσιν*) For not in another but in him exists this his own flesh (*ἀλλ' ἐν αὐτῷ ἡ ἰδικὴ αὐτοῦ ὑπέστη σὰρξ*) Indeed it [the flesh] has the general (*τὸ κοινόν*) of the human *ousia*, namely flesh animated by a spiritual soul, but only in the God-Logos did it have the specialness (*τὰ ἰδικά*), that means not to be the flesh of another. How is it [the flesh] now a *hypostasis* because it does not exist at all for itself?<sup>130</sup>

The *idika*, which could thus make the human *ousia* in Christ an individual, ultimate subject existing for itself, come to it solely from the pre-existent divine Logos-subject who is constituted as *hypostasis* in God.

129 *Ibid.*, IV. 2, p. 53, 132-133 οὐσιῶν . . τῶν ἐν συνθέσει καὶ ἐνυποστάτως ἠνωμένων

130 *Ibid.*, IV. 3, p. 55, 181-188

In this way, going speculatively beyond Chalcedon, that notion is emphasized which sees the 'one *hypostasis*' already pre-existent in the (concrete) Logos-subject and does not consider it only as the result of the *henosis*. We have established that the beginnings of this are to be found quite soon after Chalcedon.<sup>131</sup> Now it is clear that the 'one *hypostasis*' is also firmly established really and ontologically in the Logos, and not only according to the kerygmatic schema of a christology from above.

In this passage, what does the expression 'enhypostatic union' mean? Ought we to interpret it from the final words of the text just cited, which state of the flesh of Christ that it does not 'exist for itself'? Ought we here to interpret the word 'enhypostatic' on the basis of its prefix as an 'insubstisting', in distinction to the meaning first established: real, actual? From our text this much is clear: the human *ousia* of Christ has, in addition to the content of its essence, only this one *proprium*: to be the flesh of the Logos alone and of no other. The bond which links the human nature of Christ to the Logos as subject is not yet formally seen in the 'insubstistence', the existing in, but in a relationship of possession. This restriction imposes itself if one examines how John thinks of the 'becoming united enhypostatically' in its execution. He understands by it hardly anything other than what Cyril wants to express with the concept of 'appropriation' (*ἰδιοποιεῖν*). One has to interpret the following text in this sense.

(In contrast to the eternal, uncreated, impassible divine nature of the Logos, his flesh is temporal, created and subject to suffering.) But if it is *his own* flesh, so it is clear that also everything due to the flesh belongs to him, for everything is taken over as his possession (*οἰκειοποιεῖται*), even if his divine nature itself has not been subjected to this (suffering)<sup>132</sup>

Yet the whole of the Grammarian's remarks lead beyond Cyril when (1) a conceptual distinction is made between *ousia* and *hypostasis* and when (2) the concept of *hypostasis* is explained as 'existing for itself'. This 'existing for itself', however, does not yet mean more than 'to exist completely individualized'; thus the Grammarian penetrates only as far as grasping the individuality. The Grammarian seems (3) consciously not to speak of the 'physical or essential union' (*ἐνωσις φυσική, οὐσιώδης*)

131 See *JdChr* II/1, 189-96, 263-4, *CCT* II/1, 166-72, 233-5

132 John Gram, *Apol* VI Richard, *CCG* 1, p. 57, 259-261 and 267-272 Cyril of Alexandria usually supports the meaning of *enhypostatos* mentioned above, when in the *Thesaurus de Trn* VIII (PG 75, 101C9-104A9) he opposes the *enhypostatos* to things such as, for example, knowledge, wisdom, will, which 'exist in certain beings as angels and human beings'. Because the Son of God in contrast 'is enhypostatic' (*ἐνυπόστατος ὢν*), he will thus be in no way similar to the anhypostatic will

as Cyril does, but of the 'enhypostatic union'. In Cyril, the Apollinarian nature-*synthesis* still resounds when he emphasizes the 'substantial' and not only 'accidental' unity of God and a human being. Christ is a 'really-one concrete subject out of two natures'. This danger of still thinking in the manner of the nature synthesis is now clearly excluded precisely through the distinction of *hypostasis* and *ousia* (*physis*). For the unmingled human *ousia* of Christ participates in the being of *hypostasis* solely through being possessed by the Logos and the communication of his special features. The idea of *hypostasis* as the ultimate, incommunicable subject in contrast to 'essence' or 'nature' has now already come into view. Nevertheless one should not let oneself be misled by the word *enhypostatos* into seeing already a formal expression of the function of the 'insubsistence' of the humanity of Christ in the Logos-*hypostasis*. 'Insubsistence' can only be found in it to the extent that the human nature of Christ is inseparably taken under the *hypostasis* of the Logos through the communication of the divine *idiomata*, and is individualized through the *idiomata* that are proper to the Logos.

(b) *A compromise for peace*

The significance of John of Caesarea in the history of theology lies not so much in the domain of conceptual analysis as in his use of christological formulas. He was the first promoter of the idea of reconciling Chalcedonians and Cyrillians/Severans through playing with antithetical formulas. In a special way the appellation 'neo-Chalcedonian' applies to him, should this term continue to be used by researchers. We shall have to return to this. Cyril of Alexandria now also receives a new chance from the side of the supporters of Chalcedon. If the compilers of the large *Florilegium Cyrillianum* had attempted to point out how close the Patriarch was to the two-natures formula, so now the Grammarian, even more decidedly than Nephalius, adds the *mia-physis* formula and its terminological compass to Chalcedonian language, ostensibly to represent the mystery of Christ in a fully valid way. From the fragments which have been preserved by Severus we can develop a reasonably complete conception of this attempt.

(i) *Cyril as an example of tolerance and of the willingness to compromise*

In the behaviour of Cyril at the Union of 433 John also sees a model for clearing away the differences about Chalcedon. This is a legitimate thought. He depicts the situation in this way.<sup>133</sup>

<sup>133</sup> Severus Ant, *C imp Gram*, Or III 1, 12 CSCO 94, p 153,1-31, John Gram, *Apol* 37 Richard, CCG 1, I 1, pp 17,333-18,362

(1) The Orientals (that is, the Antiochenes in the party of John of Antioch) proclaimed two natures in Christ and refused to assent to the formula of the 'one incarnate nature', because for them this smelled of heresy.

(2) Through this action Cyril's patience was severely tested, because he had made himself the patron of this formula and had justified it, as he declared in his second letter to Succensus. He said: (a) the Orientals lived in darkness, not because of their positive confession, but because of their refusal to allow as a valid statement the formula of the one incarnate nature. (b) He himself has understood this formula in orthodox fashion. It means nothing other than: 'There exists one Son, one nature of the Word, but who has become flesh.' (c) As far as the issue at stake was concerned, the Orientals could also have taught this, although they showed no appreciation for the formula itself.<sup>134</sup> Thus Cyril himself saw here a fundamental consensus.

From this analysis of the situation in 433 the Grammarian now judges the possibilities of an agreement between the Chalcedonians and the Severans. (1) Cyril does not reject the statement of the two natures; he demands, however, (2) from his Antiochene partners the confession of 'the one incarnate nature of the Logos'.<sup>135</sup> The Orientals in fact could have allowed themselves to be 'illuminated' to the extent that they were ready to accept in the same way the two-natures formula together with the one-nature formula and to profess them in orthodox fashion. The ones remaining in the darkness are the Severans, who before as well as after wanted only the *mia-physis* formula to be regarded as valid.<sup>136</sup> They still would not recognize that both dispositions are present in Cyril and also that the two-natures formula was not rejected by him. At the same time the Grammarian knows that Cyril does not take over for himself the two-natures formula as such<sup>137</sup> (the Alexandrian, however, did not demand from the Antiochenes the recognition of the *mia physis*).

134. Severus Ant., *loc. cit.*: CSCO 94, p. 153, 10–26; John Gram., *loc. cit.*: CCG 1, pp. 17, 342–18, 358.

135. Severus Ant., *loc. cit.*: CSCO 94, p. 153, 27–31; John Gram., *loc. cit.*: CCG 1, p. 18, 358–362: *Itaque non reicit assertionem duarum naturarum, sed confessionem unius naturae incarnatae, carne praedita anima rationali postulat. Vos autem adhuc et nunc tenebris offundimini, dum Orientales illuminati sunt et utramque formulam aequae et recte confitentur.*

136. See the texts cited above.

137. This appears in the cautious words of John the Grammarian, *Apol.* 40: Richard, CCG 1, pp. 18, 382–19, 387 (CSCO 94, p. 154, 12–18): *Quapropter beatus Cyrillus et eos, qui duas naturas de Emmanuele dicunt, recipiebat, cum haereses Apollinarii fugeret, rursusque assertionem unius naturae Dei Verbi incarnatae profitebatur propter sectionem Nestorii. Cum enim utrumque proclamatur, rectae sententiae indicium habetur; cum vero una confessio reicitur, mala suspicio haereseos oritur.*

The position of Cyril, despite some slight eisegesis, is to some extent correctly rendered. It is false, however, to claim that the Orientals would have professed both formulas. The intention of the presbyter reveals itself clearly: to bring the historical positions of 433 so closely together so that Severus too could give up his rigid either-or position without losing face. The suggestion of excluding both Apollinarius and Nestorius through employing both formulas simultaneously seemed to be so plausible to the Grammarian and so easily realizable that he was severely disappointed at the categorical negative of the Severans.

(ii) *The reaction of Severus and his supporters*

The resistance to the Grammarian's idea of peace sprang up immediately and was fierce. Fragment 39 of John's *apologia* manifests this.

They [i.e. the Severans] will say, however: 'You use this expression [i.e. the *mia-physis* formula] in a malevolent way!' Ah! This impudence of opponents! If we were to speak only of two natures and not also proclaim that other confession: namely, one is the incarnate nature of the Word, then your accusation would have a base. But what legitimate charge against us still remains for them? Who will not rather rebuke rightfully the ones who utter their anathema against those who characterize the two natures as hypostatically united?<sup>138</sup>

Severus feels that the Grammarian interpreted the Union of 433 according to his own desires and had formed for himself a straightforward judgement. He gave John of Caesarea the following to think about.<sup>139</sup> The letter of the Orientals to Cyril<sup>140</sup> did not contain the *mia-physis* formula at all. Cyril remedied the confession of the Orientals, which according to his notions was insufficient, by adding the formula 'out of two' (*ex duobus*).<sup>141</sup> The Grammarian's attempt to employ the two contested formulas simultaneously was for him a futile enterprise. For whoever remains with the 'duality' of Chalcedon and wants to combine the *mia-physis* formula with it maintains contradictions, namely: 'to become united and not to become united are the same'.<sup>142</sup> Already in the second speech against the Grammarian, Severus had rejected the attempt to achieve the 'remedy' of Chalcedon by equating the *mia-physis* formula with the new creation 'two united natures' (*duae naturae*

138. Severus Ant., *C. imp. Gram.*, Or. III 1, 19: CSCO 94, p. 222,6-14; John Gram., *Apol.* 39: Richard, CCG 1, p. 18,374-381. Partial citations of this text are found in Or. II 12: CSCO 112, p. 89,27-31; Or. III 1, 12: CSCO 94, p. 154,9-12; Or. III 1, 13: *ibid.*, p. 165,10-13.

139. See Severus Ant., *C. imp. Gram.*, Or. III. 1, 12: CSCO 94, pp. 154,19-156,13.

140. See John Ant., *Ep. ad Cyril Alex.*: PG 77, 169-173.

141. Severus Ant., *C. imp. Gram.*, Or. III. 1,12: CSCO 94, pp. 155,27-156,1 = Cyril Alex., *Ep.* 39: PG 77, 180B4.

142. Severus Ant., *C. imp. Gram.*, Or. III. 1, 12: CSCO 94, p. 156,13: *idemque dicunt esse uniri et non uniri*.

*unitae*).<sup>143</sup> In the same way the equation of 'two united natures' and 'one composed nature' was dismissed.<sup>144</sup> To substantiate his refusal Severus referred to 'Athanasius', whose name, however, conceals Apollinarius.<sup>145</sup> Fundamentally he could not permit such an equation because the cursed 'two' is contained in one of the formulas.<sup>146</sup> For this reason the equation of 'out of two natures' and 'in two natures' can never be successful. Only in the first of the two formulas is the duality really overcome. Thus one can place as many verbal brackets around the two natures as one likes, as, for example, two 'united' or two 'undivided' natures: the gulf remains unbridgeable: 'Namely that one is equal to two belongs to the impossible.'<sup>147</sup> Thus whoever prepares this salad of formulas can only have the poisonous duality in mind.<sup>148</sup>

It is still too early to reflect on the expression 'neo-Chalcedonian'. Yet one can see clearly that for the Grammarian it is a question of 'interpreting' for the confessors of the *mia-physis* formula and the supporters of the old-Alexandrian tradition, *vis-à-vis* the two-natures formula of Chalcedon, by taking over Cyrillian elements. As a Homeric philologist, the Grammarian would have been so practised in the analysis of concepts and language that he would have realized that an equation can never be arrived at through exact conceptual analysis: the one incarnate nature of the Logos = one *hypostasis* in two natures. He strove rather for a 'functional' balance of the two formulas to ward off the antithetical threat to the one doctrine of the incarnation of God in Christ, through

143 Cf Severus Ant, *C imp Gram*, Or II 10 CSCO 112, pp 80-3, esp pp 81,23-82,11

144 *Ibid*, p 81,23-26

145 Severus Ant, *C imp Gram*, Or II 10 CSCO 112, pp 80,33-81,13 = Apollinar, *Ad Iouanum* PG 28,25, Lietzmann, 250-251. See CPG 3665 On the citations of Athanasius in Severus see C Lash, 'Saint Athanase dans les écrits de Sévère d'Antioche', in *Politique et théologie chez Athanase d'Alexandrie Actes du colloque de Chantilly 23-25 sept 1973*, ed C Kannengiesser = *ThéolHist* 27 (Paris, 1974), 377-94

146 Severus Ant, *C imp Gram*, Or II 10 CSCO 112, p 81,19-22 *Etenim dualitas solvit unionem atque omni ex necessitate natura humana in id redigitur, ut non adoretur, cum dualitatis sectione separatur a Deo Verbo adorando* For this reason 'Athanasius' said absolutely *non duas naturas unum Filium* If the Grammarian were to be correct, then it would have to read *Non duas naturas separatas unum Filium, sed duas naturas individuas et unitas* (*ibid*, p 81,34-36)

147 Severus Ant, *C imp Gram*, Or II 12 CSCO 112, p 92,1 *Etenim idem esse unum et duo, ex impossibilitus est* How much Severus was annoyed by the placing on a par of 'two undivided united natures' and the *mia physis* formula is shown by the parallel passages in Richard, CCG 1, p 15,275-278 in the apparatus to no 31 Cf CSCO 94, pp 115, 116, 121, 185-6 In the Or II 12 CSCO 112, p 89, 26-27 he calls the Grammarian *novus reconciliator et mediator oppositorum verborum*

148 Whoever admits 'two' for any gap at all smuggles it into everything, so that there are 'two hypostases, two sons, two lords, two Christs', cf Severus Ant, *C imp Gram*, Or II 13 CSCO 112, p 94,28-30

Apollinarianism on the one side and through Nestorianism on the other. Henceforward no Nestorian should be able to call upon Chalcedon on hearing the statement: even the Chalcedonians profess the 'one nature of the incarnate Word'. And no Apollinarians, no Eutychians or Manichaeans should be able to maintain their errors when they hear: 'in two natures, undivided and unmingled'. In the tension of such a dialectic the entire truth of the incarnation lights up. As long as one stays on the level of the kerygma or of christological proclamation, this dialectical use of formulas may render some service. But if one enters upon the analysis of concepts, the contradictions cannot fail to appear. Chalcedon had applied to christology the distinction between *hypostasis* and *physis* which had been accepted by Cyril for the theology of the Trinity. Severus remained with the linguistic usage of Cyril. Through taking on board the *mia-physis* terminology the Grammarian sought to combine the old-Nicene equation of *physis-hypostasis* with the neo-Nicene/Chalcedonian distinction of the two concepts.<sup>149</sup> Gregory Nazianzen would certainly have shaken his head. In the eyes of Severus there was only one thing that helped against the subtle Homeric philologist from Caesarea: a thoroughgoing purification of christological language, which would make impossible all reference to ambiguous formulas of the Fathers in the fourth and fifth centuries. The monk of Majuma took as the standard for this selection the Cyril of the anti-Nestorian letters after 429, while the 'earlier' Cyril was pushed into the background. For

149 For Severus and his usage of 'hypostasis' and 'essence' (*ousia*) in trinitarian teaching cf *Hom* 125 PO 29, p. 239 'Father, Son and Holy Spirit are three different *hypostases*, not mingled with each other, in one unique essence (*ousia*)'. We say that essence and *hypostasis* are concepts which indicate the existence of existing things. The essence [derived from *eîvai*, to be] brings to notice that the subject exists, and the *hypostasis* that it subsists . . . (234). The essence indicates a commonality, the *hypostasis* a particularity (236). With regard to the Trinity the essence is the godhead, for the Father is God, the Son is God and the Holy Spirit is God, none of them is more God than the other on account of the identity and equality of the honour of the essence (*ousia*). With regard to the *hypostasis*, that of the Father, that of the Son and of the Holy Spirit is in each case another' (239). It is to be noted that here Severus distinguishes between *hypostasis* and *ousia*. The concept *physis* is not considered in this passage. A Greek fragment helps us further, in it *physis* is enlisted for trinitarian teaching and is taken to be synonymous with *ousia*, which, however, is not possible for the incarnation, the order of the *oikonomia*. In the *Solutio argumentorum Severi* (CPG 6815) Leontius of Byzantium brings the following objection 'It is to be agreed that in theology *hypostasis* and *ousia* or *physis* are not the same, in the *oikonomia*, however, they are identical. If namely the novelty of the *mysterium* signifies a novelty also for the natures, so this will be true too, according to the divine Gregory, I believe, for the terms. Hence, according to him, to each of the two concepts the content (*Logos*) and the definition of the other apply' (PG 86, 1921B). That is, through the mystery of the incarnation the concepts of *hypostasis* and nature have received a new meaning and a new definition. Cf Severus Ant., *Ep* 3 *ad Joh* *ducem* Diekamp, DP, pp 309,15-310,12, in which he also refers to Ps Dionysius. We shall return to the problem in Leontius of Byzantium. Cf Lebon, 239-58.

the history of christology and its methodology this process is of some significance. Can orthodoxy only be attained by being constricted, and depth only by an impoverishment of language? We are already acquainted with this problem from the post-apostolic period.

(c) *The Severan purification of christological language.*

*The custodian of faith*

How consciously Severus approached the business of supervising language is evident from his basic comments on his self-imposed task. He discovered in himself the feeling of a 'vigilant and sensible custody'<sup>150</sup> which he had discovered before in his great models Cyril and Athanasius. Both teachers, each in the situation of his time, acted 'in the manner of a doctor' at the appearance of 'epidemics'.<sup>151</sup> The 'widespread disease' in Cyril's time was the new teaching of Nestorius.<sup>152</sup> The 'two natures' of Chalcedon showed its rapid spread. The attempts of Nephalius and John the Grammarian to discover this formula already in the earlier Fathers and to legitimate it with their authority would indeed have represented an epidemic as a healthy development (*bona valetudo*). In the case of infection abstinence and strict dietary rules had to be prescribed. However, the same medicinal treatment was not always suitable. In one case the drinking of water could be recommended; in another case, however, it could be extremely deleterious. This was to be transferred to the application of the christological language of Cyril and other Fathers, insofar as they had allowed themselves to speak of 'two natures'. What was once good did not always have to be so!<sup>153</sup> Thus for Severus the therapy was unambiguous: the sole medicine against Chalcedon was the consistent erasure of the two-natures terminology in its entire range from theological vocabulary. Only in this way was the Nestorian 'disease of separation'<sup>154</sup> to be eradicated effectively. The *Florilegium Cyrillianum*, Nephalius and the Grammarian had made the immediate object of this therapy ready to hand for Severus, because they had gathered together everything in the Fathers that could be adduced in favour of the two-natures formula of Chalcedon. For this the monk coined the collective

150 Severus Ant, C imp Gram, Or III 2, 22 CSCO 102, p 1,7-21

151 Ibid, p 1,20-21 *sanctus Cyrillus medici more, attento morbo, prohibitionem ipsum morbum impugnantem statuit*

152 Ibid, p 2,27-28 *morbo vaniloquiorum Nestori in ecclesius grassante* Or, p 2,33-34. *exituali morbo aliquam civitatem invadente*

153 Ibid, pp 2,20-3,5

154 Ibid, p 1,15 *divisionis morbus*



expression 'coarser language' (*lingua crassior*),<sup>155</sup> which once could have been good but now had to be replaced by more refined expressions. The conservative Severus, who was very quickly ready with the argument from tradition, particularly when Cyril was up for discussion, thus allowed himself to correct individual Fathers and regarded this procedure as legitimate.<sup>156</sup> The purification of language that had been demanded now touched the description of the incarnation of the Logos either in the process (*in fieri*) or in the final state (*in facto esse*).

(i) *Linguistic correction for the incarnation in fieri*

Even the way and means used to describe the process of hypostatic unity were decisive with regard to whether the 'effect' is rightly grasped. Hence all expressions that showed only an accidental, adoptionist unity in Christ had to be excluded. Such an expression would exist if the starting-point of the event of union was so represented that a duality was firmly present beforehand. According to Severus such a conception was necessarily connected with the verb 'to assume' (*ἀναλαμβάνειν*, *προσλαμβάνειν*, Lat.: *assumere*). Even worse was the use of *συνάπτειν*, with the substantive *συνάφεια* in the meaning of 'to join', 'to connect', 'connection'. Indeed Severus, with the Apollinarian writing Ps. Julius, *De unione*,<sup>157</sup> knew of the fact that *synapheia* also guaranteed a substantial unity. It denoted in the result a firmly established unity (*συμπλοκή, ἐνότης*). Indeed, even unsuspected witnesses such as the great Cappadocians, Basil and Gregory Nazianzen, were said to have used the *synapheia* terminology.<sup>158</sup> But they also added '(established) according to the hypostasis' in order to be successful in bringing to expression the hypostatic or substantial unity (*ἐνωσις ὑποστατική, κατ'οὐσίαν*) and not a purely moral unity in Christ.<sup>159</sup> To his regret Severus had to concede that Cyril too had spoken of *synapheia*, as we have already established, but always with a meaning completely different from

155 *Ibid*, ch. 27· CSCO 102, pp 49,35–50, 3 (*Patres*) *saepe crassius locuti (sunt) de incarnatione Domini, quia de illa tunc nulla prorsus quaestio movebatur Crassius autem eos locutos esse dico quoad unam alteramve vocem*

156 Cf Severus Ant, *C imp Gram*, Or III 2, 22 CSCO 102, 1–7, esp pp 1,18–2,19 and 7,8–22, cf also John Gram, *Apol* 56 Richard, CCG 1, 22

157 Ps Julius, *De unione* 4–5 Lietzmann, pp 186,20–187,8

158 Cf Basil, *Ep* 210 *ad primores Neocaes* 5 PG 32,776B8, Greg Naz, *Ep* 101 *ad Cledon* I PG 37, 180B· *κατ'οὐσίαν συνήφθαί τε καὶ συνάπτεσθαι*

159 Severus Ant, *C imp Gram*, Or III 2, 23 CSCO 102, pp 11,22–12,11

Nestorius, who had made this word the shibboleth of his separation.<sup>160</sup> It was for this reason indeed that the great master abandoned this loaded term as a christological one — an example which he, Severus himself, follows.<sup>161</sup>

(ii) *Insufficient designations of the incarnation in facto esse*

(1) *Christus duplex*

Talk of a 'doubling' in Christ was startling for Severus. It was only a variation on the cursed 'two'! In settling accounts with the 'godless Grammarian' it was precisely this irritating *duplex* that came up for discussion. Various Fathers had used it.<sup>162</sup> With it they wanted to protest both against the denial of the divinity of the Logos by the Arians as well as against the suppression of Christ's soul by the Apollinarians. Both had an interest in accepting in Christ only 'one *physis*': the Arians, so that from the Logos' becoming one with created flesh they could assign the result in its totality to the created *ordo*;<sup>163</sup> the Apollinarians, so that they could ascribe the overcoming of sin to an 'invisible *nous*'

160. *Ibid.*, ch. 25: CSCO 102, 37, with a citation from Cyril Alex., *De s. Trin.*, Dial. VI: PG 75, 1032D: *Ceterum ante concursum ad carnem* (πρὸ τῆς πρὸς σάρκα συνδρομῆς) *et adhaesionem secundum unionem* (καὶ τῆς καθ' ἑνωσιν συναφείας) *Dominum fuisse Filium nullo negotio videbimus*. But on this Severus says: *nec quisquam dicet sanctum Cyrillum adhaesionem hic nominare sicut Nestorius illam nominavit: eandem enim tum concursum ad carnem, tum unionem vocavit*. Thus Cyril used the concepts *syndrome* and *henosis* synonymously.

161. Severus Ant., *C. imp. Gram.*, Or. III. 2, ch. 23: CSCO 102, pp. 12,21–13,9 with reference to Cyril Alex., *Ep. 17 ad Nestorium*: PL 77, 112BC; ch. 23: CSCO 102, pp. 12,35–13,3 with reference to Cyril Alex., *Quod unus sit Christus*: PG 75, 1285 (*synapheia* has occasionally been used by us and handed on by the holy Fathers; nevertheless it is to be abandoned); ch. 23: CSCO 102, p. 13,10–12; ch. 25, p. 37,4–7, where Cyril (PG 77, 112) is cited: *Imo nomen adhaesionis (synapheia) repudiamus ut impar ad unionem significandam*. With regard to this Severus says, *ibid.*: *omnibus viribus hanc reprobationem sectamur, et nomen adhaesionis apud nos in suspicionem cadit*.

162. On *Christus duplex* and its use by individual Fathers: (a) Greg. Naz., *Or. de Epiphani.*: PG 36, 328: '[Christ] is sent [not as God], but as a human being. He is indeed twofold'; cited by Severus Ant., *Or. 2 ad Neph.*: CSCO 120, pp. 31,27–32,2; *C. imp. Gram.*, Or. III. 2, ch. 23: CSCO 102, p. 14,31–32; repeated in ch. 37: p. 171,27–34. Gregory also applies this *duplex* to the unity of body and soul: cf. CSCO 102, pp. 15,18–17,4; similarly John Chrysostom. Severus has to object that someone had made nonsense of the passage in Gregory. Cf. John the Grammarian, *Apol.* 105: Richard, CCG 1, 42 with reference to Leo M. (b) The Grammarian had discovered a particularly vexing passage in Gelasius of Caesarea: In Christ it is said *duplicita omnia* (διπλὰ πάντα) *et vera omnia, et perfecta omnia*, cited in CSCO 102, p. 174,13–14; Richard, CCG 1, no. 106, p. 42,1047–1048. Cf. F. Diekamp, *Analecta Patristica* = OCA 117 (Rome, 1938), 45 (Greek and German).

163. Cf. the question of the Arians in Athan. Alex., *C. Arian.* III. 27: PG 26, 381A: 'If he [the Logos] was true God from God, how could he become a human being . . . How do you [the Nicenes] dare to say the Logos partakes of the essence of the Father, since he has indeed a body so that he bears and suffers this?'

and not to a fallible human principle of decision-making.<sup>164</sup> In order to hinder the Arian as well as the Apollinarian *mia physis* or the diminution, be it of the divinity or humanity of Christ, the Fathers began again — as early as the period of the docetist *gnosis* — to speak of ‘perfect God’ and ‘perfect human being’ in Christ and to bring the ‘duality’ of Christ into view. Against the Arians the distinction of the ‘times’ in the incarnation, namely the time before and the time after the incarnation, also served this purpose. Although this was still a historical schema of distinction (the one God-Logos as pre-existent and then incarnate), the Greek Fathers tended to make it an ontological one (Christ, perfect in divinity, perfect in humanity). This second schema, promoted by the Cappadocians and the Antiochenes, Theodore of Mopsuestia and Theodoret, had the intrinsic tendency to be understood paratactically and to concentrate the ‘duality’ in Christ statically. According to Severus, Nestorius and Chalcedon were the disastrous end-result of this: *Christus duplex*, i.e. Christ, two natures, two hypostases!

The Grammarian’s conjuring up again of these evil spirits of division and separation, disguised under the names of holy Fathers, was extremely irksome to Severus. Hence he fell decisively in line with the anti-Nestorian Cyril and rejected the whole attempt to speak of the *Christus duplex*.

After its rejection by Saint Cyril we refuse once and for all to call Christ ‘twofold’, as he (Cyril) also rejected the word ‘adhere’ (*adhaesio*; Greek: *συνάφεια*), although it was employed (*dictum*) well by the Fathers. It counts indeed in maintaining the force of Nestorius’ illusion (*opinio, doxa*).<sup>165</sup>

So Severus brought attention back from the ontological static schema of acknowledged Fathers to the historical schema of the distinction of the ‘two times’ in the economy of salvation: there was only *one physis* in Christ which endured a process which the Scriptures depict in a ‘double narrative’. The ‘objective’ distinction was entirely transposed into the ‘subjective’ report of the two times in the holy Scriptures.<sup>166</sup> The temporal succession of pre-existent Logos and his *status incarnatorius*

164. See the examples in *JdChr* I<sup>3</sup>, 486, nn. 19–21; *CCT* I<sup>2</sup>, 333, nn. 19–21.

165. Severus Ant., *C. imp. Gram.*, Or. III. 2, ch. 23: CSCO 102, p. 17, 10–14: . . . *recusamus duplicem dicere Christum*.

166. Cf. Severus Ant., *C. imp. Gram.*, Or. III. 2, ch. 38: CSCO 102, p. 174, 20–1: *Dixit enim Athanasius duplicem esse divinarum Scripturarum narrationem: illum nimirum semper deum esse, illumque postea propter nos immutabiliter factum esse hominem*. Just before this Severus has a citation from Athanasius, *C. Arian*. III. 29: PG 26, 385AB, in which the hermeneutical principle for the distinction of the ‘two times’ is clearly developed. Cf. in general Athan. Alex., *C. Arian* III 28–29, 43, 55: PG 26, 381C–388A, 413AB, 437B. The whole of ch. 38 of the Or. III. 2 is important for this: CSCO 102, 173–178. Severus rebukes the Chalcedonians for laying claim imper-

ought not to be condensed to 'two natures' or to a 'doubling', any more than the distinction of the Fathers between a divine and a human act and speech in Christ. Indeed Severus too could not manage without making an ontological distinction. For his 'out of two one' or the 'out of two natures' were founded on an admittedly theoretical, but still ontological view of the one Christ 'before the union'. Because the unity remained, however, an unmingled one, the 'godless Grammarian' could indeed come to the idea of perpetuating this theoretical view by demanding the formula of the two (abstract) *ousiai* (essences) in Christ. Here Severus believed he had to call a halt: at no price ought there to be talk of a 'duality' as long as the consideration was concerned with the constitution of Christ himself and stayed within the incarnate Word. In his works there could be a 'two' only *extra Christum*.

(2) *Christ the 'assumed human being'*

For Severus the often-employed formula *homo assumptus*, the 'assumed human being', was on a par with *Christus duplex* in its effect. It too was protected by respected Fathers, such as Gregory Nazianzen<sup>167</sup> and even Cyril himself.<sup>168</sup> It was alleged to have been misused by Diodore of Tarsus, Theodore of Mopsuestia and Nestorius in the sense of a unity that was only according to behaviour.<sup>169</sup> Severus maintained that for this reason Cyril did not employ this term strictly speaking, but expunged it absolutely from christological vocabulary. Cyril was said to have been certainly aware that it appeared in several Fathers,<sup>170</sup> but he

missibly to texts in which there is talk of a *duplicitas*, even if there is expressed by this only the distinction of the times and only the difference on the level of divine and human speech and action, thus not on the level of the natures. In other words, Severus says it is an illegitimate *metabasis eis allo genos*, when the Chalcedonians make of this distinction of the times a static-ontological doubling, namely a *naturarum vel hypostasium duplicitas, ut in duo unam ex duobus hypostasim atque naturam, sc. naturam et hypostasim Dei Verbi incarnatam dissecarent* (p. 176,15–18). Severus had already treated this theme in *C. imp. Gram.*, Or. III. 1, ch. 7: CSCO 94, 73–96. We shall cite from this only p. 89,17–23: *Aliud enim est scire quidnam Unigenito Verbo nudo nondumque incarnato et quidnam inhumanato loqui conveniat, et aliud illud dividere, cum hypostatice unitum est carni rationaliter animatae, duplicitate naturarum, atque singulis naturis sermones aptare dicendo esse unius quidem naturae tale quid, alterius autem aliud quid loqui.* Leo I of Rome in particular is meant by this.

167. Greg. Naz., *Ep. 101 ad Cledon.* I: PG 37, 177B (against Apollinarius), adduced by Severus Ant., *C. imp. Gram.*, Or. III. 2: CSCO 102, p. 8,11–14. The two words *προσληφθῆναι* and *ἀναληφθῆναι* are synonymous for him.

168. Cf. Severus Ant., *C. imp. Gram.*, Or. III. 2: CSCO 102, pp. 8,26–9,2.

169. *Ibid.*, p. 8,29–30: *σχετικῶς κατὰ σχέσιν τῆς γνώμης.*

170. *Ibid.*, p. 9,26–33: the 'Antiochene usage' is said, however, not to be found among the Fathers. In this sense Cyril said: *Hominem assumptum esse a Deo non videtur sanctis Patribus.* He did not say this, according to Severus, in the Jewish sense of the letter of the law, but only with regard to the 'mind of the Fathers' (*mentem doctorum cognoscens*).

was convinced that in them it had not had an 'Antiochene' interpretation. Indeed this Antiochene interpretation of the formula he never approved of. According to Severus one could rightfully maintain that Cyril rejected this improper form of speech 'without distinction'.<sup>171</sup> However, the Grammarian could produce a citation from Cyril's *Thesaurus* which is very much like the Antiochene Nestorian language.<sup>172</sup> The human nature of Christ is compared namely with the *poderes*, the garment of the high priest, which the Logos had to put on in the incarnation.<sup>173</sup> Disagreeable in this citation from Cyril was also the fact that the concrete *homo* was used for denoting the humanity of Christ and as the equivalent of this stood indeed the image of the *temple*. 'Assumed human being' sounded all too much like an already present, already existing human being, who only subsequently to his coming-into-existence had been assumed into the unity of the *hypostasis* of the Logos. Creation and assumption of the humanity of Christ, however, coincided for Severus as much as they did for Augustine, who had found an excellent expression for this.<sup>174</sup>

(3) *Anthropos theophoros, homo deifer*

This suspicious expression was apparently protected by the authority of Gelasius of Caesarea (CPG 3520), who was highly esteemed by Severus.<sup>175</sup> In reality this fragment belongs to Eustathius of Antioch, who had fallen badly into disrepute. This emerges from a florilegium of Pope Gelasius I.<sup>176</sup> Because Cyril had already forbidden this word 'God-bearing',<sup>177</sup> Severus had an easier match here.

171. *Ibid.*, p. 9,33-35: *quapropter indiscriminatum, ut dixi, abnegavit formulam, ut aditum praeculderet impiorum sententiae, qua hominem secundum relationem (kata schesin) Deo Verbo coniungunt.* On Cyril's christological use of language see, however, *JdChr* I<sup>3</sup>, 609, n. 12.

172. Cyril Alex., *Thesaurus*, ass. 21: PG 65, 361D1-15; in John Gram., *Apol.* 60: Richard, CCG 1, 26: *Eodem autem modo etiam de Christo. Etenim, erat quidem Verbum in principio, multo autem postea tempore factus est pro nobis pontifex, veluti poderem quendam, id est, hominem ex Maria, sine templum assumens.*

173. Cf. Lampe, PGL, s.v. *ποδήρης*.

174. Augustine, *C. serm. Arian.* 8: PL 42, 688: *nec sic assumptus est ut prius post assumeretur, sed ut ipsa assumptione crearetur*; that is, the creation of the humanity of Christ and its union with the Word absolutely coincide. Cf. *JdChr* I<sup>3</sup>, 771, n. 6.

175. Cf. Severus Ant., *C. imp. Gram.*, Or. III. 2, ch. 23: CSCO 102, pp. 17,23-18,20.

176. See *Collectio Berolinensis, testimon.* 7: Schwartz, PS, p. 96,25-27: *Homo autem deum ferens.* This corresponds to the text in CSCO 102, p. 17,23-25: *... Itaque ille vir deifer.* Cf. F. Diekamp, *Analecta Patristica* = OCA 117 (Rome, 1938), p. 47, fragm. X. With Severus, Diekamp ascribes it to Gelasius of Caesarea and moreover translates inaccurately: 'jener gottbekleidete Mann' — 'that man clothed with God'.

177. Severus Ant., CSCO 102, p. 17,25ff.: *de universali prohibitione sapientis Cyrilli, qui decrevit nullo modo Christum hominem deiferum nominatum iri* (cf. Cyril Alex., PG 77, 120D). *Deifer* was rejected just as much as *Christus duplex*, *ibid.*, p. 18,7-20.

(4) *Anthropos kyriakos*

Severus was less irritated by this formula.<sup>178</sup> He was, however, mistrustful, as the *FlorCyr* wanted to interpret it in favour of the two-natures formula of Chalcedon.<sup>179</sup> The rejection would certainly have been much stronger if he had not falsely accepted<sup>180</sup> that Athanasius himself had used this expression, in any case differently from Andrew of Samosata, in whose writings it was also to be found.<sup>181</sup> This fierce critic of Cyril had taken offence at his remark: 'After the union the natures in Christ are not to be separated.' He found the addition 'after the union' superfluous and misleading. For it insinuates the notion of two phases in the one event of the incarnation: at first there were two realities which were brought together. But one ought not to represent the *anthropos kyriakos* (the human being, who is Lord, who is in glory) in this way. For from the moment of coming into existence he was united to the divine essence.<sup>182</sup> Naturally Cyril too did not think other-

178. The passages of Severus with *anthropos kyriakos* are collected by J. Lebon, 'S. Athanase a-t-il employé l'expression *ὁ κυριακὸς ἄνθρωπος*?', *RHE* 31 (1935) (307-29), 316-29. The following passages are important: Severus Ant., *C. imp. Gram.*, Or. III. 1, ch. 17: CSCO 94, pp. 210,23-211,15; Or. III. 2, ch. 23: CSCO 102, p. 10,13-18 (on Athanasius); as well *C. imp. Gram.*, Or. III. 1, ch. 14: CSCO 94, p. 176,1-16 (against Andrew of Samosata), and ch. 15: CSCO 94, 177-181. On the topic cf. A. Grillmeier, '*Ὁ κυριακὸς ἄνθρωπος*: Eine Studie zu einer christologischen Bezeichnung der Väterzeit', *Trad* 33 (1977), 1-63. On Severus see 2, n. 6.

179. See Hespel, *Le Florilège Cyrillien*, no. 193, 192. The *FlorCyr* produces a citation from Cyril, Or. 2 ad Theodorum: Pusey 512,2-13; PG 76, 1449A (Latin) in which Cyril refers to Greg. Naz., Ep. 101 ad Cledon. I: PG 37, 177BC. In this the Apollinarians are attacked who hold the *anthropos kyriakos*, 'as they say', to be a human being without a soul. By this it is not said that Gregory had appropriated this expression. *Cod. Sin. graec.* 1690 (13th c.) has the reading *kyrion* for *kyriakon*, even if it is certainly incorrect. To the annoyance of Severus the *FlorCyr* makes capital out of this text for Chalcedon: Cyril is said to have professed the 'perfect *homo assumptus*' which would signify as much as two natures.

180. Severus Ant., *C. imp. Gram.*, Or. III. 1, ch. 17: CSCO 94, pp. 210,22-211,15, esp. p. 210,26-30: *Dividere autem in duo hunc unum et dicere a Deo Verbo Christum, qui ex Maria et homo dominicus est, assumptum esse, alienum quidem est ab Athanasio, pertinet autem ad eos, qui duos Christos et Filios cogitant* . . . Severus refers to the *synapheia* teaching of Nestorius; then he interprets the alleged passage of Athanasius through a citation from the Letter to Epictetus, PG 26, 1053BC, cited in *C. imp. Gram.*, loc. cit., p. 211,2-15. The extent to which *kyriakos anthropos* is found in Athanasian and pseudo-Athanasian writings is treated in A. Grillmeier, *art. cit.* (above n. 178), 33-8.

181. The text of Andrew of Samosata is in Severus Ant., *C. imp. Gram.*, Or. III. 1, ch. 14: CSCO 94, pp. 175,32-176,20.

182. Andrew of Samosata, in Severus, loc. cit., p. 176,5-13: *Stultissimum et absurdissimum est artificium! Primo quidem hoc ipsum quod 'post unionem' dicitur, ratione caret. Etenim, non concipitur homo dominicus ante unionem divinam, nec unquam ipsi defuit illa beata natura, nam 'Sapientia aedificabit sibi domum (Prov 9,1)', et profecto non removetur inhabitans a templo. Proinde ineptum et stultum est dicere 'post unionem', quasi prius constitutus fuisset homo, postea vero effecta fuisset aliqua coniunctio. Thus Andrew here advocates a christology 'from above' which allows in the incarnation the creation of the humanity of Christ to coincide with the *henosis*; cf. the expression of Augustine (above n. 174). Cf. Severus Ant., loc. cit., ch. 15: CSCO 94, 177-179; *JdChr* I<sup>3</sup>, 771, n. 6.*

wise. Only in theory, in thought, does he distinguish these two times in the one Christ, whom he describes as 'the one nature of the Son as the one who has become a human being and flesh'.<sup>183</sup> Ultimately even Severus reduces everything to the schema of an exclusive *christology from above* into which neither the 'God-bearing' human being nor the 'human being in the Lord's dignity' fits.<sup>184</sup>

## §2. From the discussion among the anti-Chalcedonians

As early as the first decade after Chalcedon splits appeared among the opponents of the Fourth Council themselves. Timothy Aelurus, the first Patriarch of anti-Chalcedonian Egypt, had had his bitter experiences, which still need to be described in detail. Although at that time there were fanatics who aroused concern, Severus had to deal not only with theologically untrained extremists, who had not yet died out even in his time, but with theologians like Julian of Halicarnassus or with educated grammarians like the otherwise unknown Sergius. Common to both was the fact that they intensified the *mia-physis* christology of Cyril and his greatest spiritual disciple, and hence too, in the eyes of the leader of the anti-Chalcedonians, endangered it. Such altercations are significant for us because they allow a deeper insight into the picture of Christ of the adherent of the *mia physis*.

### I. JULIAN OF HALICARNASSUS AND HIS INTERPRETATION OF THE EARTHLY EXISTENCE OF JESUS CHRIST

Around 510 Julian, the Bishop of Halicarnassus, encountered the renowned monk Severus in Constantinople. In 511 he placed himself on the side of Severus in the conflict with Patriarch Macedonius of Constantinople (496–511).<sup>185</sup> At the end of the patriarchate of Severus in

183. Severus Ant., *loc. cit.*, p. 179,9–11 cites Cyril Alex., PG 77, 192: *Verum, post unionem, tanquam sublata iam in duas sectione, unam credimus esse naturam Filii, tanquam unius, verum inhumanati et incarnati*. Cyril is said to have coined the formula, condemned by Andrew (*Desine dividere naturas post unionem*), only against Nestorius (and Theodore of Mopsuestia), and then in the schema of the distinction of the 'two times' (*ex temporali comparatione*).

184. In all probability the reaction of Severus to the expression *kyriakos anthros* would have been more harsh, if he had been aware of the *Commentarius brevis (in Psalmos)* of Hesychius of Jerusalem (CPG 6553); ed. V. Jagič, *Supplementum Psalterii Bononiensis. Incerti auctoris explanatio graeca* (Vienna, 1917). Hesychius has numerous witnesses with the expression *kyriakos anthros*, some with an explicit Antiochene stamp.

185. Cf. the Chalcedonian Theod. Lect., HE, fr. 484: Hansen, p. 138,6–8: Among the opponents of Macedonius 'were Julian, the bishop of Halicarnassus in Caria, the monk Severus, who became attackers (*polemioi*) of the faith (i.e. of Chalcedon), but also of themselves'

Antioch (518) both were again to be found as fugitives in Egypt. Julian, who sojourned in the vicinity of Alexandria in the monastery Henaton, soon gave offence through a *Speech about the confession of faith*, although he was fundamentally on the anti-Chalcedonian side.<sup>186</sup> Severus heard of this and was particularly irritated by Julian's claim that his teaching could also be substantiated in the *Philalethes*, the showpiece of the Patriarch's polemic.<sup>187</sup> Just how much its author was affected by this is apparent by his reactions in several writings against Julian,<sup>188</sup> but particularly in the *Apologia for the Philalethes*.<sup>189</sup> This claim must also make us curious, because with it the question is raised of the origins of Julian's teaching and, in particular, its relationship to the Alexandrian-Cyrrillian-Severan tradition. But first we must concentrate on this teaching itself, and in doing this we shall touch upon an old point of controversy about which we will have to take a position. For the voluminous work of Julian, which was attacked both from the Chalcedonian as well as the anti-Chalcedonian side, has disappeared except for 154 fragments, unless fresh discoveries are made.<sup>190</sup> The misinterpretation of his views — this is the judgement we have to pass today after intensive research — is to be located in the increasingly fierce polemic of his fellow bishop, Severus. From his *Critique of the Tomus* onwards Severus let it be known that

186 Cf Michael Syr, *Chron* IX 27 Chabot II, 225 'and he held a speech against the dyophysites. But he did not compose it in a clean and unobjectionable way'

187 On the cause of the dispute see Liberatus, *Brev* 19 ACO II, 5, p 134,4-22, Severus ibn al-Muqaffa', *History of the Patriarchs* PO 1, 453-455

188 Severus Ant, *C Addit Iul* CSCO 296, *Adv Apol Iul* CSCO 302

189 Cf Severus Ant, *Apol Philal*. CSCO 319, p 1,15-19 'Ils ont osé dire que le livre de mon humilité *Le Philalète* est en accord avec les fables de l'hérésie phantasiaste de Julien et confirme son opinion abominable et immonde, faisant (là) des déclarations relevant de celles que le vent emporte et de l'incrédulité des Juifs'

190 See Draguet, *Julien d'Halicarnasse*, 45\*-78\*, R Hespel, *Sévère d'Antioche, La polémique anti-julianiste I* CSCO 244 (Louvain, 1964), I-III Julian's works which need to be mentioned are (1) *Letters* Three letters of Julian to Severus and his replies are preserved in Syriac, ed R Hespel CSCO 244 (T), 245 (V), 6-7, 8-9, 159-162, Fragments 1-5 Draguet, *Julien d'Halicarnasse*, pp 45\*-46\* (2) *Tomus* of Julian through which the discussion was started, in Draguet, *Julien d'Halicarnasse*, Fragn 6-49, 46\*-56\*, nos 42-49, 54\*-56\*, are characterized as *Propositiones haereticae* R Hespel, CSCO 245, 215-234 (3) *Additiones Iuliani* to his *Tomus*, incorporated into the second edition, they are the reply of Julian to the 'Critique of the *Tomus*' by Severus Fragn 50-56 Draguet, *op cit*, 56\*-58\* (4) *Apologia* for the *Tomus*, Fragn 57-74 Draguet, *Julien d'Halicarnasse*, 58\*-62\*, Julian replies to the charges of Manichaeism and Eutychnianism (5) A type of treatise *Contra blasphemias Severi* a work which is divided into ten *logoi*, in these Julian discusses the arguments of the 'Critique of the *Tomus*' of Severus and probably produced a patristic counter-florilegium to the witnesses adduced by Severus, Fragn 75-129 Draguet, *Julien d'Halicarnasse*, 62\*-73\* (to strengthen the theses of the *Tomus*) (6) A *Disputatio contra Achillem et Victorem nestonanos*, Fragn 130-131 Draguet, *Julien d'Halicarnasse*, 73\* (7) Fragments 132-154 Draguet, *Julien d'Halicarnasse*, 73\*-78\* cannot be attributed to any particular work On the fragments preserved in Greek, see Hespel, *Avant-propos* to CSCO 295, III See CPG 7125-7127



he saw Julian with his teaching of *aphtharsia*, that is, with his view of the uncorruptedness of the body of Christ, in the nets of Eutyches and Manes.<sup>191</sup> Even if here the banned Patriarch was still somewhat reserved in his judgement, his supporters, like the Chalcedonians too, allowed nothing good in the Bishop of Halicarnassus. Everywhere he was taken to be a docetist, that is, as supporting the teaching that Christ's body was a semblance, or a Eutychian, who denied the oneness in essence with us and taught the transformation of the human nature of Jesus into the godhead. Suffering, death, and resurrection are thus void; God's whole economy of salvation disintegrates into nothing. Julian entered the catalogue of heretics of the various parties in the list of the chief heretics.<sup>192</sup> Severus acquired his negative impression of his opponent also in discussions with Julianists who took umbrage at his teaching that Christ had a flesh that was the same as ours in essence (*homooousios*). From this he concluded that the disciples of Julian would profess 'a kind of uncreated flesh' or even (in addition) that the uncreated Logos condensed (*condensé*) himself in the incarnation to flesh 'as water solidifies to ice'.<sup>193</sup>

Let us remain first of all within the controversy between the two bishops, so that we can arrive at a judgement for ourselves about the teaching of Julian from the rejoinders of Severus and the citations and judgements offered in these.

191 Severus Ant, *Crit Tom* CSCO 245, pp 125,31-126,12 By falsely interpreting miracles, especially the virgin conception of Christ, Julian is claimed to have denied the passible and mortal quality of the body of Christ and the authenticity of the passion. Thus he fell into the nets of the Eutychians and godless Manichaeans. In contrast Julian accused Severus of having accepted human suffering and death in Christ and thus having reduced him to simply a human being in the manner of Paul of Samosata, Photinus and Nestorius.

192 On the catalogue of heretics see *JdChr* II/1, 90-4

193 Cf Severus Ant, *C Addit Iul*, ch 24 CSCO 296, pp 63,7-64,2 From the Patriarch's profession of 'Christ's flesh being consubstantial to us' the Julianists derisively concluded that he was a 'worshipper of a creature', they meant that Severus by this profession confessed two persons in Christ. For his part from this he deduced the doctrines of the Julianists sketched above. The reproach that he was a worshipper of a creaturely flesh he countered with a depiction of the relationship between created flesh and uncreated Logos, with recourse to Athanasius, *Ep ad Adelph* PG 26, 1073D-1076A. From this it follows that one ought to worship the flesh of Christ without being the worshipper of a creature. Cf CSCO 296, p 64,3-23. He derives the legitimacy of worshipping the flesh of Christ from the *mia physis* formula. The Julianists discussed here appear to be the radical representatives of this teaching, they behave towards their master like the extremists with whom Timothy Aelurus did battle during his exile. Cf CSCO 296, pp 65,7-66,21. How Severus had recourse to Timothy Aelurus and Dioscorus is witnessed by his work *Adv Apol. Iul*, ch 19 CSCO 302, p 251,1-9, ch 20 p 254,12ff, ch 22, p 259.

## 1. Cyrillian-Severan points of departure for Julian

Julian had claimed to have come to his conception of the total uncorruptedness (*aphtharsia*) of the body of Christ through the *Philaethes* of Severus. The irritated Patriarch reports this in his *apologia* for this work. It is worth the effort to follow the trail.

### (a) The 'glowing coal' (Is 6,6-7) and two different interpretations by Severus<sup>194</sup>

Cyril of Alexandria had already interpreted this image in reference to the incarnation. In no. 101 of the *FlorCyr*, Cyril's text from the *Scholia*<sup>195</sup> is adduced by the compiler as proof for the two-natures teaching. We shall begin with this.<sup>196</sup>

Now we say that the coal represents for us the symbol and the image of the incarnate Logos . . . One can see in the coal, as in an image, the Logos who has proceeded from the Father and has been united to the humanity; but he has not ceased to be that which he was; rather he has transformed into his *doxa* and power (*εἰς τὴν ἐαυτοῦ δόξαν τε καὶ ἐνέργειαν*) what had been assumed, i.e. united to him. Just as the fire informs the wood and expands itself in it as it takes possession of it, without at all causing the wood to cease being wood, rather allowing it to blend into the appearance and power of the fire, as this [viz. the fire] effects in it [viz. the wood] what is proper to the former and thus appears to be completely one with it, so, also, represent to yourself the things with Christ! For God has . . . , in an ineffable way united with humanity, retained what this was but also retained what he was; once truly united, it [the humanity] is one with him. For he has made his own what is its [humanity's] and now pours out into it the power of his own nature (*ἐμποιήσας δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς αὐτῇ τῆς ἰδίας φύσεως τὴν ἐνέργειαν*).

The collector of the *FlorCyr* had naturally only looked at the emphasis of the two elements being unmingled, and wanted to conclude from that the preservation of two natures in Christ.<sup>197</sup> Cyril, like Severus after him, was primarily interested in stressing the unity. Nettled by the claim of the *FlorCyr*, Severus had endeavoured to outline particularly clearly

194. Severus Ant., *Apol. Philal.*, ch. 101: CSCO 319, 32-72; as well, *idem*, *Philal.*, rebuttal of no. 101 of the *FlorCyr*: CSCO 134, 265-267. We need to note that R. Hespel, CSCO 319, 34, n. 2, indicates that in CSCO 134, p. 267,24 there is an abbreviation of the text of the *Philaethes*. To be added to this is CSCO 319, pp. 33,34-34,10.

195. Hespel, *Le Florilège Cyrillien*, no. 101, 154-155 from Cyril Alex., *Scholia* (CPG 5225): PG 75, 1377D-1380D = ACO I 5, 1: p. 221,17-31. This is also adduced by Severus in *Ep. ad Oecum. com.*: PO 12, 180-181.

196. Cyril Alex., *Scholia*, following Hespel, *Le Florilège Cyrillien*, 154f.

197. In Ex 3,1-5 (the burning bush) the Fathers found a parallel to Is 6,6. This passage was interpreted, according to interest, as referring to the unity in Christ (the interpenetration of fire and bush) or to the difference of godhead and humanity (the bush is not consumed). Thus Cyril as well as Nestorius was able to use this analogy. Cf. *JdChr* I<sup>3</sup>, 723-4; *CCT* I<sup>2</sup>, 516-17.

the direction adopted by Cyril to emphasize the unity in Christ. This was directed against Chalcedon.<sup>198</sup>

(i) *Anti-Chalcedonian interpretation of Cyril's text by Severus*

Before the confrontation with Julian, Severus was always concerned with stressing the unity in Christ. So against the *FlorCyr* he had to extract from Cyril's interpretation everything that spoke in this sense. In so doing he formulated the following somewhat carelessly in his *apologia* to no. 101 of this florilegium.<sup>199</sup>

In fact when the God-Logos in his august union with the humanity . . . allowed this to change, even transformed this, not indeed into his own nature — for this remained what it was — but into his glory (*doxa*) and into his own power (*energeia*), how then can you refer to the teaching of the Synod of Chalcedon and the Tome of Leo . . ., which have distributed [the *operationes*, the activity of the *energeia*] to the Logos and the human being in Christ?

Notwithstanding all the lack of mingling in Christ, Severus sees his unity guaranteed by the fact that there is a continuous influencing control from the side of the godhead on the humanity which is proper to him. Its effect is the transformation of the united humanity into the *doxa* of the Logos and a flowing over of the divine *energeia* to the human powers in Jesus. Julian could be particularly happy with the following statements.

For in many cases it is apparent that the Logos did not permit the flesh to move according to the law of the nature of flesh [reference to Jesus walking on the water or the miraculous course of events on the occasion of his death on Calvary, at the resurrection and in the appearances before his disciples] . . . How does (all this) belong to the flesh if it was not endowed with the power (*energeia*) of the Logos, an entitlement of the godhead, if it was not to be regarded as one with him, corresponding to the holy word of the holy Cyril? . . . This all the more so as this (flesh) was indeed material and touchable with the hand, thus did not cease to be flesh, whereby it *stood above corruptibility* . . .<sup>200</sup>

In his *apologia* to no. 101 of the *FlorCyr* the Patriarch had gone beyond Cyril's *Scholia* and also added a passage from his *Apologeticus contra Theodoretum pro XII capitibus*. It expounded in a particular way the notion which Cyril formed of the tension between the states of the humanity of Christ, depending upon whether this came under the influence of divine activation or used its normal human power. In this Cyril, so to say, pardons the Incarnate One for shedding tears in a human way and

198. Cf. Severus Ant., *Philal.* on no. 101: CSCO 134, pp. 266–267, to which is to be added CSCO 319, pp. 33,34–34,10.

199. CSCO 134, pp. 266,28–267,1; in part almost word for word in *Ep. ad Oecum. com.*: PO 12, p. 184,4–7.

200. *Ibid.*, p. 267,11–24.

for having experienced the conditions of fear. All this indeed was only 'corresponding to the economy of salvation (*oikonomia*) by his [the Logos]' sometimes allowing the flesh to suffer what was proper to it (*ἐφείδεις τῇ σαρκὶ καὶ πάσχειν ἕσθ' ὅτε τὰ ἴδια*) in order to make us more magnanimous'.<sup>201</sup> In the *Apologia for the Philalethes* Severus adds the following to the words of Cyril just cited.<sup>202</sup>

If he thus allowed the flesh sometimes to endure that which is proper to it, so it is evident that he [the Logos] did not leave it unreservedly the properties which are proper to it, depending on the opportunities and the laws which the ungodly determined.

In contrast to the excerptors who were interested in the distinction of the two natures, Severus had emphasized in the appearance of Christ the predominance of the divine nature and the instrumentality of the human potencies dependent on it. At the same time it seemed to him that the pre-eminent means of binding divinity and humanity was the precedence given to the divine power (*energeia*). The predominance represented for him the normal state in the divine-human appearance of Christ. The more the humanity of Christ appeared as vibrating with divine powers, the more the substantial unity in Christ was shown.

Julian now transferred this conception of the primacy of the divine power in Christ also to the static persisting qualities of the body of Christ and placed accents that corresponded to this. The one Christ, the new human being, had to be distinguished through incorruptibility (*aphtharsia*) in the place of the universal human corruptedness (*phtharsia*), through impassibility (*apatheia*) in the place of the universal subjection to suffering, and through immortality (*athanasia*) in the place of unavoidable mortality. Julian adopted the main passage for this emphasis on certain features in the picture of Christ from the *apologia* of Severus, that is, from his comments on no. 101 of the *FlorCyr* as he produced them in the *Philalethes*. From these he gathered that even before the resurrection the body of Christ was spared corruptedness (*phtharsia*). We learn of this from the later writing of Severus, *Apologia for the Philalethes*. The Patriarch saw that Julian had held on to his words about the transformation (*transformatio*) of the bodiliness of Christ into the *doxa* and *energeia* of the Logos. With strong agreement Julian had also accepted the words of his friend about the 'infusion of everything that was proper to the Logos into the humanity of Christ'. Hence he could believe that he had

201. It is a question of PG 76, 441BC = ACO I, 1, 6a, 18-24. This passage also appears again in the CA of Leontius of Byzantium, PG 86, 1329C.

202. Severus Ant., *Apol Philal.*, ch. 101: CSCO 319, p. 34, 7-10.

Severus himself as a confederate in the claim: the body of Christ is uncorrupted, not subject to suffering, and immortal from the very moment of the union of divinity and humanity.<sup>203</sup>

(ii) *Anti-Julianist interpretation of the 'coal-fire' analogy*

Severus recognized now that not only the words of Cyril but also his own were capable of excessive interpretation. The fire that was beginning had to be extinguished immediately. The first measure was violent abuse of the opponent. Then the Patriarch showed that Cyril, in interpreting the unity in Christ according to the model already familiar to us (divinity : humanity = soul : body), also explained the analogy of the glowing coal.<sup>204</sup> He also now conceived more carefully his own interpretation of the image of 'fire-coal' applied to the incarnation.<sup>205</sup> He maintained that Cyril did not say that the flesh of Christ had been wholly transformed into superiority to suffering and immortality, also that he did not say that into the body of Christ flowed the wholly transcendent *doxa* which is proper to the godhead alone (Jn 17,5).

Julian was thus involved in constructing a picture of Christ which, according to the conviction of the Patriarch, brought with it the danger of detracting from the earthly reality of Christ. This had to be prevented under any circumstance. The predicament for Severus consisted in so developing the earthly reality of the body of Christ that Julian could not come up with the reproach of Nestorianism. For the apportioning of the 'physical qualities' into purely divine and purely human and their appropriation to 'divinity' and 'humanity', was, according to the general conviction of the anti-Chalcedonians, *per se* Nestorianism and the teaching of the detested Tome of Leo. In order to solve the difficult problem Severus now sought to tread a middle path: strong emphasis on the 'one power' which flows from the Logos into the humanity, and a careful delimitation of the divinization or divine properties in the humanity of Christ. For this purpose Severus first of all entrenched himself behind a row of citations from Chrysostom.<sup>206</sup> From these he then drew his conclusions.

203. Severus Ant., *ibid*, p. 34,12-20: 'The phantasiasts, however, . . . [to whom Julian also belongs] . . . were of the opinion that it is sufficient to say the following: If the Logos of God really transformed the assumed body [we mean the body which he united to himself] into his own *doxa* and *energeia* and infused into it everything which is his, then this (body) would be elevated above suffering and be immortal from the first moment of the union.'

204. Cf. Cyril Alex., *Scholae*: PG 75, 1377BD = ACO I, 5, 1a, p. 221,6-16 (Latin: *ibid*, p. 189,11-20); CSCO 319, pp. 34,35-35,14.

205. Severus Ant., *Apol. Philal.*, ch. 101: CSCO 319, p. 35,15ff.

206. *Ibid.*, pp. 36,1-40,3. Severus says of Julian, p. 41,3-4: 'C'est sans modération et sans compétence qu'ils comprennent tout.'

(1) In the pre-Easter phase of his earthly existence the Logos infused into the hypostatically united flesh the *energeia*, the power and activity, that befits him as God, and the *doxa*, but this only to the degree that it has been apparent to us during his earthly life. According to Severus, Julian had accepted that the earthly Jesus already had that *doxa* which is to be bestowed on us after the resurrection at the end of the ages.<sup>207</sup>

(2) According to Severus, Julian did not distinguish between the *functional* overflowing into the humanity of Christ of the *energeia*, proper to God, which always remains available, and the *physical qualitative* changes in the humanity of Christ as perduring, indeed from the beginning of the united human existence of Jesus. He was said to deduce the latter invalidly from the phrase of Cyril, which Severus had adopted, of the *transformation* of the humanity of Christ into the perfect glory. Hence he lacked the gift of distinguishing. What is valid with regard to the *energeia* does not apply to the persisting qualities, such as, in particular, the *aphtharsia*.<sup>208</sup> There is no doubt that the Logos could have elevated his flesh above suffering. At his disposal stood the divine *energeia* as the ever-flowing power of *transformatio*. For our sake, however, he wanted his humanity to fit into the limits which are proper to us in order too to be able to conquer Satan definitively.<sup>209</sup> The transfiguration of Christ on Tabor is said to be an example on the part of the Logos of self-limitation in the communication of the divine power.<sup>210</sup>

(3) With this distinction of *functional energeia* and *static qualities* Severus wanted to achieve two things. *Firstly*, with the special position of the 'one *energeia*' in Christ as the real divine power proper to God which is always at the disposal of the united body he secured for himself a way of repudiating the charge of Nestorianism. A Ps. Julius citation, thus an Apollinarian text, which he put before Julian, came to his aid here. 'And there is not found, not even a single separation of the Logos and his flesh in the sacred Scriptures, but he is one nature, one *hypostasis*, one *prosopon*, one activity (*energeia*, power), completely God, completely a human being, just the same one.'<sup>211</sup> Thus here he could show a maximum of the influencing control of the Logos on his humanity and its absolute enmeshment in the *mia physis*, before which any reproach of Nestorianism was condemned to silence. *Secondly* this *energeia* remains functionally communicable; thus it can be stronger or weaker, and hence allow room for the earthly life of Jesus.

(4) Because Julian did not see this distinction and placed the persisting static qualities on the same level as the *one energeia*, he could not do justice to the earthly life of Jesus. It is false to claim for the incorruptibility of the body of Christ, the *aphtharsia*, the maximum from the conception and the beginning of the incarnation. Thus he had extracted too much from the allegory of the glowing coal.

207. *Ibid.*, p. 40,9-23.

208. *Ibid.*, p. 41,10-13: 'Ils [the Julianists] déclarent en effet que si, de concert avec le Dieu Verbe, le corps que celui-ci s'est uni a été enrichi de la même activité convenant à Dieu (que la sienne), on dira certes aussi que l'incorruptibilité est une activité propre au corps!' Then follows ll. 20-21: 'Etre incorruptible en effet est une caractéristique [thus a quality, a state], et non pas une activité du corps.'

209. *Ibid.*, p. 40,20-35. Thus a concession to the theory of the devil's rights (une victime conforme à la loi et à la justice sur la mort).

210. *Ibid.*, pp. 50,13-51,10: Severus seeks to make clear in the event of the transfiguration on Tabor how he understands the difference between his and Julian's interpretation of Mt 17, 1ff. According to Julian the real divine glory, as it corresponds to the end state, shows itself. According to Severus it was not the *doxa* which belongs solely to the invisible, incomprehensible divine essence that appeared in Christ, but a *doxa* which can belong to a 'corporeal', provisional, imperfect appearance. Thus Severus attempts to conform to the picture of Jesus' appearance, as this is presented in the gospels.

211. See Lietzmann, I, pp. 198,14-199,2: CSCO 319, p. 53,33-36. In this strong text the unity in Christ is seen on two levels, one static and one dynamic. In the firmly established form of the one incarnate God-Logos, the one *energeia* proceeds more or less continually from above to below.

(5) Quite skilfully Julian had brought into play the attribute of holiness and the worthiness of the humanity of Christ for adoration — also an anti-Nestorian theme. He did acknowledge that here in the attribute of holiness, and the consequent worthiness of the flesh for adoration, there was no place for any restriction, any *temperatio*. For here it is simply a question of the dignity proper to God as God: Christ is holy and worthy of adoration also as a human being according to the degree of the divine property. But if worthy of adoration, he is then also impassible, incorruptible and immortal! For the Scriptures forbid us to adore what is mortal, transitory and corruptible.<sup>212</sup> Thus with the 'holiness' Julian discovered a static attribute which is also to be awarded to the humanity of Christ in its divine measure, and this from the beginning to the end! Severus did not have an easy task in rebutting this argument and maintaining his postulated special position of the *energeia*. He took refuge in his *mia-physis* formula and warned that one ought not to apportion the *adoratio Christi* to two. For there is only 'one simple adoration without division into two natures'!<sup>213</sup> In this way Severus left the problem unsolved.

(b) *The wood of the Ark of the Covenant and the aphantharsia of Christ in the works of Julian*

For his teaching on *aphtharsia* Julian referred, to the anger of Severus, to a Marian homily of the latter during his patriarchate in Antioch.<sup>214</sup> The theme was the explication of the ark of the covenant (κιβωτός) as the mystery of the incarnation of the Logos from Mary. According to Exodus 25,11 and 33,1–2 the holy ark consisted of imputrescible acacia wood, and, furthermore, was covered inside and out with gold. This image inspired the speaker to comments which Julian too could have formulated to the letter.<sup>215</sup>

Does not Christ offer himself to us thus [like the ark]? He is one from two, from the godhead as from gold that shines in bright splendour, and from humanity which is *removed from corruptedness* as imputrescible wood on account of the conception of the God-Logos in purity, without seed, worked by the Holy Spirit and the Virgin Mary . . . In fact the word: 'Inside and out the wood was plated with gold' means that (Ex 25,11). Notice here how appropriate the symbol is: as that imputrescible wood is indeed from natural wood and of the same type (*genos*) and of the same essence (*ousia*) as all other timbers which decay attacks and destroys, with the one exception that this is imputrescible [that is, not subject to decay]; so too was the flesh of Christ, endowed with a rational, spiritual soul, of the same type (*genos*), of the same nature (*physis*) and the same essence (*ousia*) as ours; it had, however, one advantage it was free and far from the corruptedness of sin. For it was conceived of the Holy Spirit by the Virgin; and it was united to the Logos, to him who has committed no sin and in whose mouth there was no deceit (1 Pet 2,22). Moreover, as the wood of the ark stood above decay and was free of it but could still be cut up and burned, so indeed the whole

212. Cf. Severus Ant., *Apol. Philal.*, ch. 101: CSCO 319, p. 61,20ff.

213. *Ibid.*, p. 62,1–9.

214. Severus Ant., *Hom.* 67 on the BVM: PO 8, 349–67.

215. *Ibid.*, pp. 357,4–359,3. The allegory of the twofold gilding of the Ark of the Covenant is found in Ps. Irenaeus, *Fragm.* 8, which belongs, however, to Hippolytus, namely to *In I Reg., quae de Helcana et Samuele* (CPG 1881 [2]: here further details) Now more comprehensively in B. E. Daley, *Leontii Byzantii Opera*, in the florilegium to CNE 14, where the Greek text is presented.

pure body of Christ had no share in sin and the corruptedness resulting from it, but could nevertheless suffer mishandling, blows, injury, death and all suffering of this sort. And when he came into the tomb and descended into the underworld, he had still not yet experienced the corruptedness which is present there, and this because of his resurrection from the dead [cit Acts 2,31]. Thus it follows that the body of Christ has shown itself in everything as incorruptible, because he was in no way subjected to the debasement that comes from sin, certainly he was susceptible to the corruption (*phtharsia*) which is tied to death and burial but has excluded it without being seized by it, on account of its union with the Logos. For the latter is by his very nature incorruptible, impassible and immortal.

The Bishop of Halicarnassus could regard these words of the Patriarch with good reason as a summary of his own thoughts on the *aphtharsia* of Christ: in them the humanity of Christ was characterized literally as being absolutely 'removed from corruptedness'; its conception in Mary was elevated above all concupiscence. Particularly to be noted is the fact that Severus specified that debasement was excluded which 'comes from sin'! In this regard the humanity of Christ was doubly protected: through connection with the 'sinless Logos' and the virginal conception. This being the case, incorruptedness, insofar as it is connected to freedom from sin, had to distinguish the reality of Christ from its very beginning. No one could on this account reproach the Patriarch with teaching that Christ's body was an illusion. For, as he himself explained the analogy, the acacia wood tied together two qualities. It was not from the outset subjected to decay, but it could be cut up and burnt. This was intended to say: true suffering and death could strike the 'incorruptible' body of Christ. By doing this did Severus not accord *aphtharsia* a special place? It does not fit in with 'impassible, elevated above suffering' (*ἀπαθής*) and 'immortal' (*ἀθάνατος*). Accordingly, had Severus not prepared all the impulses for the Julianist conception of the thoroughgoing uncorruptedness of the body of Christ and also to a large extent supplied the linguistic formulation? An *aphtharsia* in principle was manifestly united with a factual corruptedness, in so far as it was a question of the suffering and death of Christ. Expressly excluded was admittedly the putrefaction in the grave, through reference to Acts 2,31. The reference to the unity of the human flesh of Christ with the immortal Logos finally closed that crack through which corruptibility in Christ could force an entry. For this Logos is 'incorruptible, impassible, immortal'!

Severus also then conceded in the second mention of Homily 67 that in *Philalethes* he explained without distinction that the body of Christ is incorruptible; even in the homily itself he did not differentiate sufficiently.<sup>216</sup> Hence he now considered it his task to purify his



terminology and to distinguish in the application of the words 'incorrupt'-'corrupt':

- (1) Christ is simply and absolutely 'incorruptible' when the word means 'without sin';
- (2) Christ is 'corruptible' in 'suffering without blame' (*πάθη ἀδιάβλητα*): suffering hunger, thirst, tiredness, blows, cross, death;
- (3) absolute incorruptibility and factual uncorruptedness coincide in Christ only with the resurrection.<sup>217</sup>

Julian could really be content with Severus' formulation: 'Indeed, in so far as uncorruptedness is identical with the absence of sin, we all confess alike that it also existed in the body from the very beginning of its union with the Logos.'<sup>218</sup> In these words was expressed the closest agreement between the two bishops.<sup>219</sup> Nevertheless, the gulf between them both was opened up and was no longer to be closed, from either side: through exaggerated formulations by Julian which were open to misunderstanding and not covered by traditions, and through the vulgarization, the selective denunciation and finally the declaration of such statements as heretical by Severus.

## 2. The Apollinarian work *Kata meros pistis* as Julian's source

In chapter 101 of the *Apologia for the Philalethes* Severus reported that in refuting Julian he referred to the *Kata meros pistis*, a writing of Apollinarius which he, however, ascribed to Gregory the Wonder-worker.<sup>220</sup> Here we can observe in an utterly special way that the Apollinarian understanding, only partly corrected, flowed into the discussion of both bishops. We present the text in a somewhat extended citation.<sup>221</sup>

[The ecclesial confession and world-saving faith in the incarnation of the Logos who has communicated himself to the human flesh which he assumed from Mary, he remained in his sameness and underwent no change or alteration in his godhead, he was united to the flesh

217 *Ibid*, pp 113,20-114,12, where at the end it reads 'Partout en effet c'est en ayant en vue l'issue et l'achèvement de la résurrection même que j'ai nommé l'impassibilité et l'immortalité'

218 Severus Ant, *Apol Philal* CSCO 319, p 92,21-28, or pp 76,33-77,5, and *passim*, particularly, however, *Ep III ad Iul*. CSCO 245, pp 174,17-175,3 The citation above p 174,24-26

219 Cf *Crit Tom* CSCO 245, pp 174,16-175,24, 180,31-181,28 (here Severus defines his use of concepts) Here too the Patriarch takes up the means for purifying language

220 Severus Ant, *Apol Philal*, ch 101 CSCO 319, pp 63,5-72,9

221 Apollinar Laod, *Kata meros pistis* 2-3 Lietzmann, p 168,11-21

according to humankind (*καθ' ὁμοίωσιν ἀνθρωπίνην*) so that he united the flesh to the godhead (*loc. cit.* ll. 5–10).] The divinity abolished the passibility of the flesh by the fulfilment of the mystery. After the destruction of death follows uninterrupted impassibility and immutable immortality, and the original human beauty is restored through the power of the godhead. It is bestowed on all human beings through the appropriation of faith. But if some now harm the holy faith and either assign to the godhead human qualities (development, suffering or an increase in *doxa*) or separate from the godhead the body which grew and suffered, as if the suffering body existed for itself, thus these are outside the ecclesial confession of the Church.

So much for the *Kata meros pistis*. Julian had reproached Severus with having abbreviated the confession of faith which both ascribed to Gregory the Wonderworker.<sup>222</sup> A certain ground for this suspicion lay in the fundamental hermeneutical approach of the *Philalethes*. In this rejoinder to the *FlorCyr* its author criticized the confession of the 'Wonderworker' with the intention of protecting the citation of Cyril in *FlorCyr* no. 101 (*Scholia*) (PG 75, 1377D–1380D) against a dyophysite interpretation. This emphasis on unity now induced Julian to the exuberance that expresses itself in Fragment 102, which stands in close relationship to the quotations in the *Philalethes*.<sup>223</sup>

The Logos of God communicated himself to a human flesh and in the humanity has entered into a connection according to humankind. With regard to this he [the 'Wonder-worker'] spoke (analogically) of the meeting of soul and body and characterized (their) union as inseparable. After the completion of the mystery proclaimed by the law and the prophets — the fulfilment of the law is indeed Christ, the godhead abolished the subjection of the flesh to suffering (*παθητικόν*); from that time on it was impossible both to characterize the *patheitikon* as accompanying a flesh which belongs to the Impassible and also (to accept) that it dominates with force the realm of nature. For the union of the flesh with the Logos is fulfilment of the mystery.<sup>224</sup>

The text is very difficult. It can only be explained on the basis of its entwinement with the Apollinarian confession and other witnesses of the fourth century which Julian took over to a large degree, but also once again corrects. He employed, in fact, all the key concepts of the *Kata meros pistis* § 2, especially the expressions *pathetikos* and *apatheia*, and furthermore the doctrine of the significance of the incarnation of the Logos of God for the restoration of the original state of humankind. Still there is an important distinction to be noted here. While the Apollinarian text also includes the death of Christ and also founds the restoration of the paradisaical *apatheia* and immortality on it, Julian passed over the death on the cross and placed the incarnation in the forefront. Severus stressed this

222. Severus Ant., *Apol. Philal.*, ch. 101: CSCO 319, p. 64, 5–7.

223. Julian Hal., in Severus Ant., *Apol. Philal.* on ch. 101: CSCO 319, p. 64, 24–33.

224. *Ibid.*; Greek in Draguet, *Julien d'Halicarnasse*, 68\*–69\* (no. 102).

dissonance between the *Kata meros pistis* and Julian, and in the context presented a notable critique both of the *Kata meros pistis* and also of two texts of Athanasius. The theological position of both the Patriarch and his opponent can be determined more precisely from this. It is a question of the incarnation and the cross in the salvific work of Christ, but also of the recognition of the soul of Christ in the *Kata meros pistis* and in Athanasius. Severus concluded from this: even the greatest authorities must be subjected to a critique on particular points. Julian too was referred to the gift of discernment. Because he did not employ it, his deductions from his 'authorities' were not valid.<sup>225</sup>

### *Notable critique of authorities by Severus*

(1) The position of Christ's death: Severus says with reference to the *Kata meros pistis* and his own teaching: '... the completion of the coming [of Christ] and of the *oikonomia* is according to the flesh, the crucifixion, the death, the resurrection and the bodily ascension into heaven' (*Apol. Phil.*, ch. 101: CSCO 319, p. 65, 10–12). The Patriarch rightfully makes reference to the *Kata meros pistis* (Lietzmann, p. 168, 11–12). In this he felt himself one with the 'Wonderworker'.

(2) The confession of the soul of Christ: Severus here openly criticizes his witness and concedes that in the *Kata meros pistis* nothing is said about the fact that 'the flesh which the God-Logos united to himself was animated by a spiritual soul' (CSCO 319, p. 70, 9–11). Such a reproach was not easy for him. Openly he stresses that in other teachers too one ought not to accept everything without reservation. Even in the holy Scriptures, the prophets and the evangelists one must in certain details watch critically and gauge them on the totality (*ibid.*, p. 70, 12–18).

Even Athanasius is here put under the magnifying glass. Although there are some lacunae in the Syriac manuscripts of the *Apologia for the Philalethes*, it is still clear from the context that Severus places in opposition to each other two texts or writings from the great Athanasius and must emphasize a serious difference: the Letter to the philosopher Maximus<sup>226</sup> and the Tome to the Antiochenes.<sup>227</sup> The Letter to Maximus is openly criticized, even indeed rejected 'because

225. On the following see Severus Ant., *Apol. Philal.* on ch. 101: CSCO 319, pp. 70, 9–71, 26. Previously Julian was reproached because he was said to have neither experience nor education in the divine and patristic teachings (p. 69, 5–6). On the following see G. Bardy, 'Sévère d'Antioche et la critique des textes patristiques', in *Mémorial Louis Petit* = *Archives de l'Orient Chrétien* I (Bucharest, 1948), 15–31; M. Richard, 'Les florilèges du V<sup>e</sup> et du VI<sup>e</sup> siècle', in *Chalkedon I*, 721–48, esp. pp. 733–6; *JdChr* II/1, 75–7; *CCT* II/1, 66–7.

226. Athan. Alex., *Ep. ad Maximum* (CPG 2100): PG 26, 1085–1089. Syriac: R. W. Thomson, *Athanasiana Syriaca II*: CSCO 272 (T), 37–41; CSCO 278 (V), 31–34. On this see M. Tetz, 'Zur Edition der dogmatischen Schriften des Athanasius von Alexandrien', *ZKG* 67 (1955/6) (1–28), 18–19. In a recent investigation C. Kannengiesser, 'L'énigme de la lettre au Philosophe Maxime d'Athanase d'Alexandrie', in *AAEΞANΔPINA = Mélanges P. Claude Mondésert* (Paris, 1987), 261–76, proves that this letter did not originate from Athanasius himself, but represents a forgery which is composed in connection with *Oratio III c. Arianos*, nos. 26–58, considered by Kannengiesser to be spurious. In particular *Ep. ad Max.* 3–4 are related to this part. See the translation in Kannengiesser, 263–5.

227. Athan. Alex., *Tome ad Antioch.*, no. 7: PG 26, 796A–809B. From this Severus cites only no. 7: 804B9–14; on the Syriac text see R. W. Thomson: CSCO 272 (T), 35; CSCO 273

in it there is no mention of the fact that the flesh [of Christ] is animated by a human soul, although God has become a perfect human being [with body and soul] and not only [flesh?]. Factually this letter does not speak of the soul of Christ. Severus does not take his refuge, for instance, in denying the authenticity of the letter. He concedes this,<sup>228</sup> but immediately sets against it another letter, the Tome to the Antiochenes (§ 7), which according to the opinion of Severus, speaks of the soul of Christ, although it cannot be proved according to the contemporary position of research.<sup>229</sup>

What the Patriarch wants to prove with this reference to Athanasius is this: as he conducts himself critically with regard to his authority, so too Julian must allow caution to prevail with regard to his witnesses. As Athanasius corrected himself with reference to the teaching of the soul of Christ, so too 'Gregory the Wonderworker'. Indeed, what his confession in the *Kata meros pistis* does not contain is supplied by his confession of faith composed later: 'Whoever explains the body of Christ as (body) without soul (*ἀψυχον*) and without spiritual soul (without nous, *ἀνόητον*) and does not confess it as perfect in everything and as one and the same, let him be anathema.'<sup>230</sup> This reference does not aim at moving Julian to acknowledge the soul of Christ, but at his teaching of *aphtharsia*. He does not have the right to refer for this to Cyril of Alexandria and the 'Wonderworker', nor any longer to their interpretation through Severus in *Philalethes* (to *FlorCyr* no. 101 with the *apologia*). Just as Athanasius and the 'Wonderworker' had corrected themselves concerning the teaching of the soul of Christ, so now Severus himself wants to retract these incautious statements in the *Philalethes* concerning the time of Christ's *aphtharsia*.

This *aphtharsia* of Christ according to the teaching of Julian must now be interpreted as Severus presents it, and then as it was *per se* historically.

(V), 28–9. R. Hespel, CSCO 319, p. 70, 24–29 with n. 9 did not discern the origin of this text. If he had done so it would have been easier for him to recognize also the author of the *Ep. ad Maxim*, because Severus ascribes both texts to the same author. This indication is also missing in C. Lash, 'Saint Athanase dans les écrits de Sévère d'Antioche', *ThéolHist* 27 (Paris, 1974), 387.

228. Cf. Severus Ant., *Apol Philal.*, ch. 101: CSCO 319, p. 70, 15–29.

229. In the more recent research the indications that the observation of Severus has a sound foundation are increasing: even the genuine Athanasius does not have any doctrine of the soul of Christ. Also the predicament in which C. Stead still found himself seems to be eliminated. Cf. C. Stead, 'The Scriptures and the Soul of Christ in Athanasius', *VigC* 36 (1982), 233–50. In *Ps* 15, 9c–10 is said to remain the sole clear and allegedly decisive text for the teaching of Christ's soul in Athanasius: *καὶ ποία τις ἦν ἡ ἐλπίς τῆς σαρκὸς αὐτοῦ ἢ ὅτι ἀναλήψεται τὴν ἀποτεθεισάν ψυχὴν*; cf. G. M. Vian, *Testi inediti del Commento ai Salmi di Atanasio* = *StudEph* 'Aug' 14 (Rome, 1978), 21, no. 13. But M.-J. Rondeau, *Les commentaires patristiques du Psautier (III<sup>e</sup>–V<sup>e</sup> siècles)* = OCA 220 (Rome, 1985), 214, n. 593, now shows that the authenticity of the *Expositiones in Ps* is to be doubted; she refers to G. Dorival, 'Athanase ou pseudo-Athanase?', *RSLR* 16 (1980), 80–9. With this falls the last witness which can be adduced for the teaching by Athanasius of a soul in Christ. Cf. *JdChr* 1<sup>2</sup>, 460–79. On the *Tomus ad Antiochenos*, *ibid.*, 472–7.

230. The 'Confession of Gregory the Wonderworker' is found in Greg. Nyss., *De vita Gregor. Thaum.* (CPG 3184); cf. Hahn, *Bibliothek der Symbole*, p. 283, 20–21 (XI). L. Abramowski is against the authenticity of this symbol, 'Das Bekenntnis des Gregor Thaumaturgus bei Gregor von Nyssa und das Problem seiner Echtheit', *ZKG* 87 (1976), 145–66; on this see M. Simonetti, 'Una nuova ipotesi su Gregorio il Taumaturgo', *RSLR* 24 (1988), 17–41.

### 3. The teaching on *aphtharsia* of Julian of Halicarnassus as judged by Severus of Antioch

Just as the reciprocal misunderstandings between Chalcedonians and anti-Chalcedonians had proved to be almost insuperable, so a similar process of misinterpretation repeated itself within the anti-Chalcedonian party itself.

#### (a) *Polarization between Julian and Severus*

We have previously seen that Julian believed that he had only developed the formulations of Severus himself and the teaching of trustworthy, commonly esteemed witnesses of the past. His critic, however, found that this had led to the betrayal of the mystery of the incarnation in the sense of Manes, Eutyches and the old docetists. This was the first response of the Patriarch to Julian's claim that in the *Philalethes* he (Severus) made concessions to Nestorianism on account of accepting that before the resurrection the body of Christ was subject to corruptibility. For whoever characterizes the body of the Lord as 'corruptible' considers it as not really united to the godhead.<sup>231</sup> Whoever, like Severus, apports corruptibility and incorruptibility to humanity and divinity respectively introduces the teaching of two natures and two powers (*energeiai*).<sup>232</sup> No other remark could infuriate the Patriarch so much as the charge of Nestorianism. His fury over this increased when he observed that Julian's notion quickly found many supporters. Lesser minds were said to have made extracts from this 'sinister book' (the *Tome*) of Julian and in this way carried out propaganda. The whole body of the Church was thus in danger.<sup>233</sup> Hence action had to be taken quickly and energetically. Correspondingly the reaction was extremely hard.<sup>234</sup> The result could only be that Julian's opinions were gravely distorted. For this reason it is worthwhile tracking down the 'genuine' Julian.

#### *A theological border-crosser*

In poorly marked countrysides it is easy to cross borders. This is the situation of both bishops. A plus or a minus point in 'orthodoxy' was

231. Cf. Severus Ant., *Apol. Philal.* on ch. 101: CSCO 319, pp. 66,27-67,2, Julian Hal., *Fragm.* 150: Draguet, 77\*.

232. Severus Ant., *Adv. Apol. Iul.*, ch. 19: CSCO 302, pp. 245,30-250,32. Cf. *Fragm.* 147 Draguet, 76\*.

233. Severus Ant., *Apol. Philal.* on ch. 101: CSCO 319, p. 71,13-26

234. There are three writings of Severus to be mentioned here: 1. *Contra Addit. Iul.* (CSCO 296); 2. *Adv. Apol. Iul.* (CSCO 302); 3. *Apol. Philal.* (CSCO 319)

easily possible there where the decisive point for the unity or the distinction in Christ remained blurred. Both theologians were fighting for an adequate depiction and grounding of the unity in Christ; both professed the *mia-physis* formula; both saw in the Council of Chalcedon the triumph of Nestorianism. Before the quarrel between them broke out, they saw the unity in Christ under the strong influence of the Apollinarian tradition, in the 'one power' (*energeia*) which, deriving from the Logos, moved the humanity of Christ more or less in everything; common to them too was the acceptance of the fact that the *henosis* of divinity and humanity must express itself also in the qualities, the condition of human being, particularly in bodiliness. If the first were the inheritance of the *mia-physis* teaching of Apollinarius, also mediated by Cyril, then the latter was introduced into the discussion particularly by Gregory of Nyssa. The teaching about the properties was used in a sense that it safeguarded the *one hypostasis* in Christ, whatever the difference of qualities of divinity and humanity might be. However, where was the border here? The more the divinization of the humanity was stressed, the more the unity seemed to be strengthened — indeed with endangerment to the peculiarity of the humanity of Christ. The stronger, however, the unmingledness of the properties was put in relief, all the more one appeared to approach the two-natures teaching of Chalcedon and thus a christology of separation, especially if these *idiomata* were expressed with words derived from the roots *φύειν*, *φύσις*. Here lay the problem of Julian of Halicarnassus. A quotation of Cyril in Severus delivered to him the weapons for an attack on the Patriarch.<sup>235</sup>

'Even if we say that in regard to the special quality the flesh is of another nature (*ἐτεροφυής*) than the Logos begotten of the Father, it is still his, however, through the inseparable union'

The question suggested itself: How can Severus still maintain the *mia physis* formula and thus the true unity in Christ, if he admits a 'natural otherness' in Christ? Still more sharply runs a section of the second letter of Cyril to Succensus in which the body-soul analogy is evaluated<sup>236</sup>

'These elements [that is, body and soul] are different in their kind (*ἐτεροειδῆ*) and are not the same as each other in essence (*ὁμοουσία*), admittedly, once united they form the one nature of the human being' (Then follows the application to the *mia physis* in Christ)

For Julian this meant: if divinity and humanity in Christ suggest or express after the union also a difference of kind or of nature, then two

235 Cyril Alex., *Ad Diodor*, Syriac in P. E. Pusey, *S.N.P. Cyrilli in D. Ioannis evangelium III* (Oxford, 1872), pp. 500,6–501,4, Severus Ant., *Adv. Apol. Iul.*, ch. 19 CSCO 302, pp. 248,27–249,3

236 Cyril Alex., *Ep. 46 ad Succensus II*, PG 77, 241BC, cited in Severus Ant., *Adv. Apol. Iul.*, ch. 30 CSCO 302, p. 275,5–10

natures and thus two persons are acknowledged. Hence he had to demand: as Cyril/Severus apply the 'out of two one' to the *physis* of Christ and thus induce the *mia physis*, so the same must hold too for the properties. Thus if the union brings about the one *physis* then that must be extended to the physical qualities (to the *ποιότητες κατὰ φύσιν*). As there ought not to be any otherness of the natures, so also the 'qualitative otherness' (the *ἐτεροφυής*) must be excluded. Hence the unity of Christ is grounded not only in *one physis* or in the *one energeia* which proceeds from the one *physis*, but also becomes apparent in the qualitative-physical consequences for the united human nature of Christ. The adaptation of the qualities of the humanity of Christ to those of the godhead continues to remain, as in Gregory of Nyssa, the indispensable means for understanding the one Christ. In contrast to Gregory this assumption is intensified in Julian through the Apollinarian *mia physis*! This was expressed in his seventh anathema which Severus has passed down to us.<sup>237</sup>

If anyone divides up the one nature of the human being into what is unbodily and what is in the flesh and says this (the flesh) is corruptible according to nature, even if it has not sinned, the soul in contrast escapes the condemnation to death, (whoever calls upon this analogy) in order to represent the Lord as '*naturally corrupted*' according to the flesh and as '*incorrupt*' according to the spirit (i.e. the godhead), introduces by this means a duality of the Christs, the natures, *the properties*, and the sons: the one is (son) by nature, the other only in the applied sense (Whoever teaches in this way) let him be anathema, because he struggles against the incarnate Lord who said of himself he was born of the Father and possesses everything the Father possesses (cf Jn 10,36; 17,10) He goes beyond the divine Scriptures

Hence there arose for Julian the necessity of presenting a new teaching of the relationship of divine and human properties in Christ. He does this in regard to both form and content.

(i) *Determination of norms for the relationship of the properties*

Julian expressed in a dialectical way what he demanded for the reciprocal relationship of divine and human qualities in so far as they are revealed in the Incarnate One: there ought to be between them only a 'difference as non-difference' thus only a *διαφορὰ ἀδιάφορος*.<sup>238</sup>

237 Julian Hal, *Anathema septimum*, in Draguet, *Fragm* 71, 62\*, Severus Ant, *Adv Apol Iul*, ch 30 CSCO 302, p 274,13-23

238 Severus Ant, *Adv Apol Iul*, ch 19 CSCO 302, p 247,6-10 Cf ch 21 p 257,28-34, *Fragm* 148 in Draguet, 76\* *προσηγόρευσα τὸ διάφορον ἀδιάφορον* For this formula there are two Synac versions (a) 'J'ai appelé indifférent la différence', (b) 'J'ai appelé non-différence la différence' The first version would mean 'The difference in Christ is indeed real, but can be overlooked', the second in contrast would mean 'There is no difference at all' According

In your foolishness you have written: with regard to Christ we want to say that the *difference* is *non-difference*. You have an inebriated mind and you mingle divinity and humanity out of which the one Christ exists, the one person, the one *hypostasis*, and the one incarnate nature of the Logos himself.

One will have to concede that this is a bold formulation which can leave the door wide open for misunderstandings. Admittedly Julian wanted to speak only of the properties in Christ; Severus, however, immediately interpreted this with regard to the relationship of divinity and humanity in Christ as such. The distinction between both he saw repudiated in the new formula, and indeed not only in the concrete reality, but also in the *theoria*, that is, in the abstract consideration of both essences 'from which' the one *physis* arises through the *henosis*. What the Bishop of Halicarnassus really meant, he endeavoured to make clear in an analogous relationship.<sup>239</sup>

See what I mean with *diaphora adiaphoros*, the 'non-different difference': 'difference' — somewhat different are seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting and touching. 'Non-different' — because in all human beings are found each of the members and each of the parts; but what is formed from them is one and is brought together as one *energeia*, one *physis* activated by an unseparated soul.

Applied to Christ, the analogy is intended to mean that the unity from divinity and humanity is for Julian so much in the foreground that the difference between both takes second place. The bishop here no doubt had in mind the Apollinarian writing *Letter to Dionysius*.<sup>240</sup>

If, however, they do not acknowledge the one according to the union, so they are able as well to divide out the one into many and to name many natures [in him] as indeed the body is multiform from bones, nerves, sinews, flesh and skin, nails and hair, blood and spirit: all of these are different from each other, but it is only one *physis*, so that also the true godhead is one with the body and not divided into two natures.

As this analogy illustrates, Julian wanted to say nothing other than what Severus also meant with his 'one nature from two'. Admittedly through its formal character the new formula looked oversubtle and seductive.

to Draguet, *Julien d'Halicarnasse*, 166–7, the first version is wrong and poorly attested. Julian himself had coined the formula: τὸ διάφορον ἀδιάφορον. It is intended dialectically and expresses the fact that the Nestorian division is to be followed up to its last detail, even in Severus.

239. Julian Hal., *Fragm.* 148: Draguet, 76<sup>\*</sup>; cited in Severus Ant., *Adv. Apol. Iul.*, ch. 21: CSCO 302, p. 257, 28–34. On this R. Draguet, *Julien d'Halicarnasse*, 166–8. Julian characterizes the variety of the senses as the *diaphoron*; but there remains *adiaphoron*, because all individual senses are integrated into the one acting subject.

240. Lietzmann, pp. 257, 19–258, 4. Cf. R. Draguet, *Julien d'Halicarnasse*, 168–9. By this analogy the Apollinarian author wanted to show that from the specific distinction between humanity and divinity in Christ one ought not to deduce a distinction of the natures. According to Draguet this was also the intention of Julian in *Fragm.* 148.



In an overly harsh way Severus pointed this out and sought for himself a support which he carefully avoided naming. It concerns the introduction of the *ousia* concept by John the Grammarian of Caesarea to ground the formula 'in two natures'. In his *Speech against the ungodly Grammarian* Severus attempted to wrest from him the miracle weapon of the distinction of *ousia* and *physis*. As it now turns out the Patriarch had already recognized its effectiveness and thus he could now direct it against Julian. Two texts witness to this.

Thus when you call the difference a non-difference, corresponding to the intention of this foolishness, Christ is to be equal in essence to us according to the divinity and in contrast equal in essence to the Father according to the humanity; on the other hand, in your view they constantly pass over into each other and transform themselves, the one into the other! The flesh would pass over into the essence (*ousia*!) of the Logos himself, and on the other side the Word would transform himself into the essence (*ousia*!) of the flesh itself, so that we can amuse ourselves with your 'non-different difference'.<sup>241</sup>

Thus as the natural state makes the one essence of Father and Son visible — the godhead of both is one and the same — so too the natural property shows the essence (*ousia*) of the only-begotten Word as different from the humanity which he has united hypostatically to himself and *from them* (*ex quibus*) is named one and the same Emmanuel. And you have dared to call indeed this so well-founded and established difference a non-difference. In an unsuitable manner you have applied the description of the 'non-different difference' to the mingling of divinity and humanity . . . And this difference shows itself precisely in the fact that the godhead of the only-begotten Logos and the humanity which he united to himself substantially are not the same essence (*ousia*); the one is not the essence of the other; admittedly, after both are united in an inexpressible way they constitute *one* hypostasis and *one* nature (*physis*), that of the Logos himself, but as incarnate. But you bring the non-different difference already into the discussion for the elements *from which* the unity (the one, the united) (results) and you fling yourself into the mire of the mingling.<sup>242</sup>

Thus Severus deduced from the incriminating expression 'non-different difference' that Julian no longer distinguished between divinity and humanity in Christ according to the *theoria*. Even before the intellectual operation of the *ex quibus* the difference between the two *ousiai* is abandoned. Thus this formula itself became superfluous for Julian. For Severus he would profess real monophysitism. Hence what the Patriarch did not want to admit in his controversy with the Grammarian of Caesarea was now tacitly accepted: in spite of the one *physis* in Christ one has in *theoria* to distinguish the two *ousiai*, the two abstract essences.<sup>243</sup> Because Julian, too, allegedly sacrificed this distinction in

241. Cf. Severus Ant., *Adv. Apol. Iul.*, ch. 19: CSCO 302, p. 247,10-18.

242. *Ibid.*, ch. 21: pp. 256,27-257,21.

243. According to Severus Ant., *Adv. Apol. Iul.*, ch. 22: CSCO 302, p. 260,1-17, Julian also adduced Theodotus of Ancyra for his 'non-different difference', as if the latter had also denied the intellectual distinction of divinity and humanity in Christ. Severus declares, however, that Theodotus wanted to make the misuse of this intellectual distinction impossible only for the

his ingenious formula, the last possibility of avoiding the *synchysis*, the mingling, in his christology, was surrendered. In this manner of reasoning Julian has certainly been done an injustice. In no way did he claim that the two *ousiai*, divinity and humanity, are the same in Christ; he sought their identity not on the abstract level, but on the level of the concrete, there where also, according to Severus, the unity is realized: in the one *physis*. His paradigm, which we have already quoted, of the differences of the senses and their identity in the one human being, signified this. Admittedly the analogy was not correctly carried through; it was not even in general convincing. He simply spoke according to the Apollinarian *Epistula ad Dionysium* (cf. n. 240 above). Julian remained, like this letter, at the level of considering the concrete *physis*, while Severus lets the distinction be based on the abstract *ousia*, the unity on the concrete *physis*. The Grammarian of Caesarea was able to have the last laugh.

(ii) *The teaching of the properties of Christ's body in terms of content*

What does Julian's teaching about the *idiomata* of Christ's body contain? The bishop offers us no systematic enumeration of all the properties which are particular to the flesh of Christ.

*Phthora and aphtharsia as christological themes in Julian*

In the centre of the discussion between the two bishops stood the question of the uncorruptedness, or the incorruptibility, the *aphtharsia* of Christ's body before Easter, or vice versa, of its corruptedness, or corruptibility, *phthora*. This problem was critical for the Chalcedonians as well as for the anti-Chalcedonians. The restoration of the *aphtharsia* of humankind as motive for the incarnation and as fruit of Christ's death had already fascinated Athanasius. But for him it was clear that only in

Nestorians. He claims that the right understanding and correct application of this distinction was had only by the defenders of the *mia-physis* formula by their confessing 'that this one being is not divided "through the thought and consideration of the intellect"'. This is true even 'if they show that the difference of the quality (*poiotes*) and the unlikeness of the essence (*ousia*) remain present in reciprocal relationship for the elements which come together in the inexpressible union' (CSCO 302, pp. 260,18–261,1 with a citation from Theodot. Ancyrr., *Hom. 1 in die nativ.*: PG 77, 1361C). He says that among the advocates of the two-natures teaching, in contrast, even stressing the 'purely intellectual distinction' (*ibid.*, p. 260,14–15) does not lead to the avoidance of a separation into 'two'. For Severus it is a question of taking away from the bishop of Halicarnassus every argument from the Fathers for his 'non-different difference' (CSCO 302, pp. 261,4–262,2). Thus here once again he also concedes the difference of the two essences (*ousiai*) in Christ. This is also the case in his letter to the Presbyter and Archimandrite Elisha from the years 519–521(?) in PO 12, no. XXXIV, 273–4 with reference to Theodotus of Ancyra.

the resurrection did Christ enjoy the *aphtharsia* of the body.<sup>244</sup> Cyril of Alexandria taught nothing different.<sup>245</sup> This teaching only became the key theme of a christological controversy through Julian. What did he understand by it?

(1) *Phthora* without reference to sin: in general Julian could describe as corruptedness any change, even in a healthy substance. As an example of this is the removal of the rib from the side of the sleeping Adam; here there is only a *διαφθορά* or a *phthora* of a lesser degree which was rather an 'alteration' (*ἀλλοίωσις*) than an injury of Adam's 'perfect nature'. Even a diminution (*ἐλάττωσις*), or indeed even an illness (*νόσος*) can be included in the concept on the sole condition that there is no reference to sin (*ἁμαρτία*).<sup>246</sup> No doubt Julian took over the word *diaphthora* from Psalm 16,10 (LXX 15,10) by way of Acts 2,31, not without interpreting it in his own way. *Diaphthora* was for him the lowest degree of *phthora* and its activity. If Christ was already freed from this lowest level, then *a fortiori* he was freed from every more intensive form.<sup>247</sup>

Julian starts with the compound words *diaphthora* and *kataphthora* (= *phthora* + *dia* or *kata*) in order to indicate the different level of the activity of *phthora* in nature and in human beings.

*Diaphthora* is the passage to *phthora* proper. Julian speaks in this way in Fragment 8 where he refers to profane authors. In contrast *phthora* is already used of stronger power of activity (Frag. 51). According to R. Draguet, M. Jugie, in his article 'Géanite (controversé)' in DTC 6, col. 1003, wrongfully claims that Julian understands by *diaphthora* the complete decomposition of the body. He presupposes a false reading, following Mai, *Spicil. Rom.* X, p. I, 192. Cf. Draguet, *Julien d'Halicarnasse*, 104, n. 7. — The highest level of *phthora* is *kataphthora*.

(2) *Phthora* with reference to sin (*hamartia*): it is especially in the christological context that Julian speaks of this connection. If one assumes this content for *phthora* and claims that the body of Christ is corrupt (corruptible), this would amount to saying that Christ is under sin.<sup>248</sup> This is to be unconditionally rejected (cf. Heb 4,15, together with 2,15).

244. On the prior history of the teaching of incorruptibility (*aphtharsia*) cf. Y. de Andia, *Homo vivens. Incorruptibilité et divinisation de l'homme selon Irénée de Lyon* = *Etudes Augustiniennes* (Paris, 1986); cf. Athan. Alex., *De incarn.* 7,5: PG 25, 109A. It was the task of the God-Logos to lead what was corrupted again to incorruptibility; cf. *Ep. ad Serap.* 2,1: PG 26, 609A. In Christ *aphtharsia* occurred first with the resurrection: Athan. Alex., *De incarn.* 20,2: PG 25, 132A.

245. Severus Ant., *Adv. Apol. Iul.*, ch. 6: CSCO 302, pp. 177,25–178,15. It is fundamentally contested whether Julian can have recourse to Cyril for his ideas.

246. Cf. Draguet, *Julien d'Halicarnasse*, 100–7.

247. Cf. *ibid.*, 104. Severus Ant., *Crit. Tom.*: CSCO 245, pp. 45,32–48,6.

248. Cf. Draguet, *Julien d'Halicarnasse*, 134–5.

Consequently the whole earthly life, the pre-Easter Jesus too, is completely free from corruption that otherwise defiles all human beings.<sup>249</sup>

### (iii) Terminological clarification

When Julian uses the group of words *phthartos*, *aphthartos*, *phtharsia*, *aphtharsia*, he means not so much a potential disposition for an actual property, but already the actual state. Hence they are not to be translated as: corruptible, corruptibility, incorruptible, incorruptibility, but as: corrupted, corruptedness, uncorrupt, uncorruptedness. This holds both for the moral order (concupiscence, sin-holiness) and also for the physical domain (sickness, death, putrefaction in the grave).<sup>250</sup> While in the normal linguistic usage of the Fathers it was natural to consider, for example, *aphtharsia* and *pathos* as mutually exclusive, contrary poles (of purely physical nature), in Julian's writings *aphtharsia* and *pathos* (death included) go together, because he includes a completely new way of looking at things in his consideration. No human-earthly experience, such as hunger, grief, sickness and even death, is subsumed under his concept of *phtharsia*, in so far as all of these experiences have been endured in freedom and authority and not out of unavoidable necessity. For him *phtharsia* is present with the necessity, coming with sin, of the acceptance of these by fallen human beings. Now if Christ is characterized by Julian as *aphthartos*, then this means that he is not subjected to any such necessity, coming from sin, of suffering physical or psychic states, especially death. Rather he is free and has full control over the conditions of his humanity.

*Phthartos* thus means the one who is subjected to corruptedness by natural necessity and indeed because he is in sin and conceived out of concupiscence. Such a *phtharsia* is not in Christ.

The *aphtharsia* of Christ also includes the morally neutral passions which are 'without blame', that is, the *πάθη ἀδιάβλητα*. On account of these Christ cannot be called *phthartos*.

That Julian supports that terminology follows from some texts handed down by Severus:

(1) In your speech against those who characterize Christ as impassible in the flesh you have written and formulated as absolute decree: in no way ought one to call suffering corruptedness (*corruptio*), because together with the holy Scriptures also the profane sages themselves would support you.<sup>251</sup>

(2) He [Julian] in fact has thoughtlessly written in accordance with the notions of his mind that passions (*pathe*) are not to be termed corruptedness (*phthora*) apart from those which come from evil, thus the perverse ones [i.e., the *πάθη διάβλητα*]; to the others, however, which are not against virtue, but are without blame (*ἀδιάβλητα*), such as hunger, thirst and wounds which frequently afflict us [and indeed as necessarily accepted passions], one

249. See Julian Hal., *Fragm.* 17: Draguet, 49\*: [Severus] 'For you have written: "If the word of Cyril, who dwells among the saints, is valid: After the resurrection our Lord had further (*λοιπόν*) an incorruptible body, then they accept that before the resurrection he was corruptible; and they should also say that he was in sin".' Cf. Cyril Alex., *Ep. ad Succensum* I: PG 77, 236B. Here also belongs the seventh anathema of Julian already cited above (Draguet, *Fragm.* 71, 62\*).

250. Cf. Draguet, *Julien d'Halicarnasse*, 106, with reference to G. Krüger, art. 'Julian v. H.', in *PRE* IX, 607.

251. Severus Ant., *Cnt. Tom.*: CSCO 245, p. 133, 11-16. In this way Severus transmits the following words of Julian: 'Where [in the scriptures] the passions are not characterized as corruptedness, as they are also not among the profane sages.' Cf. Draguet, *op. cit.*, 49\*, *Fragm.* 18.

ought in no way to give the name *phthora* [in Christ]. And he appears to have supported this in his entire incriminated work.<sup>252</sup>

This terminology is to be noted if one is not to do Julian an injustice. Because in his writings the concept of *phthora* means only that corruptedness which is necessarily imposed upon human beings as a consequence of sin, it must be excluded from Christ. This form of the concept *phthora* — with its positive side, *aphtharsia* — has the advantage that the christological teaching about the proprieties or properties is raised above a purely physical teaching of divinization, through reference to the freedom with which the Logos disposes of his human nature. That with this conception, however, the right positioning of 'freedom' in Christ has not been given, must still be discussed in particular. With this insufficiency Julian admittedly does not stand alone. Here Severus is in the same predicament, and with him most of the Fathers. With this topic we touch on the lacuna in the christological anthropology at that period, as we shall encounter it time and time again. Nevertheless, through his teaching of *phtharsia-aphtharsia* we are with Julian in the domain of this anthropology and, in connection with it, referred to that of the teaching about the original state (protology). Thus we come to the wider ordering of Julian's conceptions of corruptedness or incorruptedness.

(iv) *The anthropological-protological framework of Julian's teaching on aphtharsia*

Julian's critique of Severus was certainly motivated by an anti-Nestorian attitude, on the basis of which he had discovered gaps in the interpretation of Christ's unity even in the most decided opponent of Chalcedon: whoever so divides up the physical properties in Christ, as Severus does, divides Christ himself into two natures, no differently from Leo and Chalcedon. Really Julian could have been satisfied with a linguistic correction of Cyril and Severus, for example, with regard to ceasing to describe the divine and human properties as 'different by nature' (*ἐτεροφυής*) or as other by essence (*ἐτεροοῦσιος*, i.e., of another essence!). But a purely terminological abstinence did not satisfy him. For this reason he presented a positive teaching about the properties which

252. Severus Ant., *C. Addit. Iul.*, chs 13–23: CSCO 296, p. 25, 23–30. Julian is said to have gathered 'witnesses' for his 'abominable opinion' only through citations from Scripture and the Fathers which are incomplete and torn from the context (*ibid.*, pp. 25, 30–26, 2). Julian had referred particularly to Basil, *Ep. ad Sozopolitanos*: PG 32, 972B, where the distinction is made between 'physical passions' (*πάθη φυσικά*) and 'passions from wickedness' (*πάθη ἀπὸ κακίας*) Julian excludes the 'physical passions' from the designation *phthora*. He declines to designate these passions in Christ and only in Christ as *phthora*. Christ is not subjected to them by necessity

was conceived in the historical framework of the economy of salvation, particularly with regard to the original state of humankind, original sin, and the restoration of the original condition through Christ.

According to Julian, the human body created by God was not subject to corruptedness before the fall. In the original condition this had no place in the nature, in the *physis* of the human being. Only after the fall was it in the nature, but it was still not *φυσικῶς*, i.e., corresponding to nature. It has come to it from outside, and it is opposed to nature, *παρὰ φύσιν*. Under *phthora* must thus be understood an alteration of what existed in human beings corresponding to their nature (*κατὰ φύσιν*). 'On account of sin the corruptedness has come over us after the transgression; our nature is earthly and on account of Adam's transgression is wholly subject to corruption' (Frag. 44 and 100). Expressions of this kind are frequent in Julian. They confirm a fact which is principal in his eyes: the introduction of a new order into creation, that is, a new *oikonomia*, as against nature. On the basis of this new order Julian judges what has occurred with human beings.

In sinning Adam harmed not only himself. The nature which Adam should have transmitted to his sons is now touched by this corruptedness, so that the individual will be wholly penetrated, body and soul (Frag. 124). The *phthora* swamps the whole course of the human race and of individual lives. It dominates conception (Frag. 23, 24, 41) and death (Frag. 7, 12 for both); it holds sway over human beings for the whole time which stretches from the beginning to the end of their existence (Frag. 11, 12); it only ends in the grave (Frag. 115, 126). To be noted in particular is that Julian does not characterize the body before sin and without sin as 'corrupted', even according to its natural constitution. There must first be an alteration 'according to nature' for human beings to be subjected to *phtharsia*. But when Julian speaks here of *physis*, this word has a twofold use in the framework of his protology:

- (1) he speaks of *physis* in human beings before sin;
- (2) and of *physis* in human beings after sin.

These divergent ways of looking at things remove an apparent contradiction in Julian's statements about *phthora*. On one occasion he can emphasize that corruptedness, suffering and death do not correspond to nature: this holds for nature in the original state, before sin. But then on another occasion he can characterize *phthora* as 'natural'. This holds for the state of *physis* after sin.

This 'naturalness' in the second sense acquires even a special intensity: it means not only that the suffering and death of human beings correspond to their constitution after the fall, but that they have intrinsically the character of 'necessity'. Because Adam's sin sullied human nature, so to say as *peccatum naturae*,<sup>253</sup> the punishment falls on the nature and strikes everyone who shares in it by virtue of descent from Adam. This means the decision to be subjected to corruptedness and death, or not to be subjected, is taken from the descendants of Adam.

*Christ the new Adam and the corruptedness of human beings*

How does Julian bring the facts of the life and dying of the earthly Jesus into the compass of his terminology? What is *φυσικός*, physical, in

253. On *peccatum naturae* see Draguet, *Julien d'Halicarnasse*, 124-7. M. Jugie, *Julien d'Halicarnasse et Sévère d'Antioche. La doctrine du péché originel chez les Pères Grecs, Extrait des 'Echos d'Orient'* (Paris, 1925), in particular polemicized against this expression. With regard to the terminology of Patriarch Severus: for him *phthartos*, corruptible, is to be understood as materially, substantially corrupted. It is interchangeable with *pathetos*, passible, subjected to suffering; *thnetos*, mortal, subjected to death. Whoever is subjected to corruption is also a possible subject for suffering and death.

him? How do ἀφθαρτός, uncorrupted, and yet also παθητός and θνητός, passible and mortal, go together? Julian avoids the absolute and unrestricted statement: Christ has suffered φυσικῶς. He permits this statement only when there is added: ἐκουσίως, from free decision, or better: in freedom and authority. Thus he confesses that Christ truly, and in this sense also physically, suffered, but in complete disposition over himself, over his humanity, and was in no way subjected to a natural necessity of suffering and death. In this sense he also states the *aphtharsia*, the uncorruptedness, of Christ's body.<sup>254</sup> This interpretation of the suffering and dying of Christ he combines with the word παθητικόν and its use. Let us leave it at first untranslated. He expresses himself on this topic in the context of the question, to what extent Christ's body is the same as ours in essence (*homoousios*). Severus had accused him of denying this. In reply he says:<sup>255</sup>

We, we use the expression 'the same as us in essence' (ὁμοούσιος ἡμῖν) not, for instance, on account of the fact that (he had suffered) like any normal passible being [i.e., necessarily subject to suffering] (κατὰ τὸ παθητικόν), but on account of the fact that he is of the same nature (φύσις) [as us].

Julian means that he restricts the concept of *homoousios* to the *ousia*, the essence of Christ, but he does not relate it to what is meant by *pathetikon*. This word does not denote *passibilitas*, passibility, as such. Were this meaning connected with it, the result would be a denial of Christ's passibility and the reality of his suffering — which Severus indeed presupposes. *Pathetikon* denotes only a special circumstance in suffering or the kind of suffering, as this belongs namely only to the παθητικὸς φθαρτός, the sufferer in Adamitic corruptedness. This circumstance is nothing other than the *necessity* with which the corrupted human being is subjected to suffering and death. It is the calamity of suffering and death! This post-Adamitic 'dereliction' is so important for Julian that on account of its absence in Christ the predicate 'corrupted', *phthartos*, also can no longer be applied to him. If our suffering and dying is *necessarily* present with the possession of the Adamitic nature, then this does not hold for Christ, even though in fact he took upon himself suffering and death. For this reason he is continuously *aphthartos*, uncorrupted, from the incarnation, or from the very first moment of his earthly existence.

254. Cf. *Fragm.* 133: Dragnet, 74\*. If Christ had been subjected to suffering and death out of necessity, he would have brought us no redemption.

255. Severus Ant., *C. Addit. Iul.*, ch. 26: CSCO 296, p. 69,18–21. The text is found often, at times in differing lengths: ch. 26, p. 68,8–15; ch. 29, p. 81,25–28; ch. 31, p. 89,4–7; ch. 36, p. 111,20–23; ch. 40, pp. 128,35–129,1.

(v) *The free decision to suffer and to die*

This Julianist conception of Christ's power to have at his disposal the destiny of his assumed body must still be presented in more detail, in its origin and range. Here once again Julian had recourse to the fourth century, to its christology 'from above', to its teaching of divinization, and above all to the idea that the humanity of Christ in the course of its earthly existence was at the constant disposition of the Logos. Gregory of Nyssa had sketched this picture of Christ to establish the unity in the Incarnate One, despite all distinction of God and human being.<sup>256</sup> Although Christ as a human being keeps his true human *ousia*, this is not simply the case, however, with his earthly characteristics and properties. Divine *idiomata*, such as wisdom, power, holiness and then, what Julian provides with a special accent, superiority to suffering, take the place in Christ of human limitation. They tie the human *ousia* so definitely to the Logos-subject that the *hypostasis* is one.<sup>257</sup> Gregory himself now gives a pointer which particularly approaches the notions of Julian. In the fourth speech on the beatitudes, we read:<sup>258</sup>

He [Christ], who has shared everything with us, sin excluded (cf. Heb 4,15; 2,15) and had in common with us the same emotions (affects, *παθήματα*), did not consider hunger as sin, nor did he refuse to experience the suffering associated with it; rather he accepted the drive of nature to desire nourishment. After he had fasted for forty days he hungered (cf. Mt 4,2); he gave then the [bodily] nature the opportunity to do its own thing when he wanted.

That the Logos must first create the *kairos* for the assumed human nature in order for it to be able to show and to exercise the properties and functions properly its own, is the suggestion that Julian takes over from Gregory of Nyssa. In this there really exists no great difference between himself and Severus. The Patriarch certainly considers corruptibility, mortality and continuous passibility as physical qualities in Christ. In him they signify no relation to sin and are accordingly 'blameless passions' (*πάθη ἀδιάβλητα*) which do not detract from the honour of God. Nevertheless Severus also supports the idea of the 'divine permission to suffer' which the Logos gives to his human nature.<sup>259</sup>

256. Cf. *JdChr* I<sup>3</sup>, 539-47; CCT I<sup>2</sup>, 370-7.

257. Cf. *ibid.*, esp. 546; 376f. respectively.

258. Greg. Nyss., *De beatit. or.* IV (CPG 3161): PG 44, 1237A: ἔδωκε γὰρ ὅτε ἐβούλετο τῇ φύσει καιρὸν τὰ ἐαυτῆς ἐνεργῆσαι. Cf. Greg. Nyss., *Ad Theoph. adv. Apoll.*: Jaeger-Mueller, III/1, 128; PG 45, 1277B.

259. Cf. Severus Ant., *C Addit. Iul.*, ch. 26: CSCO 296, p. 68,20-22, where he says of the Logos: 'and he suffered like us with the exception of any sin, and (this), without it escaping their [i.e. he refers to the teachers of the Church] notice that he voluntarily took this upon himself by allowing the flesh to behave according to the laws of its nature . . .' But Severus



Without detracting from its honour, the godhead thus surrenders the assumed humanity to *phtharsia*, to corruptedness.

Julian admittedly fixes this dependence of the human-natural functions in Christ on the Logos so strongly that *for that very reason* the predicate *aphtharsia* is due to the earthly Jesus uninterruptedly right from his birth to his death.<sup>260</sup> In this way he has departed from the linguistic usage that had been common before him. He demands for the allocation of the predicate *phthartos* a negative omen which all human beings have, Christ alone excepted: namely the *παθητικόν*, the subjection to suffering caused by sin, although otherwise none of the natural qualities is changed. Whatever is capable of material dissolution also remains dissolvable in Christ; what is mortal remains mortal and in fact dies. But because all this happens from the free disposition of the Logos-*physis*, the *aphtharsia* is guaranteed in Christ without restriction.<sup>261</sup>

Severus too in his way has connected two things: actual physical sufferings and the voluntary nature of their acceptance by the Logos. An unambiguous text will make this clear to us. In it he speaks of emulating the passible Jesus as the way to life.<sup>262</sup>

concludes: on account of the word 'voluntarily' the Fathers did not deny the fact that Christ suffered in the same way as we do (*ibid.*, ll. 23-4). In the important letter to the Comes Oecumenius about the 'qualities and activities' Severus quotes similar-sounding words of Cyril, which E. W. Brooks could not verify: 'For, though it is said that he hungered and thirsted, and slept and grew weary after a journey, and wept and feared, these things did not happen to him just as they do to us in accordance with compulsory ordinances of nature; but he himself voluntarily permitted his flesh to walk according to the laws of nature, for he sometimes allowed it even to undergo its own passions.' See PO 12, 184-185.

260. Cf. Julian Hal., *Fragm.* 16: Draguet, 49\* from Severus Ant., *Crit. Tom.*: CSCO 245, p. 37,18-20: [Julian]: 'How should one not believe that the uncorruptedness continuously affected the passible body of our Lord, even where he voluntarily suffered for others?'

261. Completely in the spirit of Patriarch Severus, Paul of Antioch in his synodal letter to Theodore of Alexandria in 575 again establishes this. Cf. CSCO 103, pp. 228,36-230,25. He develops an extensive phenomenology of the earthly Jesus in order to refute the heresy of Julian, who he claims was in the succession of Marcion, Valentinus, even of Manes and Eutyches, and accepted 'that Christ really bore none of the passions, but that the mystery of Christ was a deception' (p. 229,29-30). Paul of Antioch says against Julian: 'He has not assumed a passionless and naturally immortal body, as according to your babble Adam had before the transgression' (p. 229,32-34). Paul emphasizes explicitly that the status of the *phtharsia* coincides with passibility and mortality: '*Itaque, quia natura passibile et mortale, et in hoc sensu tantum etiam corruptibile, corpus animatum et sanctissimum assumpsit Verbum Deus . . .*' (p. 230,7-9). One can, however, demonstrate that Julian himself did not approach the teaching of Eutyches. He did not deny the consubstantiality of Christ with us. Zacharias Rhetor ascribes this error to John the Rhetorician, about whom we have no further information. Cf. HE III, 10: Brooks I, CSCO 87, p. 112,20-29, where also the proximity to Apollinarius is presented.

262. Severus Ant., *Adv. Apol. Iul.*, ch. 6: CSCO 302, p. 175,9-18. In addition Severus cites a passage from John Chrysostom, *Hom.* 67: PG 59, 462, in which this voluntariness is also stressed. He could also have named the Latin Hilary of Poitiers. Cf. *JdChr* I<sup>3</sup>, 584-8; *CCT* I<sup>2</sup>, 396-400

For this purpose he [Christ] accepted *natural* and *necessary* passions; in doing this he revealed in contrast to this *necessity* the *voluntary* character [of this acceptance of passions] as fruit of an entirely divine munificence. Precisely at the height of this *necessity* (Hespel: *au sein de ces nécessités*) the *divine-voluntary* character manifested itself; for he ordered, as God, who he was, that the natural needs come into effect in his body. Thus it was every time, if he wanted it to be so, and not otherwise, that the passions (*πάθη*) of sleep, of hunger and of fear or of any other blameless emotion, of which the Gospel speaks, made themselves known (in him).

The teaching of the dependence of Christ's humanity on the Logos for the actualization of the 'blameless passions' persisted among the Severans, admittedly with the same restrictions that Severus himself had made. The long synodal letter of the Severan Patriarch, Paul of Antioch (564-577), to Theodore of Alexandria from the year 575 illustrates this. With regard to Julian of Halicarnassus the pre-Easter and post-Easter Christ is presented in the following way.<sup>263</sup>

Previously [before the resurrection] he took, as necessity occasioned him, food as we do too; however, with the difference: he himself allowed his body, when he wanted it, to experience the natural blameless passions (*πάθη*); he was Lord of this nature itself. Now [after the resurrection] exclusively, to establish the resurrection he showed the marks of the wounds and gave other signs for this. They were namely not to believe that he appeared to them in a body other than in that which he had taken from Mary and hypostatically united to himself, admittedly now elevated into the state of incorruptibility.

(b) *A concluding consideration of the dispute between Severus and Julian*  
When Severus reproached his opponent Julian with the statement that he professed Manes and Eutyches, this is apologetic exaggeration and against historical truth. The analysis of the conceptual language of the bishop has shown us that the difference between him and Severus was in the first place terminological. What Julian understood by the *aphtharsia*, the uncorruptedness, of the body of Christ did not mean the abolition of the human reality of Christ, but rather a prerogative of Jesus, the new Adam. Because he is elevated above sin and stands above the punishment of corruption of the post-Adamitic human race, he is not subjected to its unavoidable necessity, but by the free decision of the divine Logos in him has taken upon himself body, suffering and death. On this basis both bishops could have met. Severus, however, steered the interpretation of his opponent's christology on to a false track. The majority of the theologians at that time followed him.<sup>264</sup> But not a few of the supporters of the bishop of Halicarnassus also pointed in the wrong

263. Paulus Ant., *Ep synod. ad Theodor. patr. Alex.*: CSCO 103, p. 230, 17-25.

264. See Draguet, *Julien d'Halicarnasse*, ch. VII: La doctrine de Julien et la tradition, 216-56. The post-Severan altercation with Julian is here presented at the appropriate place.

direction, so that the reproaches raised against him could more and more appear to be justified. We will observe attentively the traces of this *Julianism* in the different ecclesiastical regions. This development certainly finds some early signs in Julian himself. We will attempt to record here these one-sided elements in order to reach by this means a concluding judgement about his picture of Christ.

(i) *A constructional error in the system*

The decision of Julian with regard to terminology signified a trend towards a christology of divinization. Even to characterize the earthly, pre-Easter Jesus as 'uncorrupted' was highly misleading for all those who followed the customary ecclesiastical use of language. The notion of a transfiguration of Christ's body as a permanent state was bound to occur to each of them, even though Julian was not of this opinion. But the misunderstanding lay deeper. It affected all anti-Chalcedonian theologians, more or less. For in refusing to distinguish conceptually between *physis* (nature) and *hypostasis* (hypostasis, person, subject), they remained on the level of pre-Chalcedonian unclarity which was the root of all misunderstandings: they attempted to construct a theory of the unity in Christ from the concept of nature and on the level of nature. This means that they sought to arrive at the substantiality of the connection of divinity and humanity by way of a natural adaptation, by way of the divinization of the human in Christ. Chalcedon chose to go the new way — to construct the unity in Christ from the analysis of the *subject*, but on the basis of the distinction between the concepts of *nature* and *ousia*. The old-Orientals wanted to demarcate unity and difference with the same intensity, but both on the level of *physis*, of nature (*in natura et secundum naturam*). In this way there resulted an uncertain oscillation regarding the demarcation of the extent of the influence which must devolve upon the humanity of Christ from the Logos as the *mia physis* in order to ensure the unity. We have stressed the rôle of the *mia energeia* in the picture of Christ presented by the supporters of the *mia-physis* formula. In addition to this came the trend to show the *one* image of Christ, the incarnate Logos, through a christological *doctrine of properties*. We have seen how Julian here believed it necessary to close certain dangerous gaps in Severus' picture of Christ; we have also seen why the Patriarch wanted to divert his opponent from the doctrine of properties and to refer to the emphasis on the one *energeia*.

It follows from this that the misunderstanding between the two bishops derived from the unsolved dilemma of the *mia-physis*

christology.<sup>265</sup> If the two of them sought both unity as well as difference in Christ on the level of nature, then it could only be a question of a reciprocal shifting of boundary stones, here to add more to the revelation of the *doxa*, there a reservation to lessen the divinization — both needed divinizing properties and constant influence from above. This failure in construction is more clearly obvious in Julian than in Severus. Some texts and citations which we still want to adduce show this, as also does the value which Julian gave to the virgin birth of Christ from Mary.

*Fragment 63:* 'The flesh [of Christ] did not first of all exist (for itself), but at the same time that it came to exist the nature of the Logos subsisted in it through the union with the Logos, and for that reason it transcends the physical laws.'<sup>266</sup>

*A quotation:* Julian cites with assent the statement of an otherwise unknown Alexandrian rhetorician called John, a contemporary of Peter the Iberian: 'Everything of Christ proceeds in a manner which transcends our nature.'<sup>267</sup>

To illustrate this statement Julian refers in the first place to the virginal conception in Mary.<sup>268</sup> It is a conception without *mixis* and thus without concupiscence (cf. Frag. 48 together with Frag. 7, 11, 24). The whole earthly life of Jesus, however, is seen in a certain state of exception which extends to everything (Frag. 12), even to suffering and death (Frag. 126, 127), and even to the grave. In all this Christ certainly remains a true human being (*ἄνθρωπος ἀληθής*), but not a normal human being (*ἄνθρωπος κοινός*). For he is not subjected to the normal conditions of human existence. That does not mean that Julian personally came close to the teaching of Eutyches, viz. that Christ's body is not the same as ours in essence (*homoousios*), but only Mary's is. Zacharias Rhetor ascribes this error to John the Rhetorician just mentioned.<sup>269</sup> Nevertheless the door to dangerous speculations was opened, as the later developments will show. Julian himself had seen Christ's exception in the fact that he, who in no way stood in relationship to sin, could freely determine whether his bodiliness should be exposed to earthly needs and passions and death or not. It was for all that an uncorruptedness anchored in the spiritual. The temptation was great to see the qualities of the bodily itself also altered in Christ and even in Mary, as an Ethiopic text will show us later. Dualistic influences which devalued the bodily and the sexual had been active since the time of Marcion and Manes, and were very highly explosive for christology. A misleading terminology in the teaching of *aphtharsia* could easily put one on the wrong path.

## (ii) *The understanding of the virginal birth of Jesus*

Severus expressed the suspicion that from false motives Julian, with Eutyches and Manes, stressed too strongly birth from the Virgin and,

265. Even if, following Lebon and others, we glean from the *mia-physis* christology of the anti-Chalcedonians of Severan stamp the universal ecclesial understanding of the incarnation of God in Christ, it is still an odd formula with its historical baggage, which has time and again been a source of false interpretations that on each occasion have provoked controversies. Julian of Halicarnassus and Sergius (see below) are proofs of this.

266. Cf. Draguet, *Julien d'Halicarnasse*, 60.

267. *Ibid.*, 68, *Fragm.* 100; cf. Zacharias Rh., *HE* III, 10: Brooks I, CSCO 87, 112–113.

268. Effects of Julian's or the Julianists' christology on mariology will be noted in the course of the presentation.

269. Zacharias Rh., *HE* III, 10 (above n. 267).

in general, unjustifiably accorded priority to the event of Christ's birth over his death on the cross. Severus maintained that in this way Julian wanted to deny the passible mortal character of Christ's body, for which purpose he also called upon the evangelical reports of the miracles of Jesus.<sup>270</sup> The Patriarch assumed that Julian attributed a preternatural quality to the flesh of Christ on account of the birth from the Virgin, like the type of body which Adam had before the fall. But in fact, according to the Patriarch, the birth from the Virgin and the Holy Spirit did not abolish the consubstantiality of Christ's body with us, nor the possibility of taking on oneself the 'blameless passions'. Moreover, it ought not to be understood as a condemnation of marriage and of marital intercourse between husband and wife. It is rather a reference to our baptism out of water and the Holy Spirit which brings us new birth and the pledge of resurrection. The incarnation of Christ has brought us this.<sup>271</sup> According to Julian, stated Severus, marriage and sexual intercourse are a corruptedness, *phtharsia*, on account of which he demanded a different type of birth and a spiritualizing of Christ's flesh. Hence the body of Christ has a 'superior condition' (*condition supérieure*) because it was conceived by Mary alone without seed, analogous to the body of Adam, which is from earth and not from seed. In contrast Severus gave to Christ's body and hence also to ours this 'condition supérieure' only with the resurrection.<sup>272</sup>

In Julian a further theme led to the same goal: he placed the beginning of Christ's *aphtharsia* already in his birth. For this reason the birth from the Virgin received the character of a creative new beginning, of a new ἀρχή.<sup>273</sup>

He [Christ] himself has introduced for nature a new beginning through a restoration of the elements with regard to their original condition; for this reason he has not demanded the help of the husband for the conception, because the activity of the Holy Spirit has surpassed them.

Julian is said to reach this false explanation from an erroneous interpretation of Cyril's *Ad reginas* (PG 76, 1372BC; ACO I, 1, 5a, pp. 40,37-41,6). He cites just Rom 8,29 (Jesus the first born among many brothers) too much instead of referring also to Col 1,18 (first born among the dead). If Christ were to have had all this already through his birth, his death and resurrection would have been superfluous. Again Severus says: birth from the Virgin is the anticipation of our birth from the Spirit (Jn 3,6); the resurrection of Christ, however, is the way to our definitive restoration in immortality and impassibility. Cyril is said to have already established

270. Severus Ant., *Crit. Tom.*: CSCO 245, pp. 125,31-126,1.

271. *Ibid.*, pp. 128,22-129,11.

272. *Ibid.*, p. 151,15-29.

273. Severus Ant., *Adv. Apol. Iul.*, ch. 9: CSCO 302, p. 192,6-9.

this theological balance between Christmas and Easter.<sup>274</sup> We see that already here the problem of a choice between a theology of the incarnation and a theology of the cross comes into view.

Thus according to Severus the evangelical report of the virginal conception of Jesus in Mary ought not to become the reason for denying the passible and mortal character of Christ's body.<sup>275</sup> This conception of Christ does not abolish his consubstantiality with us, a thought that one could perhaps accept for Julian, if one looks at his definition of *homoousios*. It concerns only the *ousia*, not the *pathetikon*! With some justice it can be argued that the birth from the Virgin is also conceived by Julian as an 'exception' to the *homoousios*, without his denying the reality of the body of Christ by this claim. No doubt because of the vehemence with which Julian stressed this 'exception', Severus inferred bad intentions.<sup>276</sup>

He states it is false to decree: 'If the birth from the Virgin and the resurrection, if the beginning and the end (of the life of Jesus) have taken place according to the new considerations (*Hespel: convenances nouvelles*) and exceeding the universal character of our nature, so it is obviously

274. Cyril Alex., *De recta fide ad Theodos. imp.*: PG 76, 1185AB and other passages. Cf. Severus Ant., *Adv. Apol. Iul.*, ch. 9: CSCO 302, pp. 192, 10–195, 19. In this context we find the first citation from Ps. Dionys. Ar., *De div. nom.* II 9: PG 3, 648B; P. Scazzoso, *Dionigi Areopagita, Tutte le opere* (Milan, 1981), 278, with Severus Ant., *Adv. Apol. Iul.*, ch. 25: CSCO 302, p. 267, 6–19. Severus cites the text in order to emphasize that this mystagogue also teaches that Christ 'has become a human being in one substance and in the manner of a human being', even if we do not know the manner by which Christ was formed in the womb of the Virgin.

275. Cf. Severus Ant., *Crit. Tom.*: CSCO 245, pp. 125, 31–126, 1.

276. *Ibid.*, pp. 70, 7–12; 66, 26–35. Severus also repeats his stern judgement of Julian in his letter to the Oriental monks (c. 520–525), in PO 12, no. XXXV, 275–291, esp. 286–287: '... they do not consent to confess that the true flesh of God and the Word ... suffers like us and is susceptible of innocent passions, but say that he suffered in semblance, and that the flesh was impassible and immortal at the time of the voluntary and saving cross; and besides other impossible things the wretched men foolishly speak of false passions, and in false words they name phantasy incorruptibility, and deny the true incorruptibility, and they fail to notice the wisdom of the dispensation, whereby the impassible God united to himself those of our passions which do not fall under the description of sin, wishing in it to taste our death voluntarily, destroy its dominion over us, and by means of the resurrection to set us free in incorruptibility, that is in impassibility and immortality, and raise us to our first state in which also we were created.' An unreal form of suffering and death would have made the incarnation unnecessary. For the divine passionlessness and immortality the Logos already had by reason of his divinity (*ibid.*, 287). In the same letter Severus complains about Julian's intolerant procedure as well as his hectic propaganda activity (*ibid.*, 289–290). After Julian's death Severus warned several Syrian bishops to be vigilant with regard to the spreading of Julian's teachings in the East. Cf. E. Brooks, *SL II*, V, *Ep.* 14 to the bishops John, Philoxenus and Thomas, 349–50. On the further altercation of the Severans with the Julianists, see *JdChr* II/1, 76–7; *CCT* II/1, 67 (Severan florilegia against the Julianists); also CPG 7127 with reference to further research by R. Draguet on Syriac unedited sources against Julian: 1. 'Une pastorale anti-julianiste des environs de l'année 530', *Mus* 40 (1927), 59–89; 2. 'Pièces de polémique antijulianiste', *Mus* 44 (1931), 254–317; 54 (1941), 59–89; *idem*, *Julien d'Halicarnasse*, 81–8.

necessary to exclude from the sameness with the universal character of our nature also the other aspects [thus in particular the *phtharsia*].'

It is not yet the time to speak about the movement which Julian of Halicarnassus inspired with his ideas. It was of significance to contrast the historical Julian against Julianism, which will present itself more and more in the course of this description as an exuberant outgrowth from an original idea that could have been checked. First we must stay with the basis in order to bring into view the peculiarity of the christological disposition of the *mia-physis* teaching from the confrontation of its leading figures among themselves. The comparison between the powerful Patriarch of Antioch and a theological novice, however, also serves this purpose.

## II. THE ESSENCE AND BEING OF CHRIST CONCEPTUALIZED: THE AMATEUR THEOLOGIAN, SERGIUS THE GRAMMARIAN

In spite of all the subtle polemic in the depiction of the christology of Severus we have still remained predominantly in the domain of theologizing governed by the mystery of faith. With the correspondence between Severus and Sergius the 'concept' receives a special position. Christ is to be found a place in Aristotle's doctrine of categories.

### 1. A problem shared with Julian of Halicarnassus

Although we cannot ascertain whether Sergius had personal contact with Julian or the Julianists, the question raised by the non-theologian, Sergius, touched that of Bishop Julian and his supporters. Once again the drive to secure completely the unity of Christ holds first place. There arises once more a suspicion of the acceptance of different properties, divine and human respectively, in the one Christ — a doubt which Severus also could not eliminate in Julian: there is a threat of a division into two natures and two *hypostases*, if in the properties of Christ a 'difference of nature' is accepted. Once again in the background we recognize the fundamental structure of the *mia-physis* teaching as the source of excessive demands on the interpretation of the person of Jesus Christ. In the solution of the question raised a partial agreement is also evident. Yet the whole of the correspondence between Sergius and Severus remains rather in the domain of personal guidance than in that of a propagandist publicity campaign. The public is not yet addressed by the Patriarch, although he reckons with the possibility that his addressee seeks an audience.

Sergius, called the 'Grammarian', is a loner. He gives the impression of a philosopher and private scholar who has ventured into the area of theology, but has got entangled in his own linguistic and conceptual net. For all that, he is ready to learn. His admiration is for the Patriarch Severus, to whom he turns with his difficulties. But hardly had the correspondence begun to develop, when the Patriarch was forced to flee into the desert. After the third letter of the Grammarian the fugitive seemed to be convinced of the suspicious character of his addressee's concepts, and the correspondence ended up in discord, although as a whole it was conducted moderately. The origins of Sergius and the course of his life are unknown to us.<sup>277</sup> From the correspondence it emerges that even after the change of 518 he could have remained in the *dioecesis oriens* and was keen to come to the aid of his oppressed brothers in faith.<sup>278</sup>

Before 518 Sergius had contacted the famous Patriarch of Antioch. In doing so he expressed his dogmatic opinions on christology to the great master, after having previously contacted converts who had made their way from the 'error' of Chalcedon to the truth. Severus immediately recognized the 'amateur' in the theological attempts sent to him, and warned him of ill-advised activity. In the first letter of reply Sergius indeed received praise for his keenness and progress with reference to 1 Timothy 4,15. Nevertheless the meaningful warning followed.<sup>279</sup>

But avoid writing doctrinal teachings and do not easily approach this, for such things belong, as you know, to those who are much instructed and have meditated diligently on the scriptures inspired by God, and have grown rich on the toils of the things of the same Spirit, the tested former teachers of mysteries in the holy Church, and not to those recently instructed in the knowledge of the divine teachings.

Moreover, in dealings with the converts Sergius should adhere only to the Symbol of Nicaea and not present his own texts to them as a text of faith. Sergius himself had given occasion for the instruction by two things: he had expressed his dissatisfaction with the overly mild manner of the Patriarch and his clergy in proceeding with the return of Chalcedonians to 'orthodoxy', and moreover he had dared to interpret

277. On the following see Lebon, *Chalcedon I* (425–580), 429, n. 14; 445, 474–6, 495, 520f., 537f., 548–54. Frend, 206, n. 2; 209; I. R. Torrance, *op. cit.*, esp. 6–7.

278. Sergius Gram., *Ep III ad Sever. Ant.*: CSCO 120, p. 119,9–10; I. R. Torrance, *op. cit.*, 6, rightfully concludes that Sergius was not a bishop. Sergius appears, however, on account of the banishment of the anti-Chalcedonian bishops to have felt that in his letters he was giving expression to the opinion of the forsaken Churches. Severus thought nothing of this apostolate and advised his correspondent at the end of the controversy, in the future 'to run on his own'. See *Ep III ad Serg.*: CSCO 120, pp. 134,32–135,2.

279. Severus Ant., *Ep. I ad Serg. Gram.*: CSCO 120, p. 70,9–14.



the *regula fidei* on his own authority. In doing this he had coined as *kephalaion* the sentence: 'We do not speak of two natures or properties (*dilit'*) after the inexpressible union [in Christ].'<sup>280</sup> Through the mediation of Bishop Antoninus of Aleppo, the Grammarian had presented his suggestion of a formula to a gathering of bishops, which is not determined more closely.<sup>281</sup> It remained the main theme of the discussion between Severus and Sergius up to the third piece of reciprocal correspondence, which occurred certainly in the period after 518. For the Patriarch wrote in his reply:<sup>282</sup>

Therefore show (me) when, in the six years (512-518) I spoke in the Church of the Antiochenes and wrote many letters, at any time I once said Emmanuel is *one ousia*, and of one signification (*ἰσάωδ'ο, γνώρισμα*) and of one property (*dilit'*; *ἰδιότης*).

## 2. The zealot of the unity in Christ

From the first letter Sergius claimed to acknowledge in Christ only one 'undivided property', and that on the basis of the 'one *physis*'.<sup>283</sup> It is the *proprietas Christi*, the *one* particularity proper only to Christ, which he has in mind as the closest bond of unity. It is not surpassed in expressive power by any purely 'human quality'. Walking on water and leaving the grave unhindered witness to this.<sup>284</sup> The whole economy of salvation tends towards this omega point, the one *Christus proprium* which is as proper to the Incarnate One as the *risibile*, the ability to laugh, which is simply the *proprium* of the human being. This sign of recognition (*gnorisma*) is revealed and realized in the virgin birth, through the sufferings and death of the Incarnate One to his ascension and his sitting at the right hand of God.<sup>285</sup> It is the sign of Emmanuel (cf. Is 7,14). In an almost Augustinian manner Sergius sketches this illumination of his after meditating on the visions of Daniel (Dan 7,8). He now knows that he has been ushered into the 'darkness of these divine things'.<sup>286</sup>

280. Sergius Gram., *Ep. I ad Sever. Ant.*: CSCO 120, pp. 51,19-52,4

281. Lebon, 168, had proposed the Synod of Tyre, allegedly in 514. Cf. I. R. Torrance, *op. cit.*, 7. On this see, however, *JdChr* II/1, 321f.; *CCT* II/1, 284f. (following A. de Halleux).

282. Severus Ant., *Ep. III ad Serg. Gram.*: CSCO 120, p. 132,10-14; Syriac: CSCO 119, p. 172,21-23; also in Athanasius and Cyril he cannot find such a sentence: CSCO 120, p. 125,4-7. On the date of *Ep. III* after 518 see *ibid.*, p. 135,1.8: Severus speaks of the fact that his enemies follow his tracks in the desert; p. 136,2-3: Patriarch Dioscorus II of Alexandria (d. 14 October 517) is mentioned as already dead.

283. Sergius Gram., *Ep. I ad Sever. Ant.*: CSCO 120, p. 52,26 and pp. 52,32-53,1: *... unam ex duabus Dei incarnati proprietatem admittamus*.

284. *Ibid.*, p. 53,2-6.

285. *Ibid.*, p. 53,7-16.

286. Sergius Gram., *Ep. II ad Sever. Ant.*: CSCO 120, p. 72,3-19.

Sergius, however, in his newly attained peace felt disturbed on two sides. First came the old comrades of his earlier ignorance (they are difficult to determine) who alleged much 'against the properties', and indeed with reference to a writing of Severus; then the Chalcedonians replied, likewise surrounding themselves with excerpts from Severus and spreading the teaching of the properties which were to be distinguished, but in the sense of Sergius were 'separated'.<sup>287</sup> Then, when the response of the Patriarch to the first letter was received, Sergius' confusion was complete. It contained the call to tread the *via media* between the two parties and to hear witnesses which Severus produced. Among these was Cyril's statement which for him was utterly unintelligible: '[The word "union" (*henosis*)] implies no confusing and no mixing of the natures with each other.'<sup>288</sup> It was precisely on this word of 'mixing' that Sergius had fastened to avoid any division in Christ. This word *mixis*, *krasis*, was all the more important to him because he wanted to deny, just as energetically as Severus, the total *con*-fusion, the *synchysis*.<sup>289</sup>

287. *Ibid.*, pp. 72,20-73,2.

288. Cited in Severus Ant., *Ep. I ad Serg. Gram.*: CSCO 120, p. 57,3-12, esp. 9-10; cf. p. 73,14-15. Cyril Alex., *Adv. Nest. II*: PG 76, 85AB: the mystery of Christ knows the distinction (*diaphora*), but not the separation (*dihairesis*): οὐ συγχέων [τὰς φύσεις] ἢ ἀνακρινῶν τὰς φύσεις (CSCO 120, p. 73,14-15).

289. Sergius Gram., *Ep. II ad Sever. Ant.*: CSCO 120, p. 73,15-18. Besides the discussion with John the Grammarian and Sergius the Grammarian, Severus had yet a third opportunity to take a position on the terminology and theory of the *unio hypostatica*. In the long letter 25 to the people of Emesa (PO 12, 222-248) he had an argument with a member of the community of Emesa who had fallen victim to a misunderstanding of a statement of Cyril, which reads: 'For, because the Word who is from God the Father took flesh and came forth as a human being like us, he would not for this reason be also termed a double thing. For he is one, and not without flesh, who in his own nature is without flesh and blood' (*Adv. Nestor. II* 6: Pusey VI, 112; PO 12, 225). From the sentence: 'In his own nature he [the Logos] is without flesh and blood' the Christian of Emesa had concluded that the *henosis* of the Logos with the flesh has an end and he would be again in his pure divinity (PO 12, 225-227). This could remind one of Marcellus of Ancyra, but it stems rather from an overblown Cyrillianism. This error gave Severus (presumably between 512 and 518) the occasion to sketch his own doctrine of the *unio hypostatica* with broad strokes. This time it was not so much a separation as a mixing that he had to avert. Consequently the concepts mixing and mingling were rejected and the incarnation was characterized as the 'synthesis out of two elements', corresponding to the name of the incarnate 'Emmanuel': 'but even so he preserved the absence of mixture (*hulthanā*) in the divine essence and did not change the essence of the Godhead into the nature of flesh' (228). Severus speaks of the fact that 'from the unmixed union of the incarnation, and the composition out of two elements, the godhead and the manhood, Emmanuel should be made up, who in one *hypostasis* is ineffably composite; not simple, but composite' (229-230). This is elucidated using the body-soul analogy (230). The terminology of mixing is excluded once again (233): the Logos is indeed in his own (pre-existent) nature without flesh and blood. Even the incarnation signifies no 'mixing of the flesh with the essence of the godhead'; he retains the divinity 'sublime and pure and unmixed in the characteristics of its own incorporeal character'; even in the hypostatic union he leaves the humanity as it was in its own *characteristica* (233). Severus here really comes close to the *idiomata* teaching of Leo the Great, admittedly with the difference that he will not concede an *agere secundum propriam formam* for the humanity in Christ.

Now, I acknowledge that once the divine union is mentioned, *confusion* (τὰ τῆς συγχύσεως) is set aside, (but here) the union is not thought of in a faulty way when the natures are unmixed in a divine and inexpressible mingling (*contemperatio*) and in a *hypostasis*.

But what could Severus understand by 'mingling'? Only tentatively did he attempt to determine the content of this concept.

(1) Negatively. He is not satisfied with the information that in the *mia-physis* formula the added word 'incarnate' implies the reference to another nature, and thus a *confusion* is excluded. This statement is nothing other than the secret recognition of two natures or the denial of the hypostatic unity. With this explanation of the *mia-physis* formula one arrives at a unity 'by decree'.<sup>290</sup>

(2) Positively. On his side he makes the claim:

Thus, I learn that the combination of two or more simple things into one [thing; Cyril would say ἐν πᾶγμα] belongs to the principle of composition, in which what is complete is also a *part*. And (yet) afterwards [i.e. when the combination has taken place] the (constituent) parts are not from then on adjudged according to the principle of duality, since once and for all one *ousia* and one quality (*msud'ota*, *gnorisma*) has come into being.<sup>291</sup>

If the becoming one ought to be characterized as a 'mixing' (*hlt*), then it seems for the Grammarian that Gregory Nazianzen indicated a growing together, a *συμφύσις*, as the correct mean between an external juxtaposition (*parathesis*) and the *confusion* (*synchysis*). The result is then one 'image' (*yuqna* = *εἰκὼν*) and one *hypostasis*.<sup>292</sup>

But because Severus with Cyril and his *Scholia de incarnatione Unigeniti* wanted to allow as valid finally only the expression *henosis* in the place of the terms for mixing (*krasis*, *mixis*), Sergius saw himself placed before an insoluble *aporia*. Through this restriction both theologians took from him the possibility of finding the right word for the act of union in Christ.<sup>293</sup> The sole escape for him was offered by the acceptance of a *synthesis* of the 'parts', not only to form one *physis*, but also one *ousia* and one 'property'.<sup>294</sup>

Therefore as I keep silent wise Cyril again urges on (my) thoughts, who speaks best by means of your priestly tongue, but it is not yet understood by me, who am of small account. But I read the law to you as well: 'He [Christ] is composed so as to become one in the middle, of human properties, and those which are above man.' The Father seems to say that the Incarnate Word was one in every respect, I mean both nature and property, when he mingled

290. Cf. Sergius Gram., *Ep. II ad Sever. Ant.*: CSCO 120, pp. 73,20–74,6. J. Lebon translates the Syriac *hdyu'dlut sym'* of CSCO 119, p. 100,2–3 as *unio ad suppositum*, which would produce an interesting, forward-looking formula. However, the Greek text *ἐνωσις κατὰ θεσιν* is certainly to be assumed. What is being rejected is nothing other than the Nestorian 'adoption as Son'. The Syriac stem *sym'* is found in the Syriac expression for *υποθέσια*, i.e. positing assumption as Son (*sīmuṯo bnayo'*). Cf. C. Brockelmann, *Lexicon Syriacum* (1928), 470b.

291. Cf. Sergius Gram., *Ep. II ad Sever. Ant.*: CSCO 120, p. 74,10–15, repeated almost word for word in *Ep. III ad Sever. Ant.*: CSCO 120, pp. 114,27–115,2.

292. Sergius Gram., *Ep. II ad Sever. Ant.*: CSCO 120, p. 73,21–30, with reference to PG 37, 181. The presentation of the appearance of Christ hinted at here is strongly reminiscent of texts in Theodoret. Cf. *Ep. 146*: PG 83, 1393B, cited in *JdChr* I<sup>3</sup>, 699.

293. See above, pp. 72–4.

294. Sergius Gram., *Ep. II ad Sever. Ant.*: CSCO 120, pp. 75,27–76,3. Torrance, 168f.

the natures along with the properties. But (I say) this as a suggestion rather than a decree, for in what opinion should I be headstrong?

The adduced sentence of Cyril<sup>295</sup> was written in an anti-Nestorian exuberance and signified an intensification of the confusion rather than a clarification. Because of this Sergius was induced to seek salvation in a philosophical solution.

### 3. Incarnation as event in the realm of being

It signified an intensification of Cyril's sentence just cited when Sergius advanced from confessing one *physis* to accepting one *ousia*, one essence. With the formula of the one *physis* he still remained in the domain of the *ens concretum*, which is Christ. The concrete being of the Incarnate One admits along with full ontological unity a 'composition' in which the components, divinity and humanity, have entered without change. The 'one nature composed out of two natures' was a formula born out of a historical view, from the view of the economy of salvation; this view was philosophically neutral and assigned to the result, the one Christ, no particular place in Aristotle's table of categories. Sergius, however, took this new step by claiming the '*henosis* of the *ousia*, according to the essence'. This means nothing other than the following: in his eyes through the mystery of the incarnation there is created a new essence, a new *abstract ousia* of absolute singularity, which Sergius called *Christ* and which he determined more closely philosophically by further explanation.<sup>296</sup>

I remember that in my lines there is (the formula that *Christ* is 'from two natures', and all the propriety of the inhomination of the Word is a mystery.

His speculative understanding of this unity 'Christ' emerges first from the application of the body-soul analogy, that is, the composition of the human being from body and soul to the 'incarnate Logos'. The past participle 'incarnate' ought not to be understood as a simple adjective, like for example 'black', applied to the one concrete human being. Rather

295. Cyril Alex., *De recta fide ad Theodos. imp.* 40: PG 76, 1193BC: 'It is thus dangerous to dare to dissect [in Jesus Christ]. One is namely the Lord Jesus Christ and through him the Father has created all things. He was the creator as God and life-giving as life; through the human and superhuman properties (*idiomata*) he has become a certain in-between (*ἀνθρωπίνους τε αὐ καὶ τοῖς ὑπὲρ ἀνθρώπων ιδιώμασιν εἰς ἓν τι τὸ μεταξὺ συγκεῖμενος*). He is the mediator between God and human beings, according to the scriptures (1 Tim 2,5); according to nature he exists as God, even when he is not without flesh; he is truly a human being, but not purely a human being like us; he remained what he was and became, nevertheless, flesh.'

296. Sergius Gram., *Ep. II ad Sever. Ant.*: CSCO 120, p. 75,15-17.

it must be considered as a part of the essence. Just as the human being is not defined as the synthesis of rationality and blackness (*nigritudo*), but as a 'rational animal' or as a synthesis of *animal* and *ratio*,<sup>297</sup> so too Christ as unity of essence is realized from divinity and humanity (with body and soul). He is a new *ousia* and in this way also fulfils the rôle of an intermediate being, as Cyril had suggested. Certainly 'unity' is present most clearly in simple beings. But a composition can also lead to perfect unity when it has as its result *one* new *ousia*. According to Sergius, Cyril was also of this opinion.<sup>298</sup> What Sergius here suggests as a solution is nothing other than the application of Aristotle's doctrine of categories to Christ. Apollinarius, who had already preceded him in this direction, also appears here as a witness. We cite this text which is characteristic of Sergius.<sup>299</sup>

The words *φύσις* and *οὐσία* mean the same as far as we are concerned, the one being derived from *πεφυκέναι* and the other from *εἶναι* and you, O Theologian, agree with me (on this). For you have said somewhere in (your) letter, 'Where composition and natural coming-together of *ousiai* or of natures is constituted.' [Severus must concede this.<sup>300</sup>] Therefore, if we teach 'from two natures [*physeis*], one nature [*physis*] of the Word incarnate', how do we sin against the mystery, if, by means of words with the same meaning, we fulfil the same doctrine, (in saying) that from two *ousiai* there is one *ousia* of the Word incarnate? But this 'incarnate' I have omitted, in as much as it is frequently declared, but I do not dissolve the composition because of this . . . I urge you, O Father, to endure for a little my presumption with regard to the precision of the philosophers; even if they are outside our fold, we shall greatly clarify the explanation. Among these philosophers, Aristotle, who is called *νοῦς*, said these words somewhere . . . : 'But *ousia* is, if one will speak with an example, such as man, horse.'<sup>301</sup> But it is not the case that he does not acknowledge the composition of the living creature because of this. For everything which is simple is understood, rather than falling under the senses. Therefore how do I defraud the truth, when I call the incarnate Word '*ousia*', and understand this (*ousia*) (to be) incarnate?

With the incarnation of the Word a new species has thus entered into

297. *Ibid.*, p. 75, 21–26 (on the analogy 'human being'): 'For "being rational" (*logikon*) completes an *ousia* that it should be one; thus (a man is) a rational mortal living thing (*animal rationabile*), and if someone should remove that "being rational", he destroys the subject in every respect' (i.e. the essence 'human being' is no longer present).

298. Sergius Gram., *Ep. III ad Sever. Ant.*: CSCO 120, p. 116, 19–25 with reference to Cyril Alex., *Ep. ad Succensum II*: PG 77, 241B 12–15 (the composed human being is introduced as an example). In *ibid.*, p. 116, 14–19 Basil is also adduced as a witness for this teaching.

299. Sergius Gram., *Ep. III ad Sever. Ant.*: CSCO 120, pp. 115, 12–116, 2.

300. Sever. Ant., *Ep. II ad Serg. Gram.*: CSCO 120, p. 103, 12–17: 'But we have one care (*zelus*), namely that we should establish and demonstrate plainly that where a composition and natural coming together of *ousiai* or natures is constituted, as in the case of a constitution of a man like us, it is superfluous and quite senseless to say that the living creature is composed from those things which appear in the *ousiai*.'

301. Aristotle, *Categ.* 4, 1b, 27: CSCO 120, p. 115, n. 4.

the hierarchy of beings. The 'ousia Christ' is so much one and so particular that for Sergius the formula 'the one incarnate nature of the Logos' can be abbreviated. The *one ousia* of Christ already says everything. It has, however, the advantage that the unity in Christ is now expressed more precisely. There is not only a 'pre-existent *physis*' of which in time the 'incarnate' is stated. In the sense of Sergius this formula is the description of a historical event rather than a definition. This can now simply run: the one *ousia* Christ. It encompasses the Logos and the humanity of Christ with body and soul. Although combined, categorically it is still completely one and unique, and for that reason there must correspond to it also its own properties or characteristics which otherwise are not realizable. In the place of the invisible, intangible Logos now comes the newness: visible, tangible Logos, because the incorporeal godhead is now the bodily and incarnated.<sup>302</sup> Through the union of ensouled flesh with the Logos, Christ's consubstantiality with us is not harmed, but as the flesh composed with the godhead it receives 'a precedence over our flesh', which Sergius explains in more detail in his doctrine of properties.<sup>303</sup>

Likewise I acknowledge on the one hand that the ensouled flesh which is united to the Word — for I fear to say 'mixed'! — is human and of our nature, but on the other hand insofar as it is composed to (be one with) God, it exists (with) those special (properties) in comparison to our flesh. For it did not accept sin (as a result) of transgression; it was not obliged to hunger and thirst and sleep, but to be occupied with the Word to which it was united, which willed to suffer these things for the sake of the confirmation of the inhomination.

This interpretation of the person of Christ has to be considered in more detail.

(1) *The united essences*: (a) The two *ousiai* are the true godhead and true humanity of Christ. In the synthesis they are also not abolished either, even if in a certain way they adapt to each other, at least as far as the humanity is concerned. Sergius also cannot be accused of genuine real-monophysitism. (b) These two essences are each a totality. Here Sergius consciously contrasts himself to the Apollinarians, who hold their synthesis as possible only because of the fact that the Logos is united to a flesh without a soul, thus to a partial reality. One of their fundamental propositions states: 'two perfect things cannot become one'.<sup>304</sup> (c) But Sergius also pays a tribute to this principle by allowing for the establishment of the true unity in Christ that the two perfect essences in Christ

302. Sergius Gram., *Ep. III ad Sever. Ant.*: CSCO 120, pp. 116,33–117,3.

303. *Ibid.*, pp. 117,29–118,2.

304. Cf. Ps. Athanas., *De trin. dial.* 4: PG 28, 1253B; Ps. Athanas., *C. Apollin.* 1,2: PG 26, 1096B.

have the *function* of being partial realities, although they retain their ontological totality.<sup>305</sup> Also in his writings, in spite of repeated emphasis of the reality of Christ's soul, there is still no discernible special activity ascribed to it. He will certainly ascribe to the Logos, as the principle of the nature, the mental decision of suffering, not just to the one Logos-subject as such *ratione communicationis idiomatum*. (d) Obviously the two essences do not confront each other as equals. The *ousia* of God is indeed 'above *ousia*', a phrase which is reminiscent of Ps. Dionysius.<sup>306</sup>

(2) *The act of the synthesis*: At first Sergius did not want to do without the concept of mixing (*mixis*, *hl̥*).<sup>307</sup> Indeed we have seen how he speaks with Gregory Nazianzen of a *symphyia*, a growing together.<sup>308</sup> Later under the influence of Patriarch Severus he dispensed with this terminology of mixing, or he explained it in the sense of *synthesis*,<sup>309</sup> a concept which then becomes the leading one.<sup>310</sup> One comes closest to Sergius' notion of the goal if one applies the Aristotelian relationship of matter and form to the unity of God and human being in Christ. Form and matter, like body and soul, communicate reciprocally as parts of the

305. Cf. Sergius Gram., *Ep. II ad Sever. Ant.*: CSCO 120, p. 74,10-15: the 'synthesis' in Christ is according to Sergius a combination of two or more simple elements in which what is 'complete' also becomes a 'part' of the whole so that the parts are no longer adjudged according to the principle of duality (*iam partes secundum dualitatis rationem non discernuntur*). For from them 'one *ousia* and (one) quality has come into being'.

306. Cf. Sergius Gram., *Ep. III ad Sever. Ant.*: CSCO 120, p. 118,21-22: 'But accurate speech determines that we should speak of God as being above *ousia*.' ll. 33-34: 'For God is in truth above *ousia* and property (*dili*).'

307. Cf. the text cited above from *Ep. II ad Sever. Ant.*: CSCO 120, 74 (above n. 305) which reads further: 'Therefore unless the natures, from which Christ is, were mixed inconfusedly, how shall I say that those things which thus remained unmixed with each other were hypostatically united? How shall I retain the principle of composition, when the natures are retained just as they were? For it is impossible for me to conceive of a union of things mutually unmixed, as they (the Chalcedonians) say, and necessarily thereby Christ would have to be thought of [lit., as we should have to think of] as two natures.'

308. Sergius Gram., *Ep. II ad Sever. Ant.*: CSCO 120, p. 73,23. Lebon translates *symphyia* by *congermanitas*, relationship.

309. Cf. I. R. Torrance, *op. cit.*, 44: 'Indeed, we have seen, that in this *Third Letter* Sergius speaks of *κρᾶσις*, *μῖξις* and *σύνθεσις* as if they were almost equivalent.' Cf. CSCO 120, p. 113,24-30.

310. The main text for *synthesis* is in *Ep. III ad Sever. Ant.*: CSCO 120, pp. 114,25-115,2. '... I shall give first a definition of composition. For as I deal with the mystery, I have not yet used (defined) terms, although I have spoken in this way. But I have learned that the principle of composition is like this: (namely) the coming together (*congregatio*) from two or more simples (*simplicia*), which have come to some one thing, in which also what is complete (*teleion*) (in itself) is a part, (and) afterwards the parts are not investigated with regard to the principle of duality, since once and for all there has come into being one *ousia* or quality.' Cf. the almost identical text in *Ep. II ad Sever. Ant.*: p. 74,10-15. I. R. Torrance, *op. cit.*, 43; text from *Ep. III*: *ibid.*, 207; text from *Ep. II*: *ibid.*, 167.

essence and thus produce an *essential synthesis*,<sup>311</sup> which as a third reality rises above the two 'parts': 'from two essences one essence' runs the main formula of Sergius to the vexation of Severus.<sup>312</sup> This is thus the new 'essence of Christ', as Apollinarius too had it in mind — with the intended denial of Christ's soul. The 'middle' has now been found in the form of 'middle being'.<sup>313</sup>

(3) *The 'result' of the synthesis*: Jesus Christ is thus not only to be expressed as a unique event of the history of salvation, but also as an event in the realm of being. Within the category of *ousia* the *arbor Porphyriana* received a new branch: in addition to *ens materiale, vivum, sensitivum, rationale*, the highest level of which is the human being, there is now in the eyes of Sergius the *animal rationale [divinum]*, namely Christ. If Sergius had not produced the old misgivings against the term 'God-human being', it would, thought of as one *ousia*, best express his idea. In fact the concept 'theandric' which Ps. Dionysius had coined is already close to it (see below). Sergius, however, did not recognize that in his natural synthesis (*synthesis in natura et secundum naturam*) the divine transcendence of the Logos had to accept a severe violation. The Logos becomes a *part* of the creature, not greatly different from what the Arians and Apollinarians thought. A divine-creaturely natural being fitted into Aristotelian categories: that is the result of the synthesis of Christ as Sergius understood it. Worse than a mingling of partial substances as physical realities is this ontological synthesis of divinity and humanity in one *ousia*! Instead of physical parts which, when only accidentally altered, produce a new reality, the act of the Sergian synthesis makes from the divinity and humanity of Christ two essential parts, *partes essentielles*, which give themselves away into a totality of the new essence, and in this unity are essentially dependent on each other. The monophysitism of Sergius is hence not a physical one, but a metaphysical monophysitism.

311. Cf. the expression 'synthesis in the human way' in Apollinarius. See *JdChr* I<sup>3</sup>, 483; *CCT* I<sup>2</sup>, 331.

312. Cf. Sergius Gram., *Ep. III ad Sever. Ant.*: CSCO 120, pp. 115, 12–116, 5.

313. Remember his example of the mule: 'Middle beings (*μεσότητες*) occur when different properties (*ιδιότητες*) come together into one, as in the mule the property of the ass and of the horse; no middle being, however, has both extremes as wholes in it, but only as parts. A middle being from God and a human being is, however, in Christ; he is thus not a whole human being [something that Sergius would not say], but a mixing of God and human being.' See Lietzmann, 234, § 113.



#### 4. One being — one property — one *doxa*

To the new *ousia* of Christ there must correspond a new property, a special feature in the qualitative representation. The starting-point for this claim is Cyril's sentence already cited: 'Because the incarnate Word has thus also mixed the properties with the natures, he is in every respect one, I mean one nature and one property.'<sup>314</sup> However, with this mixed quality a whole bundle of distinctions is meant which are evident in the concrete form of the Incarnate One. Sergius subsumes them under the concept *doxa*.<sup>315</sup> To them belong birth from the Virgin, the taking of nourishment in pure freedom from instinctiveness, sinlessness, invisible wandering among the Jews without being seen (cf. Jn 10,40-42), wandering on the sea (Jn 6,16-21), resurrection, ascension, sitting at the right hand of the Father, and the second coming. Hence under this *doxa* Sergius does not understand static qualities, but a series of extraordinary events as they are covered in the main by the evangelical reports. The exception to this is the absolute bodily absence of needs which is reminiscent of notions in the writings of Clement of Alexandria<sup>316</sup> and which we will soon encounter in an intensified way. Sergius is concerned to show the individual manifestations as the expressions of the unity of Christ, so to say as the 'one new theandric efficacy' in the sense of Ps. Dionysius.<sup>317</sup>

You see how some natures receive their [properties] and activities not cut apart or separately recognized, but the divinity and humanity of the Word who was incarnate appear together. Let them show me what was done after the incarnation (which) was purely human. And I will not say a tear, for that came divinely, for he was immediately summoning Lazarus whom he pitied, and, though he was putrifying, the dead man became alive and made haste to run. They speak of sweat and perplexity in relation to the passion? But these things also (happened) divinely, and surpass our reasonings, so that by means of human passions he might lead men [to] impassibility (*apatheia*). But what will they say about (his) death? Will he await this utterly human thing, which takes possession of the body? We are persuaded, thus God is he who preserved even the properties of the divinity, and suffered humanly. For because

314. See above n. 295 (with PG 76, 1193BC); now as well Sergius Gram., *Ep. II ad Sever. Ant.*: CSCO 120, pp. 75,32-76,2. Cf. the judgement of I. R. Torrance, *op. cit.*, 48: 'Sergius' Christ, instead of being one person in two natures, with two sets of properties, will be a new compound with his own emergent properties.' He states that one can understand in this way the statement: 'The product of the composition is "one quality" as well as "one ousia"' with reference to *Ep. III ad Sever. Ant.*: CSCO 119, p. 150,23-24; CSCO 120, p. 115,1-2; cf. previously *Ep. II*: CSCO 119, p. 100,15-16; CSCO 120, p. 74,14-15.

315. Sergius Gram., *Ep. III ad Sever. Ant.*: CSCO 120, p. 118,4-6. The *caro crassa* is made through the *synthesis* or *henosis* with the divinity *prorsus gloriosa*.

316. Cf. *JdChr* I<sup>3</sup>, 263-5; CCT I<sup>2</sup>, 136-7.

317. Sergius Gram., *Apolog.*: CSCO 120, pp. 140,25-141,5.

of this he also became a complete human being that he might bear our weakness (cf. Is 53,3), and giving (his) back on our behalf to scourging (Is 50,6), he conferred honour upon the wound which the ancient [serpent] set against our soul.

Under the one quality or *proprium* of the one Christ Sergius thus understood the whole undivided image of Jesus which results from seeing together all the mysteries of the life of Jesus. Experiences of futility, hunger, suffering and death are not overlooked, but from time to time brought into relief and placed in the light of the radiation of the godhead. From this description it emerges that Sergius' picture of the concrete Christ coincides with that of Severus. Rightly the student stresses: 'I have these things, which I learned from the Father [Severus].'<sup>318</sup> But what makes difficulties for the teacher is the abstract terminology with which this concrete undivided picture of Christ is explained by Sergius. The Patriarch is alarmed by the expression of the 'one (abstract) *ousia*' and the 'one property' which is supposed to correspond to this one *ousia*.<sup>319</sup> The Grammarian Sergius offers his own theory for this concrete consideration of the picture.<sup>320</sup>

For a quality [*ἡσώδο, γνώρισμα*] does not exist without an *ousia*, nor should we recognize *ousiai* without signs. Therefore when I said that two *ousiai* were composed, along with them I was also uniting the signs.

Sergius regards it as necessary to establish the 'incarnate Logos' in the

318. *Ibid.*, p. 141,6. Then to prove this student relationship to Severus there follows a florilegium from the letters of the Patriarch to him, with fifteen texts (pp. 141,8-142,27).

319. Severus equates the concept of *ousia* with the other concept of 'physical quality' (*φυσικὴ ποιότης*). He places a very strong emphasis on the fact that in the hypostatic union 'the particularity of the natures in Christ remained without confusion, and particularity implies difference in natural quality' (I. R. Torrance, *op. cit.*, 33). If Sergius on the other hand spoke of the fact that in Christ there is only one *ousia* and only one quality, then Torrance claims that this would have meant for Severus that the flesh of Christ had become consubstantial with the Word through losing its intrinsic difference from it. In Sergius too the one *ousia* of Christ is intrinsically different, just as in the one essence of a human being body and soul remain different. His mistake lay in applying the body-soul comparison to Christ *univocally*, not *analogically*. Thus divinity and humanity in Christ become *one ousia* to which then a proper Christ-characteristic must correspond in the area of the qualities. Cf. I. R. Torrance, *loc. cit.*: 'We have already tried to show that Sergius' emphasis upon the "one propriety" is his way of expressing that Christ as presented by the Biblical facts, does not fit any previous propriety, but is utterly new, different and unique. "There is one propriety of Christ, in which no-one from those who are invisible or visible shares" [Sergius, *Ep. I*: CSCO 119, p. 72,23-24; CSCO 120, p. 53,12-13]. To understand Sergius, we must give due weight to his attempt to express this radical newness and difference of the figure of Christ.' Cf. as well Sergius Gram., *Ep. III ad Sever. Ant.*: CSCO 120, p. 113,27-30: 'For I understand the supreme union of God to flesh endowed with a soul, and without confusion maiming the meaning, for (the flesh) has not changed to that which is eternal.'

320. Sergius Gram., *Ep. III ad Sever. Ant.*: CSCO 119, p. 155,4-9; CSCO 120, p. 118,18-21. On *suud'* cf. I. R. Torrance, *op. cit.*, 29-30.

realm of essences in order also to close the gaps which in his opinion Severus had allowed in christology through his rejection of the one *ousia* and the one property. In this way he falls into the Aristotelianism of Apollinarius. Luckily for him he still remains on an isolated academic height. One recognizes that he must not be so negatively judged on the basis of his concrete picture of Christ as on his abstract theory. He is as it were a desk heretic who goes wrong more in terminology than in fact. However, such one-sided placements of accent are not innocuous. For finally the concrete picture of Christ is also constricted. For the sake of his theory of unity Sergius must stress the revelation of the divine so much that the earthly Jesus threatens to be concealed. For if in Jesus with the human-all-too-human the divine is not also immediately manifest, he already sees the smoke of the Nestorian separation begin to rise. Is it still possible here for the *kenosis* of Jesus to come into play? Even if it is not denied, it is nevertheless constantly hidden by the *doxa*.

This is the price Sergius had to pay for refusing the doctrine of properties accepted by the Council of Chalcedon. He touches on it, even if only negatively. For with the concept of *gnorisma* (the mark, *šawdo'o*) which he introduces, he takes up the definition of 451 in which we read: 'one and the same Christ . . . unmingled in two natures, unchanged, undivided and without division known (*γνωριζόμενος*)'. If here it is emphasized that Christ is recognizable in two natures, despite Christ's undivided form of divinity and humanity, Sergius places the accent elsewhere. There is only *one* nature, indeed only *one ousia* recognizable, although there is a gradation: first the tears, then the miracle of waking from the dead; thus first the expression of the human and then that of the divine. A text of his *apologia*, his last writing, sums this up very clearly.<sup>321</sup>

Therefore what did the Father of the Church (Severus) say as a result of these unholy (statements)? Did he, like those who were quoted before [the Chalcedonians], set up two

321. Sergius Gram., *Apolog.*: CSCO 120, p. 139,3-15. In the lines that follow he lists again separately the properties of the Logos and those of the flesh: the *Logos* — invisible, untouchable, high above every passion; the *ensouled body* — hunger, thirst, suffering. Indeed Sergius can say in a completely Chalcedonian way: 'Therefore (even) as he remained the Word — thus preserving to himself the properties of divinity — yet preserving the integrity of the flesh, (so) too he receives these (properties) of our flesh.' Then, however, he disassociates himself from Chalcedon and stresses before Severus: 'You see how the definition has preserved for him [the Logos] immutability, (holding) him at the same time God and body. Of him who displays the particularity of the body in a godly manner, we do not say that the natures exist and each one (of) them is seen out of its own properties and activities (as indeed Chalcedon says with Leo I), but we hold that the Word himself became flesh, and (*he* and not the *flesh*) displayed these (properties) of the flesh' (*Apolog.*: Torrance, 231-2, cf. CSCO 120, p. 139,16-34).

natures, understanding these in Christ after the union, and attributing an (individuating) particularity to each of them? Not at all, but in speaking in agreement with the Fathers, he attributes these properties of our flesh to the Word who was incarnate [who is to be conceived as one *ousia*]. Therefore these people [supporters of Chalcedon] say that the *temple* of the Word was seen, hungered, thirsted, suffered, rose; but the Father (Severus) along with Cynl proclaims Emmanuel, or rather along with Isaiah (7,14), *Emmanuel* who was born from a woman, and along with John (cf. 1 Jn 1,1ff.) cries out in a loud voice that (the Word) was seen and touched, and clearly established that he hungered and thirsted, and that he was fastened to a cross, and having endured death for three days, he proclaims that he bestows life on human beings.

Under the title of his doctrine of properties Sergius really expounds nothing other than the usual communication of *idiomata*. He offers here the common ecclesial manner of speech which attributes to the one Logos-subject both the divine as well as the human. And yet this *one* subject is so conceived that it can, as a *natural unity* of divinity and humanity, bear both series of *idiomata*. In this sense he interprets the name Emmanuel as a unity of divine and human nature. In the continuation of the text of the *apologia* just cited this unity is then once again represented as a third which comprises both part-natures. There emerges the characterization of this unity as 'composed nature' which can bear the double series of *idiomata* undivided.<sup>322</sup>

And let no one think the definition is foolish, introducing a peculiarity and nature (existing) independently: for the principle of things which are composed joins some two or more, but completes one nature of the living creature: it allows the peculiarity of each one of them to appear, but yet not divided but recognizable together, as we are able to find out in the case of the nature of human beings. To be cut is the property of a body, but to perceive a blow is of an animated body: but it does not receive cutting in some (one) nature, but show perception in another, but there appears in one and the same composite nature both cutting of the body and perception of the soul. A (person) rejoices, and by means of a laugh makes known the cheerfulness of the soul: and is grieved, and a tear has announced distress.

Thus also in the case of the one composite nature of Christ, we will see the Word is born, but from a virgin mother: it is not the case that in one nature it happened to him that he should be born, but in another he effected what is strange, as Leo raved, saying, 'The Word performs that which is of the Word, but the body completes that which is of the body,' but (there is) one nature which is born, and in a miracle effected being born; hungered, thirsted, not compelled, but willingly; walked, but the sea was able to be walked on by (his) feet; and at the end he died, not that he had awaited the necessity of death,

322. Sergius Gram., *Apolog.*: CSCO 120, p. 140,1-24. Once again the composite 'nature' of the *animal rationale* is presented as an illustration and transferred univocally to Christ. Just as the human being is a composite nature, so too is Christ. He is the *una natura composita*. While Severus, however, starts only from the concrete nature, the *mia physis*, Sergius dares to speak also of a new abstract essence, the *mia ousia synthetos*, which Christ is. As the composite *ousia* it gives rise to the divine-human series of *idiomata*: the virgin birth in place of a normal birth; the series of passions, but proceeding by divine permission; wandering, but free from the law of gravity; acceptance of death, but without physical necessity.

but when it was right he dissolved death (*solvit mortem*), for 'I have the power to lay down my life and to take it up again' (Jn 10,18), and he taught the truth of (these) words by means of the resurrection.

In this way the life of Jesus occurred: not two cleanly distinguished series of happenings of which one can be attributed to the God-nature and the other to the human-nature. Rather the *one physis*, understood as the *one ousia*, produces the *one* series of events (*mia energeia*) which, however, in every single event allows the double aspect, corresponding to the composite *ousia*, to become evident. We recognize clearly that the Grammarian proposes nothing other than Severus' christology of the *one physis*, the *one energeia*, without defending a real monophysitism. The formula of the *one ousia* and of the *one property* has in its abstract form a clearly heretical character and was capable of dangerous misunderstanding. But as Sergius, however, dissolves his abstract formula in the concrete analysis of the *one physis*, he proposes nothing other than what Severus does too.

With regard to Sergius' overdrawn christology there are still some particular deficiencies to be stressed; these concern only Sergius himself.

(1) Sergius has taken over the fundamental Apollinarian error of explaining the unity in Christ by way of a synthesis of natures. Even his express avowal of a spiritual soul in Christ does not eliminate it. Through his error, however, he puts up with a crucial violation of the divine transcendence. He makes the godhead a part of the essence in a synthesis from creator and creature. On the basis of this understanding the Arians had abandoned the divinity of the Logos and had made him a creature, this in the framework of a christological Logos-sarx theory.<sup>323</sup>

(2) Through the teaching of the one combined quality which he demands for his picture of Christ, he cannot succeed in making the earthly Jesus manifest in his unmingled humanity. At every stage he must also point out in the words and deeds of Jesus the manifestation of the divine, if he is not to make himself guilty, according to his presuppositions, of the Chalcedonian-Nestorian division. The unrenounceable mystery of the *kenosis* and abandonment of Christ can no longer be proclaimed in its entire depth. An unadulterated *theologia crucis* is no longer possible. It is completely veiled by the *theologia gloriae*.

(3) On account of the abstract *mia-ousia* teaching and its extension to the qualities or *idiomata* of Christ's one essence, one can rightfully

323. On this see *JdChr* I<sup>3</sup>, 383, with reference to Athan. Alex., *C. Arian* III 27: PG 26, 381A; CCT I<sup>2</sup>, 247.

reproach Sergius with an exaggerated static christology in which soteriology comes off badly.<sup>324</sup> Yet it would not be correct to deny the soteriological aspect altogether. Just as he interprets the one quality of Christ which he claims, he understands by it ordinarily the so-called mysteries of the life of Jesus, that is, events which as such are conceived by him as salvific acts of God. In individual texts they are related expressly to 'our salvation'. The preponderance of the static is predetermined by the way he poses the question.

### Severus of Antioch and his 'synthesis' concept

Here is the place to examine the use of the words *synthesis*, *synthetos* as alternatives to *henosis* in the writings of Severus and members of his party.<sup>325</sup> In the sixth century, in Greek as well as in Latin theology, they will gain an unexpectedly great significance. The Patriarch did not bring about a new creation but only carried on an old tradition<sup>326</sup> and marked out boundaries for the understanding of it. History will admittedly show that he could not close the gate. The argument with the Grammarian Sergius was the occasion that evoked a more intense consideration of the term *synthesis*.

Sergius had devised a 'mixing without mingling' and related this to the natures of Christ. With reference to Cyril, Severus rejected this expression and put in its place the word *synthesis*.<sup>327</sup> He maintained that Cyril thus does not speak of a mixing, but of a composition, and this in harmony with Gregory Nazianzen, who used this expression *synthesis* and not 'mixing' to explain the union of the Logos with a flesh endowed with reason.<sup>328</sup> Already here *synthesis* is a synonym of *henosis* and not of

324. I. R. Torrance, *op. cit.*, in particular reproaches Sergius for overlooking soteriology. He stresses, however, that in his *Apologia* Sergius refers to it more. Cf. CSCO 120, p. 139, 14-15: the listing of the mysteries of the life of Jesus, which he emphasizes together with Cyril and Severus, he concludes with: *vitam hominibus largitum esse praedicat*. *Ibid.*, p. 140, 22: the death of Christ means the overcoming of death in general (*solvere mortem*). *Ibid.*, pp. 140, 25-141, 5: this section shows the soteriological objective of the passion of Christ well. But according to Sergius this goal is attained only through the unity in Christ, insofar as it leads to one *ousia* and to one divine-human quality, which one could characterize with the words of Ps. Dionysius as *μία θεανδρική ἐνέργεια*. It is perhaps worthwhile to note this relationship.

325. See Lebon, 292-7, 319-26; *idem*, *Chalkedon* I, 474-6, 486-91.

326. On the previous history of *synthesis*, *synthetos* see *JdChr* I<sup>3</sup>, Index.

327. Severus Ant., *Ep. II ad Serg.*: Lebon, CSCO 120, 80 with reference to Cyril Alex., *Ep. II ad Succensus*: PG 77, 241BC and dialogue *Quod unus sit Christus*: PG 75, 1285C; Durand, SC 97, 362; *De trinit ad Herm. dial* 1: PG 75, 692. Severus, however, refers to Apollinarius (Athanasius for him).

328. Greg. Naz. according to Severus Ant., *Ep. II ad Serg.*: Lebon, CSCO 120, 84-86.

*mixis*, so that hence in effect a third entity in the manner of mixing is excluded. Severus saw such a mixing in the one *ousia* and one property of Christ proposed by Sergius. As a parallel expression for *henosis*, however, *synthesis* must fulfil certain conditions: excluded from the very outset was a *parathesis* because it effects only an extrinsic unity. But if, too, there must not occur any mixing, then the only possibility remaining is to find on a new level a new status of substantial unity without the transformation of the components. This level is that of 'existence'; divinity and humanity in Christ 'exist only in the status of the *synthesis*' (ἐν συνθέσει ὑφ'εστῶτων). The opposite would be 'self-existence as monads' (ἐν μονάσιν ἰδιοσυστάτοις).<sup>329</sup> With decisiveness Severus thus removed the concept of *synthesis* from the order of essences into that of existence. It becomes a parallel expression to '*henosis* according to the *hypostasis*' which is always to be regarded as *henosis* 'from two' in the mental distinction. Hence it comes then to the strong formula 'one composed nature' (μία φύσις σύνθετος), which is gladly used by the anti-Chalcedonians. In this way the formulas '*henosis* according to the *synthesis*' and '*henosis* according to the *hypostasis*' have the same meaning. Consequently 'the one composed nature' becomes the characterization of the end result of that process which Severus sees expressed in his favourite formula: 'the one incarnate nature'.

In spite of this, as J. Lebon stresses, this formula is found only seldom in the monophysite christological writers. Severus is the sole witness for *mia physis (kai hypostasis) synthetos*.<sup>330</sup> Some reasons can be adduced for this.

(1) The first witness for the formula is found to be the Arian, Lucius of Alexandria (Patriarch 373–378);<sup>331</sup> (2) Severus must have been hampered by the fact that Cyril of Alexandria appeared not to know this formula;<sup>332</sup> (3) the linguistic usage of Apollinarius must have created a suspicious impression: *φύσις σύνθετος* is the same as *φύσις σύγκρατος*.<sup>333</sup> The expression was thus encumbered as much by its Arian-Apollinarian past as by its new misuse by Sergius the Grammarian.

329. Leontius of Jerusalem, *C. Mon.*: PG 86, 1848A provides this text for Severus Lebon, *Chalcedon* I, 476, n. 59, wrongly has 'Léonce de Byzance'.

330. Lebon, 319, with reference to Severus Ant., *Ep' ad Ioann ducem* (CPG 7071 [31]), *Frag.* in DP, Ch. 41, XXIV–XXV: Diekamp, 309–10, a passage which will concern us again later (Ps. Dionysius).

331. Text in DP, Ch. 9, XV: Diekamp, 65; English translation in CCT I<sup>2</sup>, 245 Lucius defends the *Logos-Sarx* unity without the soul of Christ.

332. See, however, Cyril Alex., *Ep. 46 ad Succensum* II: PG 77, 241BC

333. Cf. Apollin., *De unione* 5: Lietzmann, 187; *Anacephalaosis*, n. 21: Lietzmann, 244; *Ep. 1 ad Dionys.*, n. 9: Lietzmann, 260: the placing side by side of *henosis*, *synodos*, *synthesis* (σύνθεσις ἀνθρωποειδής = Christ).

In addition there was the fact that the Chalcedonians wanted to make capital out of the word *synthesis* for the 'two natures', as will become clear.

Insofar as Severus accepted it, it was the same as saying a composed *physis* or a composed *hypostasis*. Both were synonymous with 'one nature of the incarnate Word'. For *synthesis* was for him not so much a static ontological end result, as rather the characterization of the historical process of the assumption of the flesh by the Logos according to the *hypostasis*. To this characterization *physis*, *hypostasis*, *synthetos* Severus gave a twofold point: it banned from Christ both any division or duality as well as any mingling. Many variants on the fundamental formula appeared: 'the one composed *physis* (*hypostasis*) of the Logos' became 'Logos *synthetos*',<sup>334</sup> by which naturally the composition with the body is meant. Thus one ought not to introduce any 'composition' in the essence, the *ousia*, of the divine Logos himself. '*Synthesis*' always refers to the historical *henosis* with the flesh.

334 Cf Lebon, 321, n 2



## CHAPTER TWO

### THE PREACHER

By H.-J. Höhn

As the list of his great theological works previously presented shows us, Severus was in the first instance a sharp polemicist. Through his call to the patriarchal see of Antioch he received the chance to participate in the fight against Chalcedon also as a preacher. That he availed himself of this is shown by the series of his 125 cathedral homilies which he delivered during his Antiochene patriarchate.<sup>335</sup> Indeed here too he cannot deny his polemical streak, as for him it is not possible to separate cleanly between the theologian and the pastor, between abstract christology that works with concepts and concrete preaching explaining the life of Jesus. To the stylistic means of his preaching belong both the traditional wealth of formulas, predominantly of Cyrillian stamp, and also the elevated ways of theological scholarly argumentation, that is, scriptural exegesis and patristic interpretation, as well as philosophical, rhetorical dialectic. Nevertheless, speculative analysis seems not to have been his forte.<sup>336</sup> His letters clearly show a predilection for canon law.

#### I CLASSIFICATION AND FUNDAMENTAL THEOLOGICAL STATEMENT OF THE HOMILIES

According to their content and character the cathedral homilies can be subsumed into four groups:<sup>337</sup> (1) sermons on the major feasts of the

335 For a general introduction to this corpus, as well as for information on the history of the text and its tradition, see M. Brière, *Les Homélies cathédrales de Sévère d'Antioche Introduction générale à toutes les homélies*, PO 29, 7-72. Cf. on this F. Graffin, 'La catéchèse de Sévère d'Antioche', *OrSyr* 5 (1960), 47-54, *idem*, 'Jacques d'Edesse réviseur des homélies de Sévère d'Antioche d'après le ms. Synaque Br. M. Add. 12159', in *Symposium Syriacum* = OCA 205 (Rome, 1978), 243-55; C. J. A. Lash, 'The Scriptural Citations in the *Homiliae cathedrales* of Severus of Antioch and the Textual Criticism of the Greek Old Testament', in *StudPat* 12 (1975), 321-7.

336 Cf. on this Lebon, *Chalcedon* I, 425-580, especially 451-576.

337 Cf. A. Baumstark, 'Das Kirchenjahr in Antiocheia zwischen 512 und 518', *RömQ* 11 (1897), 31-66, especially 36ff. Baumstark's judgement of the literary and rhetorical quality of the first three groups is not very flattering. 'The pieces of the first group bear throughout the stamp of epideictic eloquence of orators. The strength of these declamations lies in a spirited

liturgical year; (2) sermons on martyrs and saints; (3) exegetical homilies on the pericope for the Sunday; and (4) occasional sermons, in part doctrinal and in part exhortatory. Because the homilies are arranged in a strictly chronological order, they enable us to gain an insight into the course of the Antiochene liturgical year, an insight which is not insignificant for an appreciation of religious life at that time.<sup>338</sup> If the homilies of the four groups are taken together, they permit an approximate picture of ecclesiastical and social relationships.<sup>339</sup> For a reconstruction of Severan christology, those speeches which follow the Antiochene calendar of feasts and treat 'dogmatic' questions must be given most attention. Here Severus traverses the New Testament year after year, as it were in the perspective of a 'theology of the mysteries of the life of Jesus',<sup>340</sup> in order to produce evidence for and to illustrate his anti-Chalcedonian interpretation of the revelation of divinity and humanity, or the relationship of both, in Jesus Christ. In doing this he was less concerned with a reflection on the mysteries as happenings than with the soteriological and spiritual significance of these events. In the *baptismal catecheses* which were held each year on the Wednesday of Holy Week, he gladly settled accounts with real or supposed adherents of Nestorius, Eutyches, Apollinarius, Manes and others and thereby found the opportunity to offer condensed 'monophysite' dogmatics.

Common to these homilies is a 'christology from above', which in the history of theology shows the greatest proximity to the conception of Cyril of Alexandria, as one would naturally expect.

pathos of language, rather than in a strictly logical line of thought . . . there is never a concluding review, a comprehensive formulation of results gained' (36-7). While a part of the sermons on saints stays 'in the manner of the rhetoric of the sophistic school with an enraptured panegyric of the ones being honoured, this occurring, however, often in generalities, another part gives a sketch of the life or . . . an account of the *passio*'. Now and then 'moral admonitions are urged and at the end, if saints possess their own church in Antioch, the speaker frequently has still to express some pious begging for some pressing needs of the same' (37). Also in the third group the peculiarity of the sophistic *epideiktikos* is 'still quite frequently to be noticed and to no small extent impairs a sound interpretation of Scripture' (38). Of most interest to Baumstark are the speeches of the fourth group, which are tied to various occasions, because there Severus appears in his immediate relationship to the community and cultivates a direct form of preaching.

338. Cf. on this A. Baumstark, *art. cit.*, and *RömQ* 13 (1899), 305-23; *idem*, 'Der antiochenische Festkalender des frühen sechsten Jahrhunderts', *JLW* 5 (1925) (123-35), 132-5.

339. Cf. on this, for example, F. Graffin, 'La vie à Antioche d'après les homélies de Sévère. Invectives contre les courses de chevaux, le théâtre et les jeux olympiques', in G. Wiessner (ed.), *Erkenntnisse und Meinungen* II = *GOF Syriaca* 17 (Wiesbaden, 1978), 115-30. On the somewhat unsettled religious situation in Antioch during the patriarchate of Severus, see G. Downey, *A History of Antioch in Syria from Seleucus to the Arab Conquest* (Princeton, 1961), 507-13.

340. On the development of this *topos* since the patristic period see A. Grillmeier, 'Mit ihm und in ihm. Das Mysterium und die Mysterien Christi', in *idem*, *Mit ihm und in ihm*, 716-35 (literature).

The Logos is true, immutable God and Son of the Father, who also through the incarnation does not lose or weaken his divinity. Indeed to the earthly Jesus was given a soul endowed with reason — he is a complete human being and 'is like us in all things but sin' (Heb 4,15) — yet it does not appear to be a theological factor of the salvific efficacy of Christ. For it is the constant effort of Severus to conceive of Christ as the Logos 'who has become flesh for the sake of our salvation', this to the degree that there consistently arises the notion of a 'hegemony of the Logos', through which every restriction or lessening of the divinity of the Incarnate One is intended to be warded off. Where the Patriarch has recourse to the *mia-physis* formula, he understands it as it were as the conceptual re-enactment of the event of the incarnation. The gaze is always directed towards the Logos, first in considering his pre-existence, and then his incarnation, passion and ascension, so that everything appears as the history of the *one* divine nature of the Logos. For this reason the incarnation is for the Patriarch nothing less than the historical combination of the purely divine mode of existence and of the truly human reality in this one Logos who is one *physis*, one *hypostasis* and one person, but indeed as incarnate.<sup>341</sup>

If in the following Severus himself is very frequently given the floor, the intention behind this is to characterize his theology by his own methods and not to qualify it from the outset from the point of view of 'orthodoxy'. First of all it will be a question of working out the claim to validity and the aspect of truth of a *mia-physis* christology, that is, of disclosing those reasons from which Severus deduces the justification for rejecting the two-natures formula of the Council of Chalcedon. Only after these reasons have been reconstructed and understood is it possible to proceed to evaluate them. In view of the composition of the cathedral homilies, a twofold approach for such a reconstruction offers itself. In a first stage we ought to examine the repertoire of figures of speech, metaphors, examples, polemical passing shots, etc., which Severus utilizes to elucidate his catechetical message. In a second stage it is particularly a matter of examining those key passages which characterize Severus as a 'dogmatician'. Certain overlappings and repetitions in this process are consciously accepted, because a concentric circling of a theological position can develop a considerably greater degree of vividness than a strictly linear progression of thought.

341. In nearly every homily are to be found formulas of confession in the *mia-physis* language: 'Jesus Christ is one from two, from the divinity and from the humanity, which possess their respective *integritas* according to the particular form of the essence (*notio*). The same is truly God and truly a human being and he is known in one *hypostasis*. One is the person, one the incarnate nature of the Logos . . . ; although he is from the same essence as we are, yet elevated above sin and alteration, we do not affirm, nevertheless, that he has relinquished being of the same essence as God the Father' (Hom 61: PO 8, 264). Cf. similarly: Hom 20: PO 37, 60; Hom 21: PO 37, 78–80; Hom 33: PO 36, 428; Hom 42: PO 36, 48; Hom 58: PO 8, 216–218; Hom 70: PO 12, 36–38; Hom 80: PO 20, 330; Hom 93: PO 25, 45–46; Hom 94: PO 25, 54–55; Hom 109: PO 25, 771; Hom 115: PO 26, 313–314; Hom 125: PO 29, 240.

II 'MYSTERIES OF THE LIFE OF JESUS' ACCORDING  
TO A KERYGMA OF THE *MIA PHYSIS*

Severus' entire theology, the exposition of the mysteries of the life of Jesus as well as the discussion of individual christological questions, is a variation of the one fundamental insight into the unity of the subject in Jesus Christ, which is the Logos; he 'has' become flesh without his having been transformed into flesh (cf. Hom 23: PO 37, 117-126). In this way 'subject' is not contrasted with 'nature', but is understood concretely as the *hypostasis* of the Son in his God nature. Correspondingly, the beginning of the earthly existence of the God-human being, Jesus Christ, is depicted entirely in the style of a 'descending christology', in which nevertheless the anthropological, soteriological element is throughout rightfully acknowledged. Thus the proclamation through Gabriel of the birth of Jesus (Lk 1,26-38) reveals not simply 'that God the Logos, who is without beginning and eternal, in an inexpressible way, without change and mixing, dwells in the virgin womb and assumes flesh' (Hom 2: PO 38, 278); it unveils as well the salvific character of this event (*ibid.*, 280):

The Lord assumed flesh from the womb of the Virgin of our substance and . . . blessed the origin of our race. If he had not gone through all of these phases, sin excepted, if he had not assumed flesh in the womb, if he had not been formed during the period of nine months and if he had not been born, he would not have taken away the curse which was issued against Eve.

Although Severus constantly emphasizes that the Logos has assumed flesh which was animated by a soul endowed with reason and understanding, he just as often draws attention to the fact that this event is due entirely to divine initiative. The Logos who is consubstantial with the Father has 'not received this flesh from the seed of man, but from the Holy Spirit, who apart from every desire worked this conception in a creative and divine manner' (Hom 101: PO 22, 267).

The confession 'born from Mary the Virgin' possesses for this reason a correspondingly high value.<sup>342</sup> Occasionally, objections presented and philologically supported criticism are vehemently rejected (Hom 83: PO 20, 412-413):

342. Cf., for example, Hom 7: PO 38, 316; Hom 10: PO 38, 360; Hom 14: PO 38, 408-410; Hom 36: PO 36, 468-470; Hom 83: PO 20, 412-413; Hom 101: PO 22, 267. On this see also J.-M. Sauget, 'Une découverte inespérée: L'homélie 2 de Sévère d'Antioche sur l'Annonciation de la Theotokos', in R. H. Fischer (ed.), *A Tribute to Arthur Vööbus. Studies in Early Christian Literature and its Environment, Primarily in the Syrian East* (Chicago, 1977), 55-62; E. Porcher, 'Un discours sur la sainte vierge par Sévère d'Antioche', *ROC* 20 (1917), 416-23.

But the unbelieving Jews, who distort what is right and in so doing turn against the Holy Spirit, say that some of them who have interpreted the holy books translate 'See, a young girl will conceive' and not 'See, a virgin will conceive.' A young girl is a woman who is married and has known her husband. But the divine books throughout also give to a virgin the appellation of a young girl. Correspondingly it says in the Book of Deuteronomy (Dt 22,27) about the rape of a small maiden in a remote spot: 'the betrothed maiden uttered a cry, but there was no one who could protect her'. Then it is certain that that person who cried there was a virgin, before he raped her.

Like the virginal conception, the remaining circumstances of the *birth of Jesus* are also proof of the divine *oikonomia*, sign of God's mercy and expression of his love towards the world. It is precisely the ordinariness of his coming which is the most expressive image for the unreservedness and unsurpassability of the incarnation of the Logos.

Like a king who wants to sojourn in a small town, which is unknown and utterly in no position to support his sojourn, who often makes himself small and suppresses the size of the proud appearance or of the pomp which surrounds him, in order to be able to be accepted by this town; consequently he cannot come as a king and deny in a general way who he is, so too the Son and Logos of the Father, the inconceivable and infinite, wanted to come into the world under a human form . . . (Hom 63: PO 8, 296)

With all his stressing of the historicity of the salvific event, Severus insists again and again, however, that the notion of an alteration of the divine nature or of its mixing with the human nature ought not to creep into the picture of the incarnation. Naturally it holds that Jesus Christ 'is one without division and without mingling of the two natures, namely of divinity and humanity' (Hom 14: PO 38, 410). This fundamental formula of his christology should not be missing in preaching either, any more than the *mia-physis* formula itself.

For it is impossible that the uncreated and immutable nature should change into a creature or that something from what is created should be transformed and pass over into the uncreated being. Rather he remained what he was and has united himself hypostatically with a body which possesses a rational soul in such a way that *out of two natures*, out of the uncreated divinity and the created humanity, he has appeared to us as a single Christ, a single Lord, and a single person (*prosopon*), a single *hypostasis*, a single incarnate nature of the Logos (Hom 38: PO 8, 216-217)

According to Severus there is no New Testament witness that can be adduced for dividing up Christ into two natures after the union. Each episode of his earthly life substantiates the opposite: from the outset the Magi, who learned of the birth of Jesus through the observation of the stars, testify to the fact that he is 'God and king in one' (cf. Hom 36: PO 36, 466). The question of *how* the unity of the natures is to be thought of more closely Severus can answer only negatively. Excluded first of all will be any version of adoptionism, according to

which the Logos 'appropriated' a child already existing in the womb of the Virgin. 'If it had been so, the Logos himself did not assume flesh and become a human being, but he made a person (*prosopon*) his own, and consequently after the union of this kind one must count two natures, two *hypostases* and two persons' (Hom 38: PO 8, 222). The incarnation of the Logos cannot be thought of as a happening in the manner like, for example, the transformation of the staff of Moses into a snake or the light in Egypt into darkness. That would be an alteration, as this occurs in corporeal things which are subjected to quantity and quality (Hom 42: PO 36, 50).

Here too the body-soul analogy is too feeble to explain the mystery, and leads finally into a 'negative theology', which, through waiving an explanation of the *mysterium*, expresses more than comparisons that are rash.

... we know that the soul is united to the body by nature without our being able to say how and in what way, for this surpasses our power of understanding. Thus we also know in reference to the Emmanuel that the Logos participated in blood and flesh as we do by nature and at the same time in a supernatural way. If one wants to say 'how', this surpasses every word and every thought. (Hom 58: PO 8, 219)<sup>343</sup>

A certain aid for understanding in the form of metaphors, which Severus expands explicitly in his polemical works, is found also in his sermons: the reciprocal permeation of wood and fire in the glowing coal<sup>344</sup> or the picture of the burning bush (Ex 3,2-4).<sup>345</sup> With the already known explication of the motif of the Ark of the Covenant (*kibōtos*) with its imputrescible, but still mutable and burnable wood (see above, p. 87, n. 215), a symbol is introduced for the sinlessness of Jesus, and thus a core problem is addressed which is encountered in all further remarks on the mysteries of the life of Jesus. It concerns the question, how the union of the human nature with the Logos affects

343. Cf. Hom 44: PO 36, 96-98: 'We say that the human being, ours, which is composed from a soul and a body and which is in a single *hypostasis*, is a mortal, rational animal; still on the one side it is mortal through the body, on the other side rational through the soul; nevertheless it is still the whole animal which is called mortal and which as whole is characterized as rational; and the elements from which it is composed in a natural way are not mingled and it is not at all divided into two. It is also this way with the Emmanuel, because he is one from two natures, and one single *hypostasis* and one single incarnate nature of the Logos, without in any way the elements having to be mingled, from which the inexpressible unity comes to pass, and also, while one remains, without furnishing access to the duality from which the division arises. For he, who is really one, will never be two; and if he proceeds to become two, he has necessarily ceased to be one.'

344. Cf. Hom 48: PO 35, 316-317; Hom 90: PO 23, 153-154.

345. Cf. Hom 109: PO 25, 752-755.

the human.<sup>346</sup> The line of Severus' fundamental response is that the hypostatic union in no way signifies a lessening of the corporeal. The weakening of its reality would only apparently be of advantage to a more unambiguous stressing of the divinity of Jesus, and would obstruct rather than free us to perceive how unreserved the incarnation of the Logos is. Indeed the dramatic event concerning the *flight* of the holy family to Egypt demonstrates to Severus the necessity of adhering to the physical reality and relevance of the body of Jesus for the sake of the historicity of the incarnation.

For it would have been necessary that — as in the case of an hallucination — he be invisible, in order to deceive the sight of those who saw him and to escape the hands of Herod, if he has appeared to us really only in imagination and he has given himself a heavenly or aetherial body and not that which is like ours. But this impure and ungodly opinion has been driven away and widely rebuffed by the angel who turned to sleeping Joseph (Mt 2,13.20). (Hom 8: PO 38, 332)

Jesus' stance with regard to Jewish law substantiates just as much the concreteness of the self-surrender of the Logos to the world; Jesus 'submits to *circumcision* which is assigned to him, he offers a pair of turtle doves and two small doves; he fulfils everything that stands in the law' (Hom 10: PO 38, 356). Even more emphatically formulated is the removal of the 'phantasmagoria' of Arius, Eutyches, and the Manichaeans in the sermon on the *baptism* of Jesus.<sup>347</sup>

If [Jesus Christ] is not one from two without mingling, that is, from divinity and humanity, and thus a single *hypostasis* of the incarnate God-Logos, he would not have said: 'You are' (cf. Mk 1,11), but: 'That one who is in you is my Son.' For if the humanity by nature was so separated from the divinity, the consequence would have been that it also like us needed adoption . . . But what he was by nature, we will be by grace. (Hom 38: PO 36, 490)

Such figures of argument are able to be applied against Chalcedon and the Nestorians because they are accused of the same error, namely assuming the continuation of the duality of natures after the inseparable union of divinity and humanity. 'If this were correct, [God's voice at the descent of the Holy Spirit after the baptism] would have said: "In this there is my Son!" and not: "This is my Son!". But because he said

346. Cf. Hom 67. PO 8, 358–359.

347. The Antiochene calendar of feasts assigns the homilies 10, 38, 62, 85, 103 and 117 to the feast of the Epiphany of the Lord: 'The name of the feast was *ta phota*, its character completely that of a baptismal feast. The old significance of a birth feast of Christ seems to have been forgotten' (A. Baumstark, 'Das Kirchenjahr in Antiocheia', 54). Cf. on this too J. Mateos, 'Théologie du baptême dans le formulaire du Sévère d'Antioche', in *Symposium Syriacum* = OCA 197 (Rome, 1974), 135–61; B. Botte, 'Le baptême dans l'Église syrienne', *OrSyr* 1 (1956) (137–55), 148–55.

expressly: "This one there is my Son!" (cf. Mt 3,17), he has shown that the one who is seen, because he has become flesh, is also, as the same according to nature, the invisible Logos and the true Son of the Father' (Hom 10: PO 38, 362).<sup>348</sup> In this way it is clear that only the stressing of the immediacy of the historical event takes seriously the incarnation of the one divine nature without encroaching on its divinity. For Severus, every speculation that the earthly Jesus only *became* the Son of God through the baptism in the Jordan is erroneous.

For the word 'he is' (cf. Mt 3,17) shows the truth and identity according to essence in order to ward off the hideousness of Arius, who says: 'There was a time when the Son was not.' In fact he is eternal, just as the voice testifies, as it called in the name of the Father: 'This one there is my Son!' For on the one hand it refers to creatures who come into existence in time, so that one says: 'He was' and 'he will be'; but on the other hand God is eternal, he was limited neither in the past nor will be in the future. But at all times he is present and he is without end, eternally the same and without any alteration. (Hom 10: PO 38, 362)

According to Severus two elements constitute the theological significance of the baptism in the Jordan. Firstly, it is a question of the revelation of the Trinity of God, that is, of the disclosure of a knowledge of the unity in essence and hypostatic difference of Father, Son and Spirit.<sup>349</sup> 'Just as the Father is in the Son and the Son is in the Father, so also is the Holy Spirit in the Father and in the Son on account of the unity of essence' (Hom 85: PO 23, 36). Severus thus finds in the salvific economic Trinity the revelation of the immanent Trinity. Secondly, the soteriological dimension of the baptism in the Jordan consists in the fact that Jesus on that occasion brought about the forgiveness of sins and 'opens heaven which since Adam was closed, and through this he shows that baptism has the power to clear the way to

348. Cf. also Hom 66: PO 8, 342: 'But if that one, who was baptized in the Jordan in our place and in accordance with the *oikonomia*, was not the Logos himself who assumed flesh, but if it is the human being, separated and distinct from the Logos — according to the teaching of those, who think like Nestorius and accept two natures after the union — then the Holy Spirit would have to descend upon the water like on us and to sound the voice which came from the person of the Father. According to your opinion the water was divested of the Father and of the Spirit, because the voice was to be perceived only after the coming out (of the water). It is in fact after the coming out (of the water) that the descent of the Spirit in the form of a dove occurred. It is completely certain, however, that the Logos, who assumed flesh — for he is one and indivisible — when he stepped into the waters of the Jordan, possessed in himself the Father and the Spirit, because they have the same essence, and, after he climbed from the water, received the Spirit for us and was to hear for us this word: "You are my Son", so that through him we are named children, because on account of sin we had become opponents and enemies.'

349. Cf. Hom 10: PO 38, 358–362; Hom 32: PO 36, 488; Hom 85: PO 23, 35–36; Hom 117: PO 26, 350–351. See as well the letter of Severus to John Romanus: PO 12, no. XXIV, 219–222.



heaven' (Hom 10: PO 38, 358) and 'to shatter the power of the depraver' (*ibid.*, 356). Correspondingly there is the fact that Jesus himself did not need the 'purification'; through the water of the Jordan sins were not forgiven him, but he, who was without sin, hallowed the water in advance for us.

How would he have needed that, because he was born through the will of God for us to wisdom, justice and the forgiveness of sins? Then for us he received under the form of a dove the coming of the Holy Spirit whom he from nature already possessed, because he is of the same essence. And not only when he plunged under the water did he draw the witness of the Father who declared him as his Son and the descent of the Holy Spirit on him, so that no one should think that he, like us, attained sonship through baptism; for he possessed it in virtue of his essence, as too the Father and the Holy Spirit did. When he descended into the water for our sake and not for himself, he made baptism perfect. (Hom 66: PO 8, 341)

We realize that Severus will succeed as little as Cyril in making the humanity of Christ the vessel of messianic gifts of the Spirit. The fear of giving the Arians an argument against the divinity of the Son, by the Son being made the 'recipient of the Spirit', dominated him in this, just as the intention, *vis-à-vis* the Nestorians, not to allow this humanity to appear as independent subject or as person, by being the targeted receptacle of the reception of the Spirit. The Spirit is, so to say, channelled through Jesus of Nazareth to the totality of humankind to be redeemed. In Cyril these problems were treated under the theme 'anointing'.

For Severus the same hermeneutic is to be applied also to the *fasting* of Jesus and his *temptation*. When it says that he was led by the Spirit into the desert (cf. Mt 4,1) in order to be tempted by the devil, this does not mean any kind of necessity to which he was bound to subject himself (on his own account). Both are the expression of his voluntary humiliation: it happened representatively for human beings and as a model of a victorious fight against the devil.<sup>350</sup> 'How would the temptation have been necessary for him who has borne the sins of the world . . . if he had not made my temptation his own, in order to bend the inflexible depraver for me?' (Hom 15: PO 38, 424). To the devil himself the divinity of Jesus has remained completely hidden, but for Severus it manifests itself in the fact that Jesus knows in advance his instructions and his plans.<sup>351</sup> The revelation of his messianity is to be arranged

350. Severus' interpretation of Jesus' forsakenness (Mt 27,46) and dread (Mt 26,38-39) also takes this direction: Jesus has assumed this human imperfection in order to free us from it. He is said to have had it in his power to be completely free of it. In such interpretations the anti-Arianism of the fourth century was still active, being carried over into the fifth century through Cyril. Cf. Hom 59: PO 8, 237-242.

351. Cf. Hom 15: PO 38, 424-426; Hom 66: PO 8, 345-349; Hom 105: PO 25, 647-649.

solely in accordance with the divine *oikonomia*; it determines also the time of his public appearance and work.<sup>352</sup>

We see in the interpretation of Jesus' baptism and temptation that Severus does not know how to make the messianic pardoning of the humanity of Christ apparent to his hearers — for fear of giving the Arians and the Nestorians material to underpin their denial of the divinity of Christ or the true unity in Christ.

With all this the framework is already established with which the deeds of Jesus, above all his miracles, are to be interpreted: 'The same, who without alteration has become truly a human being, was also by nature God. We deem the miracles not as repression or destruction of the flesh, but also the human-finite measure and the voluntary poverty not as denial or abolition of his divinity' (Hom 83: PO 20, 405). Severus seeks in his explanation of Matthew 14,22-33 to demonstrate into what aporiai the interpretation of the miracles which, like the *Tomus Leonis* and the Council of Chalcedon, underpins the two-natures formula, becomes entangled.

Let us distinguish for each of the natures what is characteristic of it, and let us call characteristic what each does! In the same way as the Word, who can be neither touched nor seen, was seen and touched, so is the same who heals, walks over the lake. Do we now say that it is his characteristic work that he walked on the water? They give us this as an answer, those who after the union introduce two natures, that this is the divine nature. But how would this be the characteristic of the divinity to walk on corporeal feet, and not that of the human nature? And how is it not foreign to a human being to walk over the surface of the water? Hence it is time for you to seek a third nature to which you can ascribe an action of this kind. (Hom 4: PO 38, 302)

Not two persons, not a third mixed nature explain the miracles of Christ, but — this Severus intends to impart to his hearers — only the 'one incarnate nature of the Logos'! But can the *mia physis* give this without contradiction? Can it guarantee the immutability of God?

Apparently Severus' fundamental axiom of the immutability of the incarnate nature of the God-Logos was not so evident for his listeners that further critical enquiry and counter-questioning were absent. So he had to offer a considerable amount of theological rhetoric to rebut the conjecture that the event of the *transfiguration*, should it not have happened purely in the imagination of the apostles, proves an alteration with regard to the person of Jesus. Severus saves himself here with

352. Cf. Hom 119: PO 26 on the question, why it was only at the wedding feast of Cana that the time of his official ministry began: of necessity the Jews would have been even more in doubt about him; hatred and unbelief would certainly have been the effect of an *earlier* miracle, because 'it was not the time, appropriate for the human being, to effect such things' (421).

reference to the fact that Jesus could be no other than the one who he was:

Is it, thus, that the fact that he allowed to shine forth his own countenance in a radiance which is worthy of God, like the sun, and that his clothes glistened from the brilliance of the light, lets recognize, or shows, any alteration in being, so that he has ceased to be a human being, which he in truth wanted to become without alteration, disregarding the fact that he remained God? Or is it above all so, which is really true, that namely he was the same who ignited a small spark of his personal sublimity for revelation, disregarding the fact that he wanted to confirm the thought of the disciples, insofar as that was possible? (Hom 42 PO 36, 52-54)<sup>353</sup>

The gradual revelation of the messiahship of Jesus, taking place in accordance with the *oikonomia*, is also the principal theme of the interpretation of the *entry of Jesus into Jerusalem*, which is in part strongly allegorized.

When our Lord and God Jesus Christ came to the point, because he surrendered himself voluntarily to the salvific cross to fulfil in that the whole *oikonomia*, in order to take upon himself for us every contempt and ignominy and to debase himself even to death . . . he arranged it in such a way that his entry into the Jerusalem of God was worthy and happened in a symbolic way, since he announced to us through this his second glorious advent. (Hom 20: PO 37, 46)

Severus' depiction of the *passion* and *crucifixion* comprises a fundamental discussion with the basic contemporary christological positions, in the centre of which stood the problem of the suffering of Jesus. The style and content of his argumentation are shaped by his endeavour on the one side to entangle the two-natures formula in contradictions, and on the other side to show that in his understanding of the hypostatic union such problems do not even arise.

Perhaps some of those, who after the inexpressible union divide our single Lord and God Jesus Christ into the duality of natures, will ask themselves . . . : 'Who is it that cries out on the cross: My God, my God, why have you forsaken me (Mt 27,46 par)?' For us it is the God-Logos, who without alteration has become flesh, who has cried that out, who has voluntarily become poor for us and who, insofar as he has become a human being, has called his God Father. For he was nailed on the cross, insofar as that body was nailed on it with which he is united in a hypostatic manner. For he has remained impassible, insofar as he is God, but he is not a stranger to suffering: the body which has suffered belongs to him and to no one else; hence it occurs rightfully if one believes that the suffering indeed belongs to him. You, however, when you say that there is a difficulty here, in your stupidity take away from his flesh that which is united with it. (Hom 22: PO 37, 88)

Severus attempts to avoid a logical contradiction and the heresy of

353. Cf. similarly Hom 60: PO 8, 249: 'In his countenance he shone like the sun of the divine glory and in his clothes, in which he was dressed, he became white like light. For he himself was the sun of justice.' On the understanding of the transfiguration, as Severus has presented it in his altercation with Julian of Halicarnassus, see above n 210.

theopaschism (that is, that the God-Logos suffered in his divinity) by being able to express under two different aspects two different, mutually exclusive characteristics of Jesus Christ: with regard to his divinity he remained impassible; with regard to the flesh he suffered (cf. Hom 109: PO 25, 767–768).

If Peter had not known the incarnate Logos, who also suffered for us, as the single Christ, he would not have said of him in his letter (1 Pet 4,1) 'Christ suffered for us in the flesh', but he would have spoken of the two *christoi*. If he had not known that the same, insofar as he is God, is impassible, but, insofar as he is a human being, is passible, he would not have added 'in the flesh'. For this unity of the God-Logos with his flesh is sublime and inseparable. It draws this special character to itself, that is, the addition of the *differentia specifica* in the flesh (Hom 22 PO 37, 88).

Severus considers as correspondingly erroneous the question, posed according to the manner of the Sophists, which of the two natures was nailed to the cross or whether the side which was pierced by the soldier's lance belonged to humanity or divinity.

For if that one, who was by nature without body, became embodied on account of the *oikonomia* for our sakes — without alteration — this body is altogether his and the side of the body is in every way completely his (*ibid.*, 100)

Here Severus could have reached agreement with the Chalcedonians. These only put more precisely that it is the one divine *hypostasis*, that is, the one divine subject, which suffered not in the nature of the divinity, but only in the nature of the humanity.

A similar problem is raised by the question, to what extent the *death of Jesus* is to be conceived as a separation of body and soul, if the hypostatic union is to be understood as an insoluble union of the Logos with his body animated by a rational soul. There had been an interpretation which had assumed that the death of Jesus meant a separation of the Logos from his body.<sup>354</sup> At the time of Severus the position could be regarded as already obsolete. Skirting around ontological considerations, he sees in the death of Jesus predominantly the dimension of the vicarious effecting of salvation. With his last words on the cross (especially Lk 23,46: 'Father, into your hands I commend my spirit'), Jesus wanted 'to sanctify the departure of our soul; for us, when we depart this life, he gives over into the hands of the heavenly Father our spirit, which shall no longer be caught in the clutches of death and in the fetters of sin' (*ibid.*, 104). What death means in general, and specifically for Jesus, remains in such a perspective largely unconsidered.

354 On the theologoumenon of the separation of the Logos in death, see A. Grillmeier, 'Der Gottessohn im Totenreich', in *idem*, *Mit ihm und in ihm* (1978) (75–174), 108–142.

On the one hand the soul is separated from the body by the will of him who governs all things, and on the other hand the God-Logos — for he is the one who governs them — unites each of the elements in a hypostatic manner in such an unsurpassable unity. On the basis of this union he destroys — with respect to the body — corruption and gives life back to those who are in the grave. With respect to his soul — the God-Logos, because he unites hypostatically to himself a soul, does not leave the body empty nor robbed of the unity which is proper to it.<sup>355</sup>

On occasions, however, Severus places the death of Jesus in a final large framework, when he refers to the fact that the cross of Jesus mediated to us the knowledge of the Trinity.<sup>356</sup>

As with Christ's death on the cross, a similar way of thinking is applied to the interpretation of the *descensus ad inferos*.

For he has descended into the lower regions of the earth not with the divinity alone, but in an inexpressible way united with the soul which the good shepherd surrendered for his sheep (cf. Jn 10, 11). He appeared to the souls confined there to free those over whom death reigned (Hom 49 PO 35, 350).

Hades or Sheol has for Severus only a meaning for the time before Christ. With the descent of the Son of God into the netherworld the end of Sheol has come, because he freed the souls bound in it.<sup>357</sup> An epoch in the history of salvation has come to a close.

The real fulfilment of the ages, however, is guaranteed through the *resurrection, ascension or exaltation of Christ*. With the ascent, the descent of Emmanuel reached its final meaning. Severus has here once again an explicit christological interest, that is, one that concerns the being of Christ. If the Logos before the incarnation was 'single and not composite, incorporeal, and after the incarnation one from two' (Hom 24: PO 37, 136), then the mysteries of the completion of the life of Jesus in no way signify an alteration of his divinity as such, but only their definitive revelation in the event of the incarnation.

Thus he who has ascended into heaven is no other than he who descended from there. And if he also descended without flesh and has ascended with the flesh, this is so precisely for this reason that he is one and the same, it is also he and no other who has ascended.

355 Hom 22 PO 37, 105. On the history of the development of these notions that are connected with the *descensus Christi*, see the article just cited.

356 See the letter of Severus to John Romanus PO 12, no XXIV, 220–222. Through the sign of the cross we show 'that it is through the cross that we have obtained knowledge in the Trinity' (221). Cf. also Hom 24 PO 37, 134–144, Hom 71 PO 12, 52–70.

357 Cf. W. de Vries, 'Die Eschatologie des Severus von Antiochien', OCP 23 (1957) (354–80), 361–2. Severus does not speak of the fact that the liberated souls have entered immediately with Christ into heaven, but he often emphasizes that Christ 'has ascended to heaven, while he bore all of us in himself, because he had become flesh in our condition' (Hom 71 PO 12, 66, Hom 90 PO 23, 158, Hymn 105 on the feast of the ascension PO 6, 143–144).

[But if one assumes on the contrary the Chalcedonian formula of one *hypostasis* in two natures, then he who has ascended is other than the one who descended] (Hom 47: PO 35, 313)<sup>358</sup>

Here Severus takes into account the *history of salvation* schema to interpret the event of descent and ascent. The means for this is the early Christian *typology*. For this endeavour we shall select a summary representative passage concerning Joseph-Jesus.

Joseph was sold by his brothers, so too Christ by Judas. He was thrown into a pit and he rose up out of it, as Jesus was laid in the grave and rose. He was robbed of his colourful robe, as too our Saviour of his seamless woven garment. He descended towards Egypt, as also did the Emmanuel into this world. He was thrown into gaol, he allowed the cup-bearer and servant of the Pharaoh, who was locked up there, to come out, he ruled in Egypt, as our Saviour too appeared in the regions of Sheol, . . . who with the flesh has returned to heaven — he who fills the universe in an incorporeal and unrestricted way. (Hom 80: PO 20, 327)

In the course of our study, time and again we had the opportunity to refer to the significance of the *return of Christ* and his function as *judge of the world*. Severus is no exception to this. As a homilist he is inclined to stress the severity of the *judgement* of God (Hom 80: PO 20, 334). All creatures, all beings with a rational, freely responsible intellectuality, are gathered before the judgement seat of Christ at the end of the ages. With regard to this Severus shares the views of his time.<sup>359</sup> The image of the Son of Man coming again in glory as judge is also a favourite theme of his.<sup>360</sup> In his writings the protology is combined with eschatology when he compares the condition in paradise with that after the judgement. The re-establishment of the paradisaical condition of imputrescibility and immortality does not satisfy him as the fruit of Christ's work of salvation. After the judgement humanity does not return again into paradise; rather, on the basis of the incarnation Christ introduces us in a new fashion into the kingdom of heaven.<sup>361</sup>

358. Cf. also Hom 24: PO 37, 134–144; Hom 71: PO 12, 52–70.

359. Cf. W. de Vries, *art. cit.*, 367–74. A detailed depiction of the last judgement is found in Homily 73 on the holy martyr Barlaam: PO 12, 90–96.

360. Severus Ant., *Hymnus* 87: PO 6, 127–128. The return of the Son of Man constitutes the main content of letter 71 to the deaconess Anastasia: PO 14, 107–117.

361. Severus Ant., *Ep.* 96 to Solon, Bishop of Isauria: PO 14, 183: 'That Christ by means of his Incarnation raised or raises us to these primitive conditions is certain. But this must be understood as far as concerns incorruption and the abolition of death . . . That Emmanuel invites us to prizes and crowns that surpass the primitive state, making our right actions means of support for further assistance, and that he does not raise us to Paradise again, but introduces us in a new fashion into the kingdom of Heaven, is manifest and is never a matter of doubt, not even to those who are very perverse.' In the context Severus refers to Gregory Nazianzen, Gregory of Nyssa and Chrysostom.

### III. THE CREDO OF THE CATECHUMENS — THE ANTI-CHALCEDONIAN CATECHESIS

On several occasions Severus found the opportunity to present programmatically and systematically his fundamental christological position in an elevated proclamation. Besides his address after his elevation as Patriarch of Antioch<sup>362</sup> and the sermons occasioned by visiting some surrounding places (Hom 53–61), it is particularly the annual homilies for the catechumens which provide information about the style of argumentation and manner of thinking characteristic of Severus in his catechesis (Hom 21, 42, 70, 90, 109, 123).

The construction and content of individual baptismal catechetical homilies exhibit the same structural elements each time.<sup>363</sup> The broadly constructed introduction begins with the report of a biblical account of a theophany (e.g. of Ex 19,16–19: Hom 21; Ex 3,10–13: Hom 109). To it is related the content and claim of every further catechetical instruction, in which, supported by scripture and tradition, it is a question of nothing other than the bringing to mind of God's self-manifestation. After this there comes a brief *explanation of the credo* with its fundamental trinitarian and christological statements, nevertheless not following a precisely determined version of the *Nicaenum* and/or the *Constantinopolitanum*. The sketch of salvation-history, as the baptismal creed offers a model of this, also forms the thematic guide for the major part of the homily-catechesis, which has as its focus a reflection on the incarnation of the Logos. To this belongs each time as well a succinct theology of the mysteries of the life of Jesus, which is full of polemical sideswipes at the Arians, Manichaeans, Apollinarians (who anonymously could still smuggle in so much of their christological language), Eutychians, Nestorians and Chalcedonians. The homily ends with an incidental description and theological *interpretation of the rite of baptism*.

Severus formulates his theological preoccupation in a particularly trenchant way in three *anathemas* which he uttered against the exponents of the most important dogmatic counterpositions (Hom 109: PO 25, 770–771).

(1) If anyone says that the Word of God brought the flesh from heaven or that it is from another matter or that it has transformed itself into flesh, or that it has thickened or hardened itself, like ice from water, or that it has assumed a form, like the impression of a seal [in soft wax], or that it appears like a phantom or ghost or dream image, and if he does not confess that the Son of God, who was without flesh and blood before the ages, has assumed flesh which is of the same essence as we are, from the Holy Spirit and the holy mother of God, the Virgin Mary, in a hypostatic union . . . , let him be far from the grace of the true and divine incarnation.

(2) If anyone has imagined the flesh of our Lord without soul and reason and in this way has caused the perfection of the incarnation to disintegrate, may he inherit the lot of the foolish and senseless virgins, so that the door of the marriage chamber remains closed before his nose and the hope of a future life is taken from him.

(3) If anyone does not confess that the Word of God, who became flesh and a human being without alteration — although he names him as sole Son, sole Lord, sole Christ, sole person, sole *hypostasis*, sole incarnate nature of the Word — but not that he [the Word] is impassible, insofar as he is God and that he, in accordance with the holy books, suffered

362. Hom 1; see *JdChr* II/1, 318–19; *CCT* II/1, 281–2.

363. On the following cf. J. Gribomont, 'La catéchèse de Sévère d'Antioche et le *Credo*', *ParOr* 6/7 (1975/76), 125–58; F. Graffin, *art. cit.* (n. 335), 47–54.

in the flesh, and if anyone says the flesh was altered or mingled with the divine being, let him be anathema and delivered over to terrible and unending sufferings.

Key passages of Severan christology are found also in remarks about the correct understanding of the *hypostatic union*. Severus assimilates the union of divine and human natures to the moment that the Logos dwelt in the Virgin and thus the body animated by a rational soul too began to exist. The arguments which had once been formed against early Christian adoptionism and Nestorianism were now applied to supporters of the two-natures teaching.

Show us one instant in which, while they exist, the body, or better still the human nature with which he united himself, did not partake of the Logos, and I must say that there are two natures! But because they exist in an inseparable manner, I do not have the courage to destroy through duality the hypostatic union, which cannot be ripped asunder.

It must also be explained why we, when we speak of two natures, add with regard to them: 'which in their particular aspect (*notion particulière*) are intact'. [Severus shows this with the body-soul comparison.] The spiritual soul is as soul something intact and perfect. For the soul receives the body not as a complement to its existence. For it exists also as separated from this in its separatedness (*isolément*) through itself . . . Nevertheless the soul, which is whole in its singularity and whole under its regard, proceeds to be a part of the human being when it is united to the body. Equally the body as body is something whole, which according to the definition of the body and under its particular aspect (*notion particulière*) lacks nothing. Nevertheless it is in the totality of the living being only part.

Hence we say also with regard to the Emmanuel that in this way the union took place, that is, from the divinity and from the humanity which under this particular aspect are entire. For these elements, which in the union have the function (*taxis*) to be parts, in order to form a single *hypostasis*, do not lose the integrity proper to them, because they are joined together without mingling and diminution. (Hom 70: PO 12, 38-40)

The Antiochenes, earlier so sensitive to the denouncing of their teachers and heretics, must now hear from the pulpit of their own cathedral that men like Theodoret and Nestorius do not accept a real hypostatic union, but only a unity of love, 'which is founded on a connection of mercy and love . . . it comprises not the birth of God who has become flesh, but rather excludes the birth and denies it and does not assent to the fact that the Virgin became the mother of God (*theotokos*)' (Hom 58: PO 8, 224). From the pulpit Severus certainly attributes to the Council of Chalcedon the intention of meaning one person with its 'one *hypostasis* in two natures'. All the same, he did not succeed in discovering in it the true dogma of the incarnation.

But if there is in reality one single *hypostasis*, there will also be one single incarnate nature of the God-Logos. Or, if there are two natures, there will also necessarily be two *hypostases* and two persons and the Trinity will be devised as a quaternity. But, so say these godless ones, we hold on to two natures and a single person (*prosopon*) and unite these two natures through the appellation as Christ, Son and Lord, and through the power [hence only through a moral bond] . . . We say . . . that this distinction is insidious and deceitful and has for



Directed to the Chalcedonians (= the 'Nestorians') once again is a similar reflection on the trinitarian implications and complications which Severus, together with other opponents of the Council, finds in the two-natures formula.

If there is not one nature and one single incarnate *hypostasis* of the God-Logos, it is utterly necessary that consequently we add falsely to the Trinity a fourth person. For the duality establishes each nature in itself, separate and for itself, and if once the human nature is distinct from the Logos [which for Severus means separate], one necessarily has to ascribe to it a proper person. And when it is time, the heavenly throne will reject that one which is foreign, and not only because he is foreign, but more still because he is a supernumerary; for how is that one not a supernumerary who makes a quaternity from the Trinity and introduces into heaven and allows to live there a human being who was made God, and who simultaneously regards him as uncreated and a creature worthy of worship and suddenly creates and assembles a new God, as the pagans are accustomed to fabricate and to name such falsely as gods, who seek them among human beings and allow them to ascend to heaven? (Hom 47: PO 35, 311-313)

Severus thus expresses to his listeners his whole polemic against Chalcedon, and this in such a way that it is no doubt also too exacting for an adult catechism. He says to them that in the dogma of Chalcedon there is a contradiction between the claim that each of the two natures maintains its properties and that at the same time there is only one *hypostasis* and one *prosopon*. He demands that his hearers understand what *hypostasis* is (namely one *ousia*, to which a fullness of concrete features and properties is added, so that as a result there is a concrete, individual entity, whose *prosopon* these characteristics form). Could the normal hearers understand the fact that from this background the two-natures formula of Chalcedon had really to be rejected, because it is claimed that it teaches two *hypostases* and destroys the unity of Christ? In fact the whole Severan christology is contained in such homilies, and one would dearly like to know to what extent they were understood by the hearers. In conclusion we shall give two suggestive examples illustrating this.

### The one activity of the incarnate God-Logos

Therefore godless are those, who with regard to Christ teach two natures which act, for it is necessary that each nature has an action which is proper to it and different, that is, an acting movement/motion. If we confess Christ as one from two . . . , and as one person, one *hypostasis* and one single incarnate nature of the Logos, consequently it will be one who acts and one movement which bears him in action, although the *works* are different, that is, the completely performed deeds which come from the action. For some fit God, others the human being; but they are performed by one and the same, by God who without alteration has become flesh and a human being. And this is not surprising, (but) similar to the works of a human being, of which some are intellectual, the others visible and

does this and that, and there is only one single working movement. Hence, when Christ is concerned, we recognize a change of words. Some suit God, others the human being . . . But on this account we do not say that there they belong to that nature and here to this nature. For they were expressed undistinguished of the one and the same Christ.

But some conduct themselves in an ungodly way, at the same time they suffer from a final ignorance with regard to the alteration [change] of deeds and words; they have set up two that act and speak, when very significantly they have named the persons 'natures' and have concealed two sons and two Christs under the lion's skin. (Hom 109: PO 25, 758-760)

One nature, one *hypostasis*, one Christ, one *energeia*, one activity — duality only in the effects, lying outside Christ, on the one action! We shall return to this text.

### *Ousia — physis — hypostasis*

Only in one homily did Severus explain what was to be understood more precisely by 'essence' and *hypostasis*, and this more explicitly in a trinitarian context.

'We say that essence and *hypostasis* are concepts which indicate the existence of existing things. "Essence" (*ousia*) discloses that the subject (is and) exists and *hypostasis* says that it subsists' (Hom 125: PO 29, 235). With regard to the Trinity, the essence is the godhead: Father, Son and Spirit are God without diminution or gradation. With regard to the *hypostases*, in each case a particularity is expressed of the godness of the Father, Son and Spirit. Thus for the Father the non-begotten applies (*agenetos* in the twofold meaning of 'unbecome' and 'unbegotten'); at the same time, however, the begetting is in reference to the Son; for the Son the being begotten of the Father, independently of time, and for the Spirit the proceeding from the Father. 'The particularities (*propriétés*) remain fixed and unalterable; they characterize without mingling each of the *hypostases* and do not divide the common essence.' (*ibid.*, 239)

In the trinitarian terminology Severus thus distinguishes clearly between *ousia* (*physis*) and *hypostasis*, and the formula 'three *hypostases* in the one *ousia* (*physis*)' creates no difficulties for him (*ibid.*). A corresponding translation to christology was denied to him on account of the *mia-physis* formula, also, however, on account of the imperfect determination, taken over from the Cappadocians, of the relationship of *ousia*, *physis* and *hypostasis* (see below).

### The Trishagion

That the distinction of the *hypostases* does not cancel the commonality of the essence, Severus shows in relation to the question, to what extent the Trishagion may be directed to the Son and/or to the whole Trinity.

This statement of praise is made of the only (Son) of God, of the Word, who for us assumed flesh and became human. That the Father too is by nature God, mighty and immortal and so too the Holy Spirit equally, is certain for everyone. But in opposing the stupidity of the

pagans and the incredulity of the Jews, for whom a crucified one is a folly and a scandal (cf. 1 Cor 1,23), we say: Holy are you, God, you who without change became a human being for us and remained God; holy are you, Mighty, you who in weakness have shown the superiority of power (cf. 1 Cor 1,25); holy are you, Immortal, you who have been crucified for us, you who bore in the flesh the death that came through the cross, and you who have shown that you are immortal, even as you were in death. On account of the unbelievers it is very fitting that we say that this statement of praise is directed to the Son. The Father and the Holy Spirit have never been in humanity, neither in weakness nor in death. But the only Son, the Word of God, who became flesh, voluntarily took this on himself. And when he was in adversity, he showed in a brilliant way that he was impassible, powerful and immortal God. For this reason we present to him threefold praise and allow it to ascend to him: 'You are holy', in order to show that he is no other outside the Trinity, who like one of the creatures was enriched through partaking of their holiness, because he is by nature holy as God, above all he is one of the three *hypostases* through whom the others are able to be sanctified, and because the praise of the Son is praise of the Father and of the Holy Spirit. Because their essence is one, the praise is also one, and whoever praises one of the three *hypostases* has in no way separated from it the doxology of the two others; for the doxology of the Son contains the doxology of the Father and of the Holy Spirit.<sup>364</sup>

From many of these homilies polemic leaps out at us. If we may expect something of the faithful of a metropolis like Antioch, one can still ask whether the comments on theological concepts were really understood and led to religious deepening. Nevertheless, we ought not to isolate this preaching from the liturgy and the poetic hymns of the Patriarch (CPG 7072-7078).<sup>365</sup>

364. Severus Ant., Hom 125: PO 29, 245. On this see V.-S. Janeras, 'Les byzantins et le trisagion christologique' in *Miscellanea liturgica . . . Lercaro II* (Rome, 1967), 469-99, especially 470-7.

365. On the number of hymns that are ascribed to Severus see E. W. Brooks in PO 14, 209 (indexes to PO 6 and 7).

## SEVERUS THE DOGMATICIAN AND HIS PICTURE OF CHRIST

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Neither opportunity nor aptitude drove the Patriarch of Antioch to recapitulate and present his theological opinions systematically. A certain effort is needed to gather his christology and his dogmatics together from his various writings and to give them a structure. As is already discernible from the foregoing presentation, christology is central to Severus. This theological centre is again dominated by the idea of the unity in Christ, which, in endless repetitions and with growing concentration, both linguistically and intellectually, permeates his writing and speech. Nevertheless there are numerous clues to enable one to represent Severus as theologian, responsible bishop, as organizer and spiritual monk, in any case as unsubdued advocate of his convictions — a task which is still to be done. We shall give here only a few incomplete indications to round off our presentation.

It could appear that Severus was led to intervene in the post-Chalcedonian skirmishes only through provocations, but through the power of his polemic he himself became the provocateur and leading theologian of his time. But in everything he remained the traditionalist and became more and more so. His model is Cyril of Alexandria, whom he copied very often, simplified and intensified in certain aspects, but never really transcended. His contribution to the solution of the christological problem that was affecting everybody remained for that reason confined to the horizon which was proposed by Cyril.

The same is true of his trinitarian teaching. With Cyril, Severus belongs in the tradition of Meletius of Antioch and the Cappadocians with their principal formula of three *hypostases* in the one essence. This separates him from the linguistic and conceptual usage of Athanasius, who is indeed also the great Father for him, but did not attain the significance of Cyril. Pneumatology stays, as we shall still see on occasions, in the framework of the 'king of dogmas', and for that reason Severus does not come to a satisfactory evaluation of the messianic endowment with the Spirit. The anti-Arian perspective of the fourth century still remains decisive. It is in the altercation with Julian of Halicarnassus that he cast out widest in terms of dogmatic speculation. Relatively explicitly, he spoke about his understanding of the original condition and the consequences of the fall of the first parents. From this there emerges a sound approach to the valuing of human beings and their freedom. He rejects the *peccatum naturae*, which forms the negative background for the *aphtharsia* teaching of Julian. Although a committed monk, he defends the holiness of marriage and the dignity of woman against dualistic, Manichaean criticism of the human body.<sup>366</sup> This is also linked up with his position in christology, and this in a twofold regard. (1) The positive valuing of the bodiliness of Jesus separates him definitively from docetism and from all monophysite tendencies, even in the form of Julianism. (2) It is precisely the rejection

<sup>366</sup> See the fine section on the mariological proof of the dignity of woman in Hom 83.

of the Julianist *aphtharsia* teaching that prompts him to a clear profession of a theology of the cross. Even if we share Draguet's position that Severus misunderstood Julian, Julian of Halicarnassus was also really open to misunderstanding. His *doxa* christology misled numerous supporters into the renewed reception of older gnostic, docetist evaluations of the bodiliness of Christ. In contrast, with his christological realism, his theology of the cross and his whole attitude towards human life, Severus can also offer a healthier christology. With the apologetically conditioned concentration on the christological problematic of unity, the picture of Christ even in Severus has a slant which offers little help in constructing a modern christology with a stronger appreciation of the uncurtailed humanity of Christ. In what follows we shall pay particular attention to this. All too strongly Severus remains tied to the tradition which in the Apollinarian forgeries secured for itself a wide-ranging influence, to which Cyril too paid his tribute. Apollinarius remains even longer present in the Church. Without a doubt Severus already contributes to the monoenergist, monothelite crisis of the seventh century. Only in this discussion will it be seen how important the Chalcedonian picture of Christ is for the future of christology. Admittedly here a contemporary of the Patriarch intervened as a new important figure: Ps. Dionysius the Areopagite.

Unfortunately we must pass over here what the relationship between christology, sacramental theology and ecclesiology meant for Severus, and also what he has to say about soteriology. We refer to these themes as they have been dealt with already by research into Severus.<sup>367</sup> A complete depiction of this religious, realistic churchman should quickly become the preoccupation of ecumenical research.

In conclusion we shall attempt a synopsis of the typical characteristics of the dogmatic picture of Christ from the apologetical-polemical works, the homilies and letters of the Patriarch, as we have already analysed them.<sup>368</sup>

367. Cf. W. de Vries, *Sakramententheologie bei den syrischen Monophysiten* = OCA 125 (Rome, 1940); *idem*, *Der Kirchenbegriff der von Rom getrennten Syrer* = OCA 145 (Rome, 1955) with numerous illustrations; *idem*, 'La conception de l'Eglise chez les Syriens séparés de Rome', *OrSyr* 2 (1957), 11–124; H. Engberding, 'Die Kirche als Braut in der ostsyrischen Liturgie', *OCP* 3 (1937), 5–48; W. de Vries, *art. cit.*, 116, emphasizes the significance of the concept of *komunia* (*šawwofūto*) for the West Syrians in the context of the fight concerning Chalcedon: 'La communio est un lien sacramento-juridique qui enlace les membres de la véritable Eglise du Christ, à l'exclusion de tous autres. L'autorité ecclésiastique est juge de l'appartenance à cette *communio*, dont le signe concluant est la célébration eucharistique.'

368. For the following the reader is referred to J. C. L. Gieseler, *Commentationes, qua Monophysitarum veterum variae de Christi persona opiniones inprimis ex ipsorum effatus recens editus illustrantur, Particula I et II* (Göttingen, 1835 and 1838) (still without cognisance of the Oriental sources); Lebon; *idem*, *Chalcedon I*, 425–580; G. Bardy, *art.* 'Sévère d'Antioche', *DTC* 14 (1941), 1988–2000; Frend; R. C. Chesnut, *Three Monophysite Christologies: Severus of Antioch, Philoxenus of Mabbug and Jacob of Sarug* (Oxford, 1976), 9–56; N. A. Zabolotsky, 'The Christology of Severus of Antioch', *Ekklesiastikos Pharos* 58 (1976), 357–86; V. C. Samuel, 'One Incarnate Nature of God the Word', *GOTR* 10 (1964/65), 37–53; *idem*, 'The Christology of Severus of Antioch', *Abba Salama* 4 (1973), 126–90; *idem*, 'Further Studies in the Christology of Severus of Antioch', *Ekklesiastikos Pharos* 58 (1976), 270–301; M. Simonetti, 'Alcune osservazioni sul monofisismo di Cirillo di Alessandria', *Aug* 22 (1982), 493–511; summary presentations of Old-Oriental theology: M. Gordillo, *Compendium Theologiae Orientalis* (Rome, 1939), M. Jugie, *Theologia dogmatica Nestorianorum et Monophysitarum* (Paris, 1935) (= *idem*, *Theologia dogmatica christianorum orientalium ab ecclesia catholica dissidentium*. Vol. VI).

I. THE RÔLE OF THE PATRIARCH SEVERUS IN THE  
CHALCEDONIAN-POST-CHALCEDONIAN PROCESS  
OF UNDERSTANDING THE MYSTERY OF CHRIST

Let us once again recall briefly what is to be differentiated here. There is a catechetical, homiletic transmission of faith which can and must refrain from more exacting concepts and formulas, but nevertheless can proclaim the mystery of Christ according to the spirit of the scriptures. It precedes the *théologie savante*, which has its own requirements and opportunities, particularly also its special perils. We have attempted to depict the share of the Patriarch in proclamation which bears the Church's life of faith. In doing this we have established how quickly he was diverted into the language and problematic of reflective theology. This is a consequence of the time when Severus entered into the post-Chalcedonian discussion; it was the time of deciding about the validity of the Council of Chalcedon with its two-natures teaching which he detested. A skirmish about formulas was imminent. Though they may have become hollow phrases once again, as earlier in the fourth century, according to the depiction of Gregory of Nyssa,<sup>369</sup> Severus was vastly removed from this. For him it was a question of the preservation or destruction of received faith in the one Jesus Christ, true God and true human being. But our question is: did the theologian on the patriarchal throne make a genuine, lasting contribution to formulating the christological problem more clearly, to analysing the differences between the parties and to inaugurating a reconciliation?

**A missed opportunity to clarify the problem**

*Vis-à-vis* this complex task, as we have just outlined it, Severus, to the detriment of the matter, certainly did not solve the first part of the question, a delimitation of the problem that could lead further: how in the 'composed Christ' is the unity and the difference to be established and formulated? Chalcedon had indicated a way through its distinction between *physis* and *hypostasis*. But because Severus did not want to take over this linguistic rule, and because he maintained the close bond between the two concepts, the two-natures formula was hence for him the recognition of two *hypostases*. Even if the Fathers of Chalcedon committed a sin of omission by not making explicitly clear that they wanted to clarify the christological problem by distinguishing between

369. Greg. Nyss., *Or. de deitate Filii et spiritus sancti* (CPG 3192): PG 46. 557BC.

subject and nature, in fact this path of reaching a solution had already been trodden. They sought the unity in Christ on the level of the *subject* or of the *bearer* of the true divinity and humanity; the difference, however, on the level of this twofold *manner of being*. They distinguished, in the language of Gilbert of Porretaine, between the question about the *quis* (who?), and the question about the *quid* (what?). The unity of the *quis*, of the bearing subject, should be expressed by *hypostasis*, the distinction of the borne by *physis*. Centuries before, Origen had already hinted at this methodology for seeking unity and distinction on different levels in connection with the trinitarian problem.

Opposed to the modalist, Sabellius, Origen established for trinitarian theology the clear distinction of the persons in God, especially for Father and Son. The writing *Disputatio cum Heraclide* (CPG 1481: SC 67), only discovered again in this century, reports the fact that in this distinction the teaching of two gods was suspected by the faithful. To solve these difficulties Origen demands 'that the object must be carefully handled and that it is necessary to show under what relation they are two and under what aspect these two are a single God. For the Scriptures have taught us (to see) in many cases where two things form a unity' (SC 67, ch. 2, 29-32, p. 58).

It is also a question of the same thing in christology, where Severus spoke of the unmingled unity (the *henosis asynchytos*). It is thus a question of unity in duality, and of duality in the unity. The result of the assumption of human being by the God-Logos could not be a *unum simplex*, as the Logos as divine spirit was. It had thus to be shown how Christ is one and how at the same time he is different. This way of putting the question was blocked for Severus by the exclusivity of the *mia-physis* formula. It meant for him a restriction in the use of *physis*, which was employed extensively by him as synonymous with *hypostasis*. The synonymy barred for the Patriarch the approach to the new way which Chalcedon points out: to denote in Christ the level of the *one subject*, of the one *quis*, by *hypostasis*, and the level of the what being, of the *quid*, in contrast by *physis*, and to locate the difference there. This methodological, linguistic deficit, however, also became one of content. For the concept *physis* (*kyana*) with its etymology could become the key to valuing the human being of Christ. Severus, however, could not tolerate conceding to the humanity of Christ with this designation an active principle of operation. Precisely in this natural ability to be the source of human acts, he sensed already the independence from the ultimate bearing subject. With this serious decision of a linguistic kind, the prospect for the analysis and evaluation of the human activity of Christ was severely restricted or entirely blocked. In his dread of a second subject in Christ the Patriarch rejected even the expression: Christ 'suffered in the nature of humanity'. Although this formula had been

employed well by orthodox Fathers, he still stressed that Cyril finally forbade its use. In the fight against the *morbus divisionis* no chink was to be left open for Nestorian-Chalcedonian misuse. In the synthesis, which is called Christ, there is no necessity, however, for *physis*, even when expressed of the one entire human being, to become the second *principium quod* alongside the Logos-subject. From a philosophical and terminological point of view Severus could not demonstrate any contradiction, if the solution emerged, that one and the same ultimate subject subsists in two complete principles of operation. The Fathers of Chalcedon could justifiably gather this from the Cyrillian formula: one and the same is perfect in the divinity and perfect in the humanity. If that which was divine could be characterized as 'nature', so too could that which was entirely human. By refusing to the human being of Jesus the characterization 'nature', Severus closed himself off from the recognition that the humanity of Christ had to have original knowledge, willing in spontaneity and freedom, ultimately consciousness. It is just this that Leo I could express better with his 'each of the two natures or forms is active', even if he did not succeed in making evident the unity of the bearer with the same clarity.

We see that here it was a question of the whole picture of Christ, which beyond the concepts and formulas enabled one to see the inner vivacity of him, who according to the faith of the Church is both perfect God as well as a perfect human being. Concepts and formulas could here open the wider perspective, but also block it.

## II THE SEVERAN PICTURE OF CHRIST AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO CHALCEDON

In Severus was concentrated the end of a long development which had already shown itself embryonically at the beginning of the fourth century in Alexandria. It unfolded one-sidedly and heretically in Apollinarianism, and experienced in Cyril of Alexandria an essential restraint, without being freed, however, from all one-sidedness. This will now be shown briefly in the christological, dogmatic synthesis of the Patriarch.

### 1. The fundamental orientation: a christology from above

According to Severus, the mystery of Christ can fundamentally only be approached starting from the God-Logos, in the sense of John 1,14. The descent of the Only-begotten of God into the world through the incarnation is so exclusively conceived from above that access to the person of



Christ from the 'earthly Jesus' is subject to grave suspicion from the very start. A christology 'from below', as we find it present towards the end of the fourth century as a reaction to Apollinarianism in the East, and which we demand today as a indispensable complement to the examination 'from above', is not considered at all. Even the constantly repeated confession of the reality of a human soul and spirituality of Christ does not change this. A more penetrating examination of the human psychic life of Christ and of all the changes in the humanity of Christ was under the suspicion of a probation doctrine and of an adoptionism, for which stand the names of Paul of Samosata and Nestorius, as well as Leo.

## 2. A christology aimed at 'unity'

Just as clearly as the interpretation of the person of Christ begins from above, so just as exclusively was it aimed at securing the unity; the distinction of God and human being was demarcated and circumscribed with extreme caution. In the eyes of Severus the 'duality' was the real danger for orthodoxy. This securing of unity was executed in a twofold way: first in the attunement of the entire theological statement by a fundamental formula, then in the particular view of the life-activity in the one Christ, as God and a human being.

### (a) *Mia physis: the fundamental formula with its variants*

Through the Patriarch Severus the *mia-physis* formula, which infiltrated Alexandrian theology from unknown Apollinarian sources and was to some extent adapted by Cyril, attained universal dominance in the Old-Oriental christology.<sup>370</sup> For Severus it maintained an absolute character. According to his opinion, without it the mystery of the incarnation could no longer be expressed adequately, insofar as it is possible at all.

370. It is undoubtedly with reference to this formula that the name 'Monophysites' was formed in the seventh century, analogous to the earlier 'Dyophysites', both being used as opprobrious names. Cf. E. Schwartz, PS, 171, n. 1: 'The characterization of the entire opposition against Chalcedon as "monophysite" is modern and is tolerable at the most in the history of the dogma, but not in the history of the facts, in which it is not a matter of a conceptual formula but of the historical realities.' Chalcedonian orthodoxy had still other names for the anti-Chalcedonians: 'Dioscorans', 'Severans', *διακρινόμενοι*, that is, those who separate. Frend, XIII, translates *diakrinomenoi* as 'hesitants', that is, 'those who "had reservations" about accepting its [Chalcedon's] definition'. Here it is best if we speak of the post-Chalcedonian supporters of the *mia-physis* formula or the *mia-physis* christology. On the formula see especially Lebon, *Chalcedon* I, 478-91.

Only through it were Chalcedon and Leo I overcome.<sup>371</sup> In distinction to Apollinarius, the confession of the human (spiritual) soul, and thus of the complete spiritual-corporeal reality of Christ, had a firm place with the opponents of the Fourth Council, as well as with its supporters. Complete consensus ruled in this regard. For this reason, despite the dependency on Apollinarian sources and their tendencies, one may apply the appellation of a Logos-sarx christology neither to Cyril nor to Severus, as long as by that only the confession of divinity and humanity in Christ is aimed at. Accordingly, where possible, we shall avoid the term 'monophysitism'.<sup>372</sup> The sarkic reality of Christ as such was just as clearly expressed by Severus as by the Chalcedonians. The Patriarch gave expression to this in rejecting Eutyches, Valentinus and Manes, and in his passionate, overly severe battle against Julian of Halicarnassus and the scholasticus Sergius, and as well in the interpretation of the individual mysteries of the life of Jesus, which had gladly been made the starting-point for their speculations by gnostics and docetists.

An emphatic formula like 'the one nature of the incarnate Word', however, created around itself so to say a climate of interpretation and expression, which it produced time and again in its employment, despite corrections effected subsequently. To be noted is the fact that Cyril did not correct the wording of the formula itself. Only additional explanations protect it from real heretical interpretations. How could one know that with some of the early defenders of this naked formula old conceptions did not resonate? Even in the fundamentally orthodox usage a one-sided basic formula could still have its significant consequences for the understanding of Christ as a whole. We shall seek to discover some illustrations of this in Severus himself.

371. Severus Ant., *C. imp. Gram., Or. III*, ch. 8: CSCO 94, 114-115: Severus challenges the Grammarian to show how Chalcedon and Leo's *Tomus I* could have squared with the following confession of Cyril: 'We confess that in unity: one Christ, one and the same Son, one incarnate nature of the Son . . . If they [Chalcedon and Leo] say nothing of this and do not confess the one incarnate nature — whoever does not say that feigns in vain to claim that he confesses one and the same as Lord and Son and Christ — how are you then not full of stupidity, not to say foolhardiness . . . ?'

372. The representatives of the Orthodox Old-Oriental Church defend themselves rightly against this designation. Still on that account this term is not superfluous, given that there is still a real monophysitism, either *de facto* or at least as an intellectual possibility.

(i) *The rejection of the denotation physis (nature) for the humanity of Christ*

Only the Logos obtains from Severus the denotation 'nature' in the full meaning of the word *physis*. It ought not be given to the humanity of Christ. On this point Severus proceeds beyond Cyril.

With a certain right the grammarian, John of Caesarea, had referred to the possibility of establishing the two-natures language in Cyril, at least by way of allusion

(1) He recalls the word of Cyril: '... if he [Christ] had not put on the *nature* of the poor', as Severus reports (*C. imp. Gram., Or. III, ch. 35*).

(2) Even more important to him was the formula in Cyril, 'Christ suffered according to the nature of humanity' (*τῇ φύσει τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος παθεῖν*). It had become a problem for the Patriarch of Alexandria, as *Ep. 46 ad Succensum* II, 4 (PG 77, 244-245) (after 433) shows<sup>373</sup> He was confronted with the question, if, to ward off theopaschism, one says Christ suffered only according to the flesh, then one makes the suffering of Christ irrational and involuntary. But if one says he suffered with a rational soul, and thus also voluntarily, then this means as much as if one said: *Christ suffered in the nature of the humanity*. If that is the case, then one must concede that after the union there are two natures in Christ. *Vis-à-vis* Succensus, Cyril dodges the issue by having recourse to 1 Pet 4,1: 'because Christ suffered in the flesh ...' and recommends this formula, although the other one too, which says that Christ suffered in the nature of the humanity, does not harm the Logos of the mystery, 'even if it were applied malevolently by some' (245B). For the human nature is nothing other than the flesh which is animated by a rational soul. It is thus 'overzealous' when some formulate: 'he suffered in the nature of the humanity as though it [this nature] wanted to separate from the divinity and to give to it a reality outside (the divinity), so that two were known and not a single one, who of course became flesh and a human being, the Logos from God the Father' (245BC).

Apparently the suspicion that Cyril ascribed suffering to the godhead as such, and thus supported 'theopaschism', also agitated Pope Sixtus (432-440) in Rome, because the Alexandrian defended himself against this in *Ep. 53* to Pope Sixtus. The letter is extant in only two fragments. In the first text Cyril says (according to Leontius of Jerusalem, PG 86, 1832A) 'I will never be guilty of thinking anything foreign to the truth or of having called the divine nature of the Logos passible' (PG 77, 285C). The second fragment, transmitted only incompletely (*ibid.*, 285C-288A), is rendered by Richard as: 'I regard the nature of God as impassible and immutable and inalterable, even if according to the human nature [certainly to be expanded] as passible, and Christ as one in both and out of both.'<sup>374</sup>

According to Severus Ant. (*C. imp. Gram., Or. III, ch. 19*: CSCO 94, pp. 219,32-220,30), he will acknowledge this formula with Cyril (*Christus natura humanitatis passus*), but only on condition that the unity in Christ is expressed in an absolutely certain way, 'one from two, and in one person and *hypostasis* and one nature, namely the incarnate nature of the Logos' Nevertheless it would be better to say: 'he himself [Christ] suffered in the flesh. For what is

373. Severus Ant., *C. imp. Gram., Or. III 2*, cli. 35: CSCO 102, p. 149,15-24 John Chrysostom too had been adduced by the Grammarian, because he had said the *nature* of the human being in the exaltation of Christ attained to the throne of God: *C. imp. Gram., Or. III 2*, ch. 36: CSCO 102, 166-167. Severus, however, interprets all these passages not with regard to the individual humanity of Christ, but with regard to the assumption of the human race as such.

374. Cf. Richard, 'Le pape saint Léon le Grand et les Scholia de incarnatione Unigeniti de saint Cyrille d'Alexandrie', in *Op. Min.* II, no. 53, 127f. In a florilegium of Ps. John Maron this fragment is found refurbished in a dyophysite sense: cf. Richard, *ibid.*, 127, with reference to F. Nau, *ROC 4* (1899) (188-226), 198 and 211.

the nature of humanity other than flesh animated by a rational soul?' (thus p. 221,26-35). Hence Severus only repeats and intensifies Cyril. In *C. imp. Gram.*, Or. III. 2, ch. 22: CSCO 102, p. 7,14-18, Severus regrets having admitted in addresses to Nephalius in an effusive figure of speech that the earlier teachers had spoken of 'two natures after the inexpressible union'. But he says that the wise Cyril finally forbade this to ward off the sickness of the Nestorian duality. On the 'two natures in the Fathers' see the *Or. II ad Nephali.*: CSCO 120, pp. 26,4-35,21. From the passages adduced there the Chalcedonians have, according to Severus, built the 'fortress of their authorities', which he, Severus, will raze (p. 35,22).

Thus Cyril of Alexandria certainly came close in some passages to John the Grammarian, even if the formal commitment to the expression 'two natures' is never found.<sup>375</sup> With all his awareness of these concessions Severus was cautious and no longer followed his master here. The disinclination to give the denotation *physis*, nature, to the humanity of Christ was motivated by the fear that the human being of Christ could be considered as equally eternal and equally original as the divine being. Christ, however, was not a human being 'originally', that is, by nature, but only *οικονομικῶς*, according to the plan of salvation and the free decision of God's will.

What does the *mia-physis* formula mean, then, if the conceptual word may be applied only to the Logos in his divinity? Cyril and Severus answer this question clearly. For the former let us recall *Ep.* 40 to Acacius of Melitene, where it reads: 'Understandably the *physis* of the Logos is a single one; we know indeed that it has become flesh and a human being.'<sup>376</sup> The human being of Christ, with body and soul, is thus characterized by the addition 'become flesh'. Severus also explicitly affirms this in the *apologia* to no. 51 of the *FlorCyr*.

By our saying 'become flesh' we signify the essence of the humanity [N.B. Severus explicitly names this the *ousia* and not the *physis*], admittedly not in a separate subsistence, but in unity with the Logos, so that no one can imagine speaking on this basis of two natures after the union.<sup>377</sup>

According to Severus the 'Fathers' had already given this interpretation, by which he means nothing other than the pseudonyms of the Apollinarian forgers.

375. See above n. 25 with reference to Cyril Alex., *De recta fide ad reginas*. On this see Severus Ant., *C. imp. Gram.*, Or. III, ch. 9: CSCO 94, p. 127,18-19; Greek in PG 86, 1845B; M. Simonetti, *art. cit.*, 500, n. 26. Accordingly Lebon would have needed to formulate his comments for Cyril in *Chalcedon* I, 482, n. 74 more cautiously, where he says: 'La *physis* du Christ est aussi toujours sa divinité.' Cf., however, 499, n. 124. According to Severus one can speak of two natures in Christ only intellectually, or in the mental image of the spirit, in thought, but never as realities. Cf. J. Lebon, *Chalcedon* I, 499-509.

376. Cyril Alex., *Ep.* 40 ad Acac. *Meht*: PG 77, 193B. This letter, even if not the passage above, is cited in Severus Ant., *Ep.* ad Eleusim.: PO 12, 204.

377. Severus Ant., *Phisal.*, ch. 51: CSCO 134, p. 221,14-18.

Because they in fact have said 'incarnate', they have indicated that the flesh did not cease to be flesh and that it is not constituted in isolation, separate from the union with the Logos. For this reason the nature (*physis*) of the Logos is rightfully described as unique.<sup>378</sup>

If with Cyril, Timothy Aelurus and Severus the *mia-physis* formula is explained in this sense, then it would be unfair immediately to deduce from it 'monophysitism', as a confession of a mixed nature, as the Chalcedonians, with few exceptions, were accustomed to do. For the reality (*pragma*), of which the one is first expressed, is this one *physis* of the eternal Logos, which also remains the one immutable, even when, according to the plan and decision of the *oikonomia* of God, the human reality as historical-earthly mode of existence appeared. If the *mia-physis* is explained in this way, then there is expressed in it not an ontological, but a factual, historical view. The divine Logos in his pre-existent nature is considered according to the schema of the 'two ages', which the Nicenes set up against the Arians, in order to attribute the statements about Christ's lowliness in the gospels not to the eternal Logos as such, but only to the condition of the incarnation. Admittedly this schema of the 'two ages' is only valid if the Logos, whose eternal existence is expressed in one and incarnation in the other, is strictly one and the same. It would be precisely the determination of this ontological unity in the historical schema that would matter. Cyril, however, believed that with the reference to the sequence of the two conditions he had eliminated every doubt with regard to the reality of the human existence of the Logos.<sup>379</sup> Severus follows him in this.<sup>380</sup> However, how is the unity of both understood?

If one thinks namely of the real intention that Apollinarius and his students pursued with this formula, the explanations of both Patriarchs appear as *benigna interpretatio*. For Apollinarius wanted to construct a unity of nature between Logos and body without soul in Christ, this according to the body-soul comparison applied univocally to the

378. *Idem*, *Philal.*, on the two-natures formula: CSCO 134, p. 113, 16–20. Similarly in *C imp Gram. Or.* III, ch. 36: CSCO 102, p. 166, 20–22: 'If we were to pass over this term [incarnate] in silence, your abuse [that is, the rebuke that we would be teaching a diminution of the humanity of Christ] would be in order; but because it has necessarily been added, where is there then a kind of diminution or subtraction?' Severus knows about the letters of Isidore of Pelusium, who had created such difficulties for the *mia-physis* formula. Cf. *ibid.*, ch. 39: CSCO 102, p. 183; Richard, CCG 1, nos. 111, 115, 116. The monk Eustathius, *Ep. de duabus naturis*: PG 86, 917B, claims that Severus took over the use of *physis* for the pre-existent divinity of Christ from Timothy Aelurus (*Aeluri vestigis insectus*).

379. Cf. Lebon, *Chalcedon* I, 481f.

380. On the passages named in n. 378 see the *Philalethes*: CSCO 134, p. 133, 10–11: 'Car il suffit, pour signifier parfaitement le fait qu'il est devenu homme, de dire qu'il s'est incarné'

Incarnate One. The whole was in his opinion a 'synthesis of the type that occurs in human beings'. From a soteriological interest he had made the Logos the physical soul of the *sarx*, in order to establish on this basis the impeccability of the Saviour, but also to explain by means of it the miraculous healings of Christ, as well as finally the efficacy of the sacraments. Integrity, consistency and vividness of the picture of Christ were assured in equal strength. The reality of the Logos was to be seen physically in the life and work of the *sarx* of Christ. Even the word *mia* received its force of expression from this consistency.

Without regard for the emotive value of such a picture of Christ, the Fathers of Constantinople in 381 undid this Apollinarian structure and confessed the total reality of the humanity of Christ. Not considering the Apollinarian groups, this became the confession of all christological parties, the Alexandrian as well as the Antiochene. The old tradition (Tertullian and Origen) was confirmed anew. Everything was ready for the development between 381 and 451 to result in the confession of one *hypostasis* in two natures of Christ. If the forgeries of the Apollinarians had not been successful, the Chalcedonian solution would certainly have determined more and more the East's picture of Christ. The *mia-physis* christology, however, continued to exist in concurrence with the Chalcedonian theology of two natures. What connected both was the confession of the entire humanity of Christ.<sup>381</sup> But one can recognize clearly in Severus, with Cyril in the background, what a restricted formula signified for the idea of Christ, even if the confession to the one Christ, perfect in divinity, perfect also in humanity, was common ground. The *mia physis* became the exclusive leitmotiv of his preaching and reflection.

In his endeavour to pursue it up to the rescinding of Chalcedon, a twofold tendency revealed itself in his understanding of Christ. (1) As much as Severus interpreted his major formula only on the basis of the 'two ages', there was still in its wording the constant compulsion to think of the unity of divinity and humanity in Christ according to a type of nature unity. The body-soul comparison works in the same direction: both elements unite to form a new nature, so to say a *tertium quid*. The word *mia* in the mouth of Severus is certainly more than the sequential succession: the one Logos — incarnate. The *mia physis* remained not just the starting-point, but became the result of the

381. See above nn. 226-30.

union.<sup>382</sup> The 'one *physis*' was the united divinity and humanity. We saw that Sergius Scholasticus drew the consequences from such notions, as Julian of Halicarnassus did too in his way. The *proton pseudos* of the Apollinarian nature synthesis demanded also the inclination to accept a natural symbiosis between divinity and humanity in Christ. We shall be able to substantiate this assumption immediately. But before that we still have to discuss another of Severus' efforts. (2) He notes naturally that there was not a natural *tertium quid* in Christ. The confession of the complete human nature of Christ no longer allowed the ontologically understood nature unity of Apollinarius. Hence he devised a new formula which signified a correction, even if he did not want to concede this: 'the one *composite* and incarnate nature'.<sup>383</sup> The word *synthesis* is chosen by Severus on the basis of the knowledge that in the 'Emmanuel' or 'Christ' it is not a matter of a simple nature (*natura simplex*), as this is present in the divine Logos. *Synthesis* is intended to bring into view the distinction in the unity. Nevertheless here once again a correction must be included immediately, because the Apollinarians used this concept to denote Christ as a 'nature unity' or as a 'human-being-type synthesis', that is, as a whole in which the Logos fills the physical function of the animating principle *vis-à-vis* the *sarx*. In a similar way Sergius the Grammarian wanted to consider the divinity and humanity in Christ as part essences, which through *synthesis* would form a new *ousia*.<sup>384</sup> In

382. On this problem see V. C. Samuel, 'The Christology of Severus of Antioch', *Abba Salama* 4 (1973) (126-90), 158-62, 161: 'The phrase "one nature", then, is not to be used with reference to Christ without the word "incarnate". Therefore, the "one" in the phrase is not a simple one, or the "one single", as John Meyendorff renders it [J. M. Meyendorff, *Christ in Eastern Thought*, 17]; it is the one which includes the fulness of Godhead and manhood. Jesus Christ is not "single-natured", but He is one "composite" nature.' Samuel refers to *C. imp. Gram., Or. I*, ch. 7. CSCO 94, p. 92,14-20: 'When the only-begotten Logos of God is compared with himself according to the temporal distinction, he is divested and at the same time not divested; he is basically one and the same person and *hypostasis*, first indeed simple and incorporeal, but then composite and incarnate; one could thus be of the opinion that a distinction between two is made, as can be demonstrated clearly from the words of Cyril.'

383. On these designations of the 'one composite and incarnate nature', see Lebon, *Chalcedon I*, 483-91. A *synthesis* comes to expression in the following formulas: (a) '*physis* of the incarnate Word'; (b) '*physis* of Christ'; (c) '*physis* of the Emmanuel', and above all in (d) '*mia physis synthetos*' and in *σύνθετος πρὸς τὴν σάρκα*. J. S. Assemani (2,25ff.) and J. A. Dorner (2,165) consider the expression *μία φύσις διττῇ-διπλῇ* as equivalent to these. But this expression is first found in the later anti-Chalcedonian authors. For Severus it would still be unacceptable, because in Christ every duality must be excluded. At best it is *in theoria* that there can be talk of this. Cf. *Ep. II ad Sergium*: CSCO 120, p. 88,3-4.

384. Cf. above on Sergius Gram., pp. 116-20. On this point see Severus Ant., *C. imp. Gram., Or. II*, ch. 17: CSCO 112, p. 115,24-27: 'It was thus not the union of essences (*οὐσιῶν*) that occurred, but [the union] of the one *hypostasis* of the God-Logos with a singular flesh, which is endowed with soul and spirit and stems from the Virgin and *theotokos*.' Cf. p. 116,4-7, where

spite of such misuse Severus wanted to hold on to this conceptual word, although with it he actually conceded that in a certain regard a duality in Christ would have to be acknowledged. He believed that he could save himself by once again calling upon his 'from two' from which just *one* has become, in which two abstract essences (*ousiai*), but not two concrete natures (*physeis*), can be distinguished only through a 'most subtle operation of the intellect' (*subtilissima pro posse intelligentia*).<sup>385</sup> For concretely the result of this *synthesis* is just this, 'that from both one nature and *hypostasis* is formed and subsists (as such)' (*loc. cit.*). Hence this *synthesis* means nothing other than what the favourite word of Cyril and Severus, *henosis*, says.<sup>386</sup> Of course Severus in no way saw through the speculative difficulties of the *mia physis synthetos* of his, so that here the Chalcedonian theologians, in particular Maximus Confessor, could begin to defend the necessity of the Chalcedonian distinction of the two natures. We shall follow this discussion as it develops.<sup>387</sup>

## (ii) *Subsidiary formulas*

The principal formula was accompanied by several variants which also stemmed from Cyrillian tradition.

'From two natures (*hypostases*).'<sup>388</sup> The Patriarch of Antioch gladly recalls the refusal of the Fathers of Chalcedon to approve the 'from two natures' of the first draft of the formula of faith. In its place was put, he says, the 'in two natures', the *tessera* of Nestorianism.<sup>388</sup> The *ek dyo* represented for him the simplest way to avoid the detested duality in Christ and still retain the possibility of distinguishing divinity and humanity in the *theoria*.

the peculiarity of this *synthesis*, as a uniting of the concrete nature of the God-Logos with a particular flesh, is once again emphasized.

385. Honestly admitting to being anxious, in *C. imp. Gram.*, Or. III, ch. 16: CSCO 94, p. 195,7-17, Severus attempts to describe the *synthesis* in such a way that the Chalcedonians would not be given the slightest chance to deduce a duality from it. He will not accept the suggestion of John the Grammarian, which is that Christ is to be characterized as 'two united natures' (*duae naturae unitae*) (*op. cit.*, ch. 8: CSCO 94, p. 110,11-13). Only *unum ex duobus*, never an explicit expression of abiding 'duality', is acceptable to him.

386. Cf. Severus Ant., *C. imp. Gram.*, Or. II, ch. 17: CSCO 112, pp. 115,17-116,24, especially p. 115,23-24; *ibid.*, p. 116,4-7; *idem*, *Philal.*, no. 112, Frag. A: CSCO 134, p. 268: (There is a *unio hypostatica* in Christ, because he is constituted) 'à partir de deux . . . en une unique personne et en unique nature et hypostase du Verbe incarnée. Car c'est cela l'union hypostatique.'

387. See the subtle explanations of J.-M. Garrigues, 'La personne composée du Christ d'après saint Maxime le Confesseur', *RevThom* 74 (1974), 181-204, especially II/1, 189-96: La critique de la 'nature composée' sévérienne.

388. See Lebon, *Chalcedon* I, 510-34.



'From two things (realities), ἐκ δύο πραγμάτων.' This formula sounds very thingish. In this way the reality of divinity and humanity is intended to be expressed in the face of any weakening; but equally too only the intellectual distinction of both.<sup>389</sup>

'From two natures one nature (or one incarnate hypostasis).'

<sup>390</sup> This formula can be understood as a variant of the schema of the 'two ages'.

'From two (ἐκ δύο).' This is the final simplification to which Severus gladly resorts to give expression to his aversion to any duality.

Everything really depends on the formula 'from two'; from them both the hypostatic union is effected as well as (the fact) that there is only one incarnate nature of the Logos, and also this, that one ought understand those two (realities) from which the union happens, as distinct and of a different kind only in thought, and that one ought no longer speak of two after thinking of the one.<sup>391</sup>

'From two' thus becomes the shibboleth of anti-Chalcedonian christology, and its rejection was for Severus the *proton pseudos* of Chalcedon. For in this way it renounced the possibility of hindering the division of Christ into two.<sup>392</sup> Because the 'from two' moves towards the 'one nature', it comes to be on a par with the *mia-physis* formula in general.<sup>393</sup>

There is no need to provide any further proof that the stressing or securing of the unity in Christ was the hub of Severan dogmatics. Every controversy about a grasping of the difference or duality in the person of Christ he replied to with an examination of the entire linguistic area of traditional incarnation teaching to see whether the act of uniting or the unity itself was sufficiently expressed, or whether gaps were allowed through which the division would infiltrate. If, with this concentration

389. Cf. Cyril Alex., *Apol. c. Theodoret.*: ACO I. 1, 6, p. 162,1-2; PG 75, 245AB, cited in *JdChr* 1<sup>3</sup>, 683, n. 29.

390. Cf. Severus Ant., *Philal.*: CSCO 134, 105-130 (introduction), where first of all the two-natures formula is criticized. The refutation begins on 130ff., where the variants are then offered. Cf. *C. imp. Gram.*, Or. II, ch. 6: CSCO 112, 66-69; *C. imp. Gram.*, Or. III, ch. 9: CSCO 94, 115-134.

391. Severus Ant., *C. imp. Gram.*, Or. III, ch. 10: CSCO 94, p. 141,20-25.

392. *Ibid.*, p. 157,11-18: the formula 'one Christ from two' by itself hinders any cutting up. If one rejects it, then there follows the duality of the Sons and the Christs. The Patriarch's reproach of Chalcedon revolves around the exclusion of the 'from two' in favour of the 'in two' Cf. *ibid.*, ch. 18, p. 214,23-33; p. 218,5-11, where Severus says that the *ex duabus naturis* is *destructivum ... dualitatis*.

393. Severus Ant., *C. imp. Gram.*, Or. III, ch. 12: CSCO 94, p. 158,29-34: '... this "from two" is proper to the hypostatic union; the end (*terminus*), however, of this union is the one incarnate nature of the God-Logos'. Similarly in *Philal.*, ch. 62: CSCO 134, p. 231,27-30, Severus relentlessly combines two expressions: a single Christ from two natures and the confession of the one incarnate nature of the God-Logos.

on unity, the Patriarch gave to the picture of Christ its centre and filled it with such illuminating power that the faith was immediately appealed to, he still did not offer any new help to theological understanding that went beyond Cyril. To clarify the crucial point, in what regard Christ is one and in what regard two, he contributed nothing new. Only faintly illuminating is the knowledge that the being one of a nature, of a *physis*, with its bearer, the subject, is something other than a *unio in natura et secundum naturam*. The body-soul paradigm, which was acknowledged by him as the most expressive analogy, broke down precisely in this respect: the coming together of soul and body as two incomplete nature parts to form one nature meant as well the coming into existence of a new abstract essence (*ousia*). Although Severus commented that the error of Sergius the Grammarian lay in the fact that he saw as present in Christ not only *one* concrete *physis*, but also *one* abstract new *ousia*, he did not arrive at the idea of investigating his speculative start for christology. His foundation for the unity of divinity and humanity in Christ remained trapped every time in the region of the relationship of nature to nature. This will show itself in our next stage of presenting his dogmatics.

#### (b) *The mia energieia*

Jesus Christ is for Severus not a mere ontic, static unity from two natures, but a constant *symbiosis* of divinity and humanity, in which priority is granted to the divine principle. The altercation with Julian of Halicarnassus showed that he saw the *henosis* in Christ established in two ways: (1) in an exchange of properties and (2) in the unity of the *energeia*, that is, of the dependence of the human activity in Christ on the divinity in the whole area of willing and knowing. When he saw that Julian transgressed the right limits with his *aphtharsia* teaching, he attempted to push the idea of the divinization of the humanity of Christ into the background, and for this purpose to found the *henosis* in the first place on the basis of the one activity, the *mia energieia*. In this the peculiarity of the Severan picture of Christ becomes clear in an utterly special way, and indeed as a counterpoint to Leo I's *agit enim utraque forma*.

If he [Leo] in spirit were to hold and confess the hypostatic union, he could not say that each of the two natures keeps its propriety (*proprietatem*) without detracting, but he would say, like Cyril, that the Logos now and then permitted the flesh to suffer what is proper to it and to operate according to the laws of its nature. Thus the Logos would bear that as its own which is of the flesh, and still not relinquish what he has according to his essence (*ousia*), also not the superiority to suffering and his highest nobility.<sup>394</sup>

394. Severus Ant., *C. imp. Gram., Or. III*, ch. 29: CSCO 102, p. 79,18–25.

Hypostatic union signifies for Severus first and foremost a clear Logos-hegemony in Christ. The subordinate part is the *sarx* of Christ: 'It is evident that it has not retained its propriety without diminution' (*evidens est eam [carnem] non tenuisse sine defectu suam proprietatem*). At the same time this diminution of what is proper to it is an enrichment through the divinity. Severus refers to the transfiguration or the miraculous pouring forth 'of the source of life, of the blood and water of forgiveness after the piercing of the divine side' of Jesus (CSCO 102, p. 79,4-9). The origin of such an understanding of the functions of the inner God-human life of Jesus was as old as the Apollinarians' teaching of the *one energeia*, of the one *operatio* in Christ, which could have its seat and its source only in the *dynamis* of the Logos.<sup>395</sup>

How Severus understands the life activity in Christ is stated by him quite clearly in Homily 109, cited above: as long as the person of Jesus Christ itself is considered, no duality ought to be expressed. There is a 'two' only in the effect of Christ's activity, never in himself, be it in relation to the natures, the powers of knowing and willing, and whatever else is within Christ. Against the attacks of Theodoret on his anathemas, Cyril had conceded that there is to be observed in Christ a certain doubling (*duplicitas*), namely in regard to the words (*voces*) and the activities (*actiones*). For if Christ is also one and the same, he still shows different ways of producing words and deeds: some are effected in a divine way, the others in a human way. Despite this distinction of his master, Severus stresses that it is indeed only one and the same speaking and acting, and then formulates incisively: 'There is only one single activity (*energeia*), only one single operative motion (*motus operativus*), as there is also only one single speaking of the incarnate Logos, be it that the actions and the words have been different.'<sup>396</sup>

There emerges from these words a conception of the God-human action and speech of Christ, in which everything is deduced from the divine Logos as nature principle. Every activity flows from above, even if the human principle of activity is engaged. How Severus understands the inner functioning of the one *energeia* of Christ he makes clear *vis-à-vis* the 'godless Grammarian' regarding the healing of the leper:

While the incarnate God spoke with human tongue and said with human and clear voice to the leper: 'I will, be clean' (Mt 8,3), he showed through the effect that the voice, in

395. Cf. on this *JdChr* I<sup>3</sup>, 489; *CCT* I<sup>2</sup>, 335-6.

396. Cf. Severus Ant., *C. imp. Gram.*, Or. III, ch. 38: CSCO 102, p. 175,6-7. Leo's Tome figures as the counter-image to this (*ibid.*, pp. 175-6).

keeping with the mixing (*mixtio*) worthy of God, has gone forth from the incarnate God; for the healing of the leper went together with the heard word.<sup>397</sup>

The miracle-working of Christ thus provides the model for how the 'one *energeia*' is to be understood. The activity starts from the divinity as the real source; it mixes itself with the human voice (or as well with the touch of Jesus' hand) and produces the miraculous effect in the sick person. The human voice is only the vehicle of the divine flow of will; for without a doubt Severus ascribes the 'I will' to the volition of the divinity. The human will of Christ clearly does not need to be active. Severus takes up the explanation of the miracle from Cyril, who, along the lines of a statement from Gregory of Nyssa in his Catechetical Oration,<sup>398</sup> already excluded the 'caricature' which Leo of Rome<sup>399</sup> in his Tome is said to have given of the activity of Jesus.

When he cleansed the leper, he did not offer (only) a speech and also did not say: 'My Father may will and you will be healed.' Rather he combined the healing with his own movement of will (*nutus*), as he who had in himself the paternal authority and the glory of the majesty of the Father. After he had expressed his decision (*nutus*) from his good will, he added the touch with his hand and granted it results. Thus we should learn that the holy workplace of the purification [of the leper] is also his holy body and is gathered with divine willing with best results for our sanctification.<sup>400</sup>

To clarify the notion of the process of healing, it is to be noted that Cyril (and with him Severus) attributes everything explicitly to the divine willing (*βούλησις*, act of will) of the Logos. There is no talk of Christ's human act of will. The touch with the hand is only the instrument through which the power of the divinity, which is bestowed on the holy body, acts on the sick person. This single *energeia* as activity, which is effective in this miracle, is now explained by Severus according to the body-soul analogy. He explains this most clearly in his first letter to the grammarian, Sergius, which we want to examine in more

397. *Ibid.*, ch. 32: CSCO 102, p. 94,27-32.

398. Severus Ant., *C. imp. Gram.*, Or. III, ch. 32: CSCO 102, p. 94,27-33, with reference to a text of Gregory of Nyssa (PG 45, 80), which the Grammarian wanted to utilize in order to deduce from it the two-natures teaching, along the lines of Leo's *agit enim utraque forma*. Against this Severus writes: 'The teacher did not say that the human nature spoke, the divine nature, however, acted, but that with the divine was mixed the voice that was produced in a human way.'

399. Severus cites three passages from Leo's Tome (p. 95,15-25).

400. Cyril Alex., *Comm. in Mt* (CPG 5206), a text which Lebon could not verify, but which is to be found in an abbreviated form in E. Schwartz, *Codex Vat. gr. 1431* (Munich, 1927), p. 42,3-7: CSCO 102, p. 96,21-29.

detail. Following Ps. Basil, *Contra Eunomium* IV,<sup>401</sup> he distinguishes in the human activity the agent (*ἐνεργήσας*), the action (*ἐνέργεια*) which in itself has no reality (is not *ἐνυπόστατος*), and the effect (*ἐνεργηθέν*).<sup>402</sup> Although in the human being, which is composed of body and soul, the genuinely human body-soul activity in effect produces two different types of work, intellectual and sensible-corporeal, there is nevertheless only one process of activity (*motus operativus, id est impetus ipsius voluntatis unus*),<sup>403</sup> because the human being itself is a nature unity. It is always, for example, Peter (cf. Mt 14,28f.) who posits and executes the act of the will, although the walking on the water is a matter for the body. This co-ordination of a nature unity from spirit and body the Patriarch sees to be present also in the Emmanuel.

One can see the same in the case of Emmanuel. For there is one who acts (*ἐνεργήσας*), that is the Word of God incarnate; and there is one active movement which is activity (*ἐνέργεια*), but the things which are done (*ἐνεργηθέντα*) are diverse, that is, (the things) accomplished by activity . . . And it is not the case that, because these things which were done were of different kinds, we say that conceptually there were two natures which were effecting those things, for as we have said, a single God the Word incarnate performed both of them.<sup>404</sup>

Hence the Logos is always conceived by Severus as *agens*, as *ἐνεργήσας*, always involved in the works mentioned. He is not only the final, bearing subject, to which according to the law of the communication of *idiomata* even purely human acts are ascribed, while the ability (*facultas*), which releases them from itself, would be the human nature. According to Severus, in every activity of the Emmanuel, that is, the incarnate Logos, the divinity participates as *facultas*, as nature principle, and not only as final, bearing subject. To prove this thesis the Patriarch goes through the various *opera mixta* which Christ effected as God-human actor,<sup>405</sup> and then concludes:

therefore that action is of the incarnate Word, to whom belongs at the same time divine character and humanity indivisibly.<sup>406</sup>

401. On the disputed authorship of this book see CPG 2837; *JdChr* I<sup>3</sup>, 529–35 with n. 2; *CCT* I<sup>2</sup>, 361–7. We refer to Severus Ant., *Ep. I ad Sergium*: CSCO 120, 53–70; R. Chesnut, *Three Monophysite Christologies*, 30–4.

402. Cf. Ps. Basil, *C. Eunom.* IV. 1: PG 29, 689C.

403. Severus Ant., *Ep. I ad Sergium*: CSCO 120, p. 60,29–33: 'And the man who acts (in both cases) is one, consisting of soul and body, and the activity is one, for the active movement is one, which is the impetus of volition, but the things which are done (*opera*) are diverse, for one is intellectual but the other is sensible and bodily.'

404. Severus Ant., *Ep. I ad Sergium*: CSCO 120, pp. 60,33–61,9.

405. *Ibid.*, 61–62.

406. *Ibid.*, p. 62,5–7.

Against this are contrasted the two activities of Leo, who in the eyes of Severus accepted with the two acting nature principles also two bearing subjects, that is, two persons.<sup>407</sup> The hypostatic union demands for the entire work of Christ that the Logos participate in the activity of Christ not only as the possessor or bearer of the human nature, but also as divine nature principle, even if in varying degree. In Christ every impulse to act comes from the Logos-power, as in every activity of the human being the soul is always involved. The model of interpretation of the soul-body action of the human being holds true in the strict sense, and not only analogically, for the Emmanuel.<sup>408</sup> Ps. Julius, who is cited explicitly against Sergius, is here the godfather.<sup>409</sup> The *mia physis* is here indeed the immediate consequence of the vital Logos-sarx unity, which is Christ. But how does Severus picture the same formula in conjunction with his clear confession of the soul of Christ? How is the intellectual spontaneity of the intellectuality of Christ incorporated into his interpretation of the activity of the Incarnate One? The Patriarch indeed stresses that the Logos uses his body not as a lifeless, inanimate instrument.<sup>410</sup>

In fact Severus finds it difficult to recognize and appreciate the genuine activity of the human willing of Christ<sup>411</sup> and to reconcile it with the *mia-physis* formula. In order to show his conception completely we must present a long text which Severus wrote against John the Grammarian. 'He [John] had heard that the teacher [= Ps. Athanasius] speaks of two wills,<sup>412</sup> of one (will) of fear, the human, which has its cause from the flesh, and the other, divine, prepared to suffer.'<sup>413</sup> The foolish

407. *Ibid.*, p. 62,13-21.

408. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 63,12-28.

409. *Ibid.*, p. 64,9-11 = Ps. Julius, *De fide et incarn.* 6: Lietzmann, p. 199,16-17. The summary of Severus, *loc. cit.*, p. 64,11-19.

410. *Ibid.*, p. 62,18-21. He says that only if Leo I with his *agit enim utraque forma* was right would the humanity of Christ be moved by a foreign force lying outside of it.

411. R. Chesnut, *Three Monophysite Christologies*, 34, cites the following sentence from *Ep. I ad Sergium*: CSCO 120, p. 62,22-29 for such an explicit consideration of the soul of Christ: *Apparet enim propria virtute usus tamquam Deus inhumanatus, et per voces Deo dignas hoc confirmat* . . . , and translates: 'It appears that he used the strength of his soul as God incarnate.' The *propria virtute*, which Severus means, is not, however, the human soul of Christ, but the power of the Logos. For only if this is the case is his proof against Leo's interpretation of the stilling of the storm at sea conclusive, which is allowed to be worked by the human voice as Severus assumes. Chesnut, however, refers on pp. 25-9 to the two major passages which speak of the relationship between the divine and human 'wills' in Christ: Hom. 83: PO 20, 415-417 and C. *imp. Gram.*, Or. III, ch. 33: CSCO 102, 132-133.

412. See PG 26, 1021,25-32. It is not, however, a writing of Athanasius, but Marcellus of Ancyra, *De incarnatione et c. Arianos* (CPG 2806). Cf. M. Tetz, 'Zur Theologie des Markell von Ankyra', ZKG 75 (1964), 217-70; *JdChr* I<sup>3</sup>, 426-9; CCT I<sup>2</sup>, 284-7.

413. Severus Ant., C. *imp. Gram.*, Or. III, 2, ch. 33: CSCO 102, p. 132,27-30.

Grammarian is said to believe on account of this that the Emmanuel is divided into two. What then?

### *The body-soul analogy and the willing of Christ*

(*C. imp. Gram., Or. III. 2, ch. 33: CSCO 102, pp. 132,31-133,7*): Do we not see in the human being, as we are, who is one nature and *hypostasis* from body and soul, how he can now spontaneously demand nourishment . . . , but then also can reflect on that and despise the material food, and in its place surrender himself to heavenly thoughts in desiring likeness to God? Thus there are two wills in the human being; one wills what is of the flesh, the other what is of the soul which is created according to the image of God. Should we for this reason divide the human being and consider it as two natures and *hypostases*? By doing this we would make fools of ourselves.

### *Application to Christ*

(CSCO 102, p. 133,7-21): Even less is Christ divided into two natures. He is indeed one from two, from divinity and humanity, one person and *hypostasis*, the one nature of the Logos, become flesh and perfect human being. For this reason he also displays two wills in salvific suffering, the one which requests, the other which is prepared, the one human, the other divine. As he voluntarily took upon himself death in the flesh, which was able to take over suffering and dissolved the domination of death by killing it through immortality — which the resurrection had shown clearly to all — so in the flesh, whose fruit he could take over — it was indeed rationally animated — he voluntarily took upon himself the *passio* of fear and weakness and uttered words of request, in order through the divine courage to destroy the power of that fear and to give courage to the whole of humanity, for he became after the first Adam the second beginning of our race.

[In the text further on we then learn that 'the two wills ought not to be assigned to two natures', this once again starting from the text of Ps. Athanasius or Marcellus of Ancyra]:

(CSCO 102, pp. 133,34-134,21): The teacher of divine dogmas has characterized very well the request (of Christ) to avert suffering as 'will'; in this way he shows that it occurs *for us* against the inclination and will to have fear and trembling in the face of danger, but Christ took this over voluntarily. Thus there was really a will (as intention) present, no involuntary suffering. He [Ps. Athanasius] immediately showed that he acknowledges the one Christ from two and does not divide up into two wills what belongs to one and the same, namely the incarnate God, by adding this after the passage cited: [Athanasius] 'He suffers from weakness, but he lives from the power of God' (2 Cor 13,4). The power of God is, however, the Son who suffered from weakness, that is from union with the flesh (*συνπλοκή*), as a human being he prayed to be freed from suffering; he lives, however, through his [the Son's] power (PG 26, 1024).

The Word of God was thus united to the flesh, which was endowed with a rational soul and was not divided after the union through the doubling of the natures. For that word 'union' (*συνπλοκή*) . . . denotes *one* being existing from two in unmingledness, a formula which expresses essential union, but is rejected by the Council of Chalcedon. Thus one and the same prayed as a human being to avoid suffering . . . and as God said: the spirit is willing, and voluntarily proceeded to suffer. Hence let us apportion neither the wills nor the words (*voces*) to two natures and forms.

What Severus wants to see excluded is the view of Leo I of an *actio* or *operatio* proper to both forms and natures, each with its own spontaneity and freedom. There is certainly a human soul in Christ with

knowledge and will, but there is only one *agens* and for this reason also only one *actio* and *operatio*, which proceeds from the spontaneity and freedom of the one *agens*, namely the Logos. This singularity lies established in the hypostatic union, through which the rational animated *sarx* is subjected to the Logos as *organon*.<sup>414</sup> Severus explicitly reduces the explanation of the whole *energeia* to this Athanasian concept.

(CSCO 102, p. 135,2–10): The incarnate Word has done and said this, for it is united hypostatically to the body and through adhering together (*συνφύτα*) it had this as an organ,<sup>415</sup> for the deeds, as the soul too, which is peculiar to each one of us, has chosen its own body as organ; the Logos does not act through an extrinsically (united) God-bearing human being, as the ravings of Nestorius would have, nor in the way in which an artisan uses a tool and thus completes the work and (not) like the way a cithara player strikes the cithara.

From these remarks one must certainly conclude that Severus cannot regard in the activity of the 'incarnate Logos' his human will as the spontaneous or even autonomous source of acts. All intellectual *energeia* starts from the Logos principle, even if the intellectual abilities in this process were to be regarded as co-moved or really are so. That this is the Patriarch's understanding of the will as ability and willing as action is certainly shown with particular clarity from Homily 83, where he interprets Is 7,15: 'He [the Emmanuel] will eat butter and honey until the time in which he understands how to reject evil and to choose good.' For Severus it is the problem of the freedom, of the free decision, in the incarnate Logos that is spoken about here. What is the principle performing the free choice? On the basis of the verse from Isaiah the explanation is easy for him.<sup>416</sup>

With respect to him [the new Adam] the prophet Isaiah says: 'Before he knows or chooses evil, he will choose good' (7,15). For before the child recognizes good or evil, he spurns evil in order to choose good. None of us, who is tested as a child, already has knowledge of good and evil. Only with the advance of time, it [the child] begins to distinguish them. But because the Emmanuel is by nature also God and goodness itself, although he has become a child according to the *oikonomia*, he did not await the time of the distinction; on the contrary. From the time of swaddling clothes, before he came to an age of distinguishing between good and evil, on the one side he spurned evil and did not listen to it, and on the other he chose good. These words 'he spurned' and 'he did not listen' and the other 'he chose' show us that the Logos of God has united himself not only to the flesh, but also

414. Cf. Severus Ant., *C. imp. Gram.*, Or. III, ch. 33: CSCO 102, p. 136,17–20; *Ep. I ad Sergium*: CSCO 120, p. 62,8–21.

415. The teaching of the *organon* is found particularly in Athan. Alex., *Or. III c. Arian*. (CPG 2093): PG 26, 376. Athanasius wants to accept the reality of the divine and human activities in Christ, but stresses: *Proprium enim utriusque agnoscentes et utrumque ab uno peragi considerantes atque intelligentes, recte credimus, nec umquam errabimus* (cited in Severus: CSCO 102, p. 135,20–22).

416. Severus Ant., *Hom. 83*: PO 20, pp. 415,15–416,15.



to the soul, which is endowed with will and understanding, in order to allow *our* souls, which are inclined towards evil, to lean towards choosing good and turning away from evil. For God as God does not need to choose good; but because *for our sakes* he assumed flesh and a spiritual soul, he took over for *us* this redress (*redressement*).

This homily certainly shows more clearly than the controversy with the Grammarian that the principle of free decision for the human activities also of the Incarnate One is precisely this Logos in his divinity. For he already makes a choice, because the human spiritual organ is not yet capable of action or choice. Hence if the Patriarch transfers the freedom to decide and the actual decision to the Logos as such, then in the interpretation of the freedom and sinlessness of Christ he has not essentially passed beyond Apollinarius. There is no doubt that he explicitly accepts an intellectual soul in Christ. But he does not venture to make this soul the principle of choosing which functions by itself. In the view of Severus this would make the human being Jesus appear as a second person alongside the Logos. In Emmanuel the decision for good occurs through a self-movement of the human spiritual principle, but simply with the hypostatic union of the naturally good Logos with the spiritual soul. In the soul the choice for good has already been made with the *henosis*. *We* are the place of human decisions. For the union of our soul with the Logos in the incarnation is now the model for *us*, who must decide in the battle against evil only from case to case. This evasiveness by referring to *us* in the interpretation of the graced endowment of the human spirit of Jesus is typical of Severus. With the hypostatic union the humanity of Christ has everything which is necessary to fulfil the messianic task, as the interpretation of the descent of the Holy Spirit on Jesus at his baptism has already shown *us*. Everything which appears to flow as gifts in the human nature of Jesus does not need to stop there, in order to take its place there; it only flows through, because from the very start it is only present for our sake.<sup>417</sup> This interpretation of the endowment of Christ's spirit is the inheritance of the anti-Arian teachers of the fourth century. Their fear that the Logos of God may be made, for example at his baptism, into a receptive principle, and thus into a creature, is then combined in Cyril and Severus with the anti-Nestorian dread that the humanity of Christ might be made into an autonomously active principle of salvation, and thus into a *hypostasis* of its own alongside the Logos. In spite of the repeated emphasis of the reality of body and soul in Christ, its spiritual-bodily share in the realization of salvation remains undervalued. The hegemony

417. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 416, 15–417, 17.

of the Logos, which was essential for the system of Apollinarius, who explicitly denied a human soul in Christ, is also still so narrowly conceived by Cyril that no spontaneously original function in the divine-human action of Christ is added to the corporeal and spiritual powers of Christ's humanity. Severus is the drawer of the same picture of Christ in even stronger lines. Between Cyril and him, however, stands the mystical figure of Ps. Dionysius.

*The Ps. Dionysian vision*

It is surprising, especially in this context, to encounter the christologically most important citation from the mysterious author of the Ps. Dionysian writings. It is taken from the fourth letter to Gaius and introduced by Severus into a letter to the strategos John, which is transmitted only in fragments. There emerges in it a formula, which will take its great place in history only in the seventh century, but the essential content of which can be found already in Cyril. We shall present first the major Severan text and then place the formulations of Cyril beside those of Ps. Dionysius. It is clear that a coherent line of transmission is recognizable.

Severus Ant., *Ep. 3 ad Johannem ducem* (CPG 7071,31; DP, 309,XXIV): As we have already developed in full breadth in other writings, we understood and understand the statement of the utterly wise Dionysius the Areopagite, who says: 'Since God has become a human being, he performed among us a new divine-human activity', of the one composite (activity) (*μίαν ἐνοήσαμεν σύνθετον καὶ νοοῦμεν*); it cannot be interpreted other than as a rejection of every duality; and we confess the incarnate God, who operated in this new manner [this divine-human activity], as the one divine-human nature and *hypostasis* and also as the one incarnate nature of the God-Logos (*καὶ τὸν ἀνδρωθέντα θεὸν τὸν αὐτὴν καινοπρεπῶς πεπολιτευμένον μίαν ὁμολογοῦμεν φύσιν τε καὶ ὑπόστασιν θεανδρικήν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὴν μίαν φύσιν τοῦ θεοῦ λόγου σεσαρκωμένην*).

Here is found the magic word of the new divine-human activity (*καινὴ θεανδρική ἐνέργεια*), which Severus characterizes as 'one', even if 'composite', and considers as a logical interpretation of the *mia-physis* formula. It has been too little noted that Ps. Dionysius took up the notions and terminology of Cyril, with which in his commentary on John he interprets the healing of the daughter of Jairus (Mk 5,35-37; Lk 7,49-56), and which he uses to explain the effects of the eucharistic body of Christ, as he finds them in John 6.<sup>418</sup>

After Severus in his discussion of the *aphtharsia* teaching of Julian of

418. Cf. Cyril Alex., *In Ioann. IV*, ch. II,VI, 54-59; PG 73, 576C-596C; S.P.N. Cyrilli . . . Alexandrini in *D. Ioannis evangelium* . . . ed. P. E. Pusey, I, 528-547. The detailed analysis of this will follow in CCT II/3.

Halicarnassus had moved from substantiating the *mia physis* by having recourse to the exchange of *idiomata*, or the divinization of the humanity of Christ, to doing it by having recourse to the unity and singularity of the *energeia*, he had to place particular demands on the *operatio*. Because the *henosis* is insoluble and uninterrupted, its preservation necessitates a constant flow of *energeia* or a constantly active and invariable hegemony of the Logos. There cannot be any more or less. But Severus distinguished various strengths in the controlling influence of the Logos on his humanity. The highest degree is present in the miraculous healings. But what is the case in the everyday life of the Incarnate One? We have seen that Severus, in the tradition of Gregory of Nyssa and Cyril of Alexandria, could not properly imagine such an everyday life. The hypostatic union signified for the humanity of Christ the constant claim to participation in the divine life. For this reason on each occasion it also needed permission on the side of the godhead to hunger and suffer, even to die. Such a release of the flesh for the 'blameless passions', however, was due really to a restraining of that power, on which the hypostatic union was built. In warding off the teachings of Julian, Severus trapped himself here in an insoluble dilemma. The *henosis* of Christ was not sought on the right level. This is shown also in a new way.

### (c) *Knowledge and growth of Jesus*

From tradition Severus had taken over the teaching that 'the Logos of God, elevated over all creatures and perfect in everything' has remained in the incarnation without alteration. This creates difficulties for him in explaining the growth of Christ (cf. Lk 2,40). He is for Severus

A single Christ without division or partition, in one person, one *hypostasis* and one single nature of the Logos become flesh, without one being able to say that, due to (qualifying in) virtue, he would have become perfect . . . In fact how should he have become perfect, who is himself in essence justice, wisdom and holiness; rather he mediates to every created and rational nature participation in all these perfections, and is the source of all good things and distributor of virtue.<sup>419</sup>

The Patriarch also finds it difficult to acknowledge theologically the scriptural words about the *kenosis* and the growth of Jesus in their full compass.

'Is it not truly stupid [for Christ himself] to speak of humiliation and also of advance or of becoming perfect in virtue . . .?' Is not everything only a fitting into our measure for our salvation!<sup>420</sup> What has to be warded off is the Antiochene probation theory, according to which

419. Severus Ant., *Crit. tom.*: CSCO 245, p. 74,8-17. The growth of Jesus is ascribed to the *sarx*; Christ's suffering is possible because he is also consubstantial with us.

420. *Ibid.*, pp. 74,36-75,5.

Christ is said to have earned for himself the fullness of sonship through moral behaviour and the acquisition of virtue.<sup>421</sup> What increases in the earthly Jesus is only the 'progressive revelation of wisdom' in accordance with the law of the *oikonomia*.<sup>422</sup> The nature of the Logos is always perfect and wisdom itself.<sup>423</sup> In all 'growth' in Christ it is only a question of *our* becoming perfect, for which he is the absolutely valid example.

Because Julian of Halicarnassus had recourse for his ideas, which are familiar to us, to the *Philalethes* of the Patriarch, particularly to chapter 44, the latter in his *apologia* for his work had to speak about the problem of Christ's growth, be it in knowledge, be it in the perfection of body and soul. Athanasius, in the struggle with the Arians, had already had his difficulties with this problem.<sup>424</sup> His solution turned out to be so convoluted, because he did not introduce any human soul in Christ as the bearer, for example, of the ignorance of the day of judgement, but had to ward off the ignorance from the Logos as Logos (Mk 13,32). Although Cyril of Alexandria accepted a soul in Christ, neither the *Thesaurus* nor the *Dialogue* lets one ascertain that he acknowledged in Christ a human knowledge or a development of human understanding.<sup>425</sup> In the discussion with Theodoret and Antiochene christology in general, the fear of accepting a humanly limited knowledge in Christ increased, as Severus shows in his *Apologia for Philalethes*, chapter 44. The question about Christ's knowledge is solved for him by the fact that 'Christ himself is by nature the wisdom and justice of God the Father (1 Cor 1,30), through whom everything, which is at all capable of wisdom, has become wise . . .' An imperfection in Christ, however, can be accepted only by those who isolate the human being in him from the God-Logos, so that they then declare 'through deeds he became perfect, he who proceeded from Mary and from David and has become perfect in virtue'. For this reason they must also accept that this human being is capable of sin and error and is weighed down

421. *Ibid.*, 76ff.: to speak of a becoming perfect in Christ would be to concede a sinful lack in him, as Cyril had already stressed against Theodoret (PG 76, 444D-445A); see also Severus Ant., *Apol. Philal.*, ch. 44: CSCO 319, p. 22,4-23, with the comments of Hespel.

422. Severus Ant., *Crit. tom.*: CSCO 245, p. 76,18-20.

423. For Severus Ant., *ibid.*, pp. 92,17-93,24, Christ is sinless from infancy according to Is 7,15-16 (LXX), a position which the theology of the Church in general took over, even if it has attempted to establish it in different ways. Beyond the question of impeccability, Severus promoted his particular conception of interpreting Lk 2,40. Jesus has no need of development, because 'he is not subjected to any passion which comes from evil and sin, and he is exclusively good as God' (p. 93,13-15). The moral decision is transferred entirely into the divine will of the Logos. Cf. R. Chesnut, *Three Monophysite Christologies*, 28.

424. Cf. *JdChr* I<sup>3</sup>, 467-8; *CCT* I<sup>2</sup>, 314-15.

425. *JdChr* I<sup>3</sup>, 605-9 with reference to J. Liébaert; *CCT* I<sup>2</sup>, 414-17.

through concupiscence.<sup>426</sup> Here, admittedly, Severus draws a border against Julian: he distinguishes between the weaknesses, which go together with sin and are therefore 'blameworthy', and the others, like thirst, hunger, tiredness, fear, which are 'blameless'. Only the former are not reconcilable with the reality of Christ, the others he took over freely in condescension. Thus he, the God-Logos, in the flesh which he united hypostatically to himself and which in a natural way is capable of suffering and dying, can take over 'natural and blameless passions, death as well, and thus die for us'.<sup>427</sup>

426. Cf. Severus Ant., *Apol. Philal.*, ch. 44: CSCO 319, pp. 22,4-23,4.

427. *Ibid.*, p. 23,5-24. We should like to note what R. Chesnut, *op. cit.*, 29, says: 'Sometimes Severus talks as though there was only one decision on the part of God to submit to the laws of nature; at other times, he talks as though there was a new decision to make every time, whether to grow hungry or sleepy or anxious. Either way, as far as Severus is concerned, by an act of *will* God *voluntarily* submitted himself to the laws of human nature or necessity and took upon himself a rational, willing human hypostasis. And this act of *God's will* is what is of significance to Severus, and not the human will.' It would be worthwhile making clear that, because the moral decisions appear to proceed completely from the Logos as Logos, Severus does not need any responsible human decision in the human will of Christ. This is co-moved by the Logos. For this reason Severus has not fully transcended Apollinarius' '*nous* which is not capable of defeat'.

## CONCLUDING REFLECTION

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### THE PANORAMA OF CHALCEDONIAN AND NON-CHALCEDONIAN CHRISTOLOGIES

With the one person Severus and his imposing, diverse work, a row of fundamental christological positions emerged, which allow an insight into the state of christology around 520 and a prospect of further development. The discussion about Chalcedon had finally come to the problem itself, to the question about the mutual relationship to each other of different traditions and ways of speaking. What is the situation at the end of the discussion between Severus and his opponents?

(1) After the *Henoticon* politics of Emperors Zeno and Anastasius had created insecurity in the Church, the Chalcedonian suggestion to solve the christological question was taken notice of afresh, that is, through the Cyrillian florilegium. It was intended that this suggestion be brought closer to the Alexandrian side too, by demonstrating its agreement with the greatest pre-Chalcedonian authority, Cyril of Alexandria. The Patriarch himself was so to say to be won for Chalcedon by searching out in his entire work the beginnings of the two-natures language. His *mia-physis* formula and the sharpness of his anathemas were carefully bracketed and suppressed. It was intended that both parties could in good conscience agree on a two-natures christology. For this suggestion the name 'strict Chalcedonianism' has already been established. This expression is justified, because the language of the Fourth Council was to prevail as the sole norm.

(2) Through Severus of Antioch the linguistic and conceptual counterpoint to the two-natures teaching of 451 was now contrasted as sharply as possible. The *mia-physis* christology stood in unambiguous unity before the eyes of the Greek world in a work which surpassed everything contemporary. If Cyril had undergone a development and betrayed a certain bilingualism, then the 'new Cyril' decidedly intervened and carried out a purification of language, which represented now the pure type of *mia-physis* christology, as a closed christology from above with the emphasis on the *henosis*, but also with the clear confession of the reality and earthly existence of the humanity of Christ. The troublesome thing was that there were still glimpses of Apollinarius. The well-intended

interpretation of the *mia physis* through Cyril could not wipe out its inherent virulence.

(3) The history of ideas displays enough examples of the fact that such contrary positions call for mediation in language and conception. Instead of such one-sided purification of language in the sense of the two natures, or respectively in the direction of the one nature, a synthesis of language was intended to create peace. This was the intention of the monk Nephalius, and of the grammarian John of Caesarea. Instead of reciprocally purified conceptual language and the barriers to understanding created by this, it was intended that each time the language of the other partner would be learned and practised together, perhaps from the realization that neither of the two systems by itself can express the whole truth and avert all misunderstandings of faith in Christ. In this strategy the *mia-physis* language received the task of banning the nightmare 'Nestorius', and the *dyo-physeis* terminology the task of banning the phantasma of Valentinus, Manes and Eutyches. Because both tendencies represented a continuing threat, henceforward the equally legitimate use of both systems of language should be explained as necessary, and recognized as the condition for 'orthodoxy'. In a similar way one could also demand the combination of a christology from above with one from below. If it is a matter here of first attempts, so it should be our task to pursue further the development of this theological peace initiative.

(4) If in so-called 'neo-Chalcedonianism' a middle was sought from both extremes, which at the same time was intended to lessen the dangers of the positions on both sides, then such dangers have also in fact become evident. On the Severan side one speaks in an exaggerated formulation of the 'aphthartodocetism' of Julian of Halicarnassus and of the 'real monophysitism' of the amateur theologian Sergius. On the Chalcedonian side we need to examine what is to be understood by the 'Nestorianism' of the East Syrians. Of late there has also been an attempt to discover among the Chalcedonians so-called 'Antiochenes', who are said after 451 to have combined with the formula of 451 the pre-Chalcedonian, Antiochene christology of separation.

PART TWO

RETROSPECTIVE THEOLOGICAL CONSIDERATION  
OF CHALCEDON



The challenge to the supporters of Chalcedon through the Cyrillian-Severan *mia-physis* christology did not come to a stop with the accession of Emperor Justin I (518–527) to the throne and with his restoration politics. Neither imperial edicts nor ecclesiastical feasts celebrating Chalcedon could dispense with truly theological discussion. In 518 the formula of Chalcedon, despite a broad reception in the Greek- and Latin-speaking areas, was still a long way from an explanation that could substantiate it. There was still need for a great deal of work on the concepts and the supposition concerning them, that is, that they could be applied to the total conceptual form of the 'hypostatic union'. But, above all, the act of union itself had hardly come into perspective, despite the repeated examination of ancient philosophical *henosis* terms. If a radical splitting of the Church were to be definitively prevented, then there had to be an agreement between the parties at variance on a generally acceptable formula, or, what was really desirable, on a clarified understanding of the *horos* adopted by the Fourth Council. As we have established with Severus' opponents, Nephalius and John the Grammarian, in contrast to the compilers of the *FlorCyr* there was just as much a readiness to compromise on the Chalcedonian side as on the Severan. We have observed the beginnings of the so-called neo-Chalcedonian synthesis. Yet it was not based on clarified concepts, but simply on the intention to affirm, through the simultaneous use of contrary formulas, the common element of truth present in them and to exclude the extremes which dissolve the dogma of the incarnation, christologies of mingling and separation. Could the attempt to reach this goal also succeed by way of a profound examination and new determination of the disputed concepts and their assignation within the Chalcedonian formula? In the entirety of a continuous theology and politics of Chalcedon this had to be a real preoccupation of the Church after 518. We shall now proceed to study the groups of theologians and documents that sought to resolve difficulties in this way. First of all we shall consider their crown witness.

## CHAPTER ONE

# LEONTIUS OF BYZANTIUM, THE CROWN WITNESS OF CHALCEDONIAN CHRISTOLOGY

## SECTION ONE

### THE PERSON AND WORK OF LEONTIUS

It is only now that researchers are in a position to reach agreement with regard to essentials about the person and literary corpus of the bearer of this name. After the epoch-making work of F. Loofs, which was published over a hundred years ago,<sup>1</sup> research was guided in the wrong direction. Erroneous judgements regarding his identity were possible for various reasons, but especially because the patristic sources had possessed a whole catalogue of people bearing the name Leontius.<sup>2</sup> Until recently there was no attempt to produce a critical edition of the authentic works which were or should be ascribed to one and the same Leontius. This important goal is now close to completion.<sup>3</sup> The necessary foundation

1. F. Loofs, *Leontius von Byzanz und die gleichnamigen Schriftsteller der griechischen Kirche* = TU III, 1-2 (Leipzig, 1887); *idem*, art., 'Leontius von Byzanz', in *PRE* 11 (Leipzig, 1902), 394-8.

2. See the indexes for ACO IV 3, 2, 2 (Berlin, 1982), 286-289; R. Schieffer offers twenty-eight cases where a Leontius has been ascertained, without clearly separating the bearers of the name. Our Leontius of Byzantium is named in nos. 20 and 22, which are to be referred to the same bearer. Cf. the enumeration of twenty Leontii in F. Loofs, *op. cit.*, 226-7. For our Leontius see nos. 13, 14, 16.

3. See B. E. Daley, *Leontius of Byzantium: A Critical Edition of his Works, with Prolegomena* (Diss. Oxford, 1978). Cf. *JdChr* II/1, 66-8. Daley provides a comprehensive report on the history of the text and the transmission of the Corpus Leontianum. He gathers the biographical and literary-historical data which concern the author, and in this way creates new foundations for interpreting the history of dogma and theology. An exhaustive bibliography offers the underpinnings for understanding the research on the life and work of Leontius. Because the work has not yet appeared in print, we shall still cite according to PG 86, while making use of the newly edited text. The following texts are ascribed to Leontius of Byzantium (CPG 6813-6820), for which we shall use the attached abbreviations:

*Contra Nestorianos et Eutychianos (λόγος α')* (CNE): PG 86, 1273A-1309;  
*Epilyseis (Solutiones Argumentorum Severi) (Epil)*: PG 86, 1916C-1945;  
*Epaporemata (Triginta Capita contra Severum) (Epap)*: PG 86, 1901B-1916B;  
*Contra Aphthartodocetas (λόγος β')* (CA): PG 86, 1316D-1356C;  
*Deprehensio et Triumphus super Nestorianos (λόγος γ')* (DTN): PG 86, 1357B-1385B;  
*Adversus Fraudes Apollinaristarum (AFA)*: PG 86, 1948A-1972A; for judging this writing now see A. Tuilier, 'Remarques sur les fraudes des Apollinaristes et des Monophysites', in J. Dummer

for a new presentation and evaluation of his theology has been created. Here admittedly we are limiting ourselves to the central content: the theoretical and concrete christology of the author, who has been determined to be Leontius of Byzantium.

From the works themselves there is little to be ascertained about his person. He is characterized as 'monk', 'ascetic', 'hermit', or as 'Abba Leontius'.<sup>4</sup> As a young man, in his own depiction, he was the adherent of a group of Chalcedonians, who had chosen Diodore of Tarsus and Theodore of Mopsuestia as their models and masters.<sup>5</sup> Through a special 'grace from above', however, he was freed from the teeth of these lions to a life of 'virtue' and, driven by a yearning for this, to become a pilgrim.<sup>6</sup> On the insistence of friends, but also from love of the 'right thing', the convert decided as well to define his position in several books, even though he says he could show neither the necessary secular educational background (*ἐξω παιδεία*) nor the ability (*ἐξίς*) for this.<sup>7</sup> Following the experiences of the authors of the *FlorCyr*, of John of Caesarea, of Bishop Julian of Halicarnassus and the novice theologian Sergius Grammaticus, there would also be a risk that the monk from Palestine would rile the old lion, Severus, through his attacks. Yet one ought also to accept that the chances of achieving a box-office success with polemical writings of the earlier type against Leontius were very much reduced around 535/536. In 531 the new defender of Chalcedon had already begun to hold disputations with the 'monophysites' in the

(ed.), *Texte und Textkritik* = TU 133 (Berlin, 1987), 581–90. Together with S. Rees, 'The Literary Activity of Leontius of Byzantium', *JTS* 19 (1968) (229–42), 240–2; D. Stiernon, art., 'Léonce de Byzance', in *DSP* 9 (1976) (651–60), 655; Tuilier takes the work *AFA* as belonging to the questionable, or non-authentic works;

*Fragmenta Incerta* (with Appendix III, *Excerpta Leontina*): PG 86, 2004C–2009C.

4. Cf. B. E. Daley, *op. cit.*, 1 (Title). As far as the four titles are concerned, according to Daley they could be used alternately for individual desert monks, in particular for those who lived as semi-hermits in a lavra. On this see below re Palestine. Apart from the works of Leontius, Daley refers to Sophronius of Jerusalem, in Photius, *Bibl. cod.* 231: Henry V, 66; PG 103, 1092A5–6; as well to Patriarch Germanus of Constantinople, *De haer. et syn.* (CPG 8020): PG 98, 72A1–2.

5. See the following particulars in Leontius, *DTN*: (a) PG 86, 1357C: Leontius characterizes himself as 'member of a *thiasos*'; (b) PG 86, 1360D–1361A: this consists of 'Chalcedonians', who, however, only seem to be such; (c) PG 86, 1360D, 1364A, 1377D; for they are supporters of Diodore and Theodore of Mopsuestia.

6. Leontius Byz., *DTN*: PG 86, 1360AB.

7. Leontius Byz., Prologue to the collection of his works: PG 86, 1268B–1269A; *DTN*: PG 86, 1360B. According to B. E. Daley, *ed. cit.*, introduction, II, Leontius is, however, 'clearly a man of considerable dialectical training, with extraordinary sharpness of mind and strong theological passions'.

basilica of Constantinople.<sup>8</sup> He had soon made a name for himself, for in 532 he was already taken notice of to such an extent that he could participate, at least in a subordinate rôle, in the dialogue which was held in Constantinople between the supporters and opponents of Chalcedon.<sup>9</sup> To be sure, at the time of this meeting Severus was not yet in the capital. This was the case only in 534–536, and then on the initiative of Empress Theodora.<sup>10</sup>

Whether in this period Leontius saw or spoke with the deposed Patriarch himself is not reported. As the *apocrisarius* of the monks of Palestine, he took part in the Home Synod of Constantinople, which lasted from 2 May to 4 June 536. The 'monophysite' patriarch at that time, Anthimus, was anathematized; Severus, together with Peter of Apamea, was condemned anew. For the first three sessions the 'monk Leontius' is listed among the representatives of the Palestinian monasteries and as signatory of three petitions from the Oriental monks. The three documents were addressed to the Emperor, Patriarch Menas and the Synod itself, and to Pope Agapetus. In the corresponding synodal list 'Leontius, monk and abbot and *apocrisarius* of the whole desert' is named.<sup>11</sup> In the petitions, in contrast, the form of address is expanded,<sup>12</sup> without anything new being said. Nevertheless it is assumed that the *apocrisarius* of the monks was instructed about the activity of Severus during his sojourn in the palace of Empress Theodora. Every piece of information must have been welcome to him. Leontius could still read the Severan writings in the original Greek version. One does not have the impression, however, that he concentrated in a special way on the person or the individual works of the Patriarch, just as he

8. Cf. Cyril Scyth., *Vita Sabae* 72: Schwartz, p. 176,7–15.

9. Cf. ACO IV, 2, p. 170,5–6. R. Schieffer, ACO IV, 3, 2, 2, p. 288(b) separates the Leontius named here as no. 20 (*monachus Hierosolymitanus*) from no. 22.

10. Cf. Evagrius Schol., *HE* IV 10–11: Bidez-Parmentier, 160–161; Severus was not immediately ready to follow this call, as Evagrius reports referring to a letter of the fleeing Patriarch. Cf. Zacharias Rh. cont., *HE* IX 15: ET Hamilton-Brooks, 253. (a) Arrival of Severus: *HE* IX 15: ET Hamilton-Brooks, 253; IX 16: ET Hamilton-Brooks, 261; IX 19: ET Hamilton-Brooks, 265; (b) sojourn in Constantinople at the time when Pope Agapetus I was present: IX 19: ET Hamilton-Brooks, 267; (c) in March 536 the expulsion of Severus and Anthimus from the city by Emperor Justinian I at the instigation of the Pope, who died, however, on 22 April 536. See novel 42: *Corpus iuris civilis*, Vol. III, *Novellae*, ed. Schoell-Kroll (Berlin, 1895), 263–9. Empress Theodora helped Patriarch Severus flee to Egypt. Cf. John of Eph., PO 2, 302. See E. Honigsmann, *Evêques et Evêchés*, 153–4; on the whole matter, *ibid.*, 152–4; E. Stein, *Histoire du Bas-Empire* II, 382, 386–7; P. Allen, *Evagrius Scholasticus*, 182–5.

11. ACO III, 130, *subscriptio* 76; 158, *subscriptio* 76; 165, *subscriptio* 80; 174 (without *hegoumenos*), *subscriptio* 82.

12. ACO III, p. 37,1–2: *subscriptio* 74 (to Emperor Justinian); p. 50, *subscriptio* 117; p. 145, *subscriptio* 73.

also did not directly attack the person of Julian of Halicarnassus. In both cases he aimed more at the 'group', the 'Headless Ones', the 'Aphthartodocetists' than at their leading theologians. Whether reference was made to them historically has to be demonstrated in each individual case.

One thing is certain: after 518, or rather after 527, Leontius of Byzantium accepted the challenge that was addressed to the Chalcedonians by Severan-Julianist christology. With more or less new proofs he attempts to demonstrate that the *mia physis* is untenable. Expressed positively, by doing this he draws the basic lines of a Chalcedonian picture of Christ. It was obviously difficult for him to paint into this picture the attractive power which the Christ of the Severan *mia physis* or of the Julianist *aphtharsia* radiated. Severus and Julian continued to exercise influence in the Constantinople of Justinian I and Theodora, even after they had been definitively banished and condemned. The old Emperor himself is the best proof of this. Although Nestorianism appears to stand in the forefront as the opposed thesis, if we may extrapolate from the writing *CNE*, nevertheless an analysis of the work shows that the schema 'Nestorian-Eutychian' is artificial. Both the attached florilegium as well as the further development of the dispute in the two following works (*Epil* and *Epap*) enable us to recognize that the real opponents of Leontius are the Severans.

We shall now attempt to determine the rôle of the monk Leontius of Byzantium in a twofold regard which stems from his works: firstly, he is the speculative theologian, and this above all in *CNE*, *Epil* and *Epap*; then he offers something like an outline of a picture of Christ, which can provide information for modern problems. This is particularly the case in the writing *CA*.

## SECTION TWO

### THE CHRISTOLOGY OF LEONTIUS OF BYZANTIUM HIS CONTRIBUTION TO SOLVING THE CHALCEDONIAN PROBLEM

#### I. A SHORT REPORT ON RESEARCH

In research since the study of F. Loofs,<sup>13</sup> the monk Leontius of Byzantium has in many cases been overrated, this in part being caused by the fact that Loofs had accepted untenable biographical and literary historical presuppositions. In the subsequent controversy, however, judgements that were too negative were also made about the author, whose identity is difficult to determine.

#### 1. Literary-historical identifications

F. Loofs identified the theological writer Leontius with three other bearers of this name from the sixth century, namely with

(a) the Scythian (Gothic) monk Leontius, the active participant in the so-called theopaschite controversy (CPL 653 a); this was the major error. Loofs won numerous supporters for this thesis: V. Ermoni, J. P. Junglas (*LThK* VI, 511–12), O. Bardenhewer (V, 9–10), B. Altaner, *Patrologie* (1938, 330), who then himself definitively excluded it: 'Der griechische Theologe Leontius und Leontius der skythische Mönch', *ThQ* 127 (1947), 147–65. As early as 1914, however, E. Schwartz, *ACO* IV 2, p. XII, took a critical stance;

(b) Leontius of Jerusalem, author of *Contra Monophysitas* (CPG 6917) and *Contra Nestorianos* (CPG 6918). Here Loofs was followed by W. Rügamer, *Leontius von Byzanz, ein Polemiker aus der Zeit Justinians* (Diss. Würzburg, 1894) and S. Rees, 'The Life and Personality of Leontius of Byzantium', *JTS* 41 (1940), 263–80; also too in his later article, 'The Literary Activities of Leontius of Byzantium', *JTS* 19 (1968), 229–42. In opposition, M. Richard, 'Léonce de Jérusalem et Léonce de Byzance', *MSR* 1 (1944), 35–88 = *Op. Min.* III, no. 59. After Richard and against him, the Romanian deacon Ilie Fracea, in his dissertation submitted in Athens, 'Ο Λεόντιος Βυζάντιος. Βίος και Συγγράμματα (Κριτική Θεώρηση)' (Athens, 1984), once again advocated identifying the two, Leontius of Byzantium and Leontius of Jerusalem. According to Fracea there was only one Leontius, who came from Constantinople, became a monk in Palestine and defended orthodox christology against Nestorius and monophysites. Fracea gave a detailed overview of the genuine works which he ascribed to Leontius of Byzantium (pp. 164–246). A. de Halleux provided an analysis of the dissertation in his review, *RHE* 81 (1986), 139–43. Our position will be given in later remarks.

(c) Leontius Scholasticus (Ps. Leontius) (CPG 6823), the author of *De sectis*. According to Loofs, *De sectis* is nothing other than an adaptation of a lost treatise of Leontius of Byzantium. Against Loofs, J. P. Junglas, *Leontius von Byzanz. Studien zu seinen Schriften, Quellen und Anschauungen* = FCLDG 3 (Paderborn, 1908); S. Rees, 'The *De Sectis*: A Treatise Attributed to Leontius of Byzantium', *JTS* 40 (1939), 346–60; M. Richard, 'Le traité "De Sectis" et Léonce

13. F. Loofs, *op. cit.* (above, n. 1).

de Byzance', *RHE* 35 (1939), 695–723 = *Op. Min.* II, no. 55; J. Speigl, 'Der Autor der Schrift "De Sectis" über die Konzilien und die Religionspolitik Justinians', *AHC* 2 (1970), 207–30.

## 2. Biographical identifications

Here we presuppose with B. E. Daley that Leontius, the author of the *Corpus Leontianum* (*CNE*, *Epil*, *Epap*, *CA*, *DTN*), is identical with Leontius, the participant in the *Collatio cum Severianis* in 532 in Constantinople, as well as with the theologian and monk of the Constantinopolitan Home Synod in 536 and with the Leontius of the *Vita Sabae* of Cyril of Scythopolis.

Cf. B. E. Daley, *Leontius of Byzantium*, Introduction; *idem*, 'The Origenism of Leontius of Byzantium', *JTS* 27 (1976), 333–69, where Daley argues against D. B. Evans, *Leontius of Byzantium: An Origenist Christology* = *DOS* 13 (Washington DC, 1970) and S. Otto, *Person und Subsistenz. Die philosophische Anthropologie des Leontios von Byzanz. Ein Beitrag zur spätantiken Geistesgeschichte* (Munich, 1968). L. Perrone, 'Il "Dialogo contro gli aftartodoceti" di Leonzio di Bisanzio e Severo di Antiochia', *CrSt* 1 (1980), 411–42, makes worthwhile observations.

## 3. On the method

In what follows we shall start from a turning-point, which can be observed in the writings of Leontius and which is contingent on his method of adapting to the opponent with whom he is dealing in his works. We shall establish that in the three writings *CNE*, *Epil* and *Epap*, *ratio theologica* and dialectic predominate, whereas in *CA* it is the biblical consideration, concerned with the economy of salvation, and the sketching of a picture of Christ in accordance with Chalcedonian principles.

### II. THE CHRISTOLOGY OF LEONTIUS OF BYZANTIUM

From the observations outlined above two tasks emerge for us: (1) an analysis of the Chalcedonian, anti-Severan language, which Leontius uses for concepts and in formulas, and his contribution to solving the Chalcedonian question; (2) his total picture of the God-human reality and of the soteriological mission of Jesus in the anti-Julianist polemic of Leontius.

#### 1. The Chalcedonian, anti-Severan language of Leontius

The powerfulness of the challenge which Severus issued to the Chalcedonian-Byzantine theologians expressed itself in particular demands for Justin's restoration after 518. With the fundamental negation of the *mia-physis* christology of Severan stamp and a return to the 'one *hypostasis* in two natures' on the side of Imperial Church politics, there awaited anew for theology the task of showing how in Christ 'the one and the same, perfect in divinity and perfect in humanity', the unity in the *hypostasis* and the duality in the natures, was to be understood and established. Did Leontius of Byzantium display a consciousness of the

problem which corresponded to this situation? In his case what was the relationship between the existing biblical, ecclesial kerygma of the 'Logos who became flesh' and the reflex entry into the christological question?

(a) *The 'subject of the incarnation'*

For Cyril and Severus the determination of the subject of the incarnation was already given with John 1,14; the *Logos* is present in the flesh. A remnant of Antiochene schooling seems in contrast to have remained in Leontius. As B. E. Daley concedes, in a series of texts the monk begins his theological analysis not with the eternal *Logos* and the history of his works among human beings, but with the divine *fait accompli* 'Jesus Christ', who is for him both God as well as human being.<sup>14</sup> How would he respond to the question: who is the real personal 'you' in Jesus of Nazareth, whom you confess as God and human being? It is as if Leontius answered: the *hypostasis*, the concrete person 'Jesus Christ' is neither simply divine nor simply human, although his Christ exists and acts wholly as God and wholly as human being; to be human and divine is the business of the natures and not of the person or *hypostasis*. In fact Leontius never identifies explicitly and by virtue of *logical* allocation the 'one *hypostasis*' with the *Logos* as *Logos*.<sup>15</sup> His denotations for Jesus of Nazareth are normally *Christos*, *Soter*, *Kyrios*.<sup>16</sup> To this subject denoted as *Kyrios* he also assigns the human attributes, actions and experiences. Is the Christ-subject also for this reason understood 'ontologically' as a *tertium quid*, as the correspondent of the Patriarch Severus, Sergius Scholasticus, in his way had understood this in all its strictness? The constancy of the characterization just described seems to point positively in this direction.<sup>17</sup>

14. Cf. B. E. Daley, 'The Christology of Leontius of Byzantium: Personalism or Dialectics', in *Papers from the Ninth Conference on Patristic Studies 1983, Oxford, England = Patristic Monograph Series, The Philadelphia Patristic Foundation* (typescript).

15. *Idem*, *art. cit.*

16. Cf. L. Perrone, 'Il "Dialogo contro gli astartodoceti" di Leonzio di Bisanzio e Severo di Antiochia', *CrSt* 1 (1980), 430-1, with reference to B. E. Daley, 'The Origenism of Leontius of Byzantium', *JTS* 27 (1976) (333-69), 359, n. 4. On *Kyrios* see especially *CA*: PG 86, 1325C4; 1337A8; 1341C7; 1345C8-11; 1349A1f.; 1352B11; *soma* of the *kyrios*: 1345D12; 1348B8.C2.

17. Cf. B. E. Daley, *art. cit.*, 360: Leontius 'is careful to present his Christ "symmetrically"'. He is careful to attribute the human soul and flesh, as well as the human actions and experiences of the Incarnate Word, to "Christ" or the "Lord" rather than to "a person of the blessed Trinity"; he avoids the other dramatic assertions of Christ's divinity popular with his Neo-Chalcedonian contemporaries, like the celebrated "theopaschite formula" . . . He does not deny the correctness of such statements, when properly understood." (For this Daley refers in n. 1 to *Epil*: PG 86, 1944C2-4. Cf. also *DTN* 42: PG 86, 1380C1-5).



From these textual findings grave conclusions were drawn for judging Leontius' understanding of Christ.

(1) For Leontius Jesus Christ is a *tertium quid* in the order of essences.<sup>18</sup> Such an interpretation represents a great imposition on the theologically and dialectically trained Leontius. He would be put on a par with the theologically quite unsure Sergius, the opponent of Severus. 'Christ', as the new third entity, would be a new 'essence' from the infinite divinity and created humanity, as Sergius, who was just mentioned, had this in mind. The consequence would be a real theopaschism with its violation of the divine transcendence, as this would occur with a 'nature synthesis'. On the basis of his Antiochene past Leontius had without doubt a keen eye for the inviolability of the divinity, which did not allow any physical synthesis in the manner of Apollinarianism. Certainly one can and must accept that Leontius had not yet transposed the *formal* realization of the 'one *hypostasis*' into the *hypostasis* of the Logos as such. Such a step needed time. The lack of this formal identification does not mean, however, that the monk was not conscious of the completeness and self-containedness of the Logos as such, which excluded every combination in a 'third'. That the theory of a *novum tertium quid* is not admissible is shown by the unambiguous statements about the Logos, who in the one Christ takes the rôle of the subject of the incarnation and the dominant position in the whole structure of the Incarnate One, as it is *actually* described.<sup>19</sup>

(2) Still more incriminatory is the interpretation which would like to

18. Thus according to P. T. R. Gray, *The Defense of Chalcedon in the East (451–553)* (Leiden, 1979), 101. In the meantime Gray has moved away from this interpretation.

19. These passages are cited following L. Perrone, 'Il "Dialogo contro gli astartodoceti" di Leonzio di Bisanzio e Severo di Antiochia', *CrSt* 1 (1980), 430 n. 55: (a) *CA*: PG 86, 1324D.1325B: the 'assuming' subject is indeed characterized as *Kyrios*, to whom the whole human reality of Christ is contrasted as 'assumed'. (b) PG 86, 1329C: the 'Logos' is introduced as the subject which gives permission for suffering (*τοῦ Λόγου ἐπιέντος τὸ παθεῖν*). Then twice in 1329CD there is talk of the '*henosis* with the Logos' which does not even effect the *aphtharsia* of the body, but only the substantial *henosis*, through which the heretical doctrine of two persons is excluded. (c) To the actuation of the will of the assuming Logos is ascribed the ability to suffer, or respectively *apatheia*. The Logos is the dominating principle: PG 86, 1332AB. (d) Through the Holy Spirit the Logos exercises a creative efficacy with regard to his own 'temple', that is, his humanity: PG 86, 1352D8–1353A3; esp. 1353A: The Logos surrounds himself with a temple created through the power of the Holy Spirit (*ἐαυτὸν περιλάσας*). A notion of a *tertium quid* can in no way be connected with the following section (PG 86, 1353A4–B3). The same is true with regard to the opinion that Leontius supports the adoration of the humanity of Christ. He does not speak of a 'special' adoration of this humanity. His gaze is directed to the adoration of the one *hypostasis* in Christ. In contrast the Nestorians proclaim anthropolatry, because they accept two *hypostases* in Christ (*CNE* I: PG 86, 1273C; *DTN*: PG 86, 1380D 1385CD) See V. Grumel, art. 'Léonce de Byzance', in *DTC* 9, 418–19.

make Leontius an Evagrian Origenist.<sup>20</sup> Here too Christ is seen as a 'new third', even if the components are different. Allegedly this Christ would be a synthesis from the pre-existent *nous*, conceived in Evagrian terms, which, itself a created essence, combines with the human *sarx* to become a *nous*-Christ. To refute this interpretation one can refer to a sentence in the *CNE*. In this sentence Leontius distinguished clearly between the Logos as such and the same Logos in the state of the incarnation: 'the Logos is not the complete Christ; he is this only when the human is united to him, even though he has his completeness as God'.<sup>21</sup> There is no *nous* slotted in between. Quite the opposite: we find repeated with particular regularity the formula 'union according to the essence' or 'according to the *hypostasis*', the meaning of which must be evaluated in detail. In no case ought these two formulas be called upon to interpret the *henosis* in Christ according to the manner of a *tertium quid*.

(b) *Distinction of hypostasis and physis*

If the Chalcedonian restoration were to succeed there had to be an advance in clarifying the key concepts that were causing division. These themselves, however, were embedded in more comprehensive linguistic structures, the bases of which were different ways of grasping the mystery of Christ. If the 'monophysite' said: 'the one nature of the incarnate Word', the content of the concept *physis* was to be revealed by the historical point of view. First it was the Logos that was viewed, his *physis* or *hypostasis*; about it was stated that it has become flesh. In this way the concept is defined in its meaning; only that can be termed

20. D. B. Evans, *Leontius of Byzantium: An Origenist Christology* = DOS 13 (Washington D.C., 1970). What is worthwhile in this book should not at all be overlooked, especially the textual and historical observations with regard to Leontius. Nevertheless the thesis about the Origenism of Leontius is unacceptable. The following take issue with this thesis. A. de Halleux, in his reviews in *RHE* 66 (1971), 977-85; *Mus* 84 (1971), 553-60; B. E. Daley, 'The Origenism of Leontius of Byzantium', *JTS* 27 (1976), 333-69; A. Le Boulluec, 'Controverses au sujet de la doctrine d'Origène sur l'âme du Christ', in L. Lies (ed.), *Origeniana Quarta* (Innsbruck, 1987) (223-37), 232-3. Endorsing the opinion of D. B. Evans are: J. Meyendorff, *Christ in Eastern Christian Thought* (Washington D.C., 1969), 43-9; *idem*, *Byzantine Theology Historical Trends and Doctrinal Themes* (New York, 1974), 35f.; also P. T. R. Gray, *The Defense of Chalcedon*, 101f.: 'It is impossible not to see in this Origenistic notion of the *voûç*-Christ the only conceivable explanation for Leontius' *tertium quid*.' The following accept the thesis of Origenism for Leontius without discussion: W. H. C. Frend, *The Rise of the Monophysite Movement* (Cambridge, 1972), 278f.; C. von Schönborn, *Sophrone de Jérusalem Vie monastique et confession dogmatique* = *ThéolHist* 20 (Paris, 1972), 48f. For a refutation see B. E. Daley, *art. cit.* and L. Perrone, *art. cit.*, 429-30.

21. Leontius Byz., *CNE* 2: PG 86, 1281CD

the nature of the Logos which is proper to him intrinsically, that which with him has proceeded from the Father (*φύσις* from *φύειν*). From this point of view the *physis* of Christ can only be one. To characterize the humanity of Christ too by *physis* would be equivalent to a contradiction. Hence the humanity of Christ could be acknowledged as whole and real, which must be conceded for the whole Cyrillian-Severan tradition. However, it ought not receive the title *physis*, because it has not arisen from the divinity by way of a *phyein*, but through God's special salvific disposal.

The Antiochenes and the Chalcedonians referred, however, to the birth of the human being, Jesus, from Mary, which also demanded the denotation of *physis* for the humanity. Which then was the one *hypostasis* in Christ? After three quarters of a century of dispute it was now in Leontius' court to seek an answer. Severus had always taken the *concrete physis* or *hypostasis* of Christ as his starting-point. He had become indignant when John the Grammarian set in opposition to this concrete view of the one *physis* the abstract one of two essences (*ousiai*). Leontius took up this trail and approached the christological problem on the basis of Aristotle's teaching about categories.<sup>22</sup>

We shall start with two texts in which Leontius is concerned with the clarification of the fundamental Chalcedonian concepts, with CNE I: PG 86, 1280 and with *Epilysis*: PG 86, 1945A.

(1) *Nature and hypostasis according to CNE I: PG 86, 1280A*

'Nature is (however) not *hypostasis*, because the [following] proposition is not reversible: a *hypostasis* is also nature; but nature is not *hypostasis*.' After establishing this, Leontius indicates the following determinations:

(a) for nature (*physis, ousia*)

1. Nature has the predicate 'to be' (*τοῦ εἶναι λόγου*)
2. Nature has the meaning of *εἶδος* (species, genus)

(b) for *hypostasis*

1. *Hypostasis* has in addition the predicate 'to be for itself' (*καθ'ἑαυτὸ εἶναι*)
2. *Hypostasis* reveals 'this one or that one', i.e. the individual in the species

22. On this fundamental stance see J. P. Junglas, *Leontius von Byzanz* (Paderborn, 1908), ch. 3, The philosophy of Leontius of Byzantium, 66-92; V. Grumel, art. 'Léonce de Byzance', in *DTC* 9 (1926), 405-8 (*ousia, physis, eidos*). According to Leontius the word *physis* has a twofold sense: (a) the essence or the constitutive elements of a substance; (b) on account of the multiplicity of the individuals in one nature *physis* denotes the universal in relation to the individuals and receives the denotation of *eidos* (species, kind). Thus we have two meanings: the physical and the logical. *Ousia*: (a) That which is common to all substances; this is the 'second *ousia*'; as such it denotes the existence of a thing, and not the what or how of a thing. (b) The particular nature of a being, thus the 'first *ousia*'. The latter is the most common usage in Leontius; *ousia* is synonymous with *physis* (cf. PG 86, 1273A, 1280A, 1309AB). *Ousia* gains a special significance, because it is a being, which is worthy of existing in itself and not in another.

3. Nature shows the peculiarity of the general reality (καθολικοῦ πράγματος χαρακτήρα δηλοῖ) 3. *Hypostasis* contrasts being singular to the universal (τοῦ κοινοῦ τὸ ἴδιον ἀποδιαστέλλεται)

After this delimitation there follows a response to the question: where in the realm of being can there be talk of *physis* or *hypostasis*?

In summary it must be said that one speaks principally of *one physis* (*mia physis*) with regard to things that have the same essence (*homoousia*) and things which have the same being (the same *logos* of being). The concept *hypostasis* denotes those which are the same according to nature, but are numerically different, or things which are composed of different natures, but possess one community of being in contemporaneous *perichoresis*. I mean that they participate in being, not by reason of the fact that they extend the reciprocal essences (this is the case with regard to essences and their corresponding predicates — these are called properties —) but insofar as the nature and essence of each one is not considered in itself, but together with the others that are combined or assimilated with it. One sees this happen in various things, not least with body and soul, whose *hypostasis* is common, but [each of] whose natures is its own and their reason (*logos*) is different.

From this text it emerges that (1) 'nature' and *hypostasis* are not synonymous, and (2) the particular meanings of each are not gathered and contrasted with great care. When Leontius, for example, says that the first special feature for *physis* is the predicate 'to be', we have a more accurate statement in Severus of Antioch with his combining this predicate not with *physis* but with *ousia*, which belongs etymologically to *einai*. It is important which examples are adduced for the application of both concepts. The advocates for the *mia-physis* formula receive a pre-established meaning for both, which they weaken with the intention of making them unusable by their opponents. One can also speak of *mia physis*, if things having the same essence are considered. Granted this holds only on the logical level, Leontius overplays the use of this formula on the physical level. But it is to be noted in particular that Leontius sees the formula of the one *hypostasis* in two natures as not in the least present in the case of the human being, who, despite two *physeis*, namely body and soul, is nevertheless *one hypostasis*. We shall come to speak about this 'anthropology' in its own right. It is of the greatest significance for the monk.

## (2) *Nature and hypostasis according to Epil: PG 86, 1945AD*

It is well to notice this: *hypostasis* does not mean simply and principally the perfect (τὸ τέλειον), but that which exists for itself (τὸ καθ'ἑαυτὸν ὑπάρχον), and in the second place it means the perfect.

Nature (φύσις) in contrast does not at all mean that which exists for itself (τὸ καθ'αὐτὸ οὐδαμῶς ὑπάρχον δηλοῖ), but the perfect . . .

We should know this: what the natures denote, the essence presents; what the *hypostasis*

denotes has the *ratio* of accidents, be they separable, or be they inseparable. The characteristics of simple things are simple, which are combined with the [things] that are composed and combined. As this is the case with human beings, so also in their definition: it characterizes their essence (*ousia*) as living, rational, mortal, receptive of contrary statements. The concrete concept of their essence entails that. *Hypostasis*, however, is characterized by form, colour, size, time, place, parents, rearing, instruction and what goes with that. Everything taken together cannot be true of anyone else; rather all of that belongs to one determinate (τοῦ τινος) human being.

And in the *idiomata* of the nature there share above all those which belong to the same essence; and in the *idiomata* of the *hypostasis* those also share whose *logos* (*ratio*) is different, if they have been assumed into the unity and community of being (συμφυῖα).

This is the case with the Emmanuel: he is namely one *hypostasis* of divinity and humanity; accordingly the hypostatic predicates are common to both; he is not, however, one *physis*, and thus he does not have the *idiomata*, as they would belong to the one *physis*.

If everything is also stated of him as of one, this is not, however, according to the same respect (οὐ κατὰ τὸ αὐτό), and not as of one *physis*. As one and the same is visible and invisible, mortal and immortal, tangible and intangible, this is still not according to the same respect, nor according to the same *logos* (*ratio*).

Because he is thus one and the same, everything is stated as of one, and precisely on account of the one *hypostasis* and (one) *prosopon*. But because the whole is not predicated according to the same respect, but according to one or other [reality] (κατ'ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο),<sup>23</sup> hence the whole is also not expressed of a single and simple *physis*, but of different and composed natures, which in the union also preserve their natural property (φυσικὴν ἐκείνων ιδιότητα).

Thus Leontius of Byzantium was intensively occupied with contrasting nature and *hypostasis* linguistically and conceptually in order to be able to justify the Chalcedonian way. Without further ado we recognize that, together with the theologians of the end of the fifth century, he is dependent on the Cappadocian theology of the Trinity, but also on the language of the philosophers. On the one side are the expressions *physis* and *ousia*, on the other the denotations *prosopon*, *hypostasis*, *atomon*, *hypokeimenon*, as Leontius summarizes in CNE I (PG 86, 1305). With these last expressions he enriches the language of the Cappadocians, using the philosophers, particularly Porphyry.<sup>24</sup>

For the theology of the Trinity Severus had condescended with Basil to enlist the distinction of *koinon* and *idion*, in order to distinguish nature and *hypostasis*. But he refused, as we have seen, to take this step too

23. Cf. Gregory Naz., *Ep. 101 ad Cled.* I: PG 37, 180AB; *JdChr* I<sup>3</sup>, 538-9.

24. M. Richard, 'Léonce et Pamphile', *RSPT* 27 (1938) (27-52), 31-2; *Op. Min.* III, no. 58, draws attention to this. He adduces a text from Porphyry, *Isagoge* = *Aristotelis Opera*, ed. Acad. Reg. Boruss. t. IV, p. 2b, l. 47: 'One calls this *atoma* [inseparable, primal unities], because each of them consists of properties, the collection of which does not fit any other, which is part of a kind.' The words of *Epilysis* just cited refer to this (PG 86, 1945BC), in particular: 'Colour . . . denote the *hypostasis* . . .' On this point Richard stresses that the description of the *hypostasis* by the Cappadocians was already quite close to this determination of *atomon*.

far for the order of the *oikonomia*, against both the Chalcedonians, like John the Grammarian, and the friends of his party, like Sergius Scholasticus. The 'headless one' of Leontius' *Epil*, who really speaks for Severus, still adopts the same standpoint and for that reason attacks Leontius' definition of *hypostasis*. He also continues to acknowledge it only for the *theologia*, not for the *oikonomia*. The 'novelty of the *mysterium*' is said to demand a *logos* and *horos* proper to it.<sup>25</sup> In contrast Leontius rightfully stresses that these same words (namely *hypostasis* and *ousia*) had to retain the same definition for both areas, even if the application of these concepts is to be regarded analogically (PG 86, 1921CD), and the transcendence of these mysteries is always naturally presupposed (PG 86, 1924AB). He also supports the distinction between *hypostasis* and *physis*, while the 'headless one' would like to retain their synonymous usage (PG 86, 1924C–1925B).

Yet here Leontius lands in grave difficulties: the *ratio* of the *hypostasis* coincides with that of the *individuum*.<sup>26</sup> In *CNE* he is not yet conscious of this. Not even once does he ask himself whether or not the human nature of Christ is individualized through the *idia*. Only in the *Epil* does he face up to the criticism of his opponents, which had increased in the meantime, and against his will allow himself to tackle this question. He has to admit that the human nature of Christ is individual. But nevertheless it is not a *hypostasis*, at least not in relation to the *Logos*.<sup>27</sup> Must this dilemma not become a stimulus that could not be ignored, to reflect on the concept of *hypostasis* from an utterly new perspective?

(c) *Discoverer of the formal ratio of subsistence?*

After Loofs it had been assumed that Leontius of Byzantium, or rather the one taken to be this Leontius, had aimed at a double breakthrough, namely: (1) the discovery of a twofold concept of *hypostasis* and (2) the isolation of the particular function of 'insubstisting' in the interpretation of the appearance of *ἐνυπόστατον*, which was translated by 'that which insubstists'. A large perspective appeared to open up. Both elements were

25. Cf. Leontius Byz., *Epil* 3: PG 86, 1921B–1925A. The 'Headless One' refers in contrast to Gregory of Nyssa, and intends by that his *Refutatio Confessionis Eunomii* III 3: PG 86, 1921B; Gregory Nyss., *loc. cit.*: Jaeger II, p. 131, 19–22 = PG 45, 468B13–C3, or 705D11–708A2 (according to the apparatus of B. E. Daley's edition).

26. Cf. Leontius Byz., *Epil*: PG 86, 1928B9–11: '[The *hypostasis*] is separated [distinguished] from what is common (*koinon*) through what is proper (*idion*)'; 1928C8–9: 'that, which is determined by what is its own, characterizes the *hypostasis* of each thing'; *CNE*: PG 86, 1277D: 'The *hypostasis* denotes [delimits] the *prosopon* through characteristic traits.'

27. Cf. M. Richard, 'Léonce de Jérusalem et Léonce de Byzance', *MSR* 1 (1944) (35–88) = *Op. Min.* III, no. 59, 26–7, with reference to *Epil*: PG 86, 1917A–C.

gathered from an important text of *CNE*, which for that reason deserves attentive consideration.<sup>28</sup>

*Hypostasis*, gentlemen, and the enhypostatized (*ἐνυπόστατον*) are not one and the same thing. For *hypostasis* refers to the *individuum*, but hypostatic to the essence; and *hypostasis* defines the person (*prosopon*) by means of the particular characteristics; the enhypostatized (*ἐνυπόστατον*) means, however, that it is not an *accident* — it has its being in another and is not perceived in itself; of this kind are all qualities, both those that are called properties of the essence as well as those which are added to the essence; none of the latter is *ousia* [i.e. an existing thing], but is always perceived in combination with the essence, like colour in the body and knowing in the soul.

The confusion about this section has to be cleared away by correctly interpreting a concept that was evaluated too rashly. It is a question of the famous *ἐνυπόστατον*, which without closer inspection has been interpreted as the high philosophical expression 'insubsistence'. Correct punctuation too can offer a decisive contribution in eliminating this error. This concerns the sentence at the beginning of our long text: '... enhypostatized (*ἐνυπόστατον*) means, however, that it is not an accident — it has its being in another and is not perceived in itself; of this kind are all qualities ...' We have to note two points here: (1) the expression *enhypostaton*; and (2) the inserted clause which needs to be attributed correctly.

(1) We have already encountered the expression *enhypostaton* in John of Caesarea. There we referred to its previous history which led us back to the fourth century. But even up to the time of John of Caesarea, who was a contemporary of Leontius of Byzantium, it had the same meaning as in the fourth century. A philological observation would have been necessary to prevent an over-interpretation of the prefix *en* in *enhypostatos*: 'Now the words *ἐνυπόστατος* and *ἐνούσιος* seem to me quite clearly to be examples of those Greek adjectival formations in which the prefix *ἐν-* is joined to a substantive to signify the possession of some thing or quality, as opposed to an *alpha privative*, which would signify its absence.'<sup>29</sup> It was precisely in this regard that Loofs missed

28 Leontius Byz., *CNE* 1: PG 86, 1277C14–1280B.

29. Cf. B. E. Daley, 'The Christology of Leontius of Byzantium' (above, n. 14) refers to the words *ἐμφωνος-ἀφωνος*; *ἐνυλος-ἀνυλος*; *ἐντιμος-ἀτιμος*, and comments: 'Ἐνυπόστατος, in such a reading, would simply mean "hypostatic", having a concrete existence, as opposed to "anhypostatic", or purely abstract.' As evidence Daley adduces John Philoponus, the contemporary of Leontius, who in spite of great theological differences retained a strikingly similar vocabulary. In his *Comm. in Physica* II 1: *CAG* XVI, p. 205,19 he defines the *ἐνυπόστατα πράγματα* as 'things which possess a nature (*τὰ φύσιν ἔχοντα*)'. Opposed to them are things which owe their existence only to theory (*μόνη τῇ ἐπινοίᾳ*) (*ibid.* I 1, p. 4,19).

the mark.<sup>30</sup> He furnished the prefix *en* with its own dynamic, which expressed a direction through which two independent substances are brought together in an existential relationship. Thus he said, for example, that body and soul in the thought of Leontius were two different, independent essences or substances, which were *enhyposstasized* in one concrete human being. Or fire and water too were said to be two different natures which were *enhyposstasized* in one burning torch. Loofs commented that in the examples mentioned there was not an order set up between the *enhyposstasized*, assumed, and the assuming part, the *hypostasis*.<sup>31</sup> Leontius, it is claimed, did not say which of the two natures, which were combined through the *enhyposstasis*, assumed the other. For all that, Loofs presupposed that the term *enhyposstatos* referred an essence away from itself to another, instead of allowing it to be in itself, as the prefix *en* expresses, according to B. E. Daley. But for the fact that precisely at the time of Leontius the old meaning of *enhyposstatos* as 'in its own reality' still held, we have clear evidence from his immediate surroundings, namely from the Eirenaion monastery, the centre of the Sleepless Monks. There the fictitious letters to Peter the Fuller were fabricated; these will concern us in more detail. Here we shall extract from them only their witness to the meaning of *enhyposstasis*.

In the ninth letter of the later collection, the second letter of Pope Felix to Peter the Fuller, the word appeared three times and its meaning always admitted of clear determination.<sup>32</sup> In all the falsified letters to Peter the Fuller it was a question of the so-called Trishagion controversy (or concretely, about the formula 'Holy God, Holy Mighty, Holy Immortal God' and its extension through the addition 'who has been

30. B. E. Daley, *art. cit.*, renders the cited text of Leontius according to the understanding of Loofs as follows: '*Hypostasis*, gentlemen, and the *enhyposstasized* are not the same . . . For the *hypostasis* signifies the individual, but the *enhyposstasized* the essence; and the *hypostasis* marks off the person with its characteristic traits, while the *enhyposstasized* signifies that that is not an accident which has its being in another and is not perceived in itself.' Cf. F. Loofs, *Leontius von Byzanz* (above, n. 1), 67-8.

31. F. Loofs, *op. cit.*, 67-8: 'Which of the two parts of the composed is the *ἐνυπόστατον*, which assumes into its *hypostasis* also the *φύσις* of the other, the author does not say here' (in PG 86, 1304BC).

32. *Collectio Sabbaitica* VIII, *Ep. Felicis altera*: ACO III, pp. 19-23. The occasion for composing a part of the Letters to Peter the Fuller was present in the years 511-512, when the Oriental monks who came to Constantinople with Severus sang the Trishagion, which in Constantinople was referred to the Trinity, with the addition: 'who has been crucified for us' On the monastery of the Sleepless Monks as the place of the forgery, see E. Schwartz, *PS*, 292-293. The letter above belongs to an extension of the original collection and is connected by Schwartz (*op. cit.*, 300) with the conflict in 519. In any case we are now very close to Leontius of Byzantium.



crucified for us', as will be presented in more detail in Chapter Two, III. 2, pp. 254-9). The Antiochenes at the time of Peter understood this formula as applying to the incarnate Logos, who suffered the crucifixion in the assumed flesh. In Constantinople, however, this same formula was related to the immanent Trinity and, in contrast to the Antiochenes, the conclusion was drawn that it was the divinity of the Logos that was crucified; this was regarded as blasphemy and interpreted as Arian-Apollinarian 'theopaschism'. In this context the forger of the ninth letter of the *Collectio Sabbaitica* formulated three statements with regard to the divinity of the Logos, which he wanted to defend with the expression *enhypostatos*. Initially we shall not translate this expression, but insert it in a transliteration of the Greek.

(1) When it stands written that the Logos became flesh (Jn 1,14) and that the Logos was God (Jn 1,1c), then the Logos is not invented as another God beside the Father [meaning as Logos of lessened divinity, which would be capable of suffering]. The Logos is not denoted simply [i.e. as Logos in any sense whatever], but as *Logos enhypostatos* and God the Son, so that we recognize from our lowliness [i.e. from the consideration of the *logos* which dwells in us as human beings] the sameness of the essence of the Father and of the Logos and of the Holy Spirit (λόγος γὰρ οὐχ ἀπλῶς, ἀλλὰ λόγος ἐνυπόστατος καὶ θεὸς ὁ υἱὸς εἴρηται).<sup>33</sup>

(2) Hence, because the Only-begotten of God could not suffer in his own [divine] essence, the created and ensouled body of the Logos suffers, which this very *Logos enhypostatos* of God united to himself from the womb of the holy Virgin without marital intercourse, in order to emerge from woman (πάσχει τὸ γεγονὸς ἴδιον τοῦ λόγου ἐμψυχον σῶμα, ὅπερ αὐτὸς ὁ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐνυπόστατος λόγος . . . ἐνώσας ἑαυτῷ προῆλθεν ἐκ γυναικός).<sup>34</sup>

(3) The *enhypostatos* Logos of the Father and God entered through hearing, and mystically brought about the pregnancy of the holy Virgin (ὁ γὰρ τοῦ πατρὸς ἐνυπόστατος καὶ θεὸς λόγος).<sup>35</sup>

In the three passages adduced there is talk of the God-immanent Trinity, in which, in contrast to Arius, a full reality of the divine *hypostasis* is attributed to the Logos. In this there is no talk of the reciprocal relationship of the divine *hypostases* or even of an insubistence. It is a question only of the same *hypostasis* reality for the Logos, as this is possessed by the Father and the Holy Spirit. *Enhypostasis* thus means: to have 'reality as *hypostasis*', and indeed divine reality.

(2) The idea of translating the expression *enhypostaton* by 'insubstisting' was also suggested by the false attribution of the phrase: 'this has its being in another . . .' It was referred to the word *enhypostaton*, instead of to *συμβεβηκός*, which means accident and of which it is correctly

33. *Ep. Felicis altera*: ACO III, p. 21,12-16.

34. *Ibid.*, p. 21,17-21.

35. *Ibid.*, p. 21,29-30

stated: 'it has its being in another'.<sup>36</sup> It is precisely that which Leontius, however, will not accept as correct for *enhypostaton*. That which is denoted as such has its own reality — a statement which only becomes understandable when the origin of Leontius' teaching about body and soul is considered. This problem is temporarily deferred.

*A further text for 'enhypostasy'*

For his interpretation of 'enhypostasy' Loofs also referred to a seductive formulation in *Epil*, which must be discussed.<sup>37</sup>

That some say, however, that the humanity of Christ had not been formed in advance [of the union] and had not pre-existed and had not been assumed as complete (*τελετα*), but that it exists in the Logos (*ὑποστέῃναι ἐν τῷ Λόγῳ*) and hence one *hypostasis* is formed from both, has indeed something true in it, but in part also not. We will also concede that it did not exist in advance [of the union] or had been formed in advance; but on that account we will not concede that this is the reason for the forming of one *hypostasis* from both, as if this could not occur in another way and it is not possible for God to unite himself [to become one *hypostasis*] with a perfect human being. What kind of union then would make excessive demands on God? It is not the time of the union, nor the place, nor the incomplete state of the body which made the one Christ, but the *manner of the union* (*ὁ τρόπος τῆς ἐνώσεως*) made the one Christ. Not because it [the union] would have been impossible [if the humanity of Christ had already existed in advance of it], but because it was not fitting that the humanity of Christ should have existed as a simple humanity with divinity, we reject the [idea of] creation in advance . . .

Loofs had regarded the words 'existing in the Logos' as a phrase, which would have been common to Leontius as well as to his opponents, and he had judged it as a statement parallel to his interpretation of *enhypostaton*. Loofs claimed that Leontius understood this 'insubstisting' as nothing other than a *praedicatio* of a normally independent nature or substance of another.<sup>38</sup> In doing this he claimed that Leontius had recourse to Aristotle's distinction between a 'first' and a 'second' *ousia* or substance. The 'second substances', as abstract, could be stated of the 'first substances' (i.e. of concrete individuals). For Christ the special case

36. Cf. H. Stickelberger, 'Substanz und Akzidens bei Leontius von Byzanz', *TZ* 36 (1980), 155.

37. Leontius Byz., *Epil* 8: PG 86, 1944C1–D3.

38. F. Loofs, *op. cit.*, 68: 'In fact the *ἐνυπόστατον εἶναι* in compositions is a predicative being of otherwise independent φύσεις or οὐσίαι.' With regard to content this interpretation is very much open to dispute. For in it the enhypostasy, as Loofs understands it, would be made out to be an equation: the divinity of Christ is the humanity of Christ, which is to be strictly rejected. Loofs saddles Leontius with an offence against the fundamental rules of the *communicatio idiomatum*, namely that it is not *abstracta de abstractis* (divinity : humanity), but *concreta de concretis* (God : human being), which are to be *predicated*. In Loofs' understanding, enhypostasy, already falsely interpreted in itself, would in addition be transferred to the *ordo praedicatorum*, the ideal order.

would only consist in the fact that of the 'first substance', i.e. the Logos or Son of God in the Trinity, it is not the 'divinity' which is stated as 'second substance', but the 'humanity', thus a 'second *ousia*' of a completely different kind. Loofs maintained that as one can predicate several accidents of one and the same *individuum*, so too can one predicate several 'second *ousiai*', although they are more than accidents. In no case would the *hypostasis* be doubled by this.<sup>39</sup> One can hardly interpret Leontius worse than Loofs did.

But only if we have excluded this false interpretation of Leontius' word which we have just discussed can we ask about its particular meaning. A particular relationship is assumed to exist between the humanity of Christ and the Logos, a relationship which one can characterize as having its existence or subsistence in the Logos. Thus one can certainly discover here the idea of insubsistence, which leads to the unity of the *hypostasis* in Christ. Yet to see in this a new concept of *hypostasis* or a new idea, not grasped previously, of insubsistence would be to go too far. This 'insubsisting' comes about namely in no other way than that of the communication of the divine *idiomata* to the humanity of Christ, through which this Christ becomes 'one and the same Logos and Son of God in the flesh'. How this communication is realized Leontius explains when he reflects on the relationship of the two natures.

(d) *The major objective of Leontius: the justification  
of the formula of the 'two natures'*

The interest of Leontius is not directed in the first instance to establishing the *mia hypostasis*, but the *dyo physeis*. Here two problems confront him which he attempts to resolve with regard to the 'headless one' in the *Epilysis*. (1) What does the number two mean; how must it be understood, without immediately dividing the numbered realities by its application? (2) How is the 'manner of union' to be grasped, so that the two natures in Christ do not become two *hypostases*? We shall discuss the first question briefly. The second deserves a longer investigation.

Leontius knows from Severus how much the proponents of the *mia physis* are horrified by the *dyas*, the duality. We know the significance of the monads teaching for the Arians.<sup>40</sup> The *dyas*, one could say, is for both *malignantis naturae*, i.e. intrinsically evil and intolerable for

39. We shall pass over the further conclusion of Loofs, *op. cit.*, 72, that Leontius with this theory falls in line with the Cyrillian tradition. It is refuted by the comments that follow.

40. See *JdChr* I<sup>3</sup>, 360-6.

christology.<sup>41</sup> The orthodox, i.e. Leontius, for this reason wants to neutralize the essence of the number: 'The nature of the number considered in itself neither joins them together, nor separates them; it also has no underlying realities.'<sup>42</sup> Whether in counting I speak of unity or I divide depends on the counted realities. We can speak, for example, of five metres of wood and mean by that a single *undivided* piece of wood, which is measured using a particular scale. We can think, however, of one trunk sawn into five individual pieces. Similarly we can speak of ten bushels of corn and can ignore whether the one heap of corn is in fact divided according to ten separated containers or not.

Thus for the Trinity and for the *oikonomia* there is also a different, respective application of a number which is in itself neutral. When we confess three *hypostases* in the one essence of the godhead, we do not divide up the one indivisible essence into three quanta, because by that difference and division would be expressed of it, as the Arians would have it. But it is different in the *oikonomia*, where the *hypostasis* of the Logos is united with the humanity. However, here too the number two does not imply a division, but only a difference. 'Above' and 'below' are two contrary denotations. But they could be realized in one and the same subject, which occupies now this position and then that.

Thus it is also with the *oikonomia*. If we speak of two *physeis*, then we reveal their difference (τὸ ἑτεροειδές), not their separation (τὸ κεχωρισμένον). We banish from them, even if they are not without reality (ἀνυπόστατοι), the number (counting) of the *hypostases*, as on the other side we confess there the number of the essences (*ousiai*) . . .<sup>43</sup>

Admittedly Leontius observes that, in this juxtaposition, the use of human concepts fails, and everything should end in silence. Not only the application of *hypostasis* or *ousia* signifies the risk of a *kainotomia*, but every denotation, every name and every word does the same.<sup>44</sup>

Thus from the form of the major christological concepts, Leontius believes he has justified the possibility of applying number, whether it

41. Cf. *ibid.*, 364 on the significance of the *dyas* in the Platonists. The Headless One says in Leontius Byz., *Epil* 2: PG 86, 1920A: 'Every number is a how many (*poson*), the *monas* alone is without how many (*aposton*). Thus if the without how many (*aposton*) and with it being inseparable (*atomon*) is proper to the monad then it is proper to duality and every number to express the how many (*poson*) and with it the separation.'

42. Leontius Byz., *Epil* 2: PG 86, 1920A. Cf. Leont. Schol., *De sectis*, VII, III-IV: PG 86, 1241-1244 and Ch. 29 of the DP: Diekamp, 216-221 on the theme: the duality expressed of Christ is not that of number, but that of the nature.

43. Leontius Byz., *Epil* 2: PG 86, 1921A.

44. *Ibid.*, 3: PG 86, 1924AB.

be one or two. What is the relationship of duality to unity in Christ? How does Leontius finally establish the unity?

## 2. The interpretation of the 'unity' in Christ

From the text cited above it has become clear that with his concept of *hypostasis* the monk has not advanced beyond the Cappadocian version. The formal ratio of the *hypostasis* coincides with that of the *individuum*. The idea of 'subsistence' in its differentiation from the idea of 'individuality' is not yet directly in question. But it receives a new chance indirectly, insofar as in Leontius, as in no one else before him, the problem of the 'manner of the union'<sup>45</sup> is emphasized. With this statement of the problem a new access is opened to his christology, not only for us but also for history.

The conceptual language which Leontius uses for the problem of the union is now strongly tied to the body-soul analogy, or to the unity of body and soul, as an analogy for the christological *henosis*. For this we are referred surprisingly to neo-Platonic philosophy, as it is represented in the *Symmikta Zetemata* of Porphyry and then in Nemesius, the bishop of Emesa.<sup>46</sup> The whole complex of the transmission of this idea reveals to us the christology of Leontius in a singular way. We find the path which Greek philosophy had trodden in interpreting human

45. Cf. on this J. P. Junglas, *Leontius von Byzanz* (Paderborn, 1908), 88–92. As the main text Junglas names *Epil*: PG 86, 1925C (see also CNE I, Obj. 7: 1297C–1308A). He says that the following are to be regarded precisely as a commentary on the *Epil* text: Maximus Conf., *Op. theol. pol.* 18: *Union. def.* (CPG 7697, 18): PG 91, 213A–216A; John Damasc., *Fragm. de unione* (CPG 8087, 8): PG 95, 232–233. Junglas, however, overestimates their similarity to those of Leontius. Both later authors in their enumeration of the various types of *henosis* indicate indeed an extensive agreement with Leontius, but differentiate themselves from him in taking the terminology and definition further in the decisive term *ένωσις οὐσιώδης*, substantial union. Junglas reads into Leontius the latter understanding.

46. On Porphyry see H. Dörrie, *Porphyrios' 'Symmikta Zetemata' = Zetemata H. 20* (Munich, 1959) (here cited as *Zetemata*). On Nemesius: Nemesius Em., *De natura hominis* (CPG 3550): PG 40, 504–817; Ch. 3 (PG 40, 592–608) is edited by R. Arnou, 'De "Platonismo" Patrum', in *TD* 21 (Rome, 1935), 50–58 (Greek and Latin); G. Verbeke and J. R. Moncho, *Némésius d'Emèse De Natura Hominis. Traduction de Burgundio de Pise. Ed. crit. avec une introduction sur l'anthropologie de Némésius* (Leiden, 1975); H. R. Drobner, *Person-Exegese und Christologie bei Augustinus = Philosophia Patrum* 8 (Leiden, 1986), 221–5. On Priscian see R. Helm, art. 'Priscianus', in *PWK* 22 (1954), 2328–46. On the Christianity of Priscian, *ibid.*, 2330. His work: *Solutiones ad Cosroem regem* I: ed. Dübner, pp. 558, 13–560, 98; *Suppl.* CAG I, 2, pp. 50, 25–52, 22; many texts in H. Dörrie, *op. cit.* On the relationship of Leontius to Nemesius-Porphyry see A. Grillmeier, 'Die anthropologisch-christologische Sprache des Leontius von Byzanz und ihre Beziehung zu den Symmikta Zetemata des Neuplatonikers Porphyrios', in H. Eisenberger (ed.), *FS Hadwig Hörner* (Heidelberg, 1990), 61–72.

beings on a higher level in the christology of Nemesius, and, probably through cribbing from him, in Leontius of Byzantium. This is true for comprehending the realities in question: namely body and soul in the human being, and divinity and humanity in Christ. After these realities (*πράγματα*) were determined, and then contrasted and delimited reciprocally, all the more pressing was the question about the *henosis*, the union of these essences which were comprehended this way or that. Behind the anthropological question stood the whole problem of multiplicity and unity in the world, of matter and spirit. Christology offered a tremendously broad framework to extend these cosmological-anthropological perspectives into new dimensions. Nemesius had seized this possibility. In his own singular way Leontius follows Nemesius along this path, both in choice of language and also in the speculative presentation of the christological problem. Does he progress further than his model?

(a) *The depiction of the body-soul analogy*

If one approaches Leontius subsequent to Severus of Antioch, one is struck by a distinction in the way in which divinity and humanity in Christ are characterized. As one who confesses the *miaphysis* formula, the Patriarch thinks and speaks almost only in the terminology of *physis*. The concept of *ousia* has little chance with Severus, because in his eyes it was misused by John the Grammarian and Sergius Scholasticus, as has already been shown. For this reason he avoids the use of *ousia* as far as possible. It is completely the opposite with Leontius of Byzantium. *Ousia* is strongly to the fore, to depict indeed the body-soul teaching and christology. Still, *vis-à-vis* Severus, one must not overlook the fact that Leontius starts from *ousia* in the meaning of 'single essence' (*οὐσία πρώτη*),<sup>47</sup> the Patriarch in contrast from the abstract essence, the *δεύτερα οὐσία*, as this had been brought into play by John the Grammarian and Sergius Scholasticus. This difference in the use of the *ousia* concept is conditioned both by the monk's manner of logical argumentation as well as by his sources.

In their enquiry about the soul, the middle Platonists asked in the first place about its *ousia*, its essence. The teaching about the uniting of both was not yet their problem. Plotinus too had not yet concerned himself with it. The innovator for this problematic was Porphyry, precisely in his *Symmikta Zetemata*.<sup>48</sup> For the Fathers who wanted to take over the

47. Leontius expresses the *deutera ousia* by the word *eidos*.

48. See H. Dörrie, *Zetemata*.

body-soul analogy for christology, it was of necessity important to start from a form that was appropriate for this purpose. Not everything that the Greeks offered was useful. According to an old Greek notion the soul, in being tied to the body, loses its full freedom and thus forfeits its true existence.<sup>49</sup> An ephemeral soul could not be an image for the imperishable, eternal Logos. Porphyry, who was the enemy of Christians, a fact which Nemesius does not forget to mention,<sup>50</sup> had done some preliminary work for christology. What he had to offer we experience through the mediation of the bishop of Emesa.

(i) *The soul as οὐσία, indeed as οὐσία ἀσώματος, αὐτοκίνητος, οὐσιώδης*

Greek philosophy here uses strong expressions to denote the substantial reality of the soul. It is especially the predicate 'incorporeal' which is regarded as the highest statement about the divine. It is the expression which emphasizes most perfectly the 'effectively transcendent'.<sup>51</sup> Only the 'incorporeal essences' are also 'perfect hypostases' (τέλειαι ὑποστάσεις): thus the soul and the *nous*. They have *energeia*, power and activity.

The objective of the Platonists here was to substantiate the immortality of the soul, something that could not be achieved with the Stoic teaching of mixing. The Peripatetics also failed here. They made the soul into a principle of form, into the entelechy of the body, which ceases with this. In this way Aristotle defended himself against a dualistic teaching about body and soul. Nemesius does not consider this, when he is incorrectly of the opinion that Aristotle denied the substantial character of the soul in his teaching about entelechy.<sup>52</sup> With Plotinus and Porphyry, however, something new came into the interpretation of the relationship of body and soul. Both emphasize 'with all dialectical means the transcendence of the soul', which immediately spawned a new question: how can it dwell in and unite itself with the body, which stands in fundamental opposition to it?<sup>53</sup> But let us remain for the moment with the depiction of the soul's level of being and the corresponding denotations. Here we shall establish a striking relationship between Porphyry, Nemesius and Leontius.

(1) Porphyry: cf. H. Dörrie, *Zetemata*, 179-187: on the incorporeality of the soul; 187-198: the soul as ΝΟΗΤΗ ΟΥΣΙΑ. In addition 20, 44 (*incorporales essentiae*). On the self-movement of the soul: 20, 60, 123, 124, 188, 193-5. On the substantiality of the soul (*ousia*): 9, 10, 43, 112, 169. Porphyry defends the incorporeality of the soul against the Stoics; the substantiality of the soul against the Peripatetic.

(2) Nemesius of Emesa, *De natura hominis* (CPG 3550): All of the three denotations mentioned are taken over.<sup>54</sup> The core sentence reads: the soul 'incorporeal and essentially in itself': ἀσώματος οὐσα καὶ οὐσιώδης καθ'ἑαυτήν: PG 40, 592A12-13.

49. *Ibid.*, 198.

50. Nemesius Em., *De nat. hom.*, ch. 3: PG 40, 601B-604A.

51. H. Dörrie, *Zetemata*, 186.

52. Thus G. Verbeke/J. R. Moncho, in the Introduction sur l'anthropologie de Némésius (above n. 46), XLIV, n. 47.

53. Cf. H. Dörrie, *Zetemata*, 14.

54. On Nemesius see F. R. Gahbauer, *Das anthropologische Modell. Ein Beitrag zur Christologie der frühen Kirche bis Chalkedon* = *ÖstChr* 35 (Würzburg, 1984), 24-6; *JdChr* I<sup>3</sup>, 574-6.

## (3) Leontius of Byzantium:

in general on the concept of *ousia*: PG 86, 1277D–1280B, 1309AB;  
 the soul of the human being as *οὐσία*: CNE I: PG 86, 1280B, 1281B;  
 the soul of the human being as *δσώματος*: *ibid.*, 1281B;  
 the soul of the human being as *αὐτοκίνητος*: *ibid.*;  
 the soul of the human being as *ἀθάνατος*, *ἀνώλεθρος*: *ibid.*;  
 the soul of the human being as *οὐσιώδης*: *ibid.*, 1296C–1297A.

(ii) *The formula of the 'own being' of the soul*

(1) Porphyry coins as the strongest expression for this: 'the soul exists for itself'; it can take on a state in which it is completely for itself (*ἡ ψυχὴ καθ'ἑαυτὴν γενομένη*).<sup>55</sup> 'It is its own reality, and not simply reality in and in respect to another for the duration of its existence', by which the qualities are meant. Only for the reason that the soul exists 'in and for itself' ought it be reckoned among the 'whole and perfect *hypostases*' (Porph., *sent.* 30; 15, 12 M.).<sup>56</sup> This 'for itself' (*καθ'ἑαυτό*) says in addition to that: the soul has a state in which it is 'in relationship' to the body (*σχεσεῖ*).<sup>57</sup> The contrary to that is, however, this *καθ'ἑαυτὴν εἶναι*, i.e. to be for itself in the sense of 'not being related'. The soul has this state in the hereafter or in a dream.

(2) Nemesius takes over verbatim from Porphyry this formula of the 'own being' of the soul, and with him takes the stand 'that the soul can separate itself from the body at will'.<sup>58</sup> For christology the expression 'in relationship' (*en schesei*) will have to be noted, just as much as the 'to be for itself'.

(3) Leontius of Byzantium: his heavily discussed formula *εἶναι, ὑπάρχειν καθ'ἑαυτό* must certainly be seen against the background of Porphyry. For Leontius it is a question of stressing the substantiality of a being in contrast to the accident, 'which has being in another and is not considered in itself'.<sup>59</sup> But on that point one has to ask what Leontius has to say about *schesis*.

(b) *The range of the body-soul analogy*

In no Chalcedonian author of the sixth century whom we have previously discussed can we observe such a comprehensive recourse to anthropology as a model for christology as we can in Leontius.<sup>60</sup> The

55. See H. Dörrie, *Zetemata*, 198–225.

56. Cf. *ibid.*, 220; also 178.

57. See the important parallels between Nemesius and Porphyry in H. Dörrie, *ibid.*, 70; in addition 88: 'Porphyry was the first to contrast the related existence of the soul . . . to the relationless existence of the soul, turned in on itself. The soul itself is not doubled; it has, however, a double life in not being related and in relationship . . .' Considered in itself, the soul has dwelling in itself the *energeia*. Derived from that it has the *schesis*, through which the soul as an incorporeal being is tied to the body not through localized presence, but through relatedness. Could such a notion be taken over?

58. Nemesius Em., *De nat. hom.*, ch. 3: PG 40, 597A; R. Arnou, *TD* 21, 53.

59. Leontius Byz., CNE: PG 86, 1277D5–6, a clause which refers to *symbebekos*, the accident, and not to *enhyposiaton*.

60. Leontius Byz., CNE: PG 86, 1289C: τὸ παράδειγμα τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, cf. *ibid.*, 1304B. Cf. J. P. Junglas, *op. cit.*, 79–85; V. Grumel, art. 'Léonce de Byzance', in *DTC* 9, 404–5; M. Richard, 'Le traité "De sectis" et Léonce de Byzance', *RHE* 35 (1939) (695–723), 707–9; *idem*, 'Léonce de Jérusalem et Léonce de Byzance', *MSR* 1 (1944), 35–88 = *Op. Min.* III, no. 59. In all these works the relationship to Nemesius-Porphyry is not yet noted.



immediate occasion is the debate with the Nestorians and Eutychians, which had still not been concluded. The unity and differentiation of body and soul in the human being presented itself as the closest and most expressive illustration for the Chalcedonian formula of the unity of the *hypostasis* in two natures. But it holds true of the relationship of body and soul that 'the *hypostasis* is common, the nature is proper and according to definition different'.<sup>61</sup> The opponents of Leontius criticized this comparison and its power of proof. They found the first difference between the paradigm and Christ in the fact that the Logos is already perfect before the human being, which also has its completeness. In contrast the human being is composed of 'incomplete parts'. The Aristotelians could say, 'from incomplete natures' (*naturae incompleteae*). In Christ, on the other hand, it is different: 'He has perfect parts, if one can speak of parts at all'.<sup>62</sup> In response Leontius stresses that the establishment of this fact by his opponents serves only to prove that there are two separate *hypostases* in Christ. He means here the Nestorians. In contrast the Eutychians in an ignorant manner would misuse and alienate this paradigm, in order to discover in it the 'prototype of the *synchysis* and its exact image', the *mia physis*.<sup>63</sup>

But lack of understanding and misuse should not stop one from making full use of an old tradition which had left its traces in the writings of the theologians. Admittedly, and the monk concedes that the anthropological model fits Christ only imperfectly, the 'dissimilarity' is not to be overlooked.<sup>64</sup> For this reason from the outset Leontius will delimit the exploitation of the comparison to one central point: 'We shall use the example to explain that the Logos in his essence itself (*ousia*) is united to our body and is never seen without it'.<sup>65</sup> Thus in relation to both elements of the comparison he works out this conclusion, which is important for him: in the union of an invisible and visible, of an immortal and mortal element, as these occur in 'human beings' and in Christ, their properties remain intact. That which before the union is invisible or visible remains so also after the uniting, which is emphasized particularly for the visible, mortal part against the 'Monophysites'. Hence Leontius can proceed in this way to prepare this paradigm for Chalcedonian christology.

61 Leontius Byz, CNE PG 86, 1280B9-10 κοινή μὲν ἡ ὑπόστασις, ἰδίᾳ δὲ ἡ φύσις, καὶ ὁ λόγος διάφορος

62 *Ibid.* PG 86, 1280C

63 *Ibid.*

64 Cf *ibid.* PG 86, 1280D

65 *Ibid.* PG 86, 1281A1-2 αὐτῇ τῇ οὐσίᾳ τὸν Λόγον ἠγνώσθαι τῷ ἐξ ἡμῶν σώματι

(c) *The manner of the union* (ὁ τρόπος τῆς ἐνώσεως)

We do not need to present in their entirety once again the various types of union which had been taken over from ancient philosophy and discussed by the Fathers.<sup>66</sup> Leontius presupposes in particular four central forms of mixing.

- (1) *Parathesis* (*compositio*), a form of union, as in a heap of corn or sand, or in a gathering of human beings (army, choir),
- (2) *Mixis* (*mixtio*) bodily conceived qualities permeate a body Example iron glowing with fire, air filled with light,
- (3) *κρᾶσις* (*mixtura*) mingling of fluids (water-wine), but in such a way that the elements preserve their original qualities, although in combining they clearly weaken each other,
- (4) *σύγχυσις* (*concretio, confusio*) the union is all-encompassing In the new body there arise new properties. One can no longer split the result up into its original parts Thus from the Stoic point of view, body and soul are understood materially as *ἡνωμένον ξῶον* The previous qualities cease to exist in the common transitoriness of their combined parts

For the body-soul unity Porphyry decided to eliminate two things from the Stoic *henosis* (a) the *synchysis* as the extinguishing of the previous qualities, (b) the idea of common perishability (*συνφθαρῆναι*) That resulted in his formula of 'unmingled union' (*ἀσύγχυτος ἐνωσις*),<sup>67</sup> which was avidly accepted by the Fathers. It held good for the Chalcedonians as well as for the non-Chalcedonians (c) In this process the incorporeality of the soul is particularly to be emphasized Porphyry developed the conditions for the 'manner of union' of body and soul in the important *zetema* 'on the union of soul and body'<sup>68</sup> The line of thought of this investigation can be elicited from the third chapter of *De natura hominis* of Nemesius of Emesa<sup>69</sup>

What connections between Porphyry/Nemesius and Leontius can be discovered?

(i) The very wording used to state the problem, namely the formula of the 'manner of union' (*τρόπος τῆς ἐνώσεως*), is striking. In Leontius it receives indeed a special accent.<sup>70</sup> In Nemesius it is found in a context which clearly refers back to Porphyry. In Porphyry the 'how of the union of soul and body' plays a major rôle, as emerges from the reproduction of his *zetema* in Nemesius.<sup>71</sup> The Neoplatonist speaks of the *eidos*

66 See above, pp 40-1 (on Severus of Antioch)

67 Cf H Dörrie, *Zetemata*, 173-174

68 *Ibid.*, 12-103

69 Cf *ibid.*, 12-99

70 Cf Leontius Byz, (a) *DTN*, ch 42 (Daley's numbering) PG 86, 1380BC Leontius emphasizes: οὐ περὶ λέξεων ἐστὶν ἡμῖν τὸ ἀμφισβητούμενον, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ τρόπου τοῦ ὅλου κατὰ Χριστὸν μυστηρίου ὁ τρόπος δηλαδὴ τῆς ἐνώσεως, οὐσιωδῶς, ἀλλ'οὐ σχετικῶς γερονῶς ; (b) *CNE*, Obj 7 PG 86, 1297C Ἐπειδὴ ὁ πᾶς κεκίνηται πόλεμος, τοῦ τρόπου τῆς ἐνώσεως This is the subject of his *Zetesis*, (c) *Epil* PG 86, 1940C *τρόπος τῆς ἐνώσεως*, particularly clear is the position of themes in *Epil* PG 86, 1944C οὔτε γὰρ ὁ χρόνος τῆς ἐνώσεως, ἢ ὁ τόπος, ἢ ὁ ἀτελὲς τοῦ σώματος, ἀλλ'αὐτὸς ὁ τῆς ἐνώσεως τρόπος τὸν ἕνα Χριστὸν πεποίηκεν

71 On this see the overview in H Dörrie, *Zetemata*, 36-37 and the analysis of the individual passages, 37-99 As early as his second chapter Nemesius asks about the 'how of the union' (39)

of the *henosis*, which Priscian translates as *forma adunationis*.<sup>72</sup> Plotinus had already formulated the thought that 'the way of mingling has to be investigated'.<sup>73</sup>

(ii) The concrete interpretation of the unity: the major objective of Leontius is to demonstrate the union in Christ as 'essential' (*οὐσιώδης*) (PG 86, 1925C9) or as 'union according to the essence' (*ἐνωσις κατ' οὐσίαν*) (PG 86, 1301C9). In contrast to a simply accidental, or a moral or a graced combination, as this prevails between Christians and God (PG 86, 1301AC), there has to be accepted in Christ this essential, substantial combination. 'The truth of the unity according to the essence is to be extolled with loud voice; one has to philosophize about it, as corresponds to the truth' (PG 86, 1301C9–11).

How does Leontius explain this 'essential unity'? We shall present a text from CNE:<sup>74</sup>

In order that the distinction be clear to us between the union of things, which are united according to the essence, but which, however, are not changed, and the union of such things, whose nature it is to be changed in the union, in order that we thus know what is the form of the first and the result of the second kind, we want to make the following distinction (*dihairesis*): All things are one with each other through universal, common predicates (*ταῖς καθόλου κοινότησι*) [the universals]; they are distinguished from one another by specific differences (*ταῖς εἰδοποιοῖς διαφοραῖς*); through the union one does not mingle that which is different, nor separate what is united through the distinctions. Rather, to speak paradoxically in the tradition of the Fathers, they are united in distinction and distinguished in being united.

There are two groups of unions and distinctions: many things are united in kind (*eidōs*) and distinguished in the *hypostases*; others are different in kind (*eidōs*), but united in the *hypostases*; and for these things which are united according to kind, but distinguished in the *hypostases* [or, distinguished according to kind, in contrast united in the *hypostases*],<sup>75</sup> the one group has a simple kind of union and distinction, the other a composite manner;<sup>76</sup> the individual explanation for this does not pertain to the present investigation; it also goes beyond the knowledge and understanding of most people.

72. *Ibid.*, 40.

73. Plotinus, *Enneadis* I 1[53] 4,10. Citation in H. Dörrie, *op. cit.*, 45: ζητητέον δὲ τὸν τρόπον τῆς μίξεως.

74. Leontius Byz., CNE: PG 86, 1301C15–1304A14. B. E. Daley offers an alternative English translation of this text in *JTS* 27 (1976), 344.

75. This expanded variant is added by B. E. Daley in his new edition: <ἡγουν τῶν διηγημένων μὲν τοῖς εἶδεσι, ἡνωμένων δὲ ταῖς ὑποστάσεσι> (to 1304A).

76. By a 'simple union' (*ἀπλὴ ἐνωσις*) Leontius means the combination of simple parts which are not composed. The body of the human being is of this kind, because it is composed of four elements. The 'composed union' (*ἐνωσις σύνθετος*) is one from already composed things, and this happens in two ways: (a) by way of mingling (*synchysis*) (PG 86, 1304D): an example of this is the blending of earth and water; (b) by way of preserving the unified parts (without *synchysis*): examples of this are a wick and flame; wood and fire; air and water; body and soul; Logos and body-soul. Thus the unity in Christ is for Leontius a *henosis* of composite parts.

We must rather speak of things which stand in relationship to each other through composition (*σύνθεσις*) or combination (*συμπλοκή*), or mixture (*κρᾶσις*) or union (*ένωσις*), or whatever else one may call essential relationships of things with different *eidōs*; thereby we leave it to those who squabble about terms (*onomatomachoi*) to decide which term is more expressive or more suitable. We are bent on knowing and have little time for choice of words.

What Leontius is aiming at is briefly stated: 'the result must be a genuine, substantial unity from unmingled singular features of divinity and humanity'.<sup>77</sup> The name for the result is not so important, whether *prosopon*, or *hypostasis*, or *atomon* or *hypokeimenon* (subject). In any case one needs to reject the 'Nestorian' solution of a unity, which would be founded only on the like worth or authority of divinity and humanity in Christ, or on a relatedness which implies separation (*σχέσις διαιρετική*). By these means *koinonia* and the exchange of predicates (the communication of *idiomata*) cannot be established. On the positive side the unity in Christ belongs in the area of a 'composite union' (*σύνθετος ένωσις*) and is defined as 'the essential relationship of natures which are of a different kind' (*οὐσιώδης σχέσις τῶν έτεροειδῶν*) (PG 86, 1304A8); that is, realities of a different kind can relate to each other in a substantial relationship, which results in a *hypostasis*.

In view of the expectations which had been entertained since Loofs with regard to the Byzantine theologian, the result of this arduous deduction is disappointing. That the union in Christ is 'substantial' (*οὐσιώδης*), a fact which is expressed equally by the formulas 'union according to the essence, according to the *hypostasis*' (*ένωσις κατ' οὐσίαν, καθ' ύπόστασιν*), is not peculiar to him, but, with the exception of the Nestorians, belongs to the permanent stock of theology. If once again, however, Leontius stresses the substantiality of the *henosis* so strongly, then that is best explained by his unnamed source, namely Nemesius of Emesa. The latter's opponents were the Eunomians, who transferred to the area of christology anthropological notions about the unity of body and soul, which Porphyry fought against.<sup>78</sup> They taught namely that the God-Logos is not united to the body according to his *ousia*, but on the basis of the potencies (*δυνάμεις*), be they of the divinity, or of the humanity of Christ. In this opinion they would have been followers of Aristotle, who saw body and soul united only on the basis of these potencies.<sup>79</sup> It is against this that the 'union according to the *ousia*' must be insisted upon.

77. Leontius Byz., CNE: PG 86, 1305C: *έν μέν τι τούτων είναι τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα τῆς τε θεότητος καὶ τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος ἀσύγχυτος ιδιότης*.

78. Cf. Nemesius Em., *De nat. hom.*, ch. 3: PG 40, 605A; Arnou, TD 21, 57.

79. See H. Dörrie, *Zetemata*, 19; 101-102; 113, n. 3; 115; 142, n. 1.

What is striking in Leontius, however, is the special accent which he places on this understanding of the 'manner of the union'. According to him this teaching belongs to the principles, to the *ἀρχαί*, which are fundamental for orthodoxy.<sup>80</sup> In an unusually strong way the monk uses expressions from the semantic field around *ousia*.<sup>81</sup> From this we can obtain a certain insight into the state of his speculation about the

80. Cf. Leontius Byz., DTN 42 (Daley's numbering): PG 86, 1380B9–13. Nevertheless these first principles should not be understood as purely philosophical principles in Aristotle's sense, but the fundamental truths of christology, as Leontius immediately amplifies in this connection (1380C): 'But what are these principles? They are namely the manner of union, which is effected according to the essence and not according to the *schesis*.' As an example Leontius then adduces the anthropological analogy, this time, however, in the language that he finds in the controversy with Paul of Samosata at the Synod of Antioch in 268: 'namely that the Logos is in the complete humanity, that which in us is the inner human being, as it is composed according to the Apostle . . . ' Leontius does not render the position of the opponents of Paul correctly. He smuggles into their teaching on the humanity of Christ the confession of a complete humanity (that is, with soul and body), while the unity in Christ was understood, however, as a strict Logos-sarx bond. Cf. Leont. Byz.: PG 86, 1380BC with the details in *JdChr* I<sup>3</sup>, 296–9. One should not read into this reference to the 'first principles' a self-surrender of the *fides* to the philosophical *ratio* with its methods, as is suggested by K.-H. Uthemann, 'Syllogistik im Dienst der Orthodoxie. Zwei unedirierte Texte byzantinischer Kontroverstheologie des 6. Jahrhunderts', *JÖB* 30 (1981), 103–12, especially 106. Quite the contrary. The words adduced by Leontius (PG 86, 1380BC) are strongly reminiscent of Theodotus of Ancyra, *Expositio symboli Nicaeni* (CPG 6124): PG 77, 1313–1348, especially 1325BC, in which the teaching of the principles is developed. Certainly Theodotus presupposes the teaching of the *principia circa quae sunt scientiae* of Aristotle (*Anal. post.* A 32.88b 27ff.), thus the teaching of the fundamental concepts of the individual sciences from which these have to proceed, in contradistinction to the *principia ex quibus demonstratur*, that is, the first universal principles of thought. But the application is to be noted. What Theodotus means is this: 'The *fides Nicaena* ought not be interrogated by reason, for it is the "principle" of faith . . . People who deviate in thinking from this formula of faith [Nicaea] are consequently not Christians, regardless of the fact that they may otherwise have something pertinent to say about the faith. For no one outside the Church demands from the "principle" of the respective science that it be deduced, rather one takes over the "principle" from one's teacher in the faith, without producing any reflection opposed to it. And truly the "principle" of the faith in the Only-begotten is [should be] this reflection of the Fathers.' The statements on Theodotus are taken from H.-J. Sieben, *Die Konzilsidee der Alten Kirche* (Paderborn, Munich, Vienna, Zürich, 1979), 232–5; 234 the translation of Theodotus, *Exp. symb. Nic.* 8: PG 77, 1325C. On the influence of the Aristotelian teaching on principles see already, however, Basil, *In hexaemeron* I, 5–6: PG 29, 13A–17A.

81. See in particular DTN, ch. 42 (Daley's numbering): PG 86, 1380BC, where as determinations of the union, there follow one after the other: *οὐσιωδῶς, οὐ σχετικῶς, κατ'οὐσίαν καὶ οὐσιώδης ἔνωσις* combined with *τὴν τε μίαν ὑπόστασιν τῶν δύο φύσεων*. In addition CNE: *τῇ οὐσίᾳ τὸν Λόγον ἠνῶσθαι* (1281A); *ἀνθρώπου φύσει συνάπτεσθαι οὐσιωδῶς* (1285B); finally the formula in CNE is very strong: *ἀρρήτος γὰρ ὄντως ἐστὶν καὶ ἀνεννόητος μόνῃ ἢ κατ'οὐσίαν τε καὶ οὐσιώδης καὶ ἐνυπόστατος ἔνωσις* (1300A). The contrasting picture is clearly recognizable in the sentence of the Eunomians which is adduced, and which Nemesius renders as follows: 'In some, especially in the Eunomians, it is said that the God-Logos is united to the body not according to the *ousia*, but according to the potencies (*dynamis*); it is not the substances (*ousiai*) that are united and mingled, but the potencies (*dynamis*) of the body are united to the divine potencies; the potencies of the body, and indeed of the organic (body) are, so to

unity in Christ. The unity comes about from 'essence' to 'essence', without mediation of the spiritual or corporeal potencies, as these would be proper to the divinity and humanity respectively (thus not through knowledge, will or senses), but through the *koinonia* of the substances. Leontius' thoughts on this subject had once again been stated by Nemesius before him:<sup>82</sup>

The purely incorporeal nature permeates everything unhindered, but it itself experiences a permeation from no side. It is united precisely for the reason that it permeates; but because it itself experiences no permeation, it remains without mixing or mingling.

The substances (*ousiai*), in our case the divinity and humanity of Christ, communicate themselves reciprocally without mediation; this happens by way of a permeation (*penetratio*), which occurs, however, only from the side of the Logos with regard to corporeal nature, not vice versa. In this argument Nemesius uses the word *χωρεῖν*, which is well known from the Stoics, and *παρουσία*,<sup>83</sup> which has a strong meaning. The notion which here underlies the body-soul unity implies that the spiritual soul penetrates the whole body unhindered, without being bound to one bodily place or to a partial region. While the soul receives nothing from the body, through its *parousia* it changes the

say, the senses according to Aristotle. With them, so they claim, the divine potencies blend. But no one, this is my opinion, will concede to them that the senses are corporeal potencies . . . Thus it is better, as has already been said, to maintain that the unmingled union of the substances (*οὐσιῶν*) happens corresponding to the proper nature of the incorporeal' (Nemesius Em., *De nat. hom.*, ch. 3: PG 40, 605AB; R. Arnou, *TD* 21, 57-8). The strong use of *ousia* is mediated through Porphyry, who stands here in the tradition of Aristotle. Cf. J. H. Waszink, art. 'Aristoteles (1/9)', in *RAC* I, 657: 'In the third century AD, Porphyry, who in logic was completely on the side of the Peripatetic, through his *Eisagoge* made Aristotelianism accessible to wider circles, and thus also for the Christians.' But it is true of Aristotle, in contrast to Plato, that he acquired the concept of *ousia* anew. 'To this goal-conscious orientation of all philosophizing to the concept of *ousia* is to be ascribed the fact that Aristotle's doctrinal system had achieved a monumental closedness — a closedness that allowed it to become a model for millenia.' Thus H. Dörrie, art. 'Aristoteles', in *Kl.Pauly* 1 (581-91), 590. Nemesius, and following him Leontius, wanted to express two things by using this language and conceptualization, both the reality in Christ of the divinity and humanity which were to be united, as well as the reality of union and the unity itself. For this reason the phrase from the CNE (PG 86, 1300A) just cited (*enhypostatos* stated of the *henosis*) has to be translated as 'substantial and real union'.

82. Nemesius Em., *De nat. hom.*, ch. 3: PG 40, 605B-608A.

83. On this see H. Dörrie, *Zetemata*, 70-71; 72-73: 'The mere presence (and this too should not be thought of spatially) effects already that union which is not mingling.' This is the opinion of Porphyry. From the *Symmikta Zetemata* Nemesius cites precisely this text (PG 40, 604A) and then comments that Porphyry spoke here of soul and body, but what was said is true in its purest form of the union of Logos and humanity in Christ (604B). Leontius speaks also of the dwelling of the soul in the body, but uses for this not the word *parousia*, but *διαγωγή*, sojourn, dwelling.

body into its own *energeia*.<sup>84</sup> Porphyry further determines the body-soul relationship by the expression 'as in a relationship' (ὡς ἐν σχέσει). The soul is also tied from the side of the body by a *schesis* or a desire (τῇ πρὸς τὴν ῥοπήν). But in the soul there are two states that must be distinguished, one free from relation, in which it preserves 'its own being' (καθ'ἑαυτὴν εἶναι), but also the state of related existence. It carries on, one could say, a double life, in being non-related and in relationship. In this way Porphyry expresses the tension which exists in the 'unmingled *henosis*' of body and soul. Leontius of Byzantium too retains the unity of body and soul in the same strong tension, and this with regard to the Chalcedonian teaching of two natures. In this context Richard speaks of an abuse (*abus*) of the anthropological analogy, which Leontius pushed to its limits, especially in the first book of *CNE*. The formula of the 'one *hypostasis*' in 'two natures' holds in the same way of the human being as a unity of body and soul, and of Christ, as the one *hypostasis* in divinity and humanity.<sup>85</sup> Most enlightening for his understanding of the relationship of body and soul as an analogy for christology is a section of *Epilysis*. Here he stresses first that divinity and humanity in Christ are not combined in a 'natural unity' (φυσικῶς), and explains this by means of his anthropology.<sup>86</sup>

I am far from conceding that the God-Logos has his union with our nature on the basis of the definition of his nature; rather I do not at all accept this way of speaking [which says] that the human soul by nature (φυσικῶς) enters into relationship with its body without divine power [i.e. without divine decision of power].

Thus in *CNE* too Leontius could define the soul without a reference to the body: 'What does the soul lack to have its own and independent life, in order to have an incorporeal and self-moving substance?'<sup>87</sup> Without further ado we recognize Nemesius, and behind him Porphyry. In this way Leontius certainly gained leeway for underlining the transcendence of the Logos and his freedom with regard to the incarnation, as well as the duality of natures in Christ. He loosened the

84. See the texts in H. Dörrie, *Zetemata*, 83–84. Nemesius Em., *De nat. hom.*, ch. 3: PG 40, 600A; Arnou, *TD* 21, 54: the soul belongs to the νοητά, the intelligibilia, and shares their properties.

85. Cf. Leontius Byz., *CNE*: PG 86, 1281B–1284A, a particularly important section.

86. *Idem*, *Epil*: PG 86, 1940B; to be noted is the improvement of the text by M. Richard, 'Léonce de Jérusalem et Léonce de Byzance', in *Op. Min.* III, no. 59, p. 19, n. 68.

87. Leontius Byz., *CNE*: PG 86, 1281B. According to Leontius there are two complete substances in human beings. *De sectis* teaches the opposite to this. How there can still be one nature in human beings, Leontius explains in a very convoluted way. Cf. *CNE*: 1289B–1293A. Cf. M. Richard, 'Le traité "De sectis" et Léonce de Byzance', in *Op. Min.* II, no. 55, 708–709.

body-soul unity in order to refute the *mia physis* and to have a conclusive analogy for the two natures. But this was achieved at the cost of anthropology. For this reason he had to seek a counter-balance in stressing the *henosis*. We shall see how other authors of the sixth century, Leontius of Jerusalem and the author of *De sectis*, turned away from this solution.

Leontius knows well that with the taking over of the word *σχέσις*, which is rendered by relationship, relation, and in Latin too by *habitus*, a loaded expression is introduced. However, he also certainly recognizes that, for christology, it cannot simply be avoided, but it has to be delimited by more detailed determinations. Hence on the one side he can demand for the 'manner of union', as we have seen, that it must be 'substantial' (*οὐσιωδῶς*) and ought not only be 'relationship' (*σχετικῶς*) (DTN, ch. 42: PG 86, 1380B; cf. *Epil.*: PG 86, 1925C). Precisely if mingling (*synchysis*) may not occur and the *henosis* has to be realized as 'unmingled' (*asynchytos*), one has of necessity to accept a 'relationship' between divinity and humanity, as between body and soul in the neo-Platonic view. Leontius now avails himself of composite expressions: for the unity in Christ it is sufficient to have a 'substantial relationship' (*οὐσιώδης σχέσις*) (CNE: PG 86, 1304A10-11); to be excluded in contrast is a 'dividing relationship' (*σχέσις διαιρετική*), as this has been ascribed to the Nestorians (CNE: PG 86, 1305C). The latter is realized only according to the dignity, by the assumed human being receiving the same honour as the Logos. This entails a contradiction, because in the one, or rather, in the combining (*συνάπτειν*) of the divinity and the human being Jesus, it is immediately once again divided, through the acceptance of two *hypostases*. It is worth noting how modestly Leontius summarizes the results of his investigation into the union in Christ:

Thus it remains after our investigation of the expression 'essential union' (*ἐκ τῆς ἐξετάσεως τοῦ λόγου τῆς κατ'οὐσίαν ἐνώσεως*), that we understand the special features (*ιδιότητα*), both of the divinity as well as of the humanity, without mingling, according to the examples adduced above. We have compiled only a weak picture of the truth which transcends everything, [a picture], however, that shows that there is *one* single end-result from it (*ἀποτέλεσμα*), whether we call it *prosopon*, or *hypostasis*, or indivisible (*ἀτομον*), or subject (*ὑποκείμενον*) or whatever else you please. About this I shall not argue.

But those who, through dignity or authority [of the Logos with regard to the human being Jesus] or another separating relationship in the combining, at the same time separate (*ἢ τινι τοιαύτῃ σχέσει διαιρετικῇ διὰ τοῦ συνάπτειν χωρίζοντας*), our disputation has already refuted and has found them guilty of separating the natures by [the acceptance of two] *hypostases* and of not accepting an exchange of statements [between the natures] (*καὶ μηδεμίαν κοινωνίαν ἢ ἀντίδοσιν ἐχούσας ἢ ἀντιδιδούσας*).<sup>88</sup>

88. Leontius Byz., CNE: PG 86, 1305CD.



With these words Leontius himself testifies that even he did not aim at a breakthrough in the question of the distinction of *hypostasis* and *physis*.

### III LEONTIUS OF BYZANTIUM AND THE CHALCEDONIAN PICTURE OF CHRIST

We shall certainly have to disclaim seeing in Leontius of Byzantium the forerunner of a new speculative epoch in christology, as he has been represented from F. Loofs down to S. Otto. The analysis of his conceptual language and formulas no longer allows him to be seen as a great innovator. To discover in his christology the turn from concept to axiomatic theory is difficult to justify. However, it would be erroneous to consider the significance of Leontius for Chalcedonian christology only under these restrictions. We shall attempt something different. We want to push forward beyond his dry conceptual language and his syllogisms to his total theological conception of Jesus Christ, with which he attempted to parry the seductive misinterpretations of the earthly appearance of Jesus. Here he performed worthwhile service for christological development, doing this on the basis of his fundamental, sober Chalcedonian attitude. The whole compass of the problems, however, is not yet grasped by Leontius. He is still not a systematic theologian in the later sense. As the development in the next decades of the sixth century will show, three themes belong together if one reflects on the significance of the union of divinity and humanity in Christ for the properties of the humanity of Jesus: *incorruptibility* (*uncorruptedness*) of the body, participation in the *omniscience* of God, and relationship of being created and *being uncreated* in Christ. The 'holiness' of the body of Christ also belongs here, but only occasionally is it a theme. For Leontius the incorruptibility (*uncorruptedness*) of the body of Christ comes to the fore, as the writing 'Against the Aphthartodocetists' shows.<sup>89</sup> What christological tendencies are visible here?

89 For an overview see J. Pehkan, *The Christian Tradition* 1 (Chicago-London, 1971), 266–77, especially 271–4. First of all we shall devote ourselves to the main question of the *aphtharsia*, as this is treated by Leontius Leont. Byz., *Dialogus contra aphthartodocetas* (CPG 6813) (CA) PG 86, 1316D–1356C. On this see V. Grumel, 'La sotériologie de Léonce de Byzance', *EO* 40 (1937), 385–97, *idem*, art. 'Léonce de Byzance', in *DTC* 9 (1926), 400–26, especially 422–3. L. Perrone, 'Il "Dialogo contro gli aftartodoceti" di Leonzio di Bisanzio e Severo di Antiochia', *CrSt* 1 (1980), 411–42, produces a report on research on this dialogue and new contributions to the interpretation of the *genus literarium*.

## 1. The 'Aphthartodocetists' ('Aphthartics') of Leontius of Byzantium

We encounter the denotation 'Aphthartodocetists' for the first time in the writings of John the Grammarian around 515.<sup>90</sup> Whom is Leontius attacking in his writing *Contra Aphthartodocetas* (CA)?<sup>91</sup> According to Draguet it must be held that the concept of *aphtharton* in CA implies being 'by nature incapable of suffering and dying'. Julian of Halicarnassus is different again. By this term he understands that Christ was excepted from the *peccatum naturae* and its consequences, as these affect all human beings. 'Uncorrupted' means for Julian's Christ 'not to be subjected by necessity to the corruptedness that stems from sin'. Certainly Jesus could suffer and die, not from unavoidable fate, but in the free disposition of the Logos, which decided about the whole life of Jesus. Initially Draguet had accepted that the 'Aphthartodocetists' of Leontius' writing CA had supported the teaching of Julian in the interpretation of Severus.<sup>92</sup> At first he did not want to accept that Leontius was dependent on the Patriarch in any way, but then found himself ready to make certain corrections to his opinion. Another interpretation was represented by Richard, who supported a dependence in the direction indicated:<sup>93</sup> corresponding to the elements offered by the Patriarch to interpret Julian, he claimed that the monk interpreted his Chalcedonian opponent too, and in so doing had consciously distorted his teaching. Leontius, he maintained, had wanted in this way to strike his anti-Origenist opponent, namely the neo-Chalcedonian Ephraem of Antioch, who has still to be treated in our work.<sup>94</sup> The assumptions of Richard, however, do not stand up to examination.

In order to achieve a clear result, according to L. Perrone what is needed is a methodical reflection which has to consider the following: (1) CA first of all has to be considered in itself; (2) the reactions

90 John Gram., *Adv aphthartodocetas* M Richard, CCG 1, 68–78 Docetism is ascribed incorrectly to the opponents of Leontius, but an *aphtharsia* teaching correctly For this reason we choose the following expression to characterize this group — aphthartics

91 See F. Loofs, 'Die "Ketzeri" Justinians', in *Harnack-Ehrung Beitr z Kirchengeschichte* (Leipzig, 1921), 232–48, J. P. Junglas, *Leontius von Byzanz* (Paderborn, 1908), § 12, 100–5, R. Draguet, *Julien d'Halicarnasse* (Louvain, 1924), 176–8, L. Perrone, *art. cit.*

92 R. Draguet, *op. cit.*, 107–8, 202, n 4, 208–9, 212, n 2

93 M. Richard, 'Léonce de Jérusalem et Léonce de Byzance', *MSR* 1 (1944), 35–88 = *Op Min.* III, no 59

94 M. Richard, 'Léonce de Byzance était-il origéniste?' *RevÉtByz* 5 (1947) (31–66), 36ff, *Op Min* II, no 57 According to Richard the CA bypasses in a twofold way the real picture of the aphthartics (1) through an unreliable depiction of the doctrines discussed, (2) through deficient proofs of the existence of those supporting them Cf L. Perrone, *art. cit.*, 415, n 10

of Severus and Leontius to the apthartodocetist teaching have to be compared.<sup>95</sup> As a result of this reflection the first facts that have been established, macroscopically as it were, are: In *CA* the argument from scripture and the tradition of the Fathers, which are in the background in the other writings, dominate.<sup>96</sup> Speculative argumentation, *ratio theologica*, is applied less rigorously and formally than in *CNE*, *Epil* and *Epap*, without, however, being excluded. For the method of Leontius, seen as a whole even in *CA*, remains a rational one, an impression which is intensified if one compares with it the method of Severus of Antioch. By 'picture of Christ' we mean the concrete presentation which Leontius makes of the 'earthly Jesus' in opposition to the interpretation of the 'Apthartodocetists'. Here for the first time the fundamental Chalcedonian lines are applied to the form of the earthly Jesus, with discussion about what in this life was normality and what was extraordinary. Is it a 'Byzantine picture of Christ', as we are accustomed to see it? In any case the posing of the question will prove to be useful, also with regard to the significance of Leontius for piety.<sup>97</sup>

## 2. Jesus Christ in his *aptharsia*

The central point of *CA* is the interpretation and justification of the *aptharsia* or uncorruptedness of Christ in the form in which it exercises its fascination, according to the communication of Leontius, upon the supporters of Chalcedon.<sup>98</sup> This combination of Chalcedonian two-natures teaching and the acceptance of a thorough-going *aptharsia* of Christ is the strange thing about the dialogue partners of Leontius. This is an important difference from the Julianists with whom Severus had to deal. Together with the two natures they also profess the

95. L. Perrone, *art. cit.*, 416. Here the author investigates the dialogical character of *CA*, which he states is a real dialogue pursued with representatives of the Chalcedonian-apthartic synthesis. For this reason he reduces the danger of presenting a purely fictitious opponent too one-sidedly and with distortions (422). Perrone refers to M. Hoffmann, *Der Dialog bei den christlichen Schriftstellern der ersten vier Jahrhunderte* = *TU* 96 (Berlin, 1966); B. R. Voss, *Der Dialog in der frühchristlichen Literatur* = *Studia et Testimonia Antiqua* 9 (Munich, 1970); *JdChr* II/1, 89.

96. *Idem*, *op. cit.*, 66. To be noted is the fact that among the twenty-seven testimonials in the *CA* florilegium is to be found one testimony to Ps. Dionysius Ar., *De div. nom.* (no. 1). See L. Perrone, *art. cit.*, 437-8.

97. For this reason we are prevented from accepting the assumption of S. Otto, *Person und Subsistenz* (Munich, 1968), who finds axiomatics in Leontius in a special way. There may well be some indications of it.

98. Leontius Byz., *CA*: PG 86, 1317CD: led astray by the attraction of the word *aptharsia* 'some of us' have gone over to the teaching of Severus and Julian of Halicarnassus and have thus surrendered the whole mystery of the incarnation.

*Tomus Leonis*.<sup>99</sup> Correctly they apportion the *apatheia*, the freedom from suffering, to the Logos as Logos, while they ascribe suffering to the human nature and also advocate the so-called communication of *idiomata*: of the one Incarnate One they state both the divine superiority to suffering as well as the human capacity to suffer, depending on whether 'one and the same' is considered in his divinity or in his humanity (PG 86, 1320AB). That is orthodox teaching. Inconsistently there was in Constantinople a group of Chalcedonians who had obstinately sworn to ascribe to the earthly Jesus freedom from suffering and corruptibility in general, and indeed as a perduring physical quality (PG 86, 1320B).

Leontius recognized the harm which the ecclesial understanding of the incarnation of Christ would suffer because of this. It would be turned around and practically annihilated. What does this new teaching imply? How was it justified?

As Chalcedonians, the dialogue partners of Leontius strongly profess positions which one would expect from Julianists who stand on the platform of the *mia-physis* teaching. The beginnings of the exaggerations of the Chalcedonians lay in the particular understanding of the *henosis*, an expression of which Leontius is very fond. The union in Christ here receives not only the function of combining the two natures, but also of altering them. Here an old conception of the antique teaching of mixing crept in, which holds that a substantial joining demands also a certain alteration of the parts that unite. Now it was clear to all the Fathers that the unity in Christ must have its significance for the humanity of Christ, despite the demand for an 'unmingled *henosis*'. The union of God and a human being is indeed a joining of 'infinite' and 'finite'. The more serious, the more 'essential', the more 'substantial' it had to be taken, the more the tension increased. Could the state of the *kenosis* still be taken seriously? Even to speak of that was also difficult for the Aphthartodocetists of Constantinople, as we encounter them in CA. Philippians 2,5-11 appears to play hardly any rôle.

Those enthusiastic about the *aphtharsia* of Christ demand that the effect of the *henosis* commence immediately with the coming into existence of Christ, whereby it is difficult to denote the precise moment. The Logos has certainly assumed from Mary in the womb something corruptible (*φθαρτόν*); but he changed it immediately into *aphtharsia* (*εὐθές*).

99. Thus they acknowledge Leo's incriminating formula 'each of the two forms acts' (*agit enim utraque forma*).

αὐτὸ πρὸς ἀφθαρσίαν μετεκεράσατο).<sup>100</sup> Thus the central point of the teaching of Julian of Halicarnassus is taken up, but in a modified, intensified form. Julian himself did not accept any effective, qualitative alteration of the humanity of Christ, but he saw this only as not subjected to the *necessity* of corruptedness. In freedom the Logos could resign his body to suffering or preserve it from this. The perduring capacity to suffer as such he did not see interfered with by this. The Aphthartodocetists of CA demand more: the *aphtharsia* begins immediately with the assumption of humanity, and tied to it is the *apatheia*, as the actual state of Jesus. Now a particular intervention of the Logos is needed, not to hold suffering at a distance, but first to admit it at all. The 'miracle' in the life of Jesus and the 'natural' (the λόγος φύσεως) change places.<sup>101</sup> Indeed these strange Chalcedonians are convinced of the reality of the human nature and its real capacity to suffer. They are not docetists who accept a fictitious body or fictitious suffering. The name 'Aphtharto-Docetists' is artificial as a heresiological construct and ought not be applied to the Chalcedonian risk group at Constantinople.

It is worthwhile going into this strange aberration in more detail. This particular state of Christ's human nature occurs firstly on the basis of the union and is not required for it, if one looks at its nature and takes it in its nature (κατὰ φύσιν). 'The body is not free from suffering and uncorrupted according to nature, but by power of the union with the God-Logos.'<sup>102</sup> For this reason the 'essential, substantial combination' of the humanity of Christ with the divinity becomes not only an unfulfilled claim to uncorruptedness during life on earth, but leads to an actual change: 'How was it then possible that that which was united to the uncorrupted Logos did not shed the corrupted nature?'<sup>103</sup> Leontius finds the whole process rather complicated: first of all the body of Christ is supposed capable of suffering from the side of the mother (PG 86, 1328D), but then immediately to be uncorrupted (1329AB). Leontius summarizes the consequences that this leads to in his judgement: thus if the Logos did not want, nothing of natural

100. Leontius Byz., CA: PG 86, 1329B5-6.

101. *Ibid.*, PG 86, 1321B11-12: νόμῳ θαύματος, ἀλλ'οὐ λόγῳ φύσεως. Cf. *ibid.*, 1329C: 'Christ has indeed suffered, but not out of necessity' (ἀνάγκῃ φύσεως, ἀλλὰ λόγῳ οἰκονομίας τοῦ Λόγου ἐφιεῖντος τὸ παθεῖν). Here there is certainly allusion to a phrase of Cyril of Alexandria, which had already played a rôle in Severus of Antioch (cf. above, pp. 104-5, n. 259 with reference to PO 12, 184-185).

102. Leontius Byz., CA: PG 86, 1325B.

103. *Ibid.*, PG 86, 1329A2-3; 1329A1 refers to a more far-reaching act: τὸ προσληφθὲν εἰς ἀφθαρσίαν μετεσκευάζετο (what was assumed was transformed into uncorruptedness).

symptoms would be bestowed on the flesh (1332A). The picture of Christ is developed and presented as in a negative: impassibility and immortality in Christ are the 'natural' state and rejoice in the stability and unchangeableness of natural laws, insofar as a particular intervention does not happen. The actual suffering in the body of Christ happens because of a miracle (*θαύματος λόγῳ*).<sup>104</sup>

It is important to recognize how much is at stake in this for the picture of Christ and the whole religious relationship of Christians to the life of Christ. On the whole there was a threat of a devaluation of the incarnation itself. The descending Christ, as it were, ought no longer to touch the ground, but rather he must immediately be 'released' from it. Where was there still a place for *kenosis* and the cross? Was Philippians 2,5–11 completely forgotten? What possibility was still there for an *imitatio Christi*, the crucified? From the intensity of the reaction of Leontius to this false stressing and ordering of the *aphtharsia* of Christ we recognize that he must have feared quite considerable damage for the ecclesial picture of Christ. Hence it is of significance to grasp this reaction in its peculiarity and to appreciate it. Perhaps it is on the success or lack of success of this critique that the real significance of Leontius is to be decided more clearly, rather than on his work on concepts and formulas.

### 3. Leontius' critique of the *aphtharsia* teaching and his own contrasting picture

#### (a) *Fundamental objections and their evaluation*

Not all of Leontius' counter-arguments are convincing. His claim that, if Jesus had been impassible from the beginning, he would not have freely relinquished this privilege (PG 86, 1329CD), sounds rather weak. Against this speak the Pauline passages of the *kenosis* (Phil 2,5–11) and of the voluntary poverty of Christ (2 Cor 8,9). For Leontius himself it is significant that he frees himself to some extent from the theologoumenon that dupes his dialogue partners, namely from the idea of suffering 'when the Logos permits'. Indeed, he too accepts an intervention of the divine Logos in questions of Christ's suffering, but he has an essentially better formulation of it. Moreover, it needed no 'exemption'. Only in one particular respect should it be necessary. For 'the Logos allowed a nature, which naturally could suffer, to do without

104. Thus the *aphthartia* in CA: PG 86, 1333D.

sin (*ἀναμαρτήτως*) that which corresponded to its nature'.<sup>105</sup> In this way a good theological element is introduced into christology, the idea of a graced guarantee of the sinlessness of the human will of Christ. Such a graced help signifies no alteration to the human capabilities of Christ. Nevertheless for Leontius it remains the case that, in order to make the human nature of Christ passible, there is no need for permission from the Logos.<sup>106</sup> This important recognition entails a correction of the christology of Gregory of Nyssa and other Fathers of the fourth and fifth centuries,<sup>107</sup> in whose writings, because of their understanding of the unity in Christ, it had to be 'natural' for him not to suffer. Certainly Leontius too sees the transforming will of the Logos at work in the life of Jesus, not for the purpose of permitting suffering, but on the contrary, when it occurs, of allowing the definitive, eschatological freedom from suffering to shine through in the transfiguration. For the flesh of Christ 'had impassibility not with the union, but from the will of the one uniting, who disposed of it to his advantage (*οἰκονομοῦντος*) according to the occasion'.<sup>108</sup> Whether this reversal is sufficiently established is to be tested in the context of the fourth fundamental proposition just cited.

On the contrary it is thus: when the flesh bears the sufferings that are natural to it, the Logos with many others sends it control over the passions (*τὴν κατὰ παθῶν ἐπικράτειαν*). For the 'physical bond' (*συνφύσις*) of the Logos with the flesh is inseparable and absolutely insoluble. To be free from suffering was not possible for the body in every respect. For it had this freedom from suffering (*τὸ ἀπαθές*) not from the union as such, but from the will of the one united (Logos), who disposed of this according to the moment and the need. If this is not the case, one must concede one thing of both: either the nature did not suffer at all, provided that it had become free from suffering through the union, or, if it has suffered, it has completely fallen out of the union.<sup>109</sup>

Here Leontius makes clear some important features of the Chalcedonian picture of Christ. (1) The *henosis* with the Logos means for the human nature of Christ no qualitative change, apart from the fact that

105. *Ibid.*, 1332A.

106. *Ibid.*: 'It was not the case that the flesh was superior to suffering (*ἀνωτέρα κατὰ φύσιν παθῶν οὐδσα*) and only became passible through the Logos.' The apthartic summarizes the position of Leontius on this question concisely: 'Christ is passible, and this on the basis of his bodily nature (*physis*), and not from the will of the divinity' (PG 86, 1340A5-6).

107. On Gregory of Nyssa see *JdChr* I<sup>3</sup>, 546. See above, p. 104, n. 258 (on Severus of Antioch).

108. Leontius Byz., CA: PG 86, 1332AB.

109. *Ibid.*, 1332A-B6.

it belongs to the Logos, and is to be held as holy, the same as he is.<sup>110</sup> Leontius thus leaves the Chalcedonian 'unmingled' completely intact. The *henosis* is referred back to its true function. The Aphthartologues had accepted an ontological nexus between *henosis* and *apatheia* of such a kind that Leontius could confront them with the following: if Christ actually suffers, then for this period the *henosis* must cease. (2) In the picture of Christ subjection to suffering is the natural and perduring base; for the period of the earthly life superiority to suffering is the seldom-granted exception. (3) But because in Christ too the *sarx* is naturally weak, it needs the graced help of the Logos for his humanity, so that it receives the moral power to master suffering (*epikrateia*) sinlessly. This is good theology which, however, has an odour of Nestorianism to the other side.

For Leontius' discussion partner sees the redemptive character of Christ's suffering endangered. If the interpretation of Leontius is correct, his opponent is of the opinion that then Christ would suffer only for himself and not for us. (Christ would indeed be nothing more than simply a human being: so one could extend this line of thought.) Hence the monk must enter in greater detail into the peculiarity of Christ's redemptive suffering: the Logos retains the highest power of disposition over his own body, even if this is subjected to the universal human necessity of suffering — an assumption that cannot occur in the system of Julian of Halicarnassus — and this certainly also has an effect on Leontius' discussion partner. Thus the Logos could prevent suffering if he wanted; in relation to suffering he is hence only a *removens prohibens*, not the one who through his disposal has first to enable suffering

110. Cf. *ibid.*, 1353AB: Leontius distinguishes two sources of the sanctification of Christ's humanity: (1) the power of the Holy Spirit, which became effective at the virginal conception of Christ; (2) the union of the Logos with our nature. He ascribes to it (a) freedom from sin, (b) the entire holiness which is given with the flesh's being seized by the union and thus is proper to the Logos. This holiness does not rest on a simple influence on the flesh (*energeia*), but on the 'substantial, essential union with the Logos'. *Vis-à-vis* the apthartie, Leontius can acknowledge this holiness without on that account immediately demanding a physical alteration in the *sarx* of Christ in the sense of the *aphtharsia*. Here, however, it is a matter of the 'ontological holiness', not of moral perfection in Christ. On the first question cf. fragments 43 and 48 in Julian of Halicarnassus; R. Draguet, *Julien d'Halicarnasse* (Louvain, 1924), 150 and 55–6; on ontological and moral holiness cf. D. Stiennon, Art. 'Léonce de Byzance', *DSP* 9 (1976) (651–60), 658–9 with reference to PG 86, 1353A ('L'impeccabilité et la totale sainteté' du Christ), to 1324CD, 1373B and 1332D. Leontius argues with Theodore of Mopsuestia and finds fault with his teaching of the ignorance and subjection to the 'passions' which have necessarily to be assumed, in order for progress and the acquisition of virtue in Christ to be accepted.



(cf. Jn 18,6; Mt 26,53). The Logos, however, will not prevent it.<sup>111</sup> For the redemptive power of this suffering rests precisely on the fact that the suffering is indeed naturally conditioned, and it is mastered without sin.<sup>112</sup>

Here the monk offers a presentation, seldom found among the Greeks, of the relationship between nature and supernature in human action.

*(b) Christ's impassibility in the tension between nature and supernature*

*(i) Fundamental considerations*

For the first time in Greek theology the distinction between 'nature and supernature' is articulated explicitly and then applied to the *apatheia* of Christ. Occasioning this determination of language was the reversal by the Aphthartologues of 'rule' and 'exception' in relation to the passibility or superiority to suffering in the life of Jesus. In their sense *apatheia* would be 'natural' also for the (united) humanity of Christ, being able to suffer 'supernatural'. Against this stands the thesis of Leontius: if the power to master (*epikrateia*) suffering is also supernatural (*hyper physin*), then it still does not annul the natural faculties (*τὰ φυσικά*); rather it develops these potencies and enables them to do their own work and to receive help which lies beyond this.<sup>113</sup>

The supernatural does not annul the natural, but only leads it higher and urges it on to be able to do that too and to receive the power for what is beyond . . . Consider for me the flesh of the Lord in its natural powers after the supernatural and marvellous union. The supernatural does not have any place there where the nature does not have what is natural. The miracle is annulled if that which is above nature [namely the *henosis* in Christ], changes the nature; and ambition (*philotimia*), which violates truth, becomes hybris.

In a felicitous formulation there is found here the Greek version of the Latin scholastic axiom: *gratia supponit, non tollit naturam*. Grace presupposes nature, it does not annul it. Leontius has discovered this insight in the Chalcedonian terms 'unmingled' and 'undivided'. Once again the dialogue partner, enthused by the *aphtharsia*, places the opposite picture there, although he appears to assent in principle to the remarks of Leontius about 'natural-supernatural', exemplified in the figure of Jesus. Still he remains without insight and states that what are to be characterized as miracles are the sufferings; that Christ, the Logos in the

111. In *CA* (PG 86, 1332C) Leontius refers to Athanas., *De incarn.* 21, 7: SC 199, p. 344,42-44; PG 25, 133C4-7; *ibid.*, 44, 8: SC 199, p. 428,53-56; PG 25, 176C1-5 (B. E. Daley, *Opera*, apparatus for these passages).

112. Leontius Byz., *CA*: PG 86, 1332A.

113. *Ibid.*, 1333B2-5; 1333CD.

flesh, is impassible and immortal corresponds to the indissoluble natural laws.<sup>114</sup> Leontius feels himself challenged by this thesis to show in the concrete life of Jesus his abstractly formulated rules about the relationship between nature and supernature.

(ii) *Nature and supernature in the concrete life of Jesus*

With a few strokes Leontius sketches the normal day-to-day life of Jesus, the Son of God. It took thirty years before the time of working miracles was allowed to begin.<sup>115</sup> Even in the public life of Jesus, miraculous signs remain the exception. The divinity of the Kyrios revealed itself only in a long process:<sup>116</sup>

All this [i.e. the life of Jesus] took place from the hour of his birth to his ascending the cross and the three days in the tomb in this sequence and in natural order (*τάξει φυσικῇ*). To reveal his divinity, which was not yet explained to the multitude, he worked in the whole course of the time (*πρὸς τὴν ὁλὴν ἀκολουθίαν*) miracles with his body only rarely, to reveal his own divinity, as stated, not to annul the truth of his body. [According to Leontius no miracle is directed to a bodily change to the body of Jesus for its own sake. He recalls indeed facts which appear to be opposed to this, like the event of the transfiguration, the walking on the sea, the forty days' fast, the virgin birth (1336C) ] All this he did to reveal the treasures of the divinity, not to annul or to change the assumed humanity.

Clearly Leontius is concerned to preserve the true humanity and to exclude every docetist vaporization.<sup>117</sup>

As the Kyrios of all things has communicated his own to the flesh without moving out of himself (he remained immovable in himself and retained the firm natural place [in transcendence]), so too his humanity remained in its natural constitution; it had the physical dispositions and functions (*energeias*) of the body, also did not relinquish the universal, blameless passions, possessed rather substantially (*οὐσιωδῶς*) the pattern (*δρoς*) of the perfection proper to us [human beings], but shared in the goods of the Logos, indeed it possessed the Logos as the source of all goods and thus allowed, on account of the Logos, to flow out of itself everything which the Logos had.

We can grant Leontius that, in contrast to the intensive tendencies of the Aphthartics of Constantinople to sublimate, he brought his Christ once again back to earth. He has clearly called to mind the *homoousios*

114. *Ibid.*, 1333D.

115. Leontius alludes briefly to the 'childish miracles' of the apocryphal infancy narratives (PG 86, 1336A). On this cf. E. Hennecke/W. Schneemelcher, *Nil. Apokryphen* I, 290–9; A. Orbe, *Cristología Gnostica* I (Madrid, 1976), 448–88.

116. Leontius Byz., CA: PG 86, 1336BC. In this text there is a fundamental difference from Leontius of Jerusalem, who in his picture of Christ apportions a diametrically opposite position to the miraculous, as we still have to depict. This ought to be a decisive reason against identifying both Leontii, as I. Fracea does (above, p. 185).

117. *Ibid.*, 1336D–1337A.

of Jesus with us, and in this way has also created the foundation for our imitation of Christ.<sup>118</sup> It rests on the true relationship both to the humanity as well as to the divinity of Christ. For between us and Jesus there is a true kinship (*syngeneia*), further a similarity of suffering (*homoiopatheia*), which bring us into relationship with the humanity of Jesus. The relationship to the divinity of Christ, however, mediated through his being human, makes the imitation of God (*theomimesia*) possible for us.<sup>119</sup>

(iii) *A test question for Leontius: the human will in Christ*

In the discussion about the annulment of the state of impassibility of Christ's *sarx*, a state supposed by the Aphthartics to be 'natural', the question arises: who is the bearer of this act of the will, or the organ for bringing it about? Leontius has the impression that the opponents allow the *sarx* as such to participate in this. He takes this observation, true or false, as the occasion for refuting from a new side the notion of a thoroughgoing *aphtharsia* of Christ's body.<sup>120</sup>

To believe, however, that a flesh which is naturally superior to suffering and immortal, has voluntarily permitted what was not due to it, means first not to know that willing and not-willing are proper not to the flesh, but to the soul, in which the capability of free will and the inclination to tend towards both sides [i.e. freedom of choice] are found. Secondly you make it [the flesh] guilty, because it has willed that which is against the nature (*παρὰ φύσιν*) of the willer [the flesh] and has chosen that which was not natural. This is the outermost border of the sin.

This too is not to be passed over unnoticed: there are three causes (*aitiai*) from which every act proceeds: one comes from the natural potency; the second from the corruption of a natural *habitus*; the third appears as an ascent and an advance to something better: of them the first is the natural act, the second is against nature, the third is above nature and is so called.

The act, which is against nature and is an aberration of natural attitudes and potencies, harms the essence (*ousia*) itself and its natural activities; the natural act, however, proceeds from an unimpeded cause, and this corresponding to nature; the supernatural act, however, leads up and raises and strengthens for what is better, for what, by remaining in its natural powers, it would not have been able to accomplish.

Now what is above nature does not suppress what is natural, but rather leads it further and also gives it impulses to be able to do what is natural and gives the power for what transcends.

The Aphthartics feared that, by accepting a flesh in Christ that was

118. *Ibid.*, 1336D and 1337AB. On the problem of the *imitatio Christi* also see 1348D–1349D. It is only made possible for us through the truth of the weaker nature in Christ, which in its passibility furnishes the basis for approximation on our side.

119. See V. Grumel, 'La sotériologie de Léonce de Byzance', *EO* 36 (1936), 385–97, especially 391–2 (PG 86, 1349A).

120. Leontius Byz., *CA*: PG 86, 1332D6–1333B5.

intrinsically passible and corruptible, suffering and death would not be able to have any significance for salvation at all. They were of the opinion that only a flesh that was elevated above suffering could be meritorious,<sup>121</sup> by choosing suffering by its own decision. Leontius now shows that the Aphthartologue is completely confused in his idea of the *sarx* and does not bring the correct anthropological presuppositions at all for solving the problem. Willing and not-willing, he stresses, are not acts of the flesh, but of the rational, free soul, which can decide on the basis of knowing two sides. By drawing attention away from the *sarx* to the spiritual will of Christ, Leontius would like to bring the problem of the bodily *aphtharsia* for soteriology in perspective and to represent the solution of the opponent as inappropriate from the very beginning. Redemption does not depend on whether Christ goes into suffering with an uncorrupted or corruptible body, but primarily on the decision of the human will. Admittedly, according to Leontius one must start with the *sarx*, which after the supernatural and marvellous *henosis* with the Logos also remains in its naturalness, corresponding to the laws which hold for it.<sup>122</sup> Insofar as it itself is intended to participate in supernatural properties (namely the *aphtharsia*), then this also presupposes that the nature remains in its naturalness.<sup>123</sup> These reflections make no impression on the Aphthartologue. He maintains his fundamental thesis: passibility is bestowed on the body of Christ by way of miracle; uncorruptedness and immortality, however, are the normal state, resulting from the *henosis*, a state which shares the immutability of the indissoluble laws of nature.<sup>124</sup>

In this context, however, the incorporation of the human will of Christ and its freedom into the question of the acceptance of suffering is more important for us than the 'normalization' of the concrete human existence. Here Leontius really touches on something self-evident, but which apparently was not so easy to discover. One must go back as far as Gregory of Nyssa to discover a similar emphasis on the will of Christ. Admittedly the Cappadocian does not address the situations of suffering in the life of Christ, but the opposite, the 'exception', the working of miracles by Jesus. Because the text is of great significance for the development of the Greek picture of Christ, we shall cite it fully and place it

121. *Ibid.*, 1332B.

122. *Ibid.*, 1333CD.

123. *Ibid.*, 1333D6-7: οὐδὲ γὰρ τὰ ὑπὲρ φύσιν ἔχει χάραν, μὴ τῆς φύσεως ἐχούσης κατὰ φύσιν.

124. *Ibid.*, 1333D.

in the framework of a prehistory for the text of Leontius cited above, indeed as well for the representation of the monoenergist controversy. It was certainly quite an unreasonable imposition on Gregory's audience in the paschal vigil to receive such difficult theological reflections.<sup>125</sup>

When the Holy Spirit descended on the Virgin and the power of the Most High overshadowed her, in order to allow the new human being to come into existence in her . . . at that time, Wisdom built herself her house and through the overshadowing of the power, as it were like through the imprint of a seal the material (*plasma*) was stamped from within, at that time the divine power mixed with both parts, out of which the human nature consists, both with the soul, I mean, as also with the body, by mixing with each of the two parts in him in corresponding ways. Then after these two had become mortal through disobedience (because death of the soul was the alienation from real life, the death of the body, however, decay and dissolution), death must be driven out of these two by the mingling of life. Because the divinity was mingled with each of the two parts of the human being in the corresponding manner, were the signs of recognition (*gnorismata*) the paramount nature [namely of the divinity] evident through both [soul and body].

For the body refers to the divinity [dwelling] in it by effecting healing through its touch; the soul, however, proves the divine power by that powerful will; for as the sense of touch is proper to the body, so is the movement of choice (*ἡ κατὰ προαίρεσιν κίνησις*) proper to the soul.

There the leper approaches, already emaciated and wasted in body. How on the Lord's part does the healing happen for this person? The soul (*psyche*) posits the act of the will and the body touches and through both (together) suffering vanishes; the leprosy left him, it reads, on the spot (cf. Mt 8,3). On another occasion he did not want to dismiss starving the many thousands crowding around him in the desert; so he broke the bread with his hands.

You see, how through both [through act of the will and touch] the divinity which dwells in both (*συμπαρομαρτέω, συμπαρέπομαι*) is known publicly, both through the deed of the body, as also through the act of the will of the soul (*τῷ τε ἐνεργοῦντι σώματι καὶ τῇ ὁρμῇ τοῦ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γινομένου θελήματος*).

Gregory of Nyssa here strikes the same chord as Theodore of Mopsuestia, who likewise saw the true justification of salvation endangered by the Apollinarian-Arian denial of the soul.<sup>126</sup> Unfortunately these realizations were again blocked in Cyril of Alexandria, as his explanation of the raising of the daughter of Jairus and the youth from Nain shows. The soul of Christ is not mentioned. The path is already laid which will lead to a new controversy that no longer has any room left for the soteriological activity of Christ's soul: monoenergism and monothelitism. In his commentary on John, Cyril intends to explain the efficacy of the bread of life (that is, the eucharist), promised and finally given by Christ. For him the foundation for this

125. Gregor. Nyss., *De trid. spat.*: Op IX (E. Gebhardt), 291-292.

126. On this cf. *JdChr* I<sup>3</sup>, 619-22.

is the *energeia*, as this comes into play in the events where Christ raises people from the dead.<sup>127</sup>

On this account, we find, the redeemer is active in raising the dead, not only through the word alone, nor even through simple divine orders, but he calls up the holy flesh as it were as a co-worker, in order to prove that it can bestow life [in the eucharist] and has become as it were one with it.

When he raised the daughter of the ruler of the synagogue: 'Little girl, get up', he took her hand, as it is written (Mk 5,35-37 par.): with his order that effects everything (*παντουργῶ προστάγματι*) he made her alive as God; he also made her alive, however, through contact with his holy flesh, and consequently showed the one activity that has grown together from both (*μὴν τε καὶ συγγενῇ δὲ ἀμφοῖν ἐπιδείκνυσαι τὴν ἐνέργειαν*) . . . [Then there follows the explanation of the raising at Nain (Lk 7,13-17) and finally the summation:] he wants to raise the dead not only by word, but, in order to prove that his body bestows life, . . . he touches the dead and through it [his body] gives life into those already putrifying.

It must strike one that now the soul of Christ, as one cause participating in the raising, is missing. Logos and *sarx* are contrasted directly. But they once again combine in their activity into 'a single kind of activity' of nothing less than growing mutuality. Without doubt the fourth letter of Ps. Dionysius the Areopagite<sup>128</sup> refers to this passage of Cyril, when his formula speaks of the 'simply new theandric *energeia*', which Christ executes among us. Before we are able to go into this important letter in detail, let us only refer to the fact that in the explanation of the activity of Jesus Christ in the miracles we see two lines present from the fourth to the sixth century: the Cyrillian-Areopagite, which is unreservedly affirmed by Severus, and the line of Gregory of Nyssa, which is undoubtedly again accepted by Leontius of Byzantium. The level of reflection attained by Leontius is even higher than that of Gregory, because he has discussion partners who stand on the ground of Chalcedon and thus really affirm the dialectic of 'unmingled and undivided'. Leontius is not content with formally stressing this tension, but he understands that the concrete life of Jesus in its normality has to be placed there as the real accomplishment of the economy of salvation. Jesus, as a true human being, stands there with his intellectuality and power of will, but this in the full power of his divinity, and thus mediates the effects of redemption. The Aphthartics have fallen prey to an unhealthy supra-naturalism — a word that we can derive from the linguistic formulation of Leontius himself. He shows even Jesus the human being as a finite spiritual power needing the help of God's grace,

127. Cyril Alex., *In Ioann. Ev.* IV: PG 73, 577C3-D8; P. E. Pusey, *S.P.N. Cyrilli . in D Ioannis ev.*, Vol. 1, p. 530,8-26.

128. Ps. Dionys. Ar., *Ep. IV ad Gaum* (CPG 6607): PG 3, 1072. See *JdChr* II/3.

which, however, stands at his disposal by virtue of his dignity as Son, but still does not annul the 'nature' in him.

The Chalcedonian defender of thoroughgoing *aphtharsia*, driven into a corner, now seeks refuge in protology, that is, in referring to the original condition of Adam in Paradise, with whom he compares Christ.

(c) *Passibility and mortality of Christ in the light of protology*

The *aphtharsia* of Christ seemed to suggest itself on the basis of the horizon of a larger history of salvation. Jesus was regarded by Paul as the new Adam (cf. 1 Cor 15,20-22; Col 1,18; Rom 5,12-18; Gen 3,17-19).

But how could he be called this, if he had not borne the body of the one first created [= Adam]? But this first created one was incorruptible, before he sinned. Hence too the body of the Lord is uncorrupted. For he was always without sin.

The *aphtharsia*, which in these words is presupposed for Adam and Christ, is different from the one which Julian of Halicarnassus had accepted. 'To be uncorrupted' means here 'to be by nature incapable of corruption and mortality',<sup>129</sup> or, expressed positively, to be uncorrupted by reason of a 'reconstruction' of a normal human nature into something superhuman, and this on the basis of the *henosis* with the Logos.<sup>130</sup> According to Julian, let us recall, Christ's individual human nature was from the very beginning in general human terms normal, insofar as the physical qualities were concerned. The 'exception', which made Christ 'uncorrupted', was the freedom from that necessity to be delivered over to suffering and death, which burdened the sons of Adam because of the *peccatum naturae*. To be passible and mortal was possible for Jesus without a miracle; the fact that both were apportioned to him did not bear the character of a curse on Adam, because the new Adam could choose with regard to his destiny in freedom. But Leontius' discussion partner was not satisfied with this version of *aphtharsia*. Jesus had also to be physically impassible. For had he assumed a passible, mortal nature, he would have had enough to do to save himself and to defeat death. We, however, would have been left in the cold.<sup>131</sup>

Because protology, as the teaching about the original condition of

129. On the sinlessness of Christ see PG 86, 1348B. R. Draguet, *Julien d'Halicarnasse* (Louvain, 1924), 177, places great value on the contrasting of Julian to the aphthartic in the CA of Leontius; pp. 173-4 against J. C. L. Gieseler and R. Seeberg. Also to be noted is the controversy between Draguet (*op cit*, 201-4) and M. Jugie, art. 'Gaianite (Controverse)', in *DTC* 6 (1915), 1002-23.

130. Cf. Leontius Byz., CA PG 86, 1325A; 1328D-1329B.

131. *Ibid.*, 1332B.

human beings, was brought into play, one might expect that Leontius would not only develop his christology in detail, but also his teaching about the original condition. However, he does not want to take a position with regard to the original quality of Adam's body, although he indicates that he does not consider the doctrine of Adam's paradisaical *aphtharsia* convincing.<sup>132</sup> Obviously he does not wish to open up too much territory to his opponent in an initial skirmish. Besides, he distinguishes two things, *aphtharsia* and *athanasia*. All admit that Adam died. According to Leontius it is more difficult to decide about his uncorruptedness with regard to sin. He requests, however, that one weigh the fact that Christ in coming chose the form of his body not only with regard to Adam, but also with regard to us. Why should Christ have made his choice only with regard to the one and his (Adam's) uncorrupted body, and not rather with regard to the corruptedness of the many? If Christ actually assumed a corruptible body with regard to the many, then, according to Leontius, everything speaks for the fact that Adam too is to be subsumed under that. Hence he can ask: 'For what reason should the body of the first created have been incorruptible? He did not have immortality in his constitution [which is proved through the fact of his death: 1348B], much less so incorruptibility. For it would have been different had he not used the wood [the tree] of life. The transgression did away with his chance of actually enjoying it, as the Fathers say.'<sup>133</sup> Still Leontius does not want to make any final decision about Adam's original state. The problem being considered regarding the corruptedness of Christ's body must also be solved without it. It is a question of the redemption of humankind as this actually happens from the fall of Adam. Thus at the conclusion of CA the problem is once again referred back to the context of *henosis* and *aphtharsia*.

(d) *Christ's uncorruptedness — conception through the Spirit — henosis*  
On the basis of his *henosis* concept the Aphthartic maintains an immediate exceptional situation for the humanity of Christ, beginning with the incarnation, while for the Christians, it is a gift 'in hope' (cf. Rom 8,18-30). This claim challenges Leontius to a concluding exposition.<sup>134</sup> In the thesis of his opponent he finds a denial of the historicity of the order of the incarnation: 'Thus from the very beginning of the

132. *Ibid.*, 1348D.

133. *Ibid.*, 1348C.

134. *Ibid.*, 1349D-1353C.



mystery we have the whole mystery already. Hence the rest of the *oikonomia* was superfluous.”<sup>135</sup> ‘Further detours’ (*periodoi*) would not be necessary. The *henosis* concept is overloaded. Leontius attempts to free it from this excessive demand. To some extent he is successful with his distinction between the historical process for forming the body of Christ, the *λόγος τῆς οὐσιώσεως τοῦ σώματος*, and the event of the union as such, which he renders by his favourite phrase, the ‘manner of union’, the *τρόπος τῆς ἐνώσεως*.<sup>136</sup>

The former occurred by virtue of the presence and indwelling of the Spirit by way of creative formation (*δημιουργικῶς διαπλάττειν*), the latter not by reason of the activity of the Logos (*οὐκ ἐκ τῆς τοῦ Λόγου ἐνεργείας*), but by virtue of the perfect and essential union (*ὀλικῇ καὶ οὐσιώδεις ἔνωσις*).

The two acts, which affect the earthly existence of Jesus, are delineated in more detail with regard to their peculiarity and attribution. Each has its own bearer, each its particular object. The becoming of the body, its *ousiosis*, is set in motion by the creative activity (*δημιουργικὴ ἐνέργεια*) of the *Holy Spirit*, who bestows fertility on the Virgin, who for her part contributes the *hyle*, the matter. The share of the Logos is determined in this way: he inhabits immediately, with the beginning of his formation, the temple founded by the Holy Spirit (*κατ’αὐτὴν τὴν πρώτην ἐνοικεῖ διάπλασιν*). This happening is not characterized as ‘activity’ (*energeia*), which immediately reminds us of Nemesius, but as essential, total self-communication (*ἀλλ’ἐκ τῆς πρὸς αὐτὸν ὀλικῆς καὶ οὐσιώδους ἐνώσεως*). With the beginning of the work of the Holy Spirit, the *henosis* also commences. It occurs already in the womb, in the ‘workplace’ of the formation of the human nature of the Logos. The Logos is, as it were, in the centre of a construction site. Through the activity of the Spirit there occurs around him the construction of his earthly abode, which he will not enter from the outside, but has united to himself from within (*συναφθεῖς*), to the adornment of our nature.<sup>137</sup> Because the body of Christ was formed slowly, step by step, one can recognize that the *henosis* as such does not entail the

135. *Ibid.*, 1352C1–3.

136. *Ibid.*, 1352CD.

137. *Ibid.*, 1352D–1353A. In the terminology and images used in this text (temple, indwelling, the term *synapheia*) the Antiochene material attracts attention. Here one will be reminded of Proclus of Constantinople, who is perhaps immediately meant by Leontius in the words: ‘one among us has very elegantly said . . .’ Proclus has the image of the ‘workshop of the *henosis* of the natures’ (in the womb of the Virgin). Cf. PG 65, 681A11; ACO I 1, 1, p. 103,13; Severus Ant., *Or 2 ad Neph*: CSCO 120, p. 33,16, where the phrase of Proclus is cited.

demand to accept a perfect state of bodiliness,<sup>138</sup> but remains open for accepting our body in its condition, as it existed after the fall of Adam.<sup>139</sup>

The Lord united to himself according to the *hypostasis* such a flesh with which the condemned (Adam) appeared clothed after the fall; we are all, however, from his mass.

According to Leontius the activity of the Holy Spirit in the virginal conception of Christ does not effect an uncorrupted body, so to say, *ab ovo*, but one which could in principle accept suffering and corruptibility, without having to be moved into a situation of exception (= miracle) by the Logos. That is a worthwhile piece of knowledge, which we will find quite lacking in a later Ethiopic text. Leontius only demands a supernatural intervention for preservation from corruption (*phtharsia*) in the powerful deed of the resurrection. In contrast the *henosis*, the union or assumption of the humanity through the Logos, effects (a) the sinlessness of Christ, (b) the perfect holiness, (c) the unity of Sonship.<sup>140</sup>

The singularity [peculiarity] of the body cannot be known from the union with the Logos, but from the power of the Holy Spirit, who forms the body itself without the original organs (procreative organs) of nature; the union of the Logos with our nature, however, has effected freedom from sin, the entire holiness and complete union and blending (*henosin kai anakrasin*) with the whole assuming (Logos), the unity of sonship in being and in appellation and the whole appearance of the condition of the Son (*καὶ ὅλης τῆς υἱικῆς ιδιότητος τοῦς χαρακτῆρας φανωτάτους ἐπιφαίνεσθαι*). For this reason the gracing is inseparable, because indeed the union is inseparable (*ὧν ἀναφαίρετος ἡ μακαριότης, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἡ ἐνωσις ἀδιαίρετος*).<sup>141</sup> Thus we recognize that the constitution and peculiarity of the body have proceeded from the activity of the Holy Spirit; the union, however, does not derive from the pure activity of the Logos, but from the substantial union with the Logos himself.

138. Leontius Byz., CA: PG 86, 1353A. It is expressed differently in Leontius Jer., CN IV 9: PG 86, 1669BC.

139. Leontius Byz., CA: PG 86, 1348D.

140. *Ibid.*, 1353A3-B3.

141. M. Jugie, 'La béatitude et la science parfaite de l'âme de Jésus viateur d'après Léonce de Byzance', *RSPT* 10 (1921), 548-59; *idem*, 'Quaedam testimonia byzantinorum de glorificatione humanitatis Christi a primo instanti conceptionis', *Angelicum* 9 (1932), 469-71, wanted to discover in these words the doctrine of the beatific vision in the earthly Jesus. In opposition to this V. Grumel, 'Le surnaturel dans l'humanité du Christ viateur, d'après Léonce de Byzance', in *Mélanges Mandonnet* II (Paris, 1930) (15-22), 21-2; *idem*, 'La sotériologie de Léonce de Byzance', *EO* 36 (1937) (385-97), 394, especially n. 3: the part of the sentence which reads *ὧν ἀναφαίρετος ἡ μακαριότης, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἡ ἐνωσις ἀδιαίρετος* is only a *genetivus epeexegeticus*. For with regard to content *makariotes* denotes the *bona* which the *henosis* signifies for Christ. It encompasses, namely, freedom from sin, permeating holiness, complete union with the Logos, and the title of Son. Similarly, P. Galtier, 'L'enseignement des Pères sur la Vision béatifique dans le Christ', *RSR* 15 (1925), 54-62.

## CHAPTER TWO

### THE EXPANDED CIRCLE OF STRICT-CHALCEDONIAN THEOLOGIAN OF THE TYPE OF LEONTIUS OF BYZANTIUM

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The witnesses of strict-Chalcedonian christology of the kind expressed by Leontius of Byzantium are small in number and of varying theological significance. The first to be mentioned is a metropolitan of Ephesus, an episcopal see which otherwise was orientated towards Alexandria.

#### I HYPATIUS, ARCHBISHOP OF EPHEBUS (531-c.538)

##### 1. Biographical notes

According to his public appearances Hypatius must rank as one of the outstanding bishops of the Imperial Church in the first half of the sixth century.<sup>1</sup> Emperor Justinian had become aware of him and on several occasions called on him to carry out important commissions. These concerned the Chalcedonian politics of the Emperor. The first occasion for this occurred in April 531. When the great Abba Sabas, as the delegate of the bishops of Palestine, was approaching Constantinople, Hypatius, together with Papas Eusebius and under the leadership of Patriarch Epiphanius of Constantinople (520-535),<sup>2</sup> had to journey to meet him and escort him into the Imperial City.<sup>3</sup> Considerably more important was his being summoned to participate in the so-called *Collatio cum Severianis*, which was held in 532 in the capital. This must be regarded as the major theological event in the life of the Metropolitan of Ephesus.<sup>4</sup> The third imperial commission led to Rome, where Hypatius, together with Demetrius, the bishop of Philippi, had to travel as Justinian's envoys to Pope John II. If in the doctrinal dialogue of 532

1. See F. Diekamp, *Analecta Patristica* = OCA 117 (Rome, 1938), 109-53· VII. Hypatius von Ephesus; J. Gouillard, 'Hypatius d'Éphèse ou Du Pseudo-Denis à Théodore Studite', *RevÉtByz* 19 (1961), 63-75; Y.-M. Duval, *Le livre de Jonas dans la littérature chrétienne grecque et latine. Sources et influence du Commentaire sur Jonas de saint Jérôme* (Paris, 1973), 657-62.

2. See Grumel, *Regestes* I<sup>2</sup>, nos. 217-227.

3. Cf. Cyril Scyth., *Vita Sabae*, no. 71; E. Schwartz, *Kyrillos von Skythopolis* (Leipzig, 1939), p. 173, 12-19; F. Diekamp, *Die origenistischen Streitigkeiten im sechsten Jahrhundert* (Münster, 1899), 14-15; *idem*, *Hypatius von Ephesus* = OCA 117, 109.

4. See F. Diekamp, *Hypatius von Ephesus* = OCA 117, 110-111; 112-115.

it was a question of winning the Severans for Chalcedon, then for the delegation to Rome it was a question of a current issue that was prompted by the controversial formula: 'one of the Trinity, Jesus of Nazareth, the son of the Virgin Mary, was crucified'. By denying this sentence several Sleepless Monks caused unrest. Their condemnation by the Pope was the goal which the two bishops had to reach in Rome.<sup>5</sup> The last transmitted report on Hypatius that bears a date concerns his participation in the *Synodos Endemousa* of Constantinople under Patriarch Menas (536–552).<sup>6</sup> It took place from 2 May to 4 June 536 and was concerned with the deposition of the Severan-minded Patriarch Anthimus,<sup>7</sup> which with the agreement of the Emperor had already been declared by Pope Agapetus in February or the beginning of March 536. Hypatius cast his vote in the fourth session.<sup>8</sup> In the final session there followed the anathema on Severus of Antioch, Peter of Apamea and Zooras. Hypatius probably spoke in the name of all the synodal participants.<sup>9</sup> For he signed the *acta* immediately after Patriarch Menas and before the Latins present, that is, those who had accompanied Pope Agapetus, who had died in Constantinople in the previous April.<sup>10</sup> A final testimony to the episcopal activity of Hypatius comes from the year 537 or 538.<sup>11</sup> The date of his death is unknown.

## 2. Hypatius of Ephesus as a christological author

From the few remains of his theological works only fragments of *catenae* can be investigated with regard to christology.<sup>12</sup> Apart from the reference to the legendary death of Arius and its extraordinary

5. *Ibid.*, 111. Cf. Justinian emp., *Ep. ad Iohannem II papam* (CPG 6874).

6. Grumel, *Regestes* I<sup>2</sup>, nos 232–43.

7. On Patriarch Anthimus, who, as bishop of Trebizond, and without having a successor there, uncanonically occupied the see of Constantinople, see E. Schwartz, *Kyrillos von Skythopolis*, 396–8. Anthimus had been ordained as an orthodox confessor of the four synods (ACO III, p. 31,21); he had also accepted the *Tomus* of Leo; both only 'for appearance sake'. Moreover he had promised the Emperor to do everything which the incumbent of the Apostolic See prescribed. But the Patriarch belonged to the protégés of Theodora, even in his 'Chalcedonian period'. Schwartz, *op. cit.*, 398, n. 3, conjectures that in the winter of 535/536 Anthimus was gained by Severus for the Aposchists (Severans). Through the mediation of Theodora the two met, as John of Beth Aphthonia reports. See PO 2, 254. Pope Agapetus was well informed about Anthimus from various sides and dismissed him as an uncanonically appointed usurper, without investigating his stance on Chalcedon. Schwartz, *op. cit.*, 397, nn. 1 and 6.

8. ACO III, 178–9, no. 126.

9. Cf. F. Diekamp, *Hypatius*, OCA 117, 115; ACO III, p. 182, no. 131,2.

10. Cf. ACO III, 182, no. 131,6–12.

11. See F. Diekamp, *op. cit.*, 115, 117.

12. *Ibid.*, 115–153, especially 129–153.

remembrance in the streets of Constantinople in the commentary on Zachariah (VIII),<sup>13</sup> no reference is found to events in the history of doctrine. Even the allegorical interpretation of prophetic texts in the Old Testament as referring to Christ, though they are relatively numerous, does not go beyond the customary exegesis of the Fathers. Thus as the main source for the christology of Hypatius there remain the discussions at the doctrinal dialogue in 532. There exist extensive reports about these from both parties, the Chalcedonians and Severans. The fact that we have a double report of these discussions has only become clear quite recently. Because of this recent research theological evaluation of the event now has a secure foundation.

(a) *The sources*<sup>14</sup>

(i) *On the Chalcedonian side*

Bishop Innocent of Maronia gives an extensive report of the doctrinal dialogue of 532 (in the following = I), in the form of a letter to the presbyter, Thomas of Thessaloniki, which is now extant only in Latin:<sup>15</sup> 'It [the report] goes so much beyond a private letter that the addressee could be regarded as a literary fiction. To a large extent it fulfils the requirements of minutes, and in some passages expands to become a historico-theological investigation of the questions raised. Instructional comments and a pedagogical art of evening out the argumentation and, as it were, drumming it in by repetition, certainly originate from the compiler of the minutes. Soon after the dialogue, the report did such sterling service for an episcopal delegation of the Emperor to the Pope in Rome that one is tempted to ask whether at least some parts of the report were written specifically for this purpose.'<sup>16</sup> In these sentences we have an apposite description of the peculiarity of the Chalcedonian report.

(ii) *On the Severan side*

Credit for discovering new documents and of giving order to the whole of the material is due to S. P. Brock.

13. *Ibid.*, 146; also A. Grillmeier, *Mit ihm und in ihm* (Freiburg, Basel, Vienna, <sup>2</sup>1978), 237–8, n. 31.

14. On the new state of the sources see (1) S. Brock, 'The conversations with the Syrian Orthodox under Justinian (532)', *OCP* 47 (1981), 87–121; (2) J. Speigl, 'Das Religionsgespräch mit den severianischen Bischöfen in Konstantinopel im Jahre 532', *AHC* 16 (1984), 264–85; *JdChr* II/1, 370–5.

15. Innocent Maron., *Ep. ad Thomam presb. Thessalonicensem de collatione cum Severianis habita* (CPG 6846): ACO IV, 2, 169–184. A writing of Innocent on the theopaschite formula (CPG 6847) will be referred to further below. On the rôle of Patriarch Epiphanius of Constantinople in the convocation (531) and conduct (532) of the doctrinal dialogue, see Grumel, *Regestes* I<sup>2</sup>, no. 222a with literature.

16. See J. Speigl, *art. cit.*, 265, who stresses the character of the 'court minutes', but also accepts that the text was written on the basis of a real experience by a participant who was filled with admiration for the proceedings.

(1) The *Plerophoria* on the faith of the Severan bishops summoned by Emperor Justinian, which they presented to the Emperor.<sup>17</sup> These function as a certain check for the other sources still to be mentioned, and at the same time they expand them.

(2) A Syriac report (S) 'from what the orthodox [= Severan] bishops said in the presence of the Emperor, when they were summoned by him to make an *apologia* concerning the true faith and to suggest a way by which the Churches might be (re)united'.<sup>18</sup> The Emperor and the Syrian bishops appear here as the real partners. The discussion between the two groups of bishops is mentioned only briefly. Important is the list of bishops who participated in the *collatio* (S 8).

(3) A new Syrian text (Harvard syr 22)(= H), discovered and edited with an English translation by S. P. Brock.<sup>19</sup> The report begins with the second meeting of the Syrian bishops with the Emperor. It breaks off with the depiction of the combined audience with the Emperor on the third day of the dialogue. Both reports, S and H, are closely related. Probably S depends on H, because in parts literal correspondence can be established.<sup>20</sup> In H we have detailed information about the *collatio* from the Severan point of view, concerning the events of the two days of dialogue and the combined audience with the Emperor on the third day. The editor, S. P. Brock, attributes his find with great probability to Abbot John of Beth Aphthonia, who is mentioned in the church history of Zacharias Rhetor (cont.) as accompanying the Syrian bishops and reporting on the doctrinal dialogue.<sup>21</sup>

### (b) *The character of the collatio*

The two main sources, I and H, show that the 'confessionalization' of both parties, Chalcedonians and anti-Chalcedonians, is already well advanced, although both still know that they are tied to the Imperial Church.<sup>22</sup> Interesting too is the model for selecting the participants in the dialogue. Let us first take the group around Hypatius: from the European part of the Empire (Thrace) come John of Bizya (Europa province) and Innocent of Maronia (Rhodope province); from Macedonia (Macedonia prima) comes Demetrius of Philippi; Asia Minor is represented by Anthimus of Trebizond and Stephen of Seleucia in Isauria. The Greek motherland does not

17. Preserved in Zacharias Rhetor cont., *HE IX*, 15: CSCO 84 (T), 115-123; 88 (V), 79-84. Here characterized by J. Speigl, *art. cit.*, 265-6, as G (Glaubenserklärung: exposition of faith).

18. Edited by F. Nau with a French translation: PO 13 (1919), 192-196. S. Brock, *art. cit.*, 113-17, proposes far-reaching corrections to Nau, and he himself produces a new English translation (he regrets that this text was previously overlooked in research); 117-18: analysis of the double list of names.

19. See S. Brock, *art. cit.*, 92-113. HarvSyr22 is damaged at the beginning. Cf. J. Speigl, *art. cit.*, 266-7.

20. Cf. J. Speigl, *art. cit.*, 266, n. 17.

21. On John of Beth Aphthonia see CPG 7484-5; Zacharias Rhetor cont., *HE IX*, 15: Brooks CSCO 84 (T), 115-123; CSCO 88 (V), 79-84; Hamilton-Brooks, 246-53; corrected translation in Frend, 362-6.

22. Cf. F. Winkelmann, *Die östlichen Kirchen in der Epoche der christologischen Auseinandersetzungen (5. bis 7. Jahrhundert) = Kirchengeschichte in Einzeldarstellungen I/6* (Berlin, 1980), 133: 'It is also to be borne in mind that even until the end of the sixth century the anti-Chalcedonians did not develop a contrary political-theological conception, but stood on the ground of the Byzantine Emperor-Church relationship, as long as there existed the hope that monophysitism could have been the major ideological foundation.' *Ibid.*, 102, reference to the imperial conviction of the banned Severan bishops in the petition which they addressed to Justinian after the suppression of the Nika riot (532), according to Zacharias Rhetor cont., *HE IX*, 15 and Michael Syr., *Chron. IX*, 22. Emperor Justinian nevertheless regards the Severans as 'separated from the Church'. Cf. I 4: ACO IV, 2, p. 169, 18: *pro his qui cum Severo episcopo ab ecclesia desciverunt*. Both sides, however, considered themselves as 'orthodox'.

provide a participant. Nevertheless one can speak of a 'good spread' in the origin of the members of the commission: 'Trebizond in the extreme East of Cappadocian Pontus, Seleucia in South-East Cilicia of Asia Minor and Ephesus, located in the middle of Western Asia Minor, are three points, geometrically so well chosen, that one could hang on them in a balanced way the entire weight of the Asia Minor countryside.'<sup>23</sup> All those summoned come from the Patriarchate of Constantinople, with the exception of the bishops of Seleucia (Patriarchate of Antioch) and Philippi, which is already to be reckoned as belonging to the Roman sphere of influence. On the Syrian side the following certainly take part in the *collatio*: Sergius of Cyrrhus, Thomas of Germanicia, Philoxenus of Doliche, Peter of Theodosiopolis (Rēš'ainā), John of Constantina or Tella, and Nonnus of Circesium.<sup>24</sup> Both parties have a small number of clerics and monks with them. Among the Chalcedonians Leontius of Byzantium stands out; among the Severans on the other side Abbot John of Beth Aphthonia is prominent, who according to Zacharias Rhetor cont. (HE IX 15) 'had accompanied the bishops to Constantinople, composed a report, and for that reason may have been the author of the Syriac minutes'.<sup>25</sup>

### (c) *The goal of the doctrinal dialogue*

Patricius Strategius, who was to report to the Emperor on the development of the discussions and occupied a place of honour in the assembly, explained to the Severan participants that the Emperor had summoned them not 'in imperial authority, but in paternal and priestly concern (*compunctione*)', so that they could present to the Chalcedonians their uncertainties, to which the bishops would have to respond.<sup>26</sup> According to the Emperor's intention Chalcedon was *in possessione*. No compromise was to be sought. No resolutions were to be prepared. Thus it was not a matter of a synod, but of a panel to provide theological information. On the one side were the leading supporters of the Council, which in the eyes of the Emperor was not contestable, and on the other representatives of the Severan-Alexandrian opposition, among whom it was assumed there were inhibiting difficulties which were, however, capable of being resolved. The *collatio* of 532 was thus thought of as a doctrinal dialogue on the theological level, with the aim of clarifying the Severan uncertainties and of restoring ecclesial unity.<sup>27</sup>

### (d) *The course of the doctrinal dialogue*

We may suppose that there were problems enough, such as: What do you Chalcedonians understand by *hypostasis* when you contrast *physis* with it? How do you envisage the realization of the *henosis* in Christ, when he is understood as strictly 'one', and yet exhibits two realities, two natures? How do you get around Nestorianism? We would thus have to expect from the Severan side a whole catalogue of questions that would be handled point by point. This group would have been in a position to determine the course of the dialogue simply on their own basis, according to purely pertinent aspects. Above all, accusations should not take the place of enquiries. We can thus expect that in the minutes of the Severans (H) this excellent intention of the Emperor would manifest itself in the first place and that question after question would be presented. But there is great disappointment. From H we learn that Hypatius was the first to

23. J. Speigl, *art. cit.*, 269.

24. Cf. I 6: ACO IV, 2, pp. 169, 26–170, 1; J. Speigl, *art. cit.*, 271–2, where the disparities between the lists of participants are discussed.

25. *Ibid.*, 272; S. Brock, *art. cit.*, 118.

26. Thus in I 8: ACO IV, 2, 170.

27. J. Speigl, *art. cit.*, 273, who chooses the expression 'religious dialogue'. Because it is not a question of a difference in religion, but of differences in faith, we prefer to speak of a 'doctrinal dialogue'.

speak, and that he produced 'his usual old inanities' (H 4, p. 94).<sup>28</sup> According to I 9 (ACO IV, 2, p. 170) the Orientals began the dialogue. Their speaker was perhaps Sergius of Cyrrhus, the old episcopal city of Theodore.<sup>29</sup> He refers to the *plerophoria* presented to the Emperor, into which the Syrians had woven their uncertainties and everything that had become a scandal for them (in Chalcedon) (H 2; I 9). Therefore the *collatio* could have taken the path desired by the Emperor, if Hypatius were to concede that his party had read this text. In fact the Bishop of Ephesus makes reference to this document. From it he immediately singles out the fundamental view of the Severans, that is, the continuous condemnation of the Council of Chalcedon expressed in it. Instead of enquiry, there is thus accusation! What the Chalcedonians reproached the Severans with is what the Severans criticized with regard to the imperial representatives: they would produce accusations against orthodox Fathers in order to forestall an examination of 'their own wicked beliefs' (H 4).

### *First Day: The problem of Eutyches*

According to H 4, Hypatius attempted to put the Syrians in the wrong with the statement that in the *plerophoria* they attacked Chalcedon, which was, however, directed against Eutyches. Apropos of this he had the catchcry, rather the question: What do you Syrians think of Eutyches (I 10: ACO IV, 2, 170)? They bluntly anathematized the Archimandrite (H 5; cf. I 10). Yet there awaited the next question: How can you then describe Patriarch Dioscorus as orthodox (according to I 11: ACO IV, 2, 170), even though in 449 at Ephesus with the bishops he declared the heretic Eutyches to be orthodox, but condemned Patriarch Flavian and the Bishop of Dorylaeum as heretics? The Syriac report (H 4-9) confirms that the theme Eutyches-Dioscorus formed the main object of the first day's discussion. Agreement prevailed between both parties with regard to the condemnation of Eutyches, for whom, in fact, not one of the great leaders of the anti-Chalcedonians even interceded. It was otherwise with Dioscorus, who had presided at the imperial Council of Ephesus II (449), at whose instigation Eutyches had been rehabilitated (cf. I 11-14: ACO II, 4, pp. 170,34-171,5). The Syrians were angered by this point (H 4), because the attack was then concentrated on Dioscorus, after the scandal about Eutyches had been removed. Nevertheless, it was with satisfaction that they established that Hypatius had also condemned the Alexandrian Patriarch not on account of his teaching, but on account of his indiscretions in treating questions of faith.<sup>30</sup> The Chalcedonians, however, sought to incriminate Dioscorus especially, because they wanted to take away from the Syrians the reason for doubting and calling into question the legitimacy and necessity of a new council after the Imperial Council of 449.<sup>31</sup> As a common result for the first day Innocent of Maronia wanted to record the conviction on both sides that Chalcedon had been legally summoned and was to be received, in so far as Eutyches had been condemned and the 'general council' of Dioscorus had been thus corrected.<sup>32</sup> By establishing this, however, Hypatius aimed not only at a general

28. We follow the text H in S. Brock, giving the numbers and pages; and text I according to ACO IV, 2.

29. Thus the conjecture of J. Speigl, *art. cit.*, 273, n. 59, with reference to E. Honigmann, *Evêques et Evêchés*, 68-70, which is to be supplemented by the introduction in S (PO 13, 192; Brock, 113). In S Sergius is named first among the participants in the *collatio*.

30. Thus H 9: S. Brock, *art. cit.*, 96.94.117; S 8: PO 13, 196; cf. *JdChr* I<sup>3</sup>, 734-7; *CCT* II/1, 46-7.

31. What is striking is that in I, 17: ACO IV, 2, 171, Ephesus II (449) is described as *concilium universale*. On this see H. J. Sieben, *Die Konzilsidee der Alten Kirche* (Paderborn, Munich, Vienna, Zürich, 1979), 247-50.

32. Cf. I 18: ACO IV, 2, p. 171,23-5. On the question whether the 'injustices and blindnesses of that general council' (= Ephesus II) have to be corrected by another universal council, the *contradictentes* answer: 'In every regard it had to happen this way.' To which Hypatius says: 'Thus



affirmation of the Fourth Council, but concretely at the recognition of its two-natures teaching. But the Syrians would have nothing to do with this. The main reason for the dissent thus did not come to the fore on the first day. The intermediate solution of a partial recognition of Chalcedon, insofar as it was ratified at all by the Syrians and was not simply present in the Chalcedonian reporting of the dialogue, did not accomplish very much. 'For this reason the question that now remained was what this Council had done incorrectly so that further talk and response about it could be conceded to them [the Syrians].'<sup>33</sup>

### *Second Day: A mistake made by the Council of Chalcedon?*

With the question about possible mistakes made by the Fourth Council the discussion could once again have been steered along the lines determined by the Emperor. The Syrians once again had the chance to begin with their doubts and reservations with regard to Chalcedon. For they began anew by referring to their *plerophoria*, which was even read out. Subsequently, however, they did not take up the question about the 'mistakes' of the Council, but directed attention to their own document: 'Say if you have anything you find fault with in this statement (*plerophoria*).'<sup>34</sup> This text, however, contained a sharp rejection of Leo's Tome and the definition of Chalcedon. The whole Council was thus in error, and the concession made on the first day to a partial recognition of the Fourth Council we may suppose was once again rescinded. Nevertheless once again the Chalcedonians took up the question raised the previous day, namely, what else was wrong with the Council?<sup>35</sup> The Syrians replied: the reacceptance of Bishop Ibas of Edessa in spite of his controversial letter to the Persian Mari, and of Theodoret of Cyrrhus.<sup>36</sup>

It is here that the lines of the discussion diverged: with these two names the Syrians steered towards the painful theme of the later dispute about the three names, the so-called Three Chapters (Ibas, Theodore of Mopsuestia, Theodoret), while, according to the report of Innocent of Maronia, Bishop Hypatius brought the dialogue first to the two-natures teaching. In their reports each of the two parties claimed victory for itself.<sup>37</sup> For the moment we shall postpone the discussion about the two names and consider only the dispute about the two natures, so that we can form a judgement about the state of christology according to the conception of Hypatius, regardless of how the dialogue may have proceeded historically.

According to I 21 (ACO IV, 2, p. 171,40ff.) the two-natures formula was from the very start the theme of the second day's discussion. After a brief recapitulation of the first day and after having established agreement about whether the Fourth Council had been summoned legally (I 19-21), Hypatius introduced the formula, with the question to the Severans: 'What do you reproach the Council with as a transgression, so that we can give an account of it?' The Severans

Chalcedon is a lawfully summoned council, so that those things which a universal council lacked, or, as you say, saw less (correctly), could be corrected by a universal council.' The Severans say to this: 'It was indeed summoned well and of necessity, if only it had also found a proper conclusion.' The two-natures teaching indeed ruined everything. To this partial acknowledgment of Chalcedon on the part of the Severans in I corresponds the cautious formulation in H 9: Brock 96, where without criticism the Chalcedonians can say 'that the synod of Chalcedon had met very usefully on the matter of Eutyches'.

33. See J. Speigl, *art. cit.*, 276, with reference to I 21 (171, 39f.); similarly H 13: Brock, 98.

34. Cf. H 12: Brock, 96.

35. Cf. H 13: Brock, 98. The question appears to be unjustified because of the restriction already mentioned, which is recorded in I 21: ACO IV, 2, p. 171,38-9: Chalcedon indeed began lawfully, but did not find a proper conclusion: . . . *si et iustum finem suscepisset!*

36. H 14: Brock, 98.

37. On the conflict over Ibas and Theodoret see H 18: Brock, 100 and I 78: ACO IV, 2, p. 182,21-22: *in his ergo dictis, contradicentes* (= the Syrians): *De his quidem persuasum est nobis*. On the conflict over the two natures see J. Speigl, *art. cit.*, 277.

answered: 'Above all, the novelty of the two natures. While Cyril and his predecessors had proclaimed "out of two natures one incarnate nature of the Word of God after the union", they [the Fathers of 451] claimed the novelty of "in two natures".'<sup>38</sup> We shall treat each of the two reports separately.

### (i) *The two-natures theme according to I*

The provocative word 'novelty' induced Hypatius to clarify its scope. 'Novelty' could have (1) a positive sense, insofar as something which was not previously present, now, however, causes surprise as being new in content. But in this term (2) there could also lurk a rejection of true tradition, and thus it could also denote something harmful. The Syrians were now supposed to say in what sense they understood Chalcedon as a 'novelty'. They replied audaciously: 'In both respects.' In doing this they appealed to the tradition of the *mia-physis* formula, as they said it was to be found everywhere: in the Church of Alexandria (Cyril, Athanasius), in the Church of Rome (Popes Felix and Julius), in Asia Minor (Gregory the Wonderworker, Dionysius the Areopagite): 'All of them have determined (*decernentibus*) as binding one nature of the God-Logos after the union; but all of these [the Fathers of Chalcedon] have disregarded this and have presumed to proclaim two natures after the union.'<sup>39</sup> Thus they were the innovators, and innovators in the negative sense. The legitimate tradition was on the side of the Severans. Hypatius, however, called this tradition into question by skilfully tossing the word 'forgery' into the debate.

### *The so-called Apollinarian forgeries*

In this way a long overdue theme was taken up publicly, namely the question of the legitimacy of the *mia-physis* formula as a *tessera* of orthodoxy. Through Cyril's authority it was able to develop its effectiveness between 428/429 and 532, thus over more than a century, without the critical question about its origin being persistently raised. The doubts of Bishop Hypatius certainly did not conform to the line of dialogue determined beforehand by Emperor Justinian, but they were, however, in order. With good reason we recall here Hypatius' theological adviser, Leontius of Byzantium, and his work *Against the deceits of the Apollinarians*.<sup>40</sup> Admittedly we

38. Cf. I 21: ACO IV, 2, 171: *Ante omnia duarum naturarum novitatem*.

39. Cf. I 22: ACO IV, 2, p. 172,2-7. M. Richard, 'Léonce de Jérusalem et Léonce de Byzance', *MSR* 1 (1944)(1-54), 51-53 = *Op. Min.* III, no. 59, [51]-[53], gives a brief analysis of the 'Fathers' named by the Severans and their texts. By 'Athanasius' we should understand Ps. Athanasius, *Quod unus sit Christus*: Lietzmann, *Apollinaris von Laodicea*, 296. On 'Felix' see Lietzmann, *op. cit.*, 318, frag. 186; on 'Julius' cf. Innocent Maron., *De Collat.* §25: ACO IV, 2, 173; on 'Gregory the Wonderworker' see Apollin., *He kata meros pistis*: ACO, *ibid.* On Ps. Dionys. Ar., *De divin. nominibus* 14: Zacharias Rhetor cont., *HE* IX, 15: Brooks, *CSCO* 88, 82; PG 3, 592. M. Richard, *op. cit.*, [49]-[51], refers to the fact that in many passages this extract from the Severan florilegium coincides with the florilegium which Leontius of Jerusalem refutes in *C. Monophysitas*: PG 86, 1853A-1876C. His description fits exactly the *Professio fidei* which the Severans presented to Emperor Justinian: *De Coll.* §9: ACO IV, 2, 170. This *professio* only exists in an extract in Zacharias Rhetor cont., *HE* IX, 15: Brooks, *CSCO* 88, 83; M. Richard, *op. cit.*, [51]. This should also be regarded as an indication that Leontius of Jerusalem wrote in Constantinople.

40. See PG 86, 1948A-1976A; B. E. Daley, *Leontii Monachi Byzantini Opera*, no. 6 (= *AFa*); as an introduction, *ibid.*, LV-LVIII. Daley defends the plausible position that *AFa* was composed as a dossier for Bishop Hypatius and his dialogue partners of 532. The work is not a theological treatise, but a collection of materials from the works of Apollinarius and two of his students. The introduction (PG 86, 1948AB), a section in the middle of the text (*ibid.*,

should not expect from this collection in itself much for the outcome of the dialogue of 532, or for the subsequent attitude of the Severans. In their report H there was no direct or express comment on the proof of Hypatius, that the authorities adduced by the Orientals in favour of the 'out of two natures one' and the *mia-physis* formula were forgeries, a claim which must have certainly startled the Severans.<sup>41</sup> They would have nothing directly to do with it.<sup>42</sup> What is interesting, however, is the self-protective remark of the Severans in H 19 (Brock, 102), which follows the report about the reading out of the letter to Mari of Bishop Ibas of Edessa. After this the Chalcedonians were said to have been left speechless: 'In reply, the opposing bishops could find neither defence, nor (evidence of) *forgery*' (my italics). Because the authenticity of Ibas' letter was never disputed, this reference nevertheless bears witness to the fact that the Severans were made to feel insecure, this effect being achieved by the word 'forgeries'. One could now ask to what extent the work of Leontius of Byzantium (*AFA*) played a rôle in the dialogue of 532. Hypatius himself may have had difficulties with it, for the writing leaves it to the reader 'to undertake the work of comparison [between the texts manufactured under orthodox names and the works of Apollinarius and his school] and to draw the necessary conclusions . . . Not once does he draw attention to the fact that in nos. 6 and 7 the letter of Julius to Dionysius, in nos. 15 and 16 the writing *de unione*, in nos. 39 and 40 the *Kata meros pistis* of Gregory the Wonderworker are cited directly as the property of Apollinarius.<sup>43</sup> Nevertheless with the reference of the Bishop of Ephesus to the falsified transmission of the *mia-physis* formula an impetus was given for further theological argumentation by the Chalcedonians, as the decades and centuries after 532 were to show.

What is striking is the fact that earlier doubts about the authenticity of the *mia-physis* texts had passed into oblivion.<sup>44</sup> After 532, however, remarks on this theme

1969AB) and some comments at the end (*ibid.*, 1973C–1976A) may be considered as Leontius' own contribution. The verifications for the citations from the various writings are recorded by Daley in the apparatus, and in one case there is also the comment: *fragmentum hic primo inventum*, that is, that Leontius is the first witness for this text.

41. Cf. I 22: ACO IV, 2, p. 172,3–7: besides Cyril they name Athanasius, Felix and Julius of Rome, Gregory the Wonderworker and Dionysius the Areopagite as *unam naturam dei verbi decernentibus post unionem*, cf. S. P. Brock, *art. cit.*, 119 (I 22–8 has no corresponding passage in H).

42. H. Lietzmann, *Apollinaris von Laodicea*, 124, rightly comments that the Severans made no effort to defend the authenticity of the witnesses questioned by the Chalcedonians. For it would certainly have been their business to give thought to the legitimacy of the *mia-physis* tradition. However, in the meantime Cyril, the 'king of the dogmas' (Severus), and Severus himself had 'interpreted' and sanctioned this formula, and thus enabled its reception.

43. *Ibid.*, 106. Lietzmann has even more reservations with regard to Leontius' gathering of materials.

44. We call the following considerations briefly to mind: (1) It can be established that this is first recognized in the Roman uncials, as Leontius of Jerusalem, *C. monophys.* (CPG 6917), PG 86, 1865B, knows: of Pope Julius there is 'nothing to be found in the books of the archives' (instead of *ἀρχαίων* in this passage it should read *ἀρχεῶν*). A. Tuilier, 'Remarques sur les fraudes des Apollinaristes et des Monophysites', in J. Dummer, *TU* 133 (Berlin, 1987), 583, however, asks one to consider the fact that the archives of the Roman Church were destroyed under Diocletian and were only gradually restored under Damasus. (2) Roughly at the same time as the first declaration of the alleged Julian citations in Rome through the documentation of Eutyches, there appeared in Rome the writing of an anonymous person who responds to an enquiry posed to him in this regard in the writing *Quid contrarium catholice fidei senserit Eutychis*. He repeatedly emphasizes the fact that the letter of Julius, tendered as proof, is a forgery. Cf. ACO II, 4, 145–151; especially pp. 146,39–147,2; 149,22–23.35. (3) Emperor Marcian, *Letter to the monks of Alexandria from 452*: ACO II, 5, p. 3,30–32; Greek: ACO II, 1, 3, p. 130,14–16. The anonymous author just cited (2) may have written before Emperor Marcian. (4) *Letter of the Palestinian monks to Alcison*, composed in 515, in Evagrius, *HE* III, 31: Bidez-Parmentier,

increase.<sup>45</sup> Four different writings are involved: (1) Emperor Justinian, *C. monophysitas*,<sup>46</sup> who uses the same source as the following (later) works: (2) *Doctrina Patrum*,<sup>47</sup> (3) Leontius of Jerusalem, *C. monophysitas*<sup>48</sup> and (4) the writing *De sectis*.<sup>49</sup> In addition to these authors Bishop John of Scythopolis deserves special attention.<sup>50</sup> In the question about the authenticity of the Julius letter, Leontius of Jerusalem deals with the special explanatory work of John of Scythopolis:

Moreover John, the bishop of Scythopolis, who occupied himself hard and long with the earlier writings of Apollinarius, has found this authority [that is, the alleged Julius text] in these writings with exactly the same words. That this [letter of Julius] belongs to Apollinarius, he [John] states clearly, illustrating this by adducing several pages from this [Apollinarian] book. He [Ps. Julius] says that the body of the Lord was deprived of a human soul and [human] life, which Julius in fact never said. It reads [in Ps. Julius]: the body received its life from the divine holiness, not from the faculty of a human soul.<sup>51</sup>

In the 530s there was thus present (among Chalcedonians) a broad consciousness of the Apollinarian forgeries,<sup>52</sup> which had become the major court of appeal against Chalcedon. As the Syriac document H shows, the Severans did not allow themselves to be impressed by this.

### *A discussion about the two natures*

Let us return to the two-natures question. According to the I report, the second day's discussion was not at first about Ibas of Edessa and Theodoret of Cyrrhus, but dealt immediately with the two natures.<sup>53</sup> The opposition between 'one nature' and 'two natures' had been brought

p. 129,11-14: 'They have also forged many speeches (*logoi*) of Fathers, and through headings have ascribed many texts of Apollinarius to Athanasius and Gregory [the Wonderworker] and Julius . . .' Cf. P. Allen, *Evagrius Scholasticus. The Church Historian* (Louvain, 1981), 147-9. This reference is used as a framework for reporting a forgery of a 'document about the faith' by the supporters of Dioscorus, which Patriarch Elias of Jerusalem (494-518) had sent to Emperor Anastasius. Evagrius stresses the effectiveness of these forgeries.

45. See H. Lietzmann, *Apollinaris von Laodicea*, 108-28.

46. Justinian Imp., *C. monophys.*: E. Schwartz, *Drei dogmatische Schriften Justinians* = *ABAW.PH* 18 (Munich, 1939), pp. 21,6-22; 19,9-10; 18,16-19,7.

47. DP, ch. 9, X-XI: Apollinarian forgeries: Diekamp, 62-63, with more details on 374, where the parallels to Justinian are mentioned.

48. Leontius Jer., *C. monophys.*: PG 86, 1865B13-C3.

49. Leontius Schol. (Ps. Leontius), *De sectis* (CPG 6823): PG 86, 1253C-1256D.

50. H. Lietzmann, *op. cit.*, 117, indeed refers to John of Scythopolis, but does not go any further into his knowledge of the Apollinarian forgeries. On John of Scythopolis see F. Loofs, *Leontius von Byzanz und die gleichnamigen Schriftsteller seiner Zeit* = *TU* 3,1-2 (Leipzig, 1887), 269-72; S. Helmer, *Der Neuchalkedonismus* (Bonn, 1962), 176-81; L. Perrone, *La chiesa di Palestina* (Brescia, 1980), 240-9; B. Flusin, *Miracle et histoire dans l'oeuvre de Cyrille de Scythopolis* (Paris, 1983), 17-29; 'B. Le milieu culturel et théologique: Jean de Scythopolis'; B. R. Suchla, *Die Überlieferung des Prologs des Johannes von Skythopolis zum griechischen Corpus Dionysiacum Areopagiticum* = *NAWG.PH* 1984, 4 (Göttingen, 1984), 177-88; *eadem*, *Eine Redaktion des griechischen Corpus Dionysiacum Areopagiticum im Umkreis des Johannes von Skythopolis, des Verfassers von Prolog und Scholien. Ein dritter Beitrag zur Überlieferungsgeschichte des CD* = *NAWG PH* 1985, 4 (Göttingen, 1985), 179-94.

51. Leontius Jer., *C. monophys.*: PG 86, 1865BC.

52. A. Tuilier, *art. cit.*, gives suggestions worth considering for how the Apollinarian forgeries are to be explained.

53. See above n. 37.

to mind by the Chalcedonians' attempt to justify the reacceptance of bishops Ibas and Theodoret, condemned in 449, by referring to the letters of Cyril. The letters alluded to are those of the Patriarch which had been decisive for the Union of 433.<sup>54</sup> It is said that in these Cyril had acknowledged the manner of speaking of 'two natures'. We are already acquainted with this theme from the controversy between the compilers of the Cyrillian florilegium and Severus. As Severus had categorically rejected such an acknowledgement, so too the Severan bishops of 532 referred to Cyril's writings containing the *mia-physis* formula<sup>55</sup> and denied the existence of the two-natures formula. In contrast the Chalcedonians explained that for their part they were ready to submit patristic evidence for this.<sup>56</sup> But matters did not come to a head, for on the evening of the second day there was insufficient time, and on the third day an unexpected change in the programme was made.<sup>57</sup> The Emperor invited the parties to a combined audience.<sup>58</sup>

The discussion about the two-natures formula in Innocent, however, occupied more space and was allocated to the second day. This discrepancy can no doubt be explained by the fact that the 'impressive argumentation of Hypatius for the two-natures teaching' (I 39-63: ACO IV, 2, 176-180) did not represent a genuine report of minutes, but was to be understood as 'documentation, which could be collected from the records and preparation of Hypatius for this discussion. Thus the first impression would be confirmed that the report of Innocent, in rendering the content of the dialogues, strongly served the interests of documenting its own standpoint, and did not confine itself to reproducing the course of the dialogue by way of minutes.'<sup>59</sup> This does not prevent us from making clear the christological position of the Chalcedonians at the doctrinal dialogue.

### *The christological problem in Hypatius of Ephesus according to the representation of Innocent*

Once the history of the *mia-physis* formula appeared dubious against the background of the Apollinarian forgeries, the way was clear for the positive discussion of the formulas and concepts introduced at Chalcedon.

Hypatius called to mind clearly the historical task of the Fourth Council: the teaching of the two natures had been formulated in order to exclude the falsification of faith through the teaching of one *physis* introduced by the Arians and Apollinarians. The Arians and

54. On the Union of 433 see *JdChr* I<sup>3</sup>, 703-7; see the important article of M. Simonetti, 'Alcune osservazioni sul monofisismo di Cirillo di Alessandria', *Aug* 22 (1982), 493-511; on 504 Simonetti gathers all of the Cyrillian passages together, where Cyril 'non esita a parlare di due nature di Cristo, pur sottolineando energicamente la loro unità'. As we have seen, Severus wants to deny this absolutely.

55. Cf. H, nos. 29-30: Brock, 106. The Severans name Cyril Alex., *Ep. 44 ad Eulog.*: ACO I, 1, 4, 35-37; *Ep. 40 ad Acacium Melit.*: ACO I, 1, 4, 20-31. On the appearance of the *mia-physis* formula in Cyril in chronological order, see *JdChr* I<sup>2</sup>, 674, n. 2.

56. Cf. H 31.32: Brock, 106-7.

57. See J. Speigl, *art. cit.*, 277: 'According to the Syriac minutes H, the patristic argument of the imperial party for the two-natures teaching on the second day would no longer have had a chance.'

58. Cf. I 79: ACO IV, 2, p. 182, 23-28.

59. Thus J. Speigl, *art. cit.*, 278. The concluding comment in I 78: ACO IV, 2, p. 182, 21-22, does not contradict this: in *his ergo dictis, contradicentes: 'De his quidem persuasum est nobis'*. This declaration of agreement by the Severans can hardly be accepted as authentic. It is a redactional addition in I; cf. the result in H.

Apollinarians were at one in that they both denied the divine nature of the Logos either explicitly, or implicitly by wanting to represent the Logos as 'created' or as 'passible'.<sup>60</sup> But if Christ were true God and true human being, then the talk of two natures, which were united, however, in the one *hypostasis* and in the one *prosoyon*, suggested itself. What did Hypatius have to say positively with regard to the main Chalcedonian concepts? In the bishop's first statement the confusion in the usage of concepts was clearly evident, in that in the same sentence the terminology of Ephesus and Chalcedon, of Nestorius and Cyril, was mentioned. This happened in connection with the question why Chalcedon, in contrast to the Council of Ephesus (431), had not accepted the third letter of Cyril to Nestorius. Hypatius did not deny the reservation of the Fathers, but attempted to explain it in a convoluted argument from the difficult conceptual language of the appended anathemas, in particular the third in the list.<sup>61</sup>

If the Council of Chalcedon accepted and confirmed all the formulas and definitions of faith of the Council held at Ephesus against Nestorius, what reason did it have to reject this letter? They [the Fathers of Chalcedon] wanted to define one person and one (*hypostasis*) (*subsistentiam*) against the blasphemies of Nestorius, which divide the two natures into two persons and two *hypostases* (*subsistentias*). But this letter introduced a mention of the two *hypostases*. This is why they properly deferred naming it [the letter] so as not to come into opposition either to it or to themselves, but rather it proposed another letter of his, which was praised because of its agreement with the symbol of the Council of Nicaea [CPG 5304], and that [letter] which was written to the Orientals [CPG 5339].

As we see, there appear here the main Chalcedonian concepts: *natura* (*physis*), *persona* (*prosoyon*), *subsistentia* (*hypostasis*). From his interpretation of *subsistentia* (*hypostasis*) Hypatius at first attempts to demonstrate that the Fathers of Chalcedon would have come into opposition to Cyril's letter containing the anathemas, were they to have adduced it, for the reason that this letter speaks of two *hypostases* in Christ, whereas they themselves would speak only of one. Hence it can only be the third anathema which is meant, but in an interpretation not intended by Cyril.

60. I 23: ACO IV, 2, p. 172,13–17: *neque enim Arius aliquando vel Apollinarius duas naturas confessi sunt, sed unam naturam dei verbi incarnatam ipsi magis noviter protulerunt, ut creatam et passibilem ipsam divinam verbi naturam introducerent. adversus quos duas substantias atque naturas omnes sancti patres decreverunt.* Hypatius passes over the fact that with Nicaea the Apollinarians fundamentally retained the divinity of the Logos, but the passibility of the Logos necessarily follows from their conception of the *mia physis*. To the assumption of a real *passio* of the Logos as Logos, however, was tied implicitly the denial of the divinity of Christ, a conclusion which indeed the Arians drew, but Apollinarius himself did not.

61. I 28: ACO IV, 2, p. 173,21–9. It is to be noted that the Fathers of Ephesus already treat Cyril's anathemata letter differently from his second letter to Nestorius. Cf. *JdChr* I<sup>3</sup>, 688–9; ACO I, 1, 2, pp. 26,19–20,26.

The anathema reads:

If anyone divides the *hypostases* in the one Christ after the union, joining them only in a connection according to dignity, or authority, or power, and not rather in a coming together according to the physical unity, let him be anathema.<sup>62</sup>

John the Grammarian had already drawn attention to this '*hypostases* text', and had shrewdly endeavoured to make use of it for himself.<sup>63</sup> No one, says John, can be seriously of the opinion that Cyril sees in the one Christ two *hypostases* already existing prior to the union, but which are now '*united hypostases*', retaining their station as such also in the union. What he reproduces in his anathema is the opinion of Nestorius, in the way in which the Alexandrian understands it. The third anathema can also be paraphrased as follows: 'If anyone accepts two *hypostases* after the union, let him be anathema. And anyone who does not confess the "physical union" accepts two *hypostases*.' The reservation of Chalcedon *vis-à-vis* the anathemas letter was certainly not conditioned by the terminological vagueness of the third anathema, but by the entire tendency of these twelve chapters, which seemed to the Fathers not to exclude Apollinarianism, and above all Eutychianism, sufficiently clearly. In the teaching of the '*physical union*' (*henosis kata physin*) which Cyril demanded, they suspected the Apollinarian nature-synthesis of divinity and humanity in Christ.

After almost one hundred years, this would have been the opportunity to focus on the real terminological problem of Chalcedon and its '*novelty*', that is, to clarify the distinction between *hypostasis* (*subsistentia*) and nature (*physis, natura*), and correspondingly to elucidate what differentiates the '*union according to hypostasis*' from a '*union according to nature*' (*henosis kath'hypostasin* — *henosis kata physin*). In fact this discussion tentatively touches the problem. For the Severans reply to Bishop Hypatius: 'In the letter of the twelve chapters he [Cyril] takes the two *hypostases* for two natures.'<sup>64</sup> Thus they perceive a different use of concepts: in his interpretation of the third anathema Hypatius takes the word *subsistentia* (*hypostasis*) for '*subject*'; the Severans render the Cyrillian '*two hypostases*' by '*two natures*', and believe in this way that they find in Cyril's words a condemnation of the two natures of Chalcedon. In contrast Hypatius has recourse to the conceptual history of the fourth century, and would like to transfer the distinction between

62. Cyril Alex., *Ep. 17 ad Nestor.*: COD, p. 59 III; DEC, p. 59 III; p. \*59 3.

63 See above, pp. 58–61.

64. Cf. I 29: ACO IV, 2, p. 173, 29–30: *In epistola XII capitulorum duas subsistentias pro duabus naturis dicit.*

*hypostasis* and *physis*, introduced into trinitarian theology, to the *oikonomia* as well, that is, to the doctrine of the incarnation,<sup>65</sup> and on that basis to arrive at a clarification of the third anathema. If the Severans on the other hand want to remain with the old synonymous usage of *physis* and *hypostasis*, then they will experience difficulty with its application to trinitarian teaching. For if they attempt to protest to the Chalcedonians that Cyril with his condemnation of 'two *hypostases*' has already condemned the 'two natures' — presupposing that *physis* is synonymous with *hypostasis* — then they themselves have to accept in the Trinity three separate *hypostases*, different according to nature. Hypatius passes over in silence the fact that Cyril, Severus and the Severans have given up the synonymous use of these concepts in the *theologia*, and with the Cappadocians distinguish in the 'one nature' of the godhead 'three *hypostases*', but in the *oikonomia* still take *physis* and *hypostasis* as synonymous. That is certainly inconsistent, but a historical reality. Hypatius (Innocent of Maronia) should have been aware of this. He could justifiably have emphasized such a terminological perversity, without attributing false teachings to the opponent.

Hence, if we follow I, once again formula is opposed to formula. The clarification of the concept has not begun at all. The continuation of the text also illustrates this.<sup>66</sup>

[The *contradicentes* = Severans say] And the letters of Cyril which were specifically adduced at the Council of Chalcedon, namely the one written to Nestorius [CPG 5304] as well as the one to the Orientals [CPG 5339], contain the 'from two natures' (and not the 'in two natures'. The Bishop [Hypatius]: Do you accept then a difference between 'from two natures' and) 'in two natures'? The *contradicentes* [Severans] said: Yes, to the highest degree. The Bishop [Hypatius] said: What do you mean? The opponents: To say 'from two natures' means according to Cyril and the holy Fathers the one incarnate nature of the Logos; 'in two natures' means two persons and two *hypostases*.

65. *Ibid.*, 29–31: 173,30–174,13: Hypatius first of all refers to the earlier synonymous use of *substantia* (*ousia*), *natura* (*physis*) and *subsistentia* (*hypostasis*), which had been traditional for trinitarian theology. Then he depicts the misunderstanding which occurred between the East (with the formula: in the Trinity there is one *hypostasis* = one nature) and the West (in the Trinity there are three persons in one nature). He says that the East has seen Sabellianism in the Western formula, and the West has reproached the Orientals with an Arian division of the one godhead into three unequal *hypostases* (*subsistentias*). Through the linguistic knowledge of the holy Athanasius, however, the reconciliation between East and West was achieved. Hypatius is thus of the opinion that Athanasius did away with the synonymous use of *physis* and *hypostasis*; but here he has in mind a pseudo-Athanasian writing. The real Athanasius was an old-Nicene. Cf. his *Ep. ad Afros eppos* 4: PG 26, 1036B: 'The *hypostasis* is the *ousia* and means nothing other than this very thing which is.'

66. I 32–33: ACO IV, 2, 174. The text placed in brackets < > is E. Schwartz's addition.



This was the customary Severan argumentation. The dialogue was thus completely stalled. Hypatius could only argue along these lines: your 'from two natures' does not provide any further help either. For if for you 'nature' is the same as *hypostasis*, then your formula 'from two natures' presupposes two existing *hypostases* which have been united. Then this brings one down again on the side of Nestorius. The Bishop of Ephesus notes that no decision will be arrived at on this level and would like to play down the opposition between the formulas. For this purpose he has recourse to the Flavian Synod of 448 where there had still been a certain unity. The rôle of Bishop Basil of Seleucia is also recalled.<sup>67</sup> At this assembly, which Hypatius says took a clear position against Eutyches, both the formula 'out of two natures' (Flavian) as well as the other 'in two natures' were to be heard, without bringing with them the accusation of heresy. Indeed, in his rescript to Emperor Theodosius II, Patriarch Flavian did not once reject the *mia-physis* formula.<sup>68</sup> Nevertheless at Ephesus (449) he was condemned by Patriarch Dioscorus. Hypatius concluded from this that the oscillation between both sides had to be abandoned. For Chalcedon also recognized that nothing so approached the Eutychians, as opponents of the 'two natures', as 'this Manichaean confession of one nature', which signifies mingling and docetism.<sup>69</sup> Thus he stated that the Fourth Council posed *vis-à-vis* Flavian an 'explanatory formula' (*explanativam potius vocem*), 'which confesses one person and one *hypostasis*'. By this means Flavian's correct faith was acknowledged and his statements confirmed.<sup>70</sup> Hypatius thus believes that through his mediating position he has demonstrated to the Severans that the formula of faith of 451 was the wise, indeed the sole way out of the crisis regarding Eutyches.

This attempt by Hypatius to solicit understanding ought to be acknowledged. It consists in nothing other than re-enacting the decision of Chalcedon, concerning both its major formula and its relationship to Cyril. In contrast to John the Grammarian, the Bishop of Ephesus and his companions do not demand that both formulas need to be used to

67. I 33: ACO IV, 2, p. 174,24-30. Cf. *JdChr* I<sup>3</sup>, 733-4, 757-8, II/1, 241-3.

68. As a proof this rescript is cited verbatim in I 34: ACO IV, 2, 174-175. The main sentence of Flavian reads: *et unam quidem dei verbi naturam, incarnatam tamen, dicere non negamus, quia ex utroque unus idemque dominus noster Iesus Christus est* (p. 175,14-16). Schwartz remarks that Rusticus offers a different translation (cf. ACO II, 5, 116-117); Grumel, *Regestes* I<sup>2</sup>, no. 105; *Chalcedon* I, 196 and 398-401.

69. I 35: ACO IV, 2, p. 175,27-29: *nihil ita recreat eos qui cum Eutychem adversantur orthodoxae duarum naturarum confessioni, nisi confusa et commixta et imaginaria vel Manichaica unius naturae confessio.*

70. I 35: ACO IV, 2, p. 175,29-31.

express the faith correctly, namely the Chalcedonian two-natures formula against Eutyches and the Alexandrian one-nature formula against Nestorius. 'One *hypostasis* in two natures': this definition, by its distinction between, and not the synonymous use of, the major concepts, fulfils both apologetic tasks. By the reference to the *fraudes Apollinistarum*, the Apollinarian forgeries, the authenticity of which the Severans did not attempt to uphold, the Chalcedonian decision could moreover also be spared the reproach of 'novelty'. The critical stance with regard to the letters of Cyril was also Chalcedonian, which again was nothing other than the re-enactment of the procedure of the Fathers of Ephesus. Cyril has a determining part in the definition of 451 through the two letters acknowledged by the Synod, the second letter to Nestorius approved at Ephesus and the *Laetentur* letter of 433. He is also called as a witness to the two-natures language, but not as a promoter of the one-nature formula.<sup>71</sup> Hypatius with his group stands firmly on the ground of Chalcedon, sadly also in the sense that he does not try to analyse and define his main concepts and to demonstrate how effective they can be in dealing with the problems at hand.

(ii) *The two-natures theme according to H*

While according to I the two-natures teaching forms the major theme of the second day, H places this discussion only at the end of the same day. Each of the two parties refers for its position to Cyril as the main authority. The Chalcedonians rely above all on the letter which Cyril

71. I 36: ACO IV, 2, p. 175,33-38: 'We accept [from Cyril] what agrees with his synodal letters [that is, ratified by Ephesus and Chalcedon respectively]; what, however, is not in agreement we neither condemn nor do we follow it as ecclesiastical law. As synodal letters we consider, as was said above, the letters which have been accepted and confirmed by the holy councils [Ephesus and Chalcedon], that is, the one to Nestorius [CPG 5304: *Garrunt multi*] as well as the one written to the Orientals [CPG 5339: *Laetentur Caeli*].' There follow extracts from these two letters together with the formula of union (176, nos. 39 and 41). In contrast to these synodally recognized letters, all the other letters, written more secretly (*secreto*) or in friendship, which are particularly exposed to forgery, must be passed over (I 43: ACO IV, 2, p. 177,10-15). With regard to this compromise the Severans insist on the evaluation of the whole of Cyril, particularly the letter to Eulogius and the second letter to Succensus, and begin immediately to read from them. The letters in question are CPG 5344 and 5346. According to H 30 they also demand the reading out of the letter to Acacius of Melitene (CPG 5340), a demand which because of lack of time, however, cannot be granted. Thus the Cyril of the *mia physis* is produced by the Severans; in contrast it is the Cyril who also allows the two-natures formula to be valid, who is produced by Hypatius (especially in I 45-63: ACO IV, 2, pp. 177,25-180,3). That Hypatius could rightly appeal to this follows from M. Simonetti, 'Alcune osservazioni sul monofisismo di Cirillo di Alessandria', *Aug* 22 (1982), 493-511, especially 510-11, n 50, where he refers to Cyril's writing *Quod unus sit Christus*.

wrote in connection with the Union of 433,<sup>72</sup> which to some extent is justified historically. But with equal right the anti-Chalcedonians can distil the Cyril of the *mia-physis* formula.<sup>73</sup> In this regard the main documents are the letter to Eulogius,<sup>74</sup> which is read out, and the letter to Acacius of Melitene,<sup>75</sup> which because of the lateness of the hour could no longer be read out. Moreover the imperial auditor emphasizes that its contents are equivalent to those of the letter to Eulogius.<sup>76</sup> The Chalcedonians want to place in opposition to these documents a dossier from the Fathers in favour of the two-natures language.<sup>77</sup> The Syrians encourage them in this project, because they, like Severus, are certain of the fact that the attempt would not succeed.<sup>78</sup>

The dialogue then takes an unexpected turn. Both parties are invited to an audience with the Emperor, the Chalcedonians being the first. After some time the Syrians are also summoned. Immediately they have the suspicion that behind their backs their dialogue partners have urged breaking-off the dialogue altogether, because of their embarrassment at not being able to produce the patristic proof which they had announced. The main reason for this premature ending, however, is no doubt the Emperor's realization, gained from information he had received about the course of the dialogue, that his goal could not be achieved, namely to lead the Severans back to unity with the 'imperial confession'. This concluding audience is thus equivalent to an admission that the Emperor's initiative has failed. Only one bishop, Philoxenus of Doliche, changes from the Severan to the Chalcedonian side.<sup>79</sup> Nevertheless the dialogue has an effect on later history, as the Syrian report (S) enables one to discover. To begin with, the Emperor succeeded in having the Syrians formulate, with all assurances, the conditions under which they

72. Cyril Alex., *Ep. 39 ad Iohann. Ant. de pace* (CPG 5339): ACO I, 1, 4, 15-20; II, 1, 1, 107-111; PG 77, 173-181 (*Laetentur* letter).

73. Cf. H 29-30: Brock, 106.

74. Cyril Alex., *Ep. 44 ad Eulog.* (CPG 5344): ACO I, 1, 4, p. 35,14; 36,11-12; PG 77, 225B.D.

75. *Idem*, *Ep. 40 ad Acac. Melit.* with several attestations of the *mia-physis* formula: ACO I, 1, 4, p. 26,8-9, 21-22; PG 77, 182D-193AB; cf. *JdChr* I<sup>3</sup>, 674, n. 2.

76. H 30: Brock, 106. Once again cf. M. Simonetti, *art. cit.*

77. H 31: Brock, 106; I 79: ACO IV, 2, p. 182,23-25.

78. Cf. H 34: Brock, 108. The Syrians confirm that for the third day the Chalcedonians did not have their promised testimonies of the holy Fathers prepared, and the former comment: 'indeed they could not have done so'.

79. Cf. E. Honigmann, *Evêques et évêchés*, 72-3; ACO IV, 2, pp. 169,27; 184,2; J. Speigl, *art. cit.*, 271. How Emperor Justinian further attempted indirectly to achieve his purpose with the Severans and failed is depicted by J. Speigl, *art. cit.*, 280-2. Nothing new for christology results from this.

would agree to the restoration of the unity of the Church.<sup>80</sup> Still they give to their agreement a particular meaning. They do not speak of conditions which the Severan side would have to fulfil in order to come to unity, but rather of the conditions for the Chalcedonian side. For according to their conviction it was the Chalcedonian side that was marked with the sign of schism.<sup>81</sup>

We do not think that those who have specifically withdrawn themselves from communion with the opposite party will be united, unless they anathematize those who speak of two natures after the inexplicable union, as well as the Tome of Leo, and what took place at Chalcedon in opposition to the orthodox faith.

That is an unambiguous renunciation of the Council. For the moment nevertheless the Syrians do not demand any condemnation of particular names (Ibas and Theodoret). But the Roman demands, that particular *libelli* be signed (by which no doubt the *formula Hormisdæ* is meant), should cease. Here there follows a special proposal which the Emperor himself made for union and which already points to the next phase of the discussion, as the text S reveals.

- (1) The Severans should anathematize Diodore, Theodore, Theodoret, Ibas, Nestorius and Eutyches.
- (2) They could accept the twelve anathemas of Cyril and anathematize those against whom they were written.
- (3) They might confess the one nature of the incarnate Word, but they should refrain from anathematizing the supporters of the two natures; instead they should express their condemnation of those confessing Nestorian views (under whom naturally each Severan also subsumed the Chalcedonians).
- (4) The slogan 'the two united and inseparable natures' should be accepted by both sides as a formula of reconciliation.<sup>82</sup>
- (5) Finally they should partially recognize Chalcedon by condemning Eutyches; however, they do not need to accept the actual formula of faith of 451. They should cease to anathematize the *Tome* of Leo; the *libelli Romani* should not be suspended.<sup>83</sup>

The Emperor's endeavour was in vain. The report S comments in conclusion in no. 7: 'These things failed to persuade the orthodox bishops.' Thus if we consider the Emperor's active steps to achieve unity, in this concentrated form over three days, they have to be regarded as a failure

80. In doing so they stress the private character of their step; cf. S3: Brock, 115: 'The orthodox bishops say: "The canon does not allow five insignificant bishops, bishops moreover of small towns, to provide any common (statement) on the faith by themselves".'

81. S5: Brock, 116.

82. S. Brock, *art. cit.*, 116, n. 92, adding by way of explanation: 'I.e. the Syrian Orthodox should distinguish between the ordinary upholders of Chalcedon and those who did so as a convenient front to hide their genuinely Nestorian position.'

83. Cf. S7: Brock, 116-17.

as such. As far as the procedure was concerned, it did not produce the planned exchange of doubt and solution. Instead of question and answer, there were only attack and accusation. If we were to take Justinian's strategy, as it has just been presented, and contrast it with the main theses of Hypatius, then in the place of the strict-Chalcedonian position of the imperial representative the Emperor's new attitude is already apparent. We still have to address this topic.

## II. HERACLIANUS OF CHALCEDON

To the circle of Chalcedonian bishops and theologians from the Patriarchate of Constantinople there also belonged Heraclianus, who from 537(?) to 553 was the bishop and metropolitan of Chalcedon.<sup>84</sup> Between 520 and 535 we find him as a priest of the Great Church in Constantinople and *synkellos* of Patriarch Epiphanius (520–535).<sup>85</sup> In 520, together with Bishop John of Claudiopolis in Isauria and the deacon Constantine, he was sent to Rome, arriving on 30 November 520,<sup>86</sup> in order, after the change of 518, to seal the peace between Byzantium and Rome in the name of the Patriarch and his synod. This delegation was also intended by Emperor Justin (and Justinian) to petition for the ratification of the trinitarian theopaschite formula by the Pope.<sup>87</sup> This formula stated that Jesus Christ, the Son of the Virgin, who suffered in the flesh, is rightly confessed as 'one of the Trinity', or as 'person in and from the Trinity'. In 532 Heraclianus, still as a priest and theologian, was a participant in the doctrinal dialogue which we have just described.<sup>88</sup> In 535 he was sent to Rome a second time, in order to present a letter of Emperor Justinian to the King of the Goths,

84. See CPG 6800–6801; E. Honigmann, *Heraclianus of Chalcedon (537 A.D.?)*, *Soterichus of Caesarea in Cappadocia and Achillius* = ST 173 (Vatican City, 1953), no. XXII, 205–216.

85. Cf. ACO IV, 2, 170; R. Schieffer, ACO IV, 3, 2, 1, p. 215, who emphasizes the distinguished position of Heraclianus. Cf. E. Honigmann, *op. cit.*, 213 on Heraclianus: 'Eminent ecclesiastical leaders like Heraclianus were certainly not at the time a common occurrence in the Byzantine Church . . .'

86. Cf. Epiphanius, *Relatio ad Hormisdam*: CA, ep. 233, no. 7 and ep. 234, no. 10, pp. 709, 713 for mention of Heraclianus. Between the Pope in Rome and the Patriarch in Constantinople there is complete agreement. Emperor Justin (Justinian) likewise sends a letter: CA, ep. 235. In no. 2 see the names of the delegates.

87. Justin (Justinian) imp., *Ep. ad Hormisd.* (from 9.9.520): CA, ep. 235, no. 3: CSEL 35, 2, p. 715: *nobis etenim videtur, quoniam filius dei vivi dominus noster Iesus Christus ex virgine Maria natus, quem praedicat summus apostolorum carne passum, recte dicitur unus in trinitate cum patre spirituque sancto regnare, maiestatisque eius personam in trinitate et ex trinitate non infideliter credimus.*

88. Cf. ACO IV, 2, 170.

Theodahat.<sup>89</sup> Certainly from 537, as a bishop and metropolitan, he led the Church of Chalcedon, to which he had been appointed by Bishop Soterichus of Caesarea in Cappadocia in his capacity as exarch of the dioceses of Pontus.<sup>90</sup> According to Patriarch Photius, Heraclianus was a model of orthodoxy.<sup>91</sup> To what extent his influence also had an effect on Patriarch Ephraem of Amida in the see of Antioch and on his fellow *peritus* at the doctrinal dialogue of 532, Leontius of Byzantium, as is occasionally assumed,<sup>92</sup> is difficult to determine. In any case he was a notable supporter of strict-Chalcedonian christology, with an Antiochene tint, for Photius mentions that Heraclianus considers the suspect Diodore of Tarsus as one of the 'Fathers'. He seems to have consistently maintained this position.

It was different with his consecrator, Bishop Soterichus, who was just mentioned,<sup>93</sup> who had been nominated metropolitan of Caesarea by Patriarch Macedonius of Constantinople (496–511) and on that occasion had professed Chalcedon, but then changed to the anti-Chalcedonian side. At the time of the Synod of Sidon (511) he was an acknowledged personality among the opponents of the Fourth Council.<sup>94</sup> Naturally he was also then the target of condemnations, thus by Patriarch John of Jerusalem, the saints Sabas and Theodosius, and by Hypatius, whose anathema he attracted together with Nestorius, Eutyches, Severus and all anti-Chalcedonians.<sup>95</sup> After the change of 518, however, Soterichus went to Constantinople in order to come to an understanding with the

89. See Cassiod., *Var.* X 25: PL 69, 814C; see also CA, *ep.* 88: CSEL 35, 1, p. 333,24.

90. Cf. E. Honigmann, *op. cit.*, 213.

91. Photius, *Bibl. cod.* 85: PG 103, 288A–289A; R. Henry, II, 9–10.

92. This is adduced as a possibility by J. Lebon, 'Ephraem d'Amid, patriarche d'Antioche (526–544)', in *Mélanges C. Moeller I* (Louvain, Paris, 1914), 213. Lebon refers to J. P. Junglas, *Leontius von Byzanz* (Paderborn, 1907), 56ff.

93. Cf. E. Honigmann, *op. cit.*, 208–13.

94. *Ibid.*, 208. Soterichus, however, should not be regarded as the one who suggested the Synod of Sidon, or even as the one who presided. In a letter from 510 Severus, who at that time was still in Constantinople, communicated to him that Macedonius was plotting a revolt (*stasis*) in order to hinder the addition of 'crucified for our sake' to the liturgical Trishagion. Cf. Evagrius, *HE* III, 44: Bidez-Parmentier, 146,8; cf. G. Garitte, 'Fragments coptes d'une lettre de Sévère d'Antioche à Sotérichos de Césarée (CPG 7071, 13)', *Mus* 65 (1952), 185–98. Coptic text and Latin translation, *ibid.*, 190–8. According to Severus, the chanting of the expanded Trishagion was directed against the supporters of Chalcedon *qui res Nestorii [imp]ii [sen]tiunt* (192). To be noted is the fact that according to Severus Ant., *Ep. ad Dioscorum II Al.*, written in 516–517: SL IV, 3, p. 291 [258], and *idem*, *Ep. ad Hippocr.*: PO 12, 317, the bishops of Cappadocia I and II were in favour of a union with Dioscorus II and Severus.

95. Winter 516/517, according to Cyril Scyth., *Vita Sab.*, ch. 56: Schwartz, pp. 151,24–152,2; Theophan., *Chron.*: de Boor, 158–159.

new patriarch, John II the Cappadocian (518–520).<sup>96</sup> In fact he then accepted Chalcedon, as Cyrus, the bishop of Tyana, also did.<sup>97</sup> Nevertheless Soterichus did not immediately have the confidence of Pope Hormisdas, who wanted to have him deposed. Emperor Justin I, however, defended the bishop.<sup>98</sup> When Soterichus died, his successor in 537 was Theodore Askidas, a name which will claim our attention in the next phase of christology.

In spite of the lacunae in the evidence, one can discern that Heraclianus made some attempts to execute what the doctrinal dialogue of 532 was intended to effect, namely a clarification of the concepts and formulas separating the parties. The *Doctrina Patrum* (DP) quotes from a letter to Soterichus long or short excerpts arranged under various *topoi*, but which concern the Chalcedonian concepts and formulas, and in general the problem of how one ought to speak of unity and duality in Christ. As these fragments show, their content corresponds to the state of christology between 510 and 537.

### 1. Accents in the use of concepts

In Heraclianus too the *ousia* concept comes clearly to the fore, that concept which gained its significance from John the Grammarian and Leontius of Byzantium on the Chalcedonian side, and from Sergius Scholasticus on the anti-Chalcedonian front. In the sixth chapter the DP intends to show that *physis* and *hypostasis* are not the same, but that on the other hand *ousia* and *physis* are the same, just as *hypostasis* and *prosopon*. In order to show this, a fragment from the letter of Heraclianus to Soterichus is adduced. With regard to content it does not advance beyond the distinction of *ousia* and *hypostasis* established by Basil. It is not legitimate when the bishop calls upon the Council of Nicaea as an authority for the distinction between the two concepts, for there indeed *ousia* and *hypostasis* were used synonymously.<sup>99</sup> He himself contrasts

96. Severus Ant., *Ep. ad Eleus. ep. Sasimae*: SL VI, 1: Brooks II, 361–362. The outcome of the matter was at first still uncertain for Severus.

97. Severus Ant., *Ep. ad Proclum et Euseb.* (Cappadocia II), whom he cautions against defecting, SL V, 13: Brooks II, 344: 'It was already a fact: "Cyrus has lapsed: Soteric has fallen." Will the enemies of truth also be able to laugh and say: Proclus and Eusebona were thrown into the same ditch?' The DP contains a fragment from Cyrus of Tyana in ch. 41, XXXVf.: Diekamp, 313 (against Chalcedon).

98. Justin emp., *Ep. ad Hormisd.*, from 7.6.520 = *Ep.* 111 in Thiel, 914–916; CA, *ep.* 193: CSEL 35, 2, p. 650.

99. Cf. COD, 5; DEC, 5; \*5; Heraclian. ep., in DP, ch. 6, XVIII: Diekamp, p. 43, 9–15.

*physis* and *hypostasis*. It is also on this basis that a fragment of the *DP*, which is taken from the same letter, is to be judged.<sup>100</sup>

Your Holiness knows that the Fathers of the Council of Chalcedon say that the coming together (*συνδρομή*) of divinity and humanity happened in one *hypostasis*, which means the same as confessing frankly the union according to the *hypostasis*.

One must not extrapolate from this formula a typically neo-Chalcedonian oscillation, even if it was selected with an eye to Cyril.

## 2. Anthropology and christology

Of no particular significance is the discussion about the question whether there are not three natures in Christ. For if the humanity of Christ consists of body and soul, it already contains in itself two natures. Heraclianus does not respond directly to this question.<sup>101</sup> His texts, however, can still be adduced for this purpose, for in these he makes suggestions about the philosophical denotation of compound things, and thus of human beings as well. Heraclianus is of the opinion that not all subdivisions — whether in scholastic language we call these essential parts or integral parts (*partes essentielles* or *partes integrantes*) — need to be stated together in the total denotation of a being. Thus one can consider 'humanity' as one nature and 'divinity' as the other in Christ.<sup>102</sup>

These few samples show that in his letter to Soterichus, from which no doubt all of the fragments of the *DP* belonging to him are taken,<sup>103</sup> Heraclianus moves in the area of philosophical-theological reflection on the mystery of faith of Chalcedon, and on that basis deals with the anti-Chalcedonian Soterichus. The loss of the letter in its entirety is to be regretted.

100. Heraclian. ep., *Ep. ad Soterich.* (Frag.): *DP*, ch. 21, VII: Diekamp, 134.

101. In contrast this is done by the fragment from the *defensiones* of Eulogius Alex. (CPG 6972): *DP*, ch. 29, XIII: Diekamp, 209–210.

102. Cf. *DP*, ch. 29, XI and XII: Diekamp, 207–208. The same consideration is developed in ch. 30, I, in connection with the question about number in the denotation of composite things.

103. Cf. the comments in CPG 6800. In the *Opusc. theol. polem.* Maximus Confessor cites a short fragment from Heraclianus' writing *Against the Manichaeans* (CPG 6801: PG 91, 125CD), which, however, is so short that its christological statement is difficult to determine. Cf. Photius, *Bibl. cod.* 85: PG 103, 288f.; R. Henry II, 9–10.



### III. THE SLEEPLESS MONKS OF THE MONASTERY OF EIRENAION AND THE FABRICATED CORRESPONDENCE WITH PETER THE FULLER

The Sleepless Monks of Eirenaion must be considered the most important centre of strict-Chalcedonian christology in the region of Constantinople. They were not directly subject to the Ecumenical Patriarch, but to the titular metropolitan of Chalcedon.<sup>104</sup> From the pontificate of Pope Felix (483–492) to the year 534, their monastery was a factor of the highest importance in the struggle concerning Chalcedon. For this purpose there was established in its library an extensive collection of documents which became ‘frankly an arsenal for propaganda’.<sup>105</sup> The effort of the monks, both in theology and in ecclesiastical politics, was so strong that they themselves could demand from Emperor Anastasius over the head of the Patriarch of Constantinople a pro-Chalcedonian political line, although a breach with the Patriarch of Alexandria was imminent. This opposition to the Emperor who promoted the *Henoticon* brought them more closely together with the Pope in Rome,<sup>106</sup> whether as informants, or whether also as critics of Roman behaviour. More than their activities in ecclesiastical politics, it is the christological views of the monks themselves which interest us here. We have an unusual source for these, namely a whole collection of supposed letters, which were said to have been addressed from all over the world to Patriarch Peter the Fuller (Gnapheus), who at the time of their composition was already dead. Before Peter became Patriarch he had been a monk of the Eirenaion monastery and had become a priest there. Accused of Eutychianism, he had to leave the monastery, but through the favour of the Emperor Zeno he was soon ordained as bishop and made the Patriarch of Antioch (471). Driven out of Antioch after some seven to nine months, he returned to his former monastery (471–476). Then once again he succeeded in occupying the see of Antioch for a short time. Deposed again, he was able to retreat to Euchaita (Helenopontus) (477–485), but from there he was able to

104. Cf. E. Schwartz, *PS*, 204–205; R. Riedinger, art., ‘Akoimeten’, in *TRE* 2, 148–53; *JdChr* II/1<sup>2</sup>, 295–6, n. 82. The heyday of this monastery lasted from about 448 (under abbot Marcellus, who died before 484) to the condemnation of the Sleepless Monks as ‘Nestorians’ by Pope John II on 25 March 534. On the lead-up to this see in addition E. Wölflé, ‘Der Abt Hypatios von Ruphinianai und der Akoimete Alexander’, *ByzZ* 79 (1986), 302–9; *idem*, *Hypatios. Leben und Bedeutung des Abtes von Rufiniane* = Europ. Hochschulschriften XXIII/288 (Frankfurt, Bern, New York, Paris, 1986).

105. E. Schwartz, *PS*, 204–206. The most important weapon is the publication of documents (206).

106. Cf. *JdChr* II/1, 296, 303–4.

take over the Antiochene Patriarchate for a third time (485–488). While attempting to bring the autocephalous Cypriots under his jurisdiction (488), he died.

The personal ties between Peter the Fuller and the Sleepless Monks on the one side and the christological tensions on the other offered a historical background for the production in the Eirenaion of fictitious documents, in the form of letters, which were intended to fight against a christological liturgical formula supported by him. What christology there is in these is to be attributed to the Chalcedonian monks of the Eirenaion monastery. In order to understand their statement we must first of all briefly present the history of the collection itself and the subsequent conflict concerning the so-called Trishagion, which provided the occasion for it.

### 1. The forged correspondence with Peter the Fuller

According to E. Schwartz, monks in or around Constantinople invented the following situation:<sup>107</sup>

Peter the Fuller, who in general is considered the legitimate patriarch of Antioch, demands in a letter addressed to Acacius of Constantinople [472–489] that the phrase *ὁ σταυρωθεὶς δι' ἡμᾶς* [crucified for our sake] be added to the Trishagion. At the instigation of the Roman bishop Felix [III (483–492)] and Acacius of Constantinople, who had been needed by the former, many bishops declared this claim to be heretical, and several times remonstrated with Peter about his novelty; Pope Felix himself warned him twice. Because all this had no effect, and in further letters he still demanded the addition, he was excommunicated by Felix in the last letter of the Vatican collection;<sup>108</sup> it seems as if the same judgement is to be reckoned as being passed by Acacius too. There is no need to argue especially that all this is fiction. How unconcerned the compiler of the letters is about history is betrayed by his grotesque chronology of Photinus and Paul of Samosata; the ignorance was even for that time too gross, and in the exemplar of the collection of letters used by the Latin translator the blunder was, as far as possible, corrected.

Three versions of this collection of letters exist. An original core, composed by a single author, was very quickly, or perhaps immediately after the composition, extended by newly added letters.<sup>109</sup> We shall now

107. E. Schwartz, *PS*, 292. On the whole matter see pp. 287–300 and the *praefatio* to ACO III, pp. XI–XIII.

108. Cf. Ps. Felix, *Ep. ad Petr. Ant.*: CA, ep. 71, nos. 3–5; CSEL 35, 1, pp. 164–6.

109. Three recensions of this collection of letters exist: (a) *Coll. Vaticana*, the oldest with seven letters; provisional edition by E. Schwartz, in *PS*, 125–150; new corrected edition in ACO III, 217–231; (b) a Latin translation with eight letters, preserved in the CA, ed. Günther, CSEL 35, and in the *Collectio Berolinensis*, nos. 51–58; (c) the third and latest edition of ten letters (Greek), inserted into the *Coll. Sabbatica*: ACO III, 6–25. The *Coll. Vat.* is very close to the Latin translation, but is, however, not identical with it, because there are differences in the extent and in the arrangement. It stems from one of the Palestinian Sabas monasteries and was put together

enquire into the occasion for this forgery, the conflict over the so-called Trishagion hymn, and its significance in the history of doctrine.

## 2. *Lex orandi — lex credendi*: the conflict concerning the Trishagion hymn<sup>110</sup>

### (a) *The historical findings*

There are several forms of the hymn that need to be distinguished. One must start from its core, the biblical Trishagion according to Isaiah 6,3. We encounter this biblical acclamation at the Council of Chalcedon, but it is extended with three predicates and tied to a request. In the first session, 8 October 451, we hear an acclamation of the Oriental bishops, with which they greet the deposition of Patriarch Dioscorus: 'Long years to the Senate! Holy God, holy mighty, holy immortal, have mercy on us' (ἅγιος ὁ Θεός, ἅγιος ἰσχυρός, ἅγιος ἀθάνατος, ἐλέησον ἡμᾶς).<sup>111</sup> Attempts to determine the origin and theological understanding of the Trishagion formula for the pre-Chalcedonian period produce only a blurred picture. For the North African/Italian area G. Kretschmar has established 'that the seraphim hymn, the thrice holy from Isaiah 6,3, was related to God, Father, Son and Holy Spirit, and that this interpretation came from the East, to all appearances from Alexandria, even before the *Sanctus* appeared in the liturgy'.<sup>112</sup> Its use in the fifth century can be dated. A. Baumstark seeks the roots of the Trishagion in the contact between Christian and synagogal worship towards the end of the second century.<sup>113</sup> Fitting this assumption would be the indication of the

between 542 and 544 (Schwartz, *PS*, 288). On the inauthenticity of the collections, see *ibid.*, 291–292. The intention of the latest edition is most evident in the letters VIII–X: ACO III, 18–25. These letters were taken up into the *Coll. Sabb.* at the time when the controversies against Maxentius and his companions broke out in Constantinople on account of the formula 'one of the Trinity suffered'. The mixing that thus occurred of the polemic against this formula with the expanded Trishagion produced a contradiction, of which the redactors were not aware and which contributed to increase the confusion. This will be described below.

110. The Thrice Holy to be discussed here first of all, which is to be distinguished from the *Sanctus* of the eucharistic prayer, found its entry as *Aius* into the Gallic liturgy. In the Latin liturgy it can still be found in the Office of Good Friday and in the *preces feriales* of Prime. On this cf. J. M. Hanssens, *Institutiones Liturgicae de ritibus orientalibus*, Vol. III (Rome, 1932), 108–51. The material for the following section was prepared by H.-J. Höhn.

111. Cf. ACO II, 1, 1, no. 1071, p. 195.

112. See G. Kretschmar, *Studien zur frühchristlichen Trinitätstheologie* = *BHTh* 21 (Tübingen, 1956), 141. Cf. also *idem*, 'Neue Arbeiten zur Geschichte des Ostergottesdienstes II: Die Einführung des *Sanctus* in die lateinische Meßliturgie', *JLH* 7 (1962), 79–86.

113. A. Baumstark, 'Trishagion und Qeduscha', *JLW* 3 (1923), 18–32; on the origin of the Trishagion cf. in this context also H. Engberding, 'Zum formgeschichtlichen Verständnis des ἅγιος ὁ Θεός . . . ἐλέησον ἡμᾶς', *JLW* 10 (1930), 168–74; N. Walker, 'The Origin of the "Thrice Holy"', *NTS* 5 (1958/9), 132–3.

monk Jobius (sixth century) in his treatise *De verbo incarnato* that, with reference to Psalm 42,3 (τὸν Θεὸν τὸν ἰσχυρὸν τὸν ζῶντα), a Jewish convert related the Trishagion to God in opposition to the pagan gods.<sup>114</sup> Nevertheless from the history of late Jewish liturgy and the development of Christian liturgy, there are many reasons which make it unlikely that the Trishagion was directly taken over from Jewish worship.<sup>115</sup> Genuinely Christian impulses can probably be claimed for Revelation 3,7; 4,8; 6,10, where a conceivable starting-point for a christological interpretation of the hymn could also be assumed.<sup>116</sup> Of only slight historical value are the apologetically tinted, legendary reports in our collection of Peter the Fuller's letters: the formula, nevertheless without the addition, is said to have been included in the liturgy at the time of Bishop Proclus (434-446).<sup>117</sup> We encounter this legend too in the *Liber Heraclidis*,<sup>118</sup> and there it is associated with an earthquake, understood as a proof of divine power, which would continue until the Trishagion found its place in the Byzantine liturgy.<sup>119</sup> This passage, which has to be regarded as a later interpolation, is indeed not acquainted with the ominous addition, but it is certainly acquainted with some phrases referring to the reproach of theopaschitism, which alludes to the controversies between 451 and 470.

The unsatisfying historical findings thus permit only a few sure assumptions about the appearance of the Trishagion. Apparently it arrived in the capital Constantinople from the diocese of Oriens. Its use at the Council of Chalcedon may have gained for it the reputation of a formula that could be used in theological struggles, or those concerning ecclesiastical politics, which in any case was justified beyond measure

114. Jobius mon., *De Verbo incarnato commentarius* (CPG 6984): Photius, *Bibl. Cod.* 222: PG 103, 772A; R. Henry, III, 180.

115. Cf. C. W. Dugmore, *The Influence of the Synagogue upon the Divine Office* (Oxford, 1944), 107ff.

116. Cf. A. Gerhards, 'Le phénomène du Sanctus adressé au Christ. Son origine, sa signification et sa persistance dans les Anaphores de l'église d'Orient', in A. M. Triacca/A. Pistoia (eds.), *Le Christ dans la liturgie* (Rome, 1981), 65-83, especially 68-9 (literature).

117. See the testimony in the texts of the Fuller letters in Schwartz, *PS*, pp. 242; 133,10ff.; 138,19ff.; 142,4ff.; 143,5ff.; 147,3ff.; Jobius in Photius, *Bibl. Cod.* 222: PG 103, 772BC; R. Henry, III, 181; Theophanes: de Boor, 93. With this legend the originality of the Trishagion formula was intended to be secured for Constantinople against Antioch. This occurs in a particularly explicit way in the latest recension, in the second letter of Pope Felix to Peter: ACO III, 19-23.

118. Cf. F. Nau, *Le livre d'Héraclide de Damas* (Paris, 1910), 317-23; L. Abramowski, *Untersuchungen zum 'Liber Heraclidis' des Nestorius* = CSCO 224, Subs. 22 (Louvain, 1963) 130-2.

119. On the historical bases for this legend see B. Croke, 'Two Early Byzantine Earthquakes and their Liturgical Commemoration', *Byz* 51 (1981), 122-47.

through conflicts on account of the contrary interpretations of the hymn. While at Constantinople the Trishagion was referred solely to the Trinity, in Antioch, which was considered the centre of 'monophysitism', it received a christological explanation.<sup>120</sup> As Severus' supporters who emerged in Constantinople around 510 maintained, the much-discussed insertion 'who was crucified for us' was common there from the time of Patriarch Eustathius. It seemed to them that the addition was suited to showing the unity of the acting subject in the incarnate Logos against any dyophysite position. The fact that the implications for trinitarian theology of such a manner of speaking were not reflected upon is understandable on the one hand, because of this specific christological interest; on the other hand the christological relation in the Trishagion hymn itself is not expressed. Hence in terms of trinitarian theology the whole hymn becomes a shock for the Chalcedonians, which one is accustomed to characterize by the name 'theopaschitism': for can one of the Trinity (taken as such) suffer, without the suffering being ascribed to the divinity?

*(b) On the conflict concerning the addition 'who was crucified for us'*

When in 471 the opposition to the formula of Chalcedon came to power with Peter the Fuller in Antioch, the expansion of the Trishagion, which had been known there for a long time, was introduced into the official liturgy.<sup>121</sup> Patriarch Calandion (479-484), who was of strict-Chalcedonian persuasion, had attempted to give a 'moderate' christological interpretation by placing before it the vocative *Χριστὲ βασιλεῦ*. With the return of Peter the Fuller to the See (485-488) this second addition was removed.

The conflict about the Trishagion flared up anew, when in 510 the Palestinian and Antiochene monks who were residing in Constantinople

120. Cf. the communication of Ephraem of Antioch (526-545) to Zenobius in Photius, *Bibl. Cod.* 228: PG 103, 957BC; R. Henry, IV, 115: '... that the Orientals (= Syrians) have a predilection for this hymn in the celebration of our Lord Jesus Christ and that under these circumstances they commit no error when they add "you who have been crucified for us". But the people in Byzantium and in the West relate it ... to the consubstantial Trinity. For this reason they do not allow one to add "you who ...", so that the idea of suffering is not carried into the Trinity. In numerous provinces in Europe the words, "Holy Trinity, have mercy on us" are added in the place of the "you who ...". This addition makes clearer the intention of the orthodox, who cherish a preference for the Trinity with the invocation "holy, God, holy, strong, holy, immortal", in order to eliminate the "you who ..." by an exact and fitting formula.'

121. The following description is guided by E. Schwartz, *PS*, 243-248, 259-260, 292-293; V.-S. Janeras, 'Les byzantins et le trisagion christologique', in *Miscellanea Liturgica* ..., FS Lercaro, Vol. 2 (Rome, Tournai, New York, 1967), 469-99, especially 470-5.

sang the addition 'who was crucified for us'. This stirred up the local monks, because they suspected monophysite propaganda behind it. That was the time in which the letters addressed to Peter the Fuller could have been composed in the monastery of the Sleepless Monks. Their concern was clear: the expanded Trishagion formula should be discredited by demonstrating that it was an old heresy invented by Peter the Fuller.

In the forged letters he is charged theologically with having applied a statement, which pertains to only *one* divine *hypostasis*, to all *hypostases* of the Trinity. In this way the absurd notion arose that the Holy Spirit was crucified. But it is only permissible to transfer general statements from one *hypostasis* to another. Thus Father, Son and Spirit are each holy and God, but do not form three gods, because they are distinguished from each other solely by their *hypostases* and their *properties*. That is the tradition from Basil onwards.

For the actual course of the conflict there were, however, other events that were decisive. The Constantinopolitan monks called upon their Patriarch Macedonius in this question as the defender of orthodoxy and at the same time called Emperor Anastasius a 'Manichaeon', through disillusionment at his procrastination in this affair. This began the process which ended with the downfall of the Patriarch, as we have already described.<sup>122</sup> On 7 August 511 he was led out of the city and confined in Euchaita. The events of 512 were even more dramatic. Marinus of Apamea, a friend of Severus of Antioch, attempted to convince the Emperor that the disputed Trishagion clause did not violate orthodox trinitarian doctrine, and at the Sunday mass on 4 November 512 made a renewed attempt at securing for the expanded Trishagion formula a firm place in the Byzantine liturgy. This initiative once again provoked a vehement protest, accompanied by riots in the streets of the capital which were not even to be checked by a *commonitorium* of Patriarch Timothy (511-518), which was intended to make the addition compulsory for all churches in the imperial city. There were tumultuous scenes at a procession, held to commemorate surviving a rain of ashes (an earthquake?) which had afflicted the region in 473. The houses of Marinus and Pompey, the Emperor's nephew, were set alight, statues and pictures of the Emperor were destroyed. Areobindus, the husband of Anicia Juliana (daughter of the West Roman Emperor), was proclaimed rival Emperor. The revolution seemed to be perfect. It was only with the utmost effort that the aged Anastasius succeeded in getting a hearing before the raging crowd and bringing it to its senses. Finally his authority prevailed. Heavy penalties were imposed upon the agitators.

122. Cf. *JdChr* II/1, 301-15.

The *chronique scandaleuse* of the Trishagion provisionally ended in Constantinople only in 518, not because a consensus was reached, but because the political constellation had completely changed. On the Feast of Chalcedon the Trishagion was also given back its pure form, freed from the theopaschite addition, in the Byzantine liturgy.<sup>123</sup>

The movement against the Trishagion addition also spread to its centre of origin, to Antioch, through the deposition of Patriarch Severus of Antioch. In the same year that the institution of the Feast of Chalcedon had been demanded, he had to surrender his see. The last of his 125 cathedral homilies, which is devoted entirely to the Trishagion, can be appraised as the comprehensive attempt against the objections of the Chalcedonians to demonstrate that this hymn with its addition was orthodox.<sup>124</sup>

Severus seeks the basis for his argument first in those fundamental theological propositions which were shared by his opponents, before he proceeds to explicate his specific application of these fundamental propositions. We are aware that he employs a different conceptual language for the theology of the Trinity from that for the *oikonomia*.

Father, Son and Holy Spirit are three distinct *hypostases* and are not confused in one single essence . . . With regard to the Trinity the essence is the godhead, for the Father is God, the Son is God, the Holy Spirit is God; none of them is more God than the other on account of the identity and equality of honour of the essence. With regard to the *hypostasis*, other is that of the Father, other is that of the Son, and other that of the Holy Spirit. (PO 29, 237–239)

Then Severus develops the peculiarities of the three *hypostases*, of the unbegottenness of the Father, the begottenness of the Son and the procession of the Spirit. On the peculiarity of the Son he also comments that, without alteration of his nature or its mingling with the human nature, to it belongs the fact of having become a human being by having assumed from Mary a body endowed with a rational soul. Here the Patriarch begins with his interpretation of the Trishagion additions, which is rendered in short propositions. We shall note in particular the clarification of the so-called theopaschite addition 'you who were crucified for us', for the expansion of the acclamation by the addition of 'holy God, holy mighty, holy immortal God' created fewer problems. It is only a matter of deciding whether it should be understood in a trinitarian or a christological way.

Severus, however, interprets everything christologically. Thus he has

123. *Ibid.*, 360–3.

124. Severus Ant., *Hom.* 125: PO 29, 232–252.

no great difficulty in explaining the theopaschite addition. (Cf. the quotation above, pp. 146–7 with n. 364.)

It was particularly the Nestorian misunderstanding of this addition that had to be warded off. Whoever namely was of the opinion that the Trishagion could be dissected and that the 'You are holy, God' could be allocated to the Father, the 'You are holy, mighty' to the Son, and the 'You are holy, immortal' to the Holy Spirit, had to mean, according to Severus' deductions, that the addition 'You who were crucified for us' was addressed to a fourth person (cf. PO 29, 247). Against the reproach that with the expanded Trishagion a formula was introduced which could not be supported by apostolic tradition, Severus asked that it be borne in mind that many another custom which could not call immediately upon apostolic tradition did not cease for that reason to be orthodox. He conceded, however, that the Trishagion in Antioch had not yet been sung long enough, and the Alexandrians, Libyans and Egyptians did not address this praise to Jesus Christ.

In fact the 'Holy, holy, holy Lord of hosts' said by the seraphim is reported to us by the prophet Isaiah . . . But the 'Holy God, holy mighty, holy immortal' was added much later. If then we have accepted the addition in this phrase as pious, and confess him as true God who was crucified, we do not call the confession of our faith 'new', for it is added to this praise for a good reason, because it combats the Jewish folly of Nestorius . . . It is in our city that it began, where too the name of the Christians began; but it has already reached the Churches of Asia and now makes its way to all the Churches. (249)

### 3. The teaching of the forged correspondence with Peter the Fuller

#### (a) In Trishagio crucem? — on the understanding of the Trishagion

While at Antioch the Trishagion was referred exclusively to the Kyrios Jesus and thus the theopaschite addition was not a scandal, as Severus has just shown us, in Constantinople it was applied to the Trinity and thus was bound to become a problem. The addition 'You who have been crucified for us' was then no longer acceptable, because it appeared to be formulated about the triune God as such.<sup>125</sup> Let us present some major passages on the theme from this correspondence, from the oldest collection which refers the Trishagion to the immanent Trinity. As an example let us cite the first letter of Pope Felix.<sup>126</sup>

125. In *Ep. Flaccini* (Latin only), CA, ep. 77: CSEL 35, 1, p. 212, no. 19, Flaccinus asks: *unde igitur hoc dogmatizare 'in trisagio crucem'? num ex patribus?*

126. Ps. Felix, *Ep. ad Petr. Full.*: ACO III, 231, no. 7; CA, ep. 71, no. 7: CSEL 35, 1, p. 166, no. 7.



What is more abominable than this, that with you the Father and the Holy Spirit remain without honour and are belittled by the seraphim, because they are said not to confess the Trinity when they call holy, holy, holy, but solely the person of the Son?

Reference to the Trinity is demanded in all the Fuller letters, but in such a way that the theopaschite addition has to be omitted.<sup>127</sup> The legend already mentioned (p. 255) of a special revelation made to a child at the time of Patriarch Proclus, was intended to underscore the originality of the Trishagion interpretation in favour of the Church of Constantinople against Antioch.<sup>128</sup> It is in opposition to this that Peter the Fuller is said to have allowed the heresy to be proclaimed 'that one of the Trinity died, who is the God-Logos himself'.<sup>129</sup> The reference of the Trishagion to the Trinity is emphasized particularly strongly, also terminologically, in this second letter of Pope Felix. If namely the theopaschite addition 'one of the uncreated Trinity has been crucified' is ascribed to the Son, then he is declared mortal according to his divinity. This would mean, however, the denial of the Nicene *homoousios* and the dissolution of the one unseparated Trinity. For the first time it is thus subjected to number, because the middle is wrenched out. Father and Spirit are now separated from each other.<sup>130</sup> Peter the Fuller is unmasked as a heretic.

(b) *The christological position of the correspondence with Peter the Fuller*

There is not much to be expected with regard to christological content, considering the severe judgement about the education of the forgers which E. Schwartz passes from a philological standpoint.<sup>131</sup> Just as they do not grasp the structure of the Antiochene statement of the Trishagion, that is, its application to Christ, they leave us even more in the lurch when it is a question of elucidating the two-natures language. Let us illustrate this by the letter of Quintian, the alleged bishop of Asculanum.<sup>132</sup>

127. Anteonus, *Ep. ad Petr. Full.*: ACO III, 217, no. 2; CA, *ep.* 74: CSEL 35, 1, p. 188, no. 2.

128. See above, n. 117.

129. Ps. Felix, *Ep. II ad Petr. Full.*: ACO III, p. 23,9-10.

130. *Ibid.*, p. 21,4-6.

131. Cf. E. Schwartz, PS, 292-300, especially 294. He criticizes in detail the 'curious Greek of the letters which (is) characterized only insufficiently by the predicate "Latinizing"'. The explanation for this Schwartz finds in the fact that 'the compiler or the compilers of the letters had learned literary Greek not on the basis of Greek as a mother tongue, but as a foreign language; of the two imperial languages, Latin was the more familiar to them. They had to write Greek because they wanted to defend the Greek liturgy, and their opponents, the Palestinian and Antiochene monks, understood only Greek' (296).

132. Quintian., *Ep. ad Petr. Full.*: CA, *ep.* 72: CSEL 35, 1, pp. 170-82; here according to the Greek text ACO III, 227-229 (older version).

Peter the Fuller perverts the *evangelium Christi* 'not by the fact that he proclaims one Son from two natures and in two natures, our Lord Jesus Christ, and him as crucified for us, but by the fact that out of a perverse desire for novelty he goes so far as to speak . . . of the strong, immortal God as the crucified one nature of the Trinity'.<sup>133</sup> And not only that. 'You speak also of the one nature of the God-Logos and of the flesh. If there is only one nature of the God-Logos and the Father, then there is, so to say, only one nature of the Father, the body and the Logos.'<sup>134</sup>

Here then the forger lets it be known that he ascribes to Peter the Fuller the formula 'from two natures before the union of the God-Logos with the flesh'. But he says that this formula is impossible, because he who is from Mary according to the flesh did not pre-exist.<sup>135</sup> In this case Peter should explain how he interprets the Trinity in its one divinity, if the incarnate Son has only one nature and not two. In constantly new phrases the forger lists the numerous evil consequences of Peter's false assumption,<sup>136</sup> a process which presents as well many proofs for the necessity of the two-natures teaching. Above all it is stated that an orthodox explanation of the impassibility of the *Logos* would demand a two-natures teaching. Instead of 'God who suffered according to the flesh' (*deus passus carne*), he proposes saying: 'Christ suffered according to the flesh' (*Christus passus carne*).<sup>137</sup> Then there follow twelve anathemas against Peter the Fuller, which, particularly the eighth, express the strict-Chalcedonian teaching; these are also intended to hit at Nestorius.<sup>138</sup>

And if anyone speaks of two persons or *hypostases*, and not rather of two natures which have come together in one person or *hypostasis*, let him be anathema.

The most detailed presentation of the two-natures teaching is found

133. *Ibid.*, ACO III, p. 227,22-26.

134. *Ibid.*, p. 227,27-28.

135. *Ibid.*, p. 228,3-4.

136. *Ibid.*, 228-229, nos. 5-11. Peter makes himself guilty of many heresies, those of Valentinus, Marcion, Eutyches and Sabellius. He is reproached with a detailed list of heresies in the letter of Justinian of Sicily, which also belongs to the oldest collection, although it is missing in the *Coll. Vat.* Cf. ACO III, 12-13: Manes, Valentinus, Eutyches, Paul of Samosata, Nestorius, Arius.

137. *Ibid.*, p. 228,30-37 (nos. 9-10). See the anathema II, 229, no. 12. This could easily be interpreted as Nestorianism, because Nestorius himself has recourse to this terminology.

138. *Ibid.*, 229, no. 13. In the seventh anathema the writer rejects the abstract denotation *θεανθρωπία* as a formula for the incarnate Christ, because he fears a mixed essence in it. He demands in its place 'God and human being', thus the concrete denotation. The Latin text cannot express very well what is meant. Cf. CA, *ep.* 72: CSEL 35, 1, p. 178,22-23 (VIII): *Si quis deum hominem et non magis deum et hominem dicit, damnetur*. On the whole matter see A. Grillmeier, art., 'Gottmensch III', in *RAC* 12 (1982), 316-17.

in the letter of Flaccinus, which is transmitted only in Latin.<sup>139</sup> We shall confine ourselves to the section in which Christ himself addresses Peter the Fuller in direct speech.<sup>140</sup> In this there is expressed a strong christology of distinction, which in some formulas is reminiscent of the old Antiochenes and Pope Leo. Christ says:<sup>141</sup>

What belongs to my created flesh you should not tie to me and should not assign createdness, being made, suffering or death [to me] as one of the Trinity.<sup>142</sup> Nothing beyond what was, is and will be [namely the divinity] should you introduce into it [the Trinity], but you should also not deprive the divinity of my flesh (through the *mia-physis* formula). For I am by nature his Word. I gave to it [the flesh] what is mine, not through the transferral of what is mine by nature, but according to grace; and that [the flesh] has not transferred what is its by nature, but by grace I wanted through it to become [incarnate], as if being clothed with an ensouled human being. Because I am by nature the Son of God, I also confess myself as the natural son of man . . . The property of each of the natures is intact in me.<sup>143</sup> Whoever does not preserve these [natures] and maintains that I had only one nature, maintains that the incarnate God is no longer God, not uncreated, no longer free from suffering, but passible; they render me completely bereft of everything which is mine.

Illuminating as these forged letters to Peter the Fuller may be for characterizing the theological situation in the dispute about the Trishagion in Constantinople, they provide little for the substance of christology at that time. They produce no support at all for the Chalcedonian party. In many regards they betray a very simple christology, when, for example, they interpret the *descensus Christi* (in a literal interpretation of Job 40,25) in the following way: the divinity of Christ hid itself as a hook in the soul of his holy body, in which he descended into Hades, in order to conquer it.<sup>144</sup>

#### IV. THE MONK EUSTATHIUS AND HIS PLEA FOR THE TWO NATURES

We are not leaving the environment in which we have moved up until now when we add the short letter of the monk Eustathius to Timothy

139. Flaccin., *Ep. ad Petr. Full.*: CA, ep. 77: CSEL 35, 1, pp. 206–12.

140. *Ibid.*, nos. 11–19: pp. 209–12.

141. *Ibid.*, nos. 12–14: pp. 209, 14–210, 11.

142. By this he means 'not according to the divine nature'.

143. *Ibid.*, no. 13: p. 210, 6–7: *salva enim in me utriusque naturae proprietas*. Cf. Leo M., *Tom. ad Flav.*: TD 9, V. 54–55, p. 24: *Salva igitur proprietate utriusque naturae, et in unam coeunte personam*.

144. Cf. Acacius, *Ep. ad Petr. Full.*: ACO III, p. 18, 34–36. The emphasis on Christ's descent into Hades as a descent according to the 'soul' is found in the works of Eustathius, who is about to be discussed. Cf. n. 170.

about the two natures.<sup>145</sup> Its significance is based (1) on a relatively detailed and frequent citing of the writings of Patriarch Severus,<sup>146</sup> (2) on its affinity with the christology of Leontius of Byzantium and thus (3) on its testimony for a strict-Chalcedonian teaching.<sup>147</sup> It seems indeed that Eustathius is inclined to combine the formula rejected at Chalcedon 'from two natures' with that of 'in two natures'. However, he does not make that a condition for a correct confession of faith.<sup>148</sup>

### 1. The situating of the letter of Eustathius chronologically

There seem to be some co-ordinates for establishing the date of the letter. The doctrinal dialogue of 532 suggests itself as the *terminus post quem*. The report about this by Innocent of Maronia speaks of the relationship of Patriarch Dioscorus to Eutyches and the consequences this has for the latter's deposition at the Council of Chalcedon. The letter of Eustathius quite clearly approaches some of the points in the discussion of 532, which would presuppose that the doctrinal dialogue was concluded. A comparison of the sources also yields the same result. A particular *topos* is the alleged 'repentance of Eutyches'.<sup>149</sup> By referring to this the

145. Eustath. mon., *Ep. de duabus nat.* (CPG 6810): PG 86, 901-942 according to A. Mai, *Nov. coll. II* (1833); here the new edition by P. Allen could be used, for which the editor is thanked. We shall cite it according to the chapter division and the line numbers in the new edition (CCG 19, Turnhout, Louvain, 1989).

146. These numerous citations were made use of by F. Loofs, *Leontius von Byzanz* (Leipzig, 1887), 54-9; by J. P. Junglas, *Leontius von Byzanz* (Paderborn, 1908), 105-19; J. Lebon, *Le monophysisme sévérien* (Louvain, 1909), 307-8; 350, n. 1; 373-5; P. Allen, 'Greek Citations from Severus of Antioch in Eustathius Monachus', *OLP* 12 (1981), 261-4.

147. A brief assessment is found in C. Moeller, 'Le chalcédonisme et le néo-chalcédonisme', in *Chalcedon I*, 684-5, n. 137; as well by M. Richard, 'Les florilèges diphysites', *ibid.*, 743-4 with a brief classification of the patristic citations of Eustathius: (1) a small group of texts from texts which are common to almost all the diphysite authors of the sixth century; (2) a few from the texts attacked by the anti-Chalcedonians (Leo's *Tomus*, formula of Chalcedon); (3) a florilegium of anti-Chalcedonian texts which is related to that of Justinian; (4) extracts from the works of Severus himself.

148. Cf. the lines 1004-1006 (Allen) = PG 86, 941: *Εἰ οὖν σύνθετός ἐστιν ὁ Χριστός, οὐ μόνον ἐκ δύο συνενήνκεται φύσεων, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἔχει ταύτας ἐν ἑαυτῷ*; that is, 'from two natures' rightly understood already means 'in two natures', for Christ still has them in himself.

149. Cf. Eustath. mon., *Ep. de duab. nat.*, no. 46, ll. 865-867; PG 86, 936B with *Coll. c. Sev. hab.*: ACO IV, 2, nos. 10-14, pp. 170, 27-171, 4. The *Coll.* lists the following assertions: (1) Eutyches is also regarded by the Severan side as a heretic; (2) Dioscorus, however, rehabilitated him (449) after his condemnation by Flavian (448), and in contrast condemned Flavian; Dioscorus could do this, because Eutyches had perhaps shown repentance (nos. 12 and 13). Eustathius: (1) Severus condemns Eutyches, but recognizes Dioscorus (ll. 861-864: 936AB); (2) the assumption that Eutyches had presented Patriarch Dioscorus with an improved *Libellus* and thus shown repentance (no. 46, ll. 864-873: 936B) (*eum lapsus poenitebat*) is false. Leont., *C. monoph.*: PG 86, 1884D-1885D; here as well the repentance of Eutyches is mentioned.

Severans want to justify Patriarch Dioscorus and his reception of the Archimandrite. Until now we know of this only from Innocent of Maronia.<sup>150</sup> From a comparison of the different reports it follows with some degree of certainty that Eustathius wrote after 532. From further observations, however, we can still narrow somewhat the *spatium utile* for the composition of the letter, even if we do not want to go as far as E. Schwartz, who wants to place the letter after the death of Emperor Justinian.<sup>151</sup> Worth noting is the manner in which Eustathius uses the Greek *Corpus Severianum*. He still has it at his disposal, because he can make original excerpts from 'various treatises'.<sup>152</sup> On this account, however, the letter does not have to be placed earlier than 536, that is, before the year in which Emperor Justinian ordered the Severan writings to be burned.<sup>153</sup> This judgement was certainly not carried out immediately and everywhere. There is also no need to conclude from the language of the work that Severus was still alive at the time of the composition of the writing, when the present tense is used in reference to the Patriarch.

And he condemns those who speak of two natures after the *unio*. If after the union the two [natures] have become one, how does he himself consider the two natures so many years after the union in Christ? How can he deny once again what he considers and writes and says?<sup>154</sup>

If one interprets the prior indication of time 'almost six hundred years after the *henosis*'<sup>155</sup> somewhat liberally, then a possible date for the composition of the letter is in the middle or the second half of the sixth century.

150. As Eustathius introduces the *mia-physis* formula as an invention of the heretics and in particular of the Apollinarians, he seems to allude to the discussion of the Apollinarian forgeries at the doctrinal dialogue. Cf. ed. Allen, no. 8, ll. 92-96: PG 86, 905CD.

151. Cf. E. Schwartz, *Drei dogmatische Schriften Justinians* (Munich, 1939), 113-114. In contrast P. Allen, *op. cit.*, 398-403, introduction with n. 55.

152. Cf. Eustath. mon., *Ep de duab. nat.*, no. 25, ll. 463-464: PG 86, 920C; P. Allen, *art. cit.*, 262.

153. Justinian emp., *Constitutio Sacra c. Anthimum, Severum, Petrum et Zoaram*: PG 86, 1095D-1104B; on Severus: 1097C-1100D: . . . *Quare universis interdiciamus aliquid de libris ipsius possidere nec dicta et scripta Severi maneant penes aliquem Christianum, sed sint profana et aliena ab Ecclesia catholica, igneque comburantur a possidentibus, nisi qui ipsa habent, velint periculum pati* (1099C). All calligraphers and stenographers who manufacture these books are threatened with amputation of the hand (*ibid.*).

154. Eustath. mon., *Ep de duab. nat.*, no. 24, ll. 453-456; PG 86, 920C.

155. *Ibid.*, no. 24, ll. 450-452: PG 86, 920B: *καὶ ταῦτα ὁ μετὰ ἑξακόσια σχεδὸν ἔτη τῆς ἐνώσεως δύο φύσεις ὁμολογῶν σκοπεῖν ἐν τῷ Χριστῷ.*

## 2. On the classification of the theological content of the letter

There are some indications of the affinity of this writing with the documents of strict-Chalcedonian orientation between 532 and the beginning of the 540s. The clearest is the relationship to Leontius of Byzantium and his milieu, a fact which can be demonstrated in the conceptual language of Eustathius.

(a) Eustathius finds in Severus a Cyrillian passage which explains the process of the God-human union by means of the body-soul analogy. In body and soul we recognize in the case of human beings 'two natures', one is the soul, the other the body. Nevertheless both come together into 'one': 'Thus the two are no longer two, but from both one living being is perfected.'<sup>156</sup> This also follows for Christ: he is 'one living being'. In this Severus follows the master, and as an interpreter of Cyril is certainly correct. Eustathius, however, finds this a misinterpretation, and says: 'The distorters of right things should hear it. The teacher [Cyril] did not say that from both one nature is perfected (*ἀποτελεῖσθαι*), but one living being (*ζῶον*) which is the same as saying that one person (*prosopon*) is perfected.'<sup>157</sup> From this word *ἀποτελεῖσθαι* Eustathius is stimulated to speak of the 'end-result' (*ἀποτελεσμα*) in the 'union from two', which he says is, nevertheless, not the 'one nature', but the 'one *prosopon*'.<sup>158</sup> This is 'what is aimed at' (*telos*).

In this terminology Eustathius is clearly in line with Leontius of Byzantium, as his CNE indicates.<sup>159</sup>

Thus it remains after our investigation of the expression 'essential union' (*τοῦ λόγου τῆς κατ'οὐσίαν ἐνώσεως*), that we understand the special features, both of the divinity and the humanity, without mingling, according to the examples [analogies] adduced above. We have compiled only a weak picture of the truth which transcends everything, a picture, however, that shows that there is one single end-result [product] from it (*ἐν μὲν τι τούτων εἶναι τὸ ἀποτελεσμα*), whether we call it a *prosopon*, or a *hypostasis* or an *individuum* (*atomon*) or subject (*hypokeimenon*) or whatever else you please. About this I shall not argue.

This terminologically rich text finds its further counterpart in Eustathius, where we should not forget Cyril and Severus in the background.<sup>160</sup>

We say that Christ is from two natures, just as the one body is from many members and parts, but not from two persons as well. Heaven forbid! Because the humanity of Christ never existed for itself (*ἰδιουποστώτως*), no proper *prosopon* will be attributed to what does not exist for itself, as Severus assumes: [Severus:] 'If we characterize Christ as out of two natures, then we also say he is two natures and in two natures, by our holding onto the words "unmingled" and "undiminished".' If indeed the two natures form the one *prosopon* (*ἀποτελεσματικαί εἰσι τοῦ ἐνὸς προσώπου αἱ φύσεις*), insofar as there is talk about 'from two', why then not also the end-result [end-product] (*τὸ ἀποτελεσμα*)? That is what we

156. *Ibid.*, no. 53, ll. 976-978; it is a question of Cyril Alex., *Ep. 2 ad Succensum* (CPG 5346). PG 77, 245AB. The conclusion reads: *ὥστε τὰ δύο μηκέτι μὲν εἶναι δύο, δι'ἀμφοῖν δὲ ἐν ἀποτελεῖσθαι ζῶον*.

157. *Ibid.*, no. 53, ll. 978-981; PG 86, 940BC.

158. *Ibid.*, no. 50, ll. 943-947; PG 86, 937D: 'For this reason the Fathers have beautifully said that Christ is two natures, that he consists of them, brings them together, and thus is both. This composition is a *prosopon*, not insofar as it is composed, but insofar as it is the end-result (*apotelesma*). The one *prosopon* is what is really aimed at in the process of union (*telos*)

159. Cf. above, p. 211, n. 88, Leontius Byz., CNE: PG 86, 1305C.

160. Eustath. mon., *Ep. de duab. nat.*, no. 14, ll. 220-31; PG 86, 912AB.

mean by the end-result [end-product] itself, which is composed from them (τὰ ἐξ ὧν συνέστη αὐτὸ τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα).

We can hardly accept the alleged sentence of Severus as genuine. It is the 'interpretation' of Eustathius which he reads into the 'from two natures' of the Patriarch. But stimulated by the Cyrillian-Severan terminology, Eustathius moves in a striking way in the language of Leontius, as we see from the text just cited.

(b) *Enhypostatos*: a still more significant affinity between Leontius and Eustathius, beyond that of *apotelesma*, is *enhypostatos*. The latter employs it three times in order to denote by it the reality of something, be it of the two natures, be it of the union from both.<sup>161</sup>

(c) *Synthesis, synthetos*: in Leontius these concepts surface in connection with the theory of the union in Christ, in association with other words which he examines for their applicability to his purpose.<sup>162</sup> Eustathius stresses the concept *synthetos* particularly strongly in order to express the two-natures teaching as duality in unity.<sup>163</sup>

This is the expression *synthetos*: it signifies the coming together of two things; whoever reads *synthetos* thinks of two things from which that composition is made, which it also has in itself; and they remain these (two) as long as what is composed is really a composition. If, then, Christ is composed, he comes not only from two natures [as from one preceded and now disappeared], but he retains them in himself, as one who consists of them, and he is them both, so that he is not as another in other things. The principle of the *synthetos* thus remains preserved.

In fact this linguistic field around *synthetos* fits in very well with the Chalcedonian two-natures teaching, and the concept will retain its significance in Greek theology. It is thus no surprise when Severus does not like it and rejects it.<sup>164</sup>

Finally we can also refer to a similarity in *negativis*: Leontius and Eustathius alike have no love for the concept *hypostasis*. To characterize the unity they prefer *prosonon*, and in this regard Leontius displays a somewhat richer language than his colleague. One could certainly extend the comparison between them even further. The agreement between the two monks is sufficiently clear, but this still provides no hint with regard to chronology. Both stand in the same defence against Severus, fit into the milieu of Constantinople and defend a purely Chalcedonian christology, as will now be briefly demonstrated for Eustathius.

### 3. Eustathius as defender of strict-Chalcedonian language

As in Leontius, so too in Eustathius the two-natures theme is to the fore. Unfortunately Eustathius also fails to see the problem of the distinction of the main Chalcedonian concepts *hypostasis* and *physis*. His view is confined to the possibility of proving that in Christ, despite the

161. Eustath. mon., *Ep. de duab. nat.*, no. 9, ll. 123–125; PG 86, 908B. In no. 13, ll. 210–211; 909D *enhypostatos* stands as a counter-concept to *φαντασιώδης* and *οὐσιώδης* and means once again real, actual; in no. 15, l. 248 (912C) *enhypostatos* stands opposed to *anhypostatos*, or as 'being' to 'non-being'; in no. 18, l. 336 (916B) Eustathius says of the *mia physis* of Severus that he understands it as 'substantial' and 'real' (*οὐσιώδη καὶ ἐνυπόστατον*). Thus with his linguistic usage Eustathius fits into the environment of Leontius of Byzantium and the compilers of the letters of Peter the Fuller.

162. See Leont. Byz., *CNE*: PG 86, 1301–1304.

163. Eustath. mon., *Ep. de duab. nat.*, no. 54, ll. 1000–1008; PG 86, 940D–941A.

164. See above, pp. 159–60.

'essential *henosis*', a duality has to be accepted. His dialogue partner is Severus.

(a) *The Severan mia-physis formula in the interpretation of Eustathius*

The monk knows that Severus is a follower of Cyril when he refers the denotation of the 'one *physis*' to the pre-existent Logos. He shows sympathy for this, but is surprised at the fact that then this denotation is also applied to the result of the union, although the 'ensouled flesh' is now included as well. Logically there has still 'to be seen in the *synthesis* (!) two existing [real] natures, and not one single nature'.<sup>165</sup> After the Logos in the union assumed everything from the human being, soul, body, flesh, his human being cannot have lost this one thing, namely to be called 'nature'.<sup>166</sup> This argument is not bad, but pays too little attention to the fact that Severus does not give to the 'one *physis* of the divinity' a general meaning, but one that is proper to God alone, in the sense, for example, of 'God's own proper nature'. There cannot be a second. Nevertheless Severus would then have to add: 'no second nature of the same kind'. Eustathius too will not speak of such a second nature of the same kind. He certainly knows that the same concept can be applied on different levels, that is, used analogically. The human nature of Christ does not have the 'station' of the God nature, but it must still be denoted as nature. He says that Severus must be able to think along these lines too.<sup>167</sup>

But we stress this: as in the assumption of the humanity all is preserved and named, and on account of the union the particular denotations are not shed, so too the nature is called 'nature', and on account of the *synthesis* is neither contracted [namely to denote the one nature] nor does it disappear because of the synthesis. Each of the two natures remains, not only what each is by nature, but also has the denotation for the nature. You are also of that opinion, Severus, when you treat each of the two natures by itself (*ιδίως*); or you decline to call them, when taken together, 'two natures', so that you do not afflict the docetists in every regard (that is, from false consideration for the docetists).

(b) *Does Severus really speak of two natures?*

Eustathius is cautious when he wants to ascribe to Severus the statement of two natures. He limits it to the case where Severus speaks of the two natures disjunctively, that is, each by itself, not conjunctively, or considered together.<sup>168</sup> He admits that the Patriarch never speaks of two

165. Eustath. mon., *Ep. de duab. nat.*, no. 19, ll. 356–357; PG 86, 916C: *καὶ ἐν τῇ συνθέσει ὑφισταμέναις φύσεσι ὁρᾶν, οὐχὶ μίαν μόνον φύσιν.*

166. *Ibid.*, no. 19, ll. 357–361; PG 86, 916CD.

167. *Ibid.*, ll. 363–370; PG 86, 916D.

168. Cf. *ibid.*, no. 9, ll. 108–123; PG 86, 908AB.



natures when he considers them in the state of being united. Hence he can only put forward the logical demand that to be consistent, Severus must accept two natures and denote them as such, also in the state of being united (*ἐν συνθέσει*). In order to escape this necessity, the Patriarch has recourse to the old anti-Arian schema of the distinction of the two times.<sup>169</sup> He is of the opinion that by recourse to the different states of the one *physis* he can avoid the real distinction into two *physeis*. And in the concrete how does this distinction of the 'times' or of the 'states' of the divine Logos appear? Eustathius says that we are not confronted simply with differences of time, but with realities. This is said in a text which is also terminologically interesting, which in a special way allows the 'nature-schema' of Eustathius to be recognized, but taken together with the 'distinction of the times'. Each time which is to be distinguished in Christ corresponds also to a nature, so that four times and four natures are contrasted with each other. Christ is first of all considered in the time before the incarnation, then in the time of the incarnation. This makes two natures. But the Only-begotten died in the nature of flesh. He descended as 'soul', to the 'souls', which resulted in a third nature. Finally he awakened his body and ascended with it above all the heavens before the countenance of God, which referred to a fourth nature.<sup>170</sup>

169. *Ibid.*, no. 20, ll. 373–399; PG 86, 917AB. He is said on this account to be guilty of a contradiction, because he 'denotes the one nature as two natures' (l. 381; 917A8–9). Severus himself, however, testifies that the Fathers before him have accepted two natures in Christ (no. 6, ll. 49–61; 904D–905A). Eustathius refers honestly to a writing of Severus, *Expositio fidei*, which according to K.-H. Uthemann, *Anastasii Sin. Viae Dux* = CCG 8, 442, seems to be an excerpt from the *Or. I ad Nephalum*. In this Severus defends himself against misusing the name of Cyril, because a development occurred in the latter through apologetic necessity.

170. *Ibid.*, no. 22, ll. 430–434; PG 86, 920A: *Καὶ διατοῦτο οὐ μόνον ἐρωτήσωμεν τίς φύσις ἀσάρκου θεοῦ καὶ τίς σαρκακωμένον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τίς φύσις ἐμψύχου μόνον θεοῦ — ἀσάρκος γὰρ ἐπεδήμησεν τοῖς ἐν ᾧδου — καὶ τίς φύσις θεοῦ, σαρκακωμένον μὲν, σαρκὶ δὲ ἀφθάρτῳ καὶ ἀθανάτῳ*. The different applications of the *physis* concept are not unproblematical. Insofar as it is a matter of the 'divinity' and 'humanity' of Christ, the application is covered by Chalcedon. But if now the soul, descended into Hades and united with the divinity (the ensouled God), and then 'the exalted Christ' are placed beside them as a third and a fourth *physis*, the content of the *physis* concept changes. The discussion with Severus is not made any easier by this. Yet here Eustathius is witness to a rare terminology, and that attests his wide reading in patristic literature. He speaks of the 'ensouled God, descending into Hades only in the soul' (*ἐμψυχὸς μόνον θεός*). In no. 23 Eustathius repeats these questions of no. 22 in a modified form (no. 23, ll. 442–445; PG 86, 920B). The distinction is the same. The formulation of the 'soul being God, descended into Hades' stands at the end of a long development in the *descensus* theology. That Eustathius knows it places him in a far-reaching tradition. On this see A. Grillmeier, 'Der Gottessohn im Totenreich', in *idem*, *Mit ihm und in ihm* (Freiburg, Basel, Vienna, 1978), 159–71.

For this reason we ask not only what is the nature of God without the flesh and what is the nature of the Incarnate One, but also what is the nature of the God who is only soul, for he dwelt without flesh in Hades; (we ask) as well what is the nature of God, who indeed became flesh, but is now in incorruptible and immortal flesh.

Eustathius knows that such a dividing up is a horror for Severus. For the question 'which nature in Christ?' already means a dissolution of the unity, exactly what Severus objected to in the detestable Leo I of Rome and his *Tomus* (no. 24). But what does the witness of Severus signify for Eustathius? What Severus does not want to concede is found in particular Fathers before Cyril.<sup>171</sup> Thus the monk feels certain of his ground. Admittedly the two-natures schema of Chalcedon is now presented in a way which makes it even harder for Severus to acknowledge in his opponents the will to retain the unity in Christ. This follows too from the further problematic of Eustathius.

(c) *One or two activities in Christ?*

Over and above the two natures Eustathius defends with Leo I also the two activities, the divine and the human, in Christ, in the framework of a critique of a Christmas sermon of the Patriarch, within which the walking of Jesus on the lake is said to be interpreted 'in a monophysite way'.<sup>172</sup> In contrast to this the monk undertakes to interpret this miracle in the sense of Leo I's *Tomus* to Flavian.<sup>173</sup>

Although he [Severus] distinguishes the nature of the flesh from the nature of the divinity, he still condemns those who confess two natures, but most of all himself. For he acknowledges two natures in Christ, indeed as subsisting and remaining. But then he brings

171. Eustath. mon., *Ep. de duab. nat.*, no. 7, ll. 71–73; PG 86, 905B: 'It is sufficient for us that Severus testifies that the manner of speaking of the two natures is found in the holy Fathers, and in many Fathers, not only in one or two.' Eustathius stresses too that if we began already with the corrections made to the two-natures teaching of the Fathers which they produced before the heretics, then the manner of speaking of the *mia physis* 'must also be relinquished, since it has been invented by the heretics' (no. 8, ll. 82–104; 905CD). The monk complains about the authoritarian procedure of Severus who 'distinguishes (the natures) as two when he wishes and again joins them together into one, as if he had the authority to speak and to act' (no. 9, ll. 126–127; 908B). Eustathius can rightly refer to certain inconsistencies in Severus. Against the Grammarian, for example, Severus stresses that divinity and humanity retain their undiminished reality in the synthesis. Why then does he not accept two natures? (Cf. no. 15, ll. 252–266; 912D–913A). Or if Severus takes the words *ousia* and *physis* synonymously, why does he then censure Sergius Scholasticus, when the latter modifies the *mia-physis* formula into a *mia-ousia* formula? Cf. *ibid.*, no. 10, ll. 162–165; 909A.

172. *Ibid.*, nos. 29–30, ll. 559–587; PG 86, 924C–925A. Severus will admit only an 'undivided activity': ll. 570–571; 924D3. *Ibid.*, nos. 30–36, ll. 588–741; PG 86, 925A–932A. Eustathius thus confesses Pope Leo I's *agit enim utraque forma quod proprium est*, which is rejected by Severus

173. *Ibid.*, no. 42, ll. 803–813; PG 86, 933AB.

them together, I know not how, into one . . . If there was only one nature in Christ, then it is superfluous to stress 'insofar as God' and 'insofar as a human being', or 'the nature of the flesh' or 'the nature of the divinity', or 'to him who was born to suffer' and 'to him who was born not to suffer'. For that refers precisely to the two natures.

As in Leontius of Byzantium, so too in Eustathius the theological emphasis is on the duality of the natures. In contrast to this the interpretation of the unity of the *hypostasis* recedes. Nor even does the term *hypostasis* emerge. For this reason the monk fails to advance beyond Leontius or John the Grammarian. Yet in comparison with the latter there is a clearer line with regard to the evaluation of the *mia-physis* terminology and of the neo-Chalcedonian compromises in general. For Eustathius the confession of the two natures unambiguously excludes the formula of the one nature in such a way that the idea of the simultaneous use of both formulas can no longer exist.<sup>174</sup>

If the two natures are really two, they cannot be called one. But that there are two natures in Christ, Severus not only stated, but also wrote.

Thus Eustathius is to be reckoned among the supporters of a strict-Chalcedonian language. He also clearly makes reference to the text of the definition of 451 and renders it in his own words. He understands well that the principal terms of Chalcedon and in particular its 'in two natures' can be derived from Cyril himself.<sup>175</sup>

What is the difference between saying 'Christ is in two natures' and what Severus, the double-headed fox, says, corresponding with the blessed Cyril: 'perfect in the divinity and perfect in the humanity', and it is impossible for 'two' not to appear in 'two', yet not in the persons. For in Christ there are not two persons.

If Eustathius is not an outstanding theologian, still through his own study of the sources he creates for himself a clear conviction of the expressive power of the Chalcedonian formula, from which, though, he omits the concept of *hypostasis*.

174. *Ibid*, no. 54, ll. 991-994; PG 86, 940CD. Eustathius knows that Cyril used the *mia-physis* formula to ward off the erroneous teaching of Nestorius. Cf. no. 55, ll. 1018-1019; PG 86, 941AB. For the right understanding of this formula in Cyril, he refers to his letter to Eulogius (CPG 5344; PG 77, 224-228) and his *Prosphonetikus* to the Alexandrians (CPG 5265).

175. *Ibid*, no. 52, ll. 970-975, PG 86, 940B.

## CHAPTER THREE

### LEONTIUS OF JERUSALEM AND HIS PICTURE OF CHRIST

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We encounter a new type of Chalcedonian christology in the works of an author who is characterized as Leontius of Jerusalem, but whose identity is difficult to determine.<sup>1</sup>

#### SECTION ONE

#### ON THE PERSON AND WORK OF LEONTIUS OF JERUSALEM

F. Loofs had identified the two Leontii, the one from Byzantium and the one from Jerusalem,<sup>2</sup> as one and the same person. The writings ascribed to the latter, *Against the Monophysites* (*Contra monophysitas*) (CPG 6917) and *Against the Nestorians* (*Contra Nestorianos*) (CPG 6918), he considered as adaptations of a lost original of Leontius of Byzantium.<sup>3</sup> The two works named only attracted notice and a new

1. Cf. the colophon in PG 86, 1769/70: Τοῦ πανσόφου μοναχοῦ Κῦρ Λεοντίου Ἱεροσολυμίτου.

2. The new edition of the works of the latter is being prepared by P. T. R. Gray.

3. F. Loofs, *Leontius von Byzanz und die gleichnamigen Schriftsteller der griechischen Kirche* = *TU* 3, 1-2 (Leipzig, 1887). On the identity of Leontius of Byzantium and Leontius of Jerusalem see 183-94. This thesis is taken over by W. Rügamer, *Leontius von Byzanz. Ein Polemiker aus dem Zeitalter Justinians* (Diss. Würzburg, 1894), 33-43; thus Rügamer is against equating Leontius of Byzantium with the Scythian monk Leontius, and Leontius of Byzantium with the 'Origenist Leontius' of the *Vita Sabae*. Nevertheless Rügamer will not accept the statement on 194-7, that the *Contra Monophysitas* is the later adaptation of a part of the 'scholia of Leontius', which as well is said to be the basis for *De sectis*. Furthermore he rejects Loofs' hypothesis about the adaptation of the *Contra Nestorianos* (41-3). In other respects too he repeatedly distances himself from Loofs. Thus Rügamer uses the two works named in his presentation of the christology of Leontius of Byzantium. A different opinion is found in J. P. Junglas, *Leontius von Byzanz* = *FCLDG* VII 3 (Paderborn, 1908) and V. Grumel, art., 'Léonce de Byzance', in *DTC* 9, 400-26. But since CPG 6917 and 6918 were regarded by most authors in Loofs' way of thinking as *opera dubia* or *spuria*, for the most part they remained unconsidered for the history of doctrine. D. Stiennon, art. 'Léonce de Byzance', in *DSp* 9 (1976) (col. 651-60), says in col. 655 'Le *Contra Nestorianos* . . . et . . . le *Contra Monophysitas* . . . sont attribués par les mss au "moine très sage . . . Léonce le hiérosolymite", en qui il convient de voir un Léonce distinct

assessment through the research of M. Richard,<sup>4</sup> who conceded Leontius of Jerusalem a significant place in the history of doctrine in the sixth century. Two works have to be distinguished: one against the Monophysites, and the other against the Nestorians.<sup>5</sup> *CM* falls really into two distinct *opuscula*. (a) 63 *capitula* or *aporiai* (PG 86, 1769–1804): Leontius demands from the Monophysites answers to this series of objections, similar to the *capitula* XXX of Leontius of Byzantium. The argumentation is consistently speculative, but a few patristic authorities are adduced.<sup>6</sup> (b) *Testimonia sanctorum* (PG 86, 1804–1900A9). The conclusion (1900A9–1901A2) is not authentic. As Richard remarks, Leontius does not really produce a florilegium, but rather an exposition in the genre of ‘questions and answers’ (*erotapokriseis*).<sup>7</sup> With F. Loofs and M. Richard, one should probably accept that the *aporiai* represent the continuation of an extensive work, which expounded the arguments of the Severans and refuted them, but which is no longer extant. The *aporiai* and the *testimonia sanctorum* are to be considered as two appendices, as it were, to this work.

*CN* originally comprised eight books, of which, however, we possess only seven, with chapters of varying number and length.<sup>8</sup> The

du nôtre’ (= Leontius of Byzantium). The assigning of these writings to Leontius of Byzantium is still defended by J. H. I. Watt, ‘The Authenticity of the Writings Ascribed to Leontius of Byzantium. A New Approach by Means of Statistics’, in *StudPat* 7 = *TU* 92 (1966), 321–36; S. Rees, ‘The Literary Activity of Leontius of Byzantium’, *JTS* 19 (1968), 229–42; I. Fracea, ‘Ο Λεόντιος Βυζάντιος. Βίος καὶ Συγγράμματα (Κριτική Θεώρηση) (Athens, 1984), 217–46.

4. M. Richard, ‘Léonce de Jérusalem et Léonce de Byzance’, *MSR* 1 (1944), 35–88 = *Op. Min.* III, no. 59; *idem*, ‘Les florilèges diphysites’, in *Chalkedon* I, 740–2; see *CCT* II/1, p. 60. For M. Richard, *Op. Min.* III, no. 59, pp. 81–8, ‘Leontius of Jerusalem’ is the *apocrisarius* of the Palestinian monks, the participant in the doctrinal dialogue of 532 and in the Synod of Constantinople in 536, who is closely connected with the court of Justinian. On this see above, pp. 181–4.

5. See the literary-historical explanation in M. Richard, *Op. Min.* III, no. 59, pp. 37–9, on the *Contra Monophysitas* (*CM*) (CPG 6917); and pp. 39–43 on the *Contra Nestorianos* (*CN*) (CPG 6918). The new suggestion by M. Breydy for dating the *CM* (after 641) and on the Leontius question in general, which he makes in his recent edition, *Jean Maron. Exposé de la foi*, CSCO 497–498 (1989), and presents in other articles, cannot be discussed here.

6. *Aporia* 12: Gregory of Nyssa; *Aporia* 18: Gregory Nazianzen; *Aporiai* 21 and 44: Cyril of Alexandria.

7. Here we have to distinguish: (i) a more speculative presentation (1804D–1817B); (ii) a patristic section with a dyophysite florilegium (1817C–1849C) and a critical investigation (1849C–1876C) where in particular it is a question of the Apollinarian forgeries; (iii) a historical section with refutation of monophysite objections against the Council of Chalcedon. On the *CM* see P. T. R. Gray, ‘An Anonymous Severian Monophysite of the Mid-Sixth Century’, *Patristic and Byzantine Review* 1 (1982) 117–26. From the *CM* Gray gathers texts of a Severan who cannot be identified.

8. An overview indicates the christological themes:

1. The *synthesis* of the natures of Christ: 52 chs.

peculiarity of *CN*, in terms of the history of literature, was shown decisively by the discovery that Leontius of Jerusalem 'not only gives the Nestorian views or, as is customary in polemical writing, caricatures them, but that he *cites* them, that there are thus Nestorian texts preserved for us in *Adversus Nestorianos*. Through their sheer quantity these texts represent a considerable increase in the pool of resources for the history of Antiochene theology.'<sup>9</sup> The 'Nestorianism' which Leontius of Jerusalem had in mind was in various regards just as undervalued as his own writing.<sup>10</sup> In the study just cited L. Abramowski has recorded all the Nestorian citations and has compiled a complete list (pp. 51-5). The 'Nestorian' who speaks in these 'supports the view that two natures are two *hypostases*, and two *hypostases* two *prosopa*, the unity is presented in the one *prosopon*'.<sup>11</sup> But from this new insight into the textual situation one should not conclude that the complete citations already reproduce the complete text of the Nestorian writing, for only seven books of the *CN* are extant. 'As far as the Nestorian is concerned, the loss of the eighth book of Leontius is a real misfortune . . . , because it is only in the eighth book that Leontius wanted to refute the Nestorian's formulations for the *unity* of the person of Christ, which in his opinion were inadequate.'<sup>12</sup> Because we can recognize from the citations of

2. The one *hypostasis* of Christ: 49 chs.

3. Against the two-sons teaching: 14 chs.

4. Mary *theotokos*: 49 chs.

5. The divinity of Christ (in divine nature): 33 chs.

6. Against the expression: 'God-bearing human being' *theophoros anthropos*: 10 chs.

7. The formula *unus de Trinitate passus est*: 11 chs.

9. L. Abramowski, 'Ein nestorianischer Traktat bei Leontius von Jerusalem', in *III. Symposium Syriacum 1980 = OCA 221* (Rome, 1983) (43-55), 43-4, where the conclusion reads: 'With the exception of I 52, the last chapter of the first book, where no citation appears, every chapter begins with a citation' (44).

10. Thus M. Richard himself, *art. cit.*, 68 (even in 1944) wrote: 'D'abord on aurait grand tort de chercher dans les questions du *Contra Nestorianos* la doctrine réelle de théologiens nestoriens byzantins dont nous ignorons jusqu'aux noms. L'exposé que nous présente Léonce de Jérusalem est tout théorique et artificiel.' This judgement is repeated in part verbatim by C. Moeller in *Chalcedon I* (1951), 687. Two other authors found in the opposing citations in *CN* II, 13 (PG 86, 560BC-1516D) some belonging to Leontius of Byzantium. Thus D. B. Evans, *Leontius of Byzantium. An Origenist Christology* (Washington, 1970), 139; he is followed by P. T. R. Gray, *The Defense of Chalcedon in the East (451-553)* (Leiden, 1979), 128-31. The basis for this lies in an unclarified concept of *enhypostatos*.

11. L. Abramowski, *art. cit.*, 45. Abramowski emphasizes the clear Greek of these texts, which is in very marked contrast to that of Leontius of Jerusalem himself, to his disadvantage. She says that unfortunately the Latin translation in PG 86 'frequently succumbs to the obscurity of Leontius' Greek', and that on some occasions in the translation Nestorian citation and counter-argument are joined without distinction.

12. *Ibid.*, 45-6.

the opponent that he is attacking an earlier writing of Leontius, our knowledge of literary history is thus also expanded.

'There were three writings:

- (a) a writing of Leontius of Jerusalem, which is no longer extant,
- (b) the Nestorian's attack on this writing, which is partly preserved in the excerpts of Leontius,
- (c) Leontius' writing in defence, which is also no longer complete.'<sup>13</sup>

### Classification both chronologically and in the history of ideas

The corpus of Leontius of Jerusalem must have been composed in the years between 536(538) and 543/544, thus in the period after the condemnation of Severus at the Synod of Constantinople (536) and his death (538), and before the outbreak of the Three Chapters dispute.<sup>14</sup> M. Richard speaks of the time between 525 and 550 as 'une des périodes les plus brillantes de la théologie byzantine'.<sup>15</sup> He groups Leontius of Jerusalem with Leontius of Byzantium and Theodore of Raithu.<sup>16</sup> Leontius thus belongs to the class of educated monks who with their ascetical-theological training also acquired secular knowledge. In contrast to Leontius of Byzantium, who is more orientated to psychology, his namesake takes his analogies for christology more from physics of an Alexandrian stamp.<sup>17</sup> M. Richard speaks in defence of moving Leontius of Jerusalem's literary activity to Constantinople, but in doing so he gives him the rôle which is attributed here to his namesake.<sup>18</sup> In the course of our investigations we shall produce various indications of the fact that the author of *CN* and *CM* also wrote in Byzantium, without wanting

13. *Ibid.*, 46. Here, with the help of the Nestorian citations, certain christological themes for the lost writing of Leontius are reconstructed.

14. Thus M. Richard, *art. cit.*, 62-3; L. Abramowski, *art. cit.*, 43 with reference to A. Basdekis, *Die Christologie des Leontius von Jerusalem. Seine Logoslehre* (Diss. Münster, 1974), XVII and 12, n. 30, where further suggestions for dating are discussed (S. Helmer, C. Moeller, F. Loofs).

15. M. Richard, *art. cit.*, 62-3.

16. *Ibid.*, 63.

17. *Ibid.*, 70 with reference to *CN* I, 17: PG 86, 1464-1465 in comparison with Leontius of Byzantium, *CNE* I, 2: 1280D.

18. *Ibid.*, 81-8. P. T. R. Gray situates the author in Jerusalem on the basis of the MSS tradition. S. Helmer, *Der Neuchalkedonismus* (Bonn, 1962) (202-15), 207 (with note) refers to the frequent anonymous use of the writings of the Areopagite in the writings of Leontius. This is 'only understandable for Constantinople, where in 532 the court bishop Hypatius had rejected the Areopagite writings as inauthentic, but not for Palestine, where at the same time John of Scythopolis was already composing his *scholia* on the writings of Ps. Dionysius'.

to claim them as strict proofs. Some comments in Leontius of Byzantium seem to refer to his namesake. If this can be demonstrated, then conclusions could be drawn for the chronology,<sup>19</sup> but these are not essential for judging the two authors.

19. This is true especially for Leontius of Byzantium *vis-à-vis* Leontius of Jerusalem. We shall return to this.



## SECTION TWO

### THE CHRISTOLOGY OF LEONTIUS OF JERUSALEM

In comparison with Leontius of Byzantium, Leontius of Jerusalem appears as the sharper thinker and the more felicitous innovator of language. The novelty that he introduces consists in (1) a sharper version of the one subject in Christ and with this the concept of *hypostasis* and (2) the theory of the *henosis* of the two natures in Christ in the one *hypostasis*, a theory which is expanded terminologically and strengthened speculatively. We shall attempt to capture both in the fullest way possible, and in conclusion to work towards his new picture of Christ.

#### I ANALYSIS

##### THE LINGUISTIC AND CONCEPTUAL TOOLS

#### 1. A new consciousness of the problem

##### (a) *Distinctions*

The first advance of Leontius of Jerusalem consists in the fact that he consciously distinguished between a nature union (*unio in natura et secundum naturam*) and a *hypostasis* union (*unio in hypostasi et secundum hypostasim*). In contrast to the Apollinarian nature synthesis of the fourth century and the lack of clarity of the Cyrillian-Severan *mia-physis* formula, with this distinction there is for the first time the theoretical differentiation of union according to the *hypostasis* and the nature synthesis. In it there is a clear dismissal of Apollinarianism and every form of monophysitism.<sup>20</sup> More difficult, however, is the differentiation from the Nestorian and his teaching of two *hypostases*. But for the Nestorian too the correct distinction concerning both the Logos and the human being in Christ is found: in the incarnation 'the Logos does not assume an additional *hypostasis* in order now to attain the perfection of the *hypostasis*; he possesses only *the (hypostasis)* which he also had after

<sup>20</sup> Leontius Jer, CN VII, 3 PG 86, 1765C 'The flesh is not proper to the *physis* of the Logos, at the end of the ages it would be truly proper to his *hypostasis*' Leontius, however, can take over the Cyrillian formula of the *ένωσις φυσική*, be it with certain difficulties Cf CN I, 50 PG 86, 1512CD, CM PG 86, 1844B, a formula which Leontius of Byzantium rejects Epil PG 86, 1940AB

the addition of the *nature* which he did not have'.<sup>21</sup> Whether Leontius pursues christology 'from above' or 'from below', it is completely clear that the one subject in Christ is seen as the *hypostasis* of the Logos. The human being in Christ 'does not possess like us his own proper human *hypostasis* which separates him from every similar or dissimilar nature, but the common and indivisible *hypostasis* of the Logos, both for his own [human] as well as for the [divine nature] which is over him'.<sup>22</sup> The problem which we had to clarify in the case of his namesake (of Byzantium), namely, whether he considered the subject in Christ as a *tertium quid*, does not even arise for Leontius of Jerusalem.

(b) *The determination of the subject in Christ*

We recall that the definition of Chalcedon did not attempt any speculative explanation of where in the one Christ the one *hypostasis* is realized, and under the assumptions at that time could not have aspired to this. The formal 'concept' of the *hypostasis* was not yet located in the one Logos-subject. The one Christ was presented as a complex totality, seen from the end-point of the incarnation and its result, in the unmingledness of the two natures and of the properties of each, which, however, have come together in one person and in one *hypostasis*.<sup>23</sup> The Fathers knew that the whole event of union had as its starting-point the perfect Logos and Son in the pre-existence. Nevertheless the concept of the 'one *hypostasis*' was not applied to this, but to the final form of him who had assumed flesh and in the 'one *hypostasis*' let the two natures be recognized. From this view of the one concrete *hypostasis* in the end-result (*apotelesma*, as Leontius of Byzantium said) the theologians laboriously attempted to change to the predicative placing of the 'one *hypostasis*' in the pre-existent Logos, in order to determine from there how the humanity of Christ is to be integrated into this pre-existent uniqueness. Thus where precisely is the one *hypostasis* realized? What does *hypostasis* mean when it is already there in the pre-existent Logos and nevertheless has to integrate into itself a second complete existence, which is also *physis* (nature) or *ousia* (essence), even if in historic finitude?

21 Leontius Jer., CN VII, 4 PG 86, 1768aA

22 Leontius Jer., CN V, 29 PG 86, 1749BC Cf. CN II, 48 PG 86, 1601A In Christ there is only one ego, which Leontius explains in connection with Jn 2,19 ('Destroy this temple') 'This one and the same *prosopon*, which is signified by the pronoun "I", comprises the destroyed body, the soul which speaks through the body, and the God who resurrects what was destroyed.' The additive view of the 'ego' is not a counter-instance to what was said above, as will immediately become clear

23 See the definition in CCT I<sup>2</sup>, 544

Why is it also not a *hypostasis*? In view of the Logos in God, how must I grasp and define *hypostasis*, if a contradiction is not to emerge from a consideration of the Incarnate One? What happens when the complete human nature is taken up into the one *hypostasis*?

These questions afflicted both Leontii in the same way. They were formulated anew in the work of the Nestorian whom Leontius of Jerusalem opposed in his *CN*. Until then the greatest handicap was the Basilian metaphysics of *hypostasis* and its transferral from trinitarian teaching to that of the incarnation: *hypostasis* is the *ousia* with the *idiomata*, or the *koinon* together with the *idion*.<sup>24</sup> We know that the Cyrillian-Severan tradition escaped this problem by wanting to use the Basilian teaching about *hypostasis* only for the *theologia*, not for the *oikonomia*. That amounted to an ostrich policy. The Chalcedonians received the more difficult inheritance by taking over the Cappadocian terminology and the combination of the theologies of the Trinity and of the incarnation, introduced by Gregory Nazianzen: in the *theologia*, one nature and three *hypostases*, and in the *oikonomia*, one *hypostasis* (from the Trinity) in two natures. A valid answer had been given neither to the Severans nor to the Nestorians when they asked: Why is the humanity of Christ also not *hypostasis*, if it is complete *physis* and also has its *idiomata*? Or is the humanity of Christ not an *individuum concretum*, not something distinct from the universality of the essence? Leontius of Byzantium did not face this question unambiguously. How did the other Leontius react to these questions?

### *First objection: the prosopon of Christ*

We shall start with some attempts by the Nestorian to demonstrate two *hypostases* or *prosopa* in the Incarnate One by proposing a '*prosopon* of the nature', which is a *ἐν* not on the basis of the union, but 'by nature', namely the *prosopon* of the God-Logos. The other *ἐν*, the Christ-*prosopon*, whose unity and uniqueness are due to the *henosis*, is contrasted to this.<sup>25</sup>

Leontius investigates this terminology, and he too sees in Christ the one natural *prosopon* on the basis of the one *physis* of the Logos. This one *prosopon* does not change, rather it remains the same in the state of assuming humanity. With 'Christ' a second *prosopon* is not added. *Prosopa* are not united, but the *natures* are united into the *prosopon*. Thus there remains the one *prosopon*, which the pre-existent Logos has, which at

24. *Ibid.*, 367-73.

25. Leontius Jer., *CN* II, 34: PG 86, 1592B.

the same time is also the one *prosopon* of Christ, that is, of the Logos united with the humanity.<sup>26</sup> There is thus complete identity of the *prosopon*, of the person, of the subject before and after the incarnation. The pre-existent *hypostasis* of the Logos himself is the subject of the incarnation who assumes a human nature, which neither is nor has its own *prosopon*.<sup>27</sup> In this way there arises not merely a relationship of possession, as when one person acquires another. The Logos did not acquire (*ἐκκτήσατο*)<sup>28</sup> a *sarx*, but he became flesh — a distinction which is familiar to us from the fourth century. We shall encounter it anew in the Syrian region. Because the one *hypostasis* has entered into this entitative relationship with the *prosopon*-less *sarx*, it can bear both series of 'physical names', that is, the predicates of both divine and human natures. While this Logos presented himself before (*πάλαι*) only in the one *prosopon* of 'one nature', he is now a two-natures *prosopon*.<sup>29</sup> This access to being is proper to the creative power of God alone.<sup>30</sup>

If God alone is the cause of nature and *hypostasis*, what prevents him from putting one nature into another? Is not everything really possible for him?

The examples which then follow from the *physis* of animals and plants are admittedly not suitable for illustrating the specific peculiarity of the God-human union, which has been stated in a new linguistic way. Leontius finds there the taking over of natures into other *hypostases*, for example, by way of assimilating nourishment, or the transformation of *hypostases* into other natures, as in the case of the caterpillar-butterfly.<sup>31</sup> He would be better off speaking of nature synthesis or nature transformation. Fortunately he does not insist on a strict application of these analogies from nature to christology. The 'one *hypostasis*' of the Incarnate One is the unchanged *hypostasis* of the Logos, which assumes 'a nature without a *prosopon*' through a creative action which pertains to God alone, an action which first allows the 'assumption' of the flesh to be characterized as a 'becoming'. The one Logos in the flesh is a hypostatic entitative unity in two natures.

26. *Ibid.*, PG 86, 1592C: *ἐν ἑστί τὸ πρόσωπον Χριστοῦ, ὃ ἔστιν ἐκ μιᾶς φύσεως ἐν πρόσωπον τοῦ Λόγου.*

27. Leontius Jer., CN II, 35: PG 86, 1593B: *καὶ ἀνθρώπος ἄρα γέγονεν τῇ τῆς φύσεως τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης προσλήψει, εἰ καὶ ἀπροσώπῳ ἡ αὐτὴ ὑπόστασις τοῦ Λόγου.*

28. Leontius probably meant by this that the Logos did not appropriate to himself an already existing human nature.

29. Leontius Jer., CN II, 35: PG 86, 1593C: Christ is *ἐν πρόσωπον μονοφυῆς* before the incarnation, and *διφυῆς* after the incarnation.

30. *Ibid.*

31. *Ibid.*, 1593D.

*Second objection: the Basilian concept of hypostasis*

The decisive point has not yet appeared clearly. Leontius of Byzantium (see above, pp. 181–229) did not get beyond explaining the one fact that the humanity of Christ also has its human *idiomata* and thus must be a *hypostasis*. How does Leontius of Jerusalem proceed? The Nestorian formulates this difficulty.

If the Logos has become a human being, he is in fact a particular human being [that is, recognizable as an *individuum*] (τίς ἀνθρώπος) It is only in this way that he can be a human being at all! But if he is a particular (individual) human being, he is a *hypostasis*. Hence there are two *hypostases* in Christ, or the *hypostasis* of the Logos ceases (to be) <sup>32</sup>

The response of Leontius of Jerusalem runs as follows:

But from the first moment of its existence this particular (individual) human being Christ is divine according to the *hypostasis*. This means the same as the statement according to his *hypostasis* God became a human being through the union of a human *ousia* with the divine *ousia* <sup>33</sup>

The question remains: does Leontius of Jerusalem admit that the humanity of Christ is one individual being, thus one concrete *ousia* with *idiomata*? Does this humanity in its individuality also remain in the state of being united?

What is new is the fact that Leontius of Jerusalem is not closed to this insight. In contrast to Basil and his followers, he allows particularity to be ascribed to the human nature of Christ. He says expressly: 'We say that the Logos has taken over an individual nature into his own *hypostasis*.'<sup>34</sup> Can two individualized natures with their *idiomata* be united in one *hypostasis*? If they can, then several problems result from this. (1) How does Leontius of Jerusalem grasp the concept of *hypostasis*? (2) How does he understand the taking up of the human nature of Christ into the one *hypostasis*? In reality the response to the second question will resolve the first question.

*(c) A new concept of hypostasis?*

In the first chapter of CN II, Leontius of Jerusalem presents a whole series of meanings for the word *hypostasis*,<sup>35</sup> which in fact are so far

<sup>32</sup> Leontius Jer, CN II, 43 PG 86, 1597AB

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid*, 1597B

<sup>34</sup> *Idem*, CN I, 20 PG 86, 1485C οὕτω φαμέν τὸν Λόγον ἐκ τῆς ἡμετέρας φύσεως εἰς τὴν ἰδίαν ὑπόστασιν προσλαβέσθαι φύσιν ἰδικήν τινα. The opposite would be the assumption of the 'universal human nature' as such or the assumption of the total nature of human beings, which Severus accused John the Grammarian of Caesarea of doing

<sup>35</sup> Cf Leontius Jer, CN II, 1 PG 86, 1528D–1532A

removed from our problematic that we can pass over them. The first relevant conception for us is the following:

We speak of *hypostasis* when, because different individual natures (φύσεων διαφόρων ἰδικῶν), with their *idiomata* (ιδιωμάτων) with them come together, but not *prosopa*, as one or at once, because of the union there comes into existence (σύστασις) a single atom<sup>36</sup>

The conception of *hypostasis* that follows this should precede it.

We speak of *hypostasis* in a generally acknowledged sense not when different natures (φύσεων) come together, but when several partial idioms (μόνων ιδιωμάτων μερικῶν πλειόνων) (come together), forming one general *idioma* (ἐν ἰδίωμα καθολικόν) from all, in one subject (ὑποκειμένῳ ἐνί), or in one single nature<sup>37</sup>

Finally then he writes:

Whether in a single, or composite, or individual or common (nature), like the divine nature or in one nature (φύσις) only, or in several united, provided they are totally in existence, this state or composition of partial *idiomata*, or of a common *idioma*, as thought of in a subject, is called *hypostasis*<sup>38</sup>

One will understand this tailor-made definition of *hypostasis*, if one keeps in mind the application of the concept: the individual cases which Leontius means are the divine nature (which is simple, but also general, because it is in Father, Son and Spirit), the human nature, which is composed, or Christ with his two united natures. But it is not these different ways of considering separated or united natures that constitute the *hypostasis*, but only the coming together of several individual *idiomata* in a simple or composite nature, insofar as there is present a subject with irrevocable individualization, a *τόδε τι*, thus an utterly determined, unrepeatable subject. It finally reads: 'each *hypostasis* is separated in its own monad'.<sup>39</sup> Hence the last thing that Leontius can say is: 'Individualization and separation of inseparable essences into an individual number as far as the *prosopon* is concerned.'<sup>40</sup> Being a *hypostasis* means being the final monad:

36 *Ibid* PG 86, 1529C4–8 Cf A Basdekis, *Die Christologie des Leontius von Jerusalem Seine Logoslehre* (Diss Münster, 1974), 17

37 Leontius Jer PG 86, 1529C8–12

38 *Ibid*, 1529C12–D4

39 *Ibid*, CN II, 5 PG 86, 1544A10–11 *πᾶσα ὑπόστασις ἐν τῇ μονάδι ἑαυτῆς διακρίνεται*

40 *Idem*, CN II, 1 PG 86, 1529D9–11 *τόδε τι καθ'ἑαυτὴν ἀπότασις τις οὐσα καὶ διορισμὸς τῶν ἀδιορίστων οὐσιῶν εἰς τὸν κατὰ πρόσωπον ἀριθμὸν ἐκάστου* Cf A Basdekis, *op cit*, 17–18

It is rather the *idion* of the *hypostasis*, that it both discerns by their own (nature) the atoms from others which qua nature are the same, and assigns individuality to each of them <sup>41</sup>

This concept of person can only prove its worth in its applicability to christology when the way in which Leontius represents the 'union according to the *hypostasis*' is investigated. He clearly feels the narrowness of the Basilian concept of *hypostasis*. It is only a step that separates him from breaking through this. The combination of *hypostasis* and *idion*, which he still maintains, prevents him from taking this step. But it still seems that something new opens up.

## 2. New language for the *henosis*

There is now an increase in neologisms which are intended to encompass the event of the '*henosis* according to the *hypostasis*' and which are aimed at the *hypostasis* as such, although it is a question of the unification of natures.

(a) *συνυποστάναι* (from *συνυφίστημι*) = to subsist together: 'In his own one *hypostasis* subsist together the human and the divine natures of the Logos.'<sup>42</sup>

(b) *ἐνυποστάναι* (second aorist of *ἐνυφίστημι*) = to subsist in. Christ's *sarx*, as a passible nature, has its subsistence in the impassible Logos.<sup>43</sup> Faith in the mystery of Christ demands from us the following confession:

The Logos has clothed his eternal *hypostasis*, which existed before the human nature, and the fleshless nature which existed before the ages in the last ages with flesh, and hypostatically inserted the human nature into his own *hypostasis* and not into that of a simple human being <sup>44</sup>

In this way the verbs *υφίστημι* and *υποστάναι* with the prefix *ἐν* become the technical expression for 'to cause to subsist in', and in the second aorist for 'to subsist in'. Here the history of a great christological concept begins. Related word-formations now multiply.

(c) *προσωποποιεῖν* = 'to personalize', 'to make the person', to take

41 *Ibid*, 1532C10-12 *υποστάσεως γὰρ μᾶλλον ἰδίων, ὃ καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων κατὰ φύσιν διακρίνειν τὰ ἄτομα ἰδίᾳ ἀπ' ἀλλήλων, καὶ καθ' αὐτὰ δεικνύειν ἐκάστου*

42 *Idem*, CN VII, 2 PG 86, 1761AB, not to be confused with this is the expansion of *ἐνυπόστατος* = real, actual, to *συνενυπόστατος*, as it is present in CN V, 30 PG 86, 1749D1-D5 On *ἐνυπόστατος* see below

43 *Idem*, CN VII, 6 PG 86, 1768C *ἡ πρόσθεσις τῆς σαρκὸς αὐτῷ προσεῖληπται, ἐνυποστᾶσα τῷ ἀπαθεῖ αὐτῷ ἡ παθητὴ (σάρξ)* The assumed flesh is taken up into the *hypostasis* of the Logos and thus has its *hypostasis* in it

44 *Idem*, CN V, 28 PG 86, 1748D *αὐτὴ τῇ ἰδίᾳ ὑποστᾶσει τὴν ἀνθρωπείαν φύσιν ἐνυπέστησεν*

into the unity of the person or to bestow personality.<sup>45</sup> As the unity of the *hypostasis* is synonymous with the unity of the *prosopon*, the formation of this word is easily understandable christologically.

(d) The *henosis* as *synthesis* — *Christos synthetos*. *Synthesis* is one of the oldest words in the history of the interpretation of the unity in Christ, as Origen showed us. Sergius Scholasticus, to the anger of Patriarch Severus, takes pleasure in this.<sup>46</sup> With Leontius of Jerusalem (and then Justinian), christology really becomes a 'confession of the *synthesis* of the natures'.<sup>47</sup> The opposite of *synthesis* is the pure *parathesis*.<sup>48</sup>

(e) Expanded descriptions. On the basis of this clarified understanding of the taking of Christ's human nature under the *hypostasis* of the Logos, there occurred further formulations of an understandable kind: 'to transfer one nature into another *hypostasis*' which only God, as the creator of nature and *hypostasis*, can do.<sup>49</sup> Or: 'We may say that the humanity of the Saviour does not have a subsistence of its own (*ἐν ἰδιαζούσῃ ὑποστάσει*), but from the very beginning subsisted in the *hypostasis* of the Logos'.<sup>50</sup> In any case the idea of the insubsistence of the aprosopic human nature in the *hypostasis* of the Logos is contrasted with any *henosis* 'in the nature and corresponding to the nature'.

(f) Verbal adjectives with the root (*ὕφ*)*ίστημι* (*στατός*). The word-formations which have as their starting-point the verbal adjective from *ίστημι*, *στατός* together with various prepositions are extraordinarily rich, for example, *ἐνυπόστατος*, *ἀνυπόστατος*, *συνυπόστατος*; or composites too, like *ιδιουπόστατος*, *ἐτερουπόστατος*. As we already know, we have to be particularly careful in interpreting these terms. They can lead to rash conclusions. The Nestorian takes advantage of this state of affairs.<sup>51</sup> For him it is a question of proving two *hypostases* in the one Christ: on the one hand Christ is consubstantial (*homoousios*) with the Father, on the other hand also with King David. The twofold *homoousios*

45 *Idem*, CN V, 25 PG 86, 1748A. *τῇ γὰρ ἰδίᾳ ὑποστάσει αὐτὴν [= σάρκα] ἀνείληφως, ἐπροσωποποίησεν* by the Logos taking up the flesh into his own *hypostasis*, he hypostatized and personalized it Cf A Basdekis, *op cit*, 24-5 The verb named above means as much as *ἡ εἰς πρόσωπον ἔνωσις* (CN III, 8 PG 86, 1636A)

46 On Sergius Scholasticus see above, pp 118-20.

47 Leontius Jer, CN I, *Prooemium* PG 86, 1401A *ὁμολογία τῆς τῶν φύσεων συνθέσεως* Besides the substantive there is also the verb *συντίθεσθαι* His fondness for playing with *synthetos* and other words finds expression particularly in CN IV, 3 PG 86, 1657A The concept *σύστασις* or the verb *συστάναι* is related to the term *synthesis* CN IV, 3 PG 86, 1657C *ἐκ Λόγου γὰρ αἰδίου καὶ σαρκὸς ὑποχρόνου, ὁ Δεσπότης ἡμῶν Χριστὸς ὁλος συνέστηκε*

48 *Idem*, CN I, 1 PG 86, 1409B

49 *Idem*, CN II, 35. PG 86, 1593C *μετατιθέναι φύσιν τινὰ εἰς ἑτέραν ὑπόστασιν*

50 *Idem*, CN II, 14 PG 86, 1568A

51 Cf *idem*, CN II, 5 PG 86, 1540AB



is balanced as on scales: as the Logos has his own *hypostasis* (ἰδικήν ὑπόστασιν) *vis-à-vis* the Father, so as a human being he must also have one *vis-à-vis* David. It is impossible, he says, that the human being Jesus is without his own *hypostasis vis-à-vis* King David, 'for the non-hypostatic cannot properly be consubstantial with the enhypostatic [= which David is]'.<sup>52</sup> Once again we encounter the tempting antithesis *enhypostatos-anhypostatos*. What is placed in opposition here does not yet lead beyond the previously known interpretation of the two adjectives. It is a question of the simple realization that what is 'anhypostatic', that is, that which does not have any reality, cannot be consubstantial with the 'enhypostatic', that is, the real. This is confirmed a little later in CN II, 10, with a slight variation of the same objection.

If the Orthodox (Leontius) accepts 'that the human being Jesus subsists, that is, exists, but does not have or is not a *hypostasis*, how is a contradiction not taught, if one says that the existent is anhypostatic, that is, does not have reality'?<sup>53</sup> For the Nestorian himself the solution is clear; to have an entire human nature is the same as having an existing, real nature, not an anhypostatic one, but also the same as having a hypostatic nature which subsists in itself. If the Chalcedonians refuse to denote the human nature of Christ as a *hypostasis*, then this means for the Nestorian that as nature it is unreal, an *anhypostaton*. Leontius of Jerusalem counters as follows:

We do not want to show the *anthropos kyriakos* as anhypostatic — not at all — but also not as idiohypostatic [with its own *hypostasis*], that is, as separated from the Logos. For who doubts the fact that it is not the same thing to call something anhypostatic and idiohypostatic?<sup>54</sup>

In other words, when we grant reality to the human nature of Christ, we do not immediately make it a nature subsisting in itself, or a *hypostasis*, as the Nestorian understands it. If the human nature of Christ is thus not an 'own *hypostasis*' (*idiohypostatos*), as the Nestorian intends, it is still not anhypostatic, which Leontius of Jerusalem now explicitly interprets as 'not being at all'.<sup>55</sup> But we shall wait in vain for the famous *enhypostatos*, with the alleged meaning of 'subsisting in', to be inserted between the extremes 'own *hypostasis*' and 'not-hypostatic' as the solution. There had been the same opportunity for this word in CN II,

52 *Idem*, CN II, 5 PG 86, 1540A9–10 τὸ γὰρ ἀνυπόστατον τῷ ἐνυποστάτῳ ὁμοούσιόν ποτε οὐχ ἂν λεχθεῖη

53 *Idem*, CN II, 10 PG 86, 1556A1–3

54 *Ibid.*, 1556A4–8

55 *Ibid.*, 1556A10 ὅλως μὴ εἶναι

5 (PG 86, 1540AB). To the equation by the Nestorian of 'twofold *homoousios* in Christ = twofold *hypostasis*', Leontius places in opposition the other equation 'twofold *homoousios* = two natures'. These 'two natures' are for the Nestorian admittedly a *sophisma*.<sup>56</sup> For a solution Leontius certainly grasps the word *enhypostatos*, but without changing its meaning (real). There too it forms the counter-term to *anhypostatos* = unreal, not existing, and thus must also be translated as real, existing. This conclusion is confirmed by the fact that *enhypostatos* is stated of the Father as the first *hypostasis* of the Trinity.<sup>57</sup> In short, *enhypostatos* means here once again 'real', and it is related only to Christ's two natures. Thus it follows that the acknowledgement of divinity and humanity in Christ as *enhypostata* does not mean that they are *idihypostata*, that is, that each constitutes its own proper *hypostasis*. For Leontius of Jerusalem, Christ is only *one hypostasis* in the real two natures. He excludes two characterizations for the humanity of Christ: *ιδιουπόστατος* and *ετερουπόστατος*.<sup>58</sup> In CN II, 13 there seems to be a last chance for the interpretation of *enhypostatos* as 'subsisting in' (another *hypostasis*).<sup>59</sup>

The two natures, we say, subsist in one and the same *hypostasis*,<sup>60</sup> admittedly not as if one of the two could be in it *anhypostatically*, but rather that *both can subsist in the one common hypostasis, and each of the two (natures) in one and the same hypostasis, whereby each (of the two natures) is enhypostatic*. For in order to be something, it is necessary that this same thing is also wholly on its own. If the natures have being, they must also subsist (= exist) and be *enhypostatic*. But because they are not independent of each other, since admittedly a union has occurred between them, it is not necessary that each of the two exists on its own (*ιδία ὑφεστηκέναι*). Thus it is clear that the two *enhypostata* (= the two natures) must not be *heterohypostata* (= *hypostasis* beside *hypostasis*), but are thought as being in one and the same *hypostasis*.<sup>61</sup>

There is no doubt that in this text there is talk of subsistence, even of

56 *Idem*, CN II, 5 PG 86, 1540B

57 *Ibid*, PG 86, 1540D2 τῷ Πατρὶ τῷ ἐνυποστάτῳ ὁμοούσιος. Neither for the Nestorian nor for Leontius of Jerusalem is the Father 'insubstisting' in another *hypostasis*. It is only a question of his reality in the divine nature, through which he is consubstantial with the Son.

58 *Ibid*, PG 86, 1540C8 and D9 the humanity of Christ is not 'its own *hypostasis*' nor 'another *hypostasis*'.

59 *Idem*, CN II, 13 PG 86, 1561B8-C9

60 *Ibid*, PG 86, 1561B8-9 τὰς γὰρ δύο φύσεις ἐν μιᾷ καὶ τῇ αὐτῇ ὑποστάσει λέγομεν ὑπόστασθαι.

61 *Ibid*, PG 86, 1561C7-9 Δῆλον ὅν ἐστι οὐχ ἑτερουπόστατον εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἐν μιᾷ καὶ τῇ αὐτῇ ὑποστάσει νοεῖσθαι ἀμφοῖν αὐτῶν τὸ ἐνυπόστατον δεῖ. Shortly before the two natures have a common *hypostasis*. And in one and the same *hypostasis* is each an *enhypostaton*, that is, has its own reality (1561B10-13). In the background is still the statement from CN II, 5 PG 86, 1544A10-11 'Each *hypostasis* is separate in its own monad' (πᾶσα ὑπόστασις ἐν τῇ μονάδι ἑαυτῆς διακρίνεται).

subsistence in, as one can perceive from the italicized lines. The word *enhypostaton* also seems to be included in this. But if one looks more closely, it still retains its old meaning of 'real' or 'existing'; it still stands in opposition to *anhypostatos*, meaning 'unreal'. For the objection of the Nestorian still hangs in the air: if the human nature of Christ is not a *hypostasis* on its own account and in itself, it is anhypostatic, that is, without existence. When in contrast Leontius of Jerusalem sees two *enhypostata* in the one *hypostasis* of the Logos, he characterizes them both as real.<sup>62</sup>

We have established that the adjective *enhypostaton* also in Leontius of Jerusalem retains its old meaning: real, having reality. Even an expanded neologism, which Leontius attempts with *συν-εν-υπόστατος*, does not proceed beyond this.<sup>63</sup> It is a question of clarifying the significations flesh, human being, divinity in the one Christ. It is in this context that the expression appears: in Christ the 'divinity' is *syn-en-hypostatos* with 'flesh' and 'human being', which the Latin translation inappropriately renders as *consubstantialis*, because elsewhere it still stands for *homoousios*. What no doubt is meant is that the divinity in Christ is as co-real as the human nature.

(g) Some further word formations: Leontius of Jerusalem's pleasure in new expressions was unrestrained. We shall mention only a few neologisms which by themselves are easy to understand:

(i) with *υφίστημι*, *στατός*: *δισυπόστατος* = dyhypostatic (CN II, 5: PG 86, 1544B); *ετερουπόστατος* = having another *hypostasis* (1540D).

(ii) with *φύσις* in CN II, 35: PG 86, 1593C:

(1) *μονοφυής* = in one nature; *διφυής* = in two natures. As pre-existent Logos Christ has a *μονοφυὲς πρόσωπον* (*prosopon* in one nature), after the incarnation a *διφυὲς πρόσωπον* (*prosopon* in two natures); the human *physis* in him is *ἀπρόσωπος* (without *prosopon*).

(2) Before the union the *sarx* of Christ did not exist, but it became nature in being co-nature with the supernature (that is, the Logos), as in CN I, 14: PG 86, 1457C (*φύσις καὶ συμφύσεις τῷ ὑπερφυεῖ*). Here this is an imitation of Ps. Dionysius.

(3) The characterization of the confessors of the *mia-physis* formula as *μιξοφυσῆται*, mixers of natures, sounds derisive.<sup>64</sup>

62. Thus above the translation must be 'whereby each [of the two natures] is real' [instead of 'enhypostatic'].

63. Leontius Jer., CN V, 30: PG 86, 1749D1-5.

64. *Idem*, CM: PG 86, 1841B; 1889B; CN I, 49: PG 86, 1512A2.

## II. SYNTHESIS

If this heading is given to indicate the theme of the second section, it is merely a signpost to mark the central points and goal of Leontius of Jerusalem's efforts; it is not our intention to say that he developed a systematic christology. In the first place he is a speculative theologian, who more energetically than his predecessors and contemporaries tackles the task posed by Chalcedon, which until then had not been completely resolved. This is the task of showing the *henosis* in Christ as the *synthesis in hypostasi et secundum hypostasim*, thus as a unity which leaves the two natures in their intactness, connecting them, however, entitatively, without this resulting in a new nature. It is still a question of justifying the Chalcedonian formula in its pre-philosophical, but very successful form: Jesus Christ, one and the same, perfect in divinity, the same perfect also in humanity. We can also say that he has still to come to terms with the question of how the custom of the earlier Church can be justified, viz. the custom of expressing the mystery of the incarnation of the Son of God in the rules of the so-called *communicatio idiomatum*, of the communication of properties, or of the *praedicatio idiomatum*, the attribution of divine and human predicates to one and the same subject. The problem of Nestorius is still very acute, as Leontius gathers from the writing to which he attempts to respond in his *Contra Nestorianos* (CN).

What is new is that he makes a decided attempt to arrive at an ontology of the Chalcedonian formula of the one *hypostasis* and the one *prosopon*, by having recourse to the concepts introduced by the Cappadocians, Basil and Gregory of Nyssa, and to some extent by carrying further initiatives that we were able to discern among the Chalcedonians and neo-Chalcedonians after 451. If we now hear of an ontology of the Chalcedonian formula, we should not switch off from the very start and presuppose the uselessness of such an attempt. The task of the historian must be to join in the tentative exploration of the Fathers in an almost impassable area, that of the speculative justification of Chalcedon, and to follow step by step their efforts to understand the faith. We shall see that Leontius of Jerusalem discovered a good clue. We may also believe that he understood his task as a believing theologian, indeed as a Chalcedonian theologian. This is revealed by an outline of his main christological thesis, which he himself describes as the *Canon of Orthodoxy*.<sup>65</sup> We shall place it at the beginning.<sup>66</sup>

65. *Idem*, CN II, 14: PG 86, 1568C9.

66. For the whole text see *ibid.*, 1568A8–C10.

# 1. The interpretation of the unity in Christ

## The Canon of Orthodoxy

We know of one *hypostasis* which is also common to both (natures), which pre-existed the *ousia* of the human being, being previously proper (*idike*) to the Word in the common *ousia* of the divinity. It created the nature (*physis*) of the *kyriakos anthropos*<sup>67</sup> for itself, and embraced it (*συνάψασα*) and took it together with its own nature (*physis*). At the same time it began to be a *hypostasis* of the nature of the flesh and to be from its own (*ἐξ ἰδικῆς*) [and simple *hypostasis*] the common [*hypostasis*] and was constituted as multifaceted.

For the *hypostasis* of the Logos now is not distinguished (*διακρίνεται*) as it previously was by a single *idioma* in the birth from both the Father and (through the difference of the *hypostasis*) the Spirit, but also from being from more natures and abounding in natural and personal *idiomata*. [There follows a rejection of the reproach that in this way a fourth person is added to the Trinity.] But if the *hypostasis* was added to the flesh before it assumed it, which no one would assert in an orthodox manner,<sup>68</sup> how, after the assumption, that is after it remains in both assumed and assuming, can it remain in it and a distinction of each be preserved from the other, which constitutes the *hypostasis*?

Therefore it is necessary to understand correctly that the nature of the Logos is common with the Father and the Spirit, but the *hypostasis* is individual (*ἰδικῆ*) with regard both to the Father and the Spirit and to all human beings not born from the holy Virgin, and it is common only with the flesh taken by the Word from the *theotokos*. And again it is necessary to understand correctly that this flesh from the holy *theotokos* has a commonality with ours with respect to nature, and is common to all who come from Adam, but with respect to the *hypostasis* it is individual (*ἰδικῆ*) with regard to us and the Father and the Spirit, being common only with the Word. This canon of orthodoxy is transmitted to us by the theologians.

This is the way the Chalcedonian confession<sup>69</sup> appears, after the theologians have become conscious of the task of distinguishing more sharply between *physis* and *hypostasis*, and of locating in the Logos-subject the concept of *hypostasis* which has now been worked out. Worthy of notice is the fact that Leontius of Jerusalem achieved the clarification of his Chalcedonian language in discussion above all with the Nestorians, while Leontius of Byzantium went through a similar process in discussions with the Severans. For this reason each of them places the accent in a different place: Leontius of Jerusalem extends the understanding of the one *hypostasis*, while Leontius of Byzantium builds up the two-

67. On the signification of the incarnate Logos as *kyriakos anthropos* in Leontius of Jerusalem see A. Grillmeier, 'Ὁ κυριακὸς ἄνθρωπος. Eine Studie zu einer christologischen Bezeichnung der Vaterzeit', *Trad* 33 (1977) (1-63), 47-51.

68. Here one could think of a polemic against Leontius of Byzantium, who thought that it was possible that an already existing human being could be taken up into the *prosopon*-unity of the Logos, although he himself was not prepared to hold this. Cf. above Leontius of Byz.; *Epil* 8: PG 86, 1944CD.

69. Although Leontius of Jerusalem interprets the Chalcedonian formula, he does not mention the Council.

natures teaching. The real advance which appears to have been achieved consists in the fact that the concept of *enhypostasis* or insubsistence has emerged formally and is used to explain the unity of the subject in Christ, in the duality of the natures. But how does the Logos-subject realize his hypostatic function *vis-à-vis* the human nature of Christ? Does Leontius of Jerusalem have a useful explanation of this? This topic must first be approached on the basis of his concept of *hypostasis*.

(a) *The ontology of the enhypostasis*

The Basilian concept of *hypostasis* is still operative in Leontius of Jerusalem. *Hypostasis* is the *ousia*, the essence, individualized by *idiomata*. The weakness of this approach is that its model is construed too physically. The concept of *hypostasis* is derived from things in nature, from the *ens physicum concretum*, and is intended to fit the anorganic and the organic, the material and the spiritual nature in the same way. But for this reason the concept is overtaxed. Thus when we investigate the way in which the unity of the *hypostasis* occurs, this is also purely physical. We shall study this in CN II, 7, where the intention is to exclude the unity in Christ occurring in the Nestorian manner as *henosis* of two existing *hypostases*.<sup>70</sup>

On the contrary, becoming and subsisting coincide [in the case of the human nature of Christ]; we acknowledge, however, that it is not in a *hypostasis* proper to itself alone, that is, that of a simple human being, but in the *hypostasis* of the Logos which pre-exists it. In it the Logos also grasped the particularities and *idiomata* of the human nature; in the coming together of two natures he showed *one prosopon*, both from the two natures as well as through the piling up of the characteristics of each of the two essences, and thus proved himself to be the One from the holy Trinity.

To solve the Nestorian difficulty Leontius of Jerusalem attempts to proceed, so it seems, along the same path that Cyril, Severus and all the supporters of the formula 'from two natures' took: only in *theoria* or 'in thought' are the two natures to be accepted before the union; really, *de facto* there exists for them in Christ only the 'one incarnate nature'.<sup>71</sup> Leontius of Jerusalem as well seems to proceed in this way: before the union and without it the humanity of Christ too would be, in *theoria*, in its *idiomata*, thus a *hypostasis*. But it is allowed no time to be a *hypostasis* for itself.<sup>72</sup> That this is behind his reflections follows from the continuation of the text of CN II, 7.<sup>73</sup>

70. Leontius Jer., CN II, 7: PG 86, 1552D.

71. Cf. *idem*, CM 58: PG 86, 1801AB: ἐν ἐννοίᾳ.

72. Cf. *idem*, CN II, 14: PG 86, 1568B: the human nature was never outside the *hypostasis* of the Logos.

73. *Idem*, CN II, 7: PG 86, 1552D-1553A.

He [Christ] is in reality only one single, non-human *hypostasis*. For he has the divine nature with its (divine) *idiomata*. But he is not only in the divine *idiomata*. In addition to the divine he is overrich in particularities, which are gathered to him through the assumption of the new (second) nature.

Before the human *idiomata* of the human nature of Christ could impart hypostatic character, they were already appropriated to the divine subject.<sup>74</sup> To what audacious conclusions Leontius sees himself obliged by this fundamental assumption will be indicated later. First of all against many a malicious suspicion he has to secure this idea of his of the taking over of the human characteristics into the Logos-subject. For the following doubts arise:

(1) According to this idea, is not *hypostasis* still united with *hypostasis*, so that the result is two *hypostases*? The theme raised in CN I, 20<sup>75</sup> is still present. In response Leontius says that there is only one *hypostasis* active, the divine. It does not experience any composition with another finished *hypostasis*, but only an enrichment of its divine *idiomata* by the *idiomata* of the human nature. Christ is thus not a synthesis of two *hypostases*.<sup>76</sup>

(2) Does there not occur a synthesis according to nature, if the human *physis* is united to the godhead? Reply: Christ is not a synthesis of the two natures which become one *physis*. Rather what happens is only something in the *idiomata* of the *hypostasis* of the Logos: they are in fact to some extent 'more composed' than before the incarnation, without the *hypostasis* as such being changed.<sup>77</sup>

(3) In CN I, 42 there is a similar reply to the objection of the Nestorians, which says that in Chalcedonian teaching the nature of God receives an increase (*προσθήκη*). The reply of Leontius is: 'Not the nature, but the *hypostasis* of the Logos experiences an increase.' But also *hypostasis* does not come to *hypostasis*; rather it is only *idiomata*, that is, 'elements of the *hypostasis*' (*στοιχεῖα ὑποστάσεως*) which are united

74. Cf. *idem*, CN II, 21: PG 86, 1581CD: 'the flesh has never subsisted without God (*μὴ ἀθεεῖ*) and for itself in purely its own nature'.

75. PG 86, 1485C6-7.

76. PG 86, 1485D.

77. Leontius says this in CN I, 20: PG 86, 1485D4-7: 'The natures were not composed in mixing; there is also no composite *hypostasis*, because it is not from *hypostases*; rather the *idioma* of the *hypostasis* of the Logos becomes more composite (*ἀλλὰ συνθετώτερον ἰδίωμα τῆς τοῦ Λόγου γέγονεν τῆς ὑποστάσεως*; the Migne text incorrectly has *ἀλλ' ἄσυνθετώτερον*, which makes no sense). After the incarnation the simple *idiomata* in it [the *hypostasis*] are increased. This, however, effects no change, either in the nature or in the *hypostasis* of the Logos.'

with the simple *idiomata* of the *hypostasis* of the Logos.<sup>78</sup> Thus the happening of the incarnation is positioned exclusively in the region of the *idiom*. *Hypostasis* and *nature* remain without any increase. Leontius thus attempts to steer between Scylla and Charybdis: either one new (third) nature, or two *hypostases*. The saving factor is the new synthesis in the *idiom* of the Logos-*hypostasis*, which is now made clear in an analogy, namely 'the iron becomes fire'<sup>79</sup> when it is put into glowing coals.<sup>80</sup>

Not every synthesis necessarily produces a new nature or *hypostasis*. The iron, placed in coals and glowing right through with fire, shows neither a foreign nature nor a new *hypostasis*. The *hypostasis* of the iron and that of the fiery coals are related in the same way. In the *hypostasis* of the iron, the nature of the fire, which considered in itself is anhypostatic,<sup>81</sup> is united to the nature of the iron, by its coming together with the nature (of the iron) in one *hypostasis*.<sup>82</sup>

While the natures are not mixed, only one *hypostasis* is formed: 'in the glowing metal (*μύδρος*) one cannot recognize two *hypostases*', he writes in CN II, 12.<sup>83</sup> The same is true of Christ: in him there occurred a synthesis, in which what was previously uncombined was fitted into the one *hypostasis* of one of the two, which at the same time became the *hypostasis* of those that were combined.<sup>84</sup> The whole richness of the divine nature was thus bestowed on ours, a fact which presents a soteriological reference of Leontius that has still to be noted. He presents a type of doctrine of physical redemption. We shall see how his understanding of the *henosis* works itself out in his concrete picture of Christ.

If in Leontius of Jerusalem we pay attention to the orientation which is predominant in the previous remarks, our gaze is always directed away from the *sarx* of Christ towards the *hypostasis* of the Logos. This is conditioned by the effort of the Nestorian, through stressing the *idiomata*

78. Leontius Jer., CN I, 41-42: PG 86, 1501AC. The Nestorians want to concede only that God can unite himself with the created nature only according to the will and not according to the nature. Against this Leontius argues that it is possible for God equally to unite himself with the creature according to the will as well as according to the nature. Here Leontius uses the expression: *φυσικὴ ἔνωσις* (1501C).

79. *Idem*, CN I, 49: PG 86, 1512A6: *πυρωθεὶς ὁ σίδηρος*.

80. *Ibid.*, 1512AB.

81. *Ibid.*, 1512B1-2: *φύσις πυρὸς ἀνυπόστατος καθ'αυτὴν οὐσα*, that is, the fire as such is not substantial, is not a nature existing in itself, but only a property which needs another nature as base. On this philosophy of nature see John Philoponus, *De opif. mundi*, II 10-11: Reichardt (Leipzig, 1897), 76-7.

82. *Idem*, CN I, 49: PG 86, 1512B2-3: *συντεθῇ τῇ φύσει τοῦ σιδήρου, συνυπόστατος αὐτῇ γενομένη*.

83. *Idem*, CN II, 12: PG 86, 1557C.

84. *Idem*, CN I, 49: PG 86, 1512B: *κατὰ μίαν τὴν θατέρου τῶν συγκειμένων ὑπόστασιν*.



of the flesh, to demonstrate that this too is a *hypostasis*. Leontius must then allow himself to wonder whether nothing 'idiomatic' at all happens to the *sarx* in the *henosis*.<sup>85</sup> His response is as follows:

To the person who looks more exactly, it is clear that all the *idiomata* of the flesh of the Lord are held together by a total idiom<sup>86</sup> which encompasses all his *idiomata*. This is the following: the flesh has never subsisted without God (*μη ἀθεῖ*) and for itself in simply its own nature.<sup>87</sup>

The being-united to the *hypostasis* of the Logos is now the comprehensive idiom of Christ's *sarx*. Thus Leontius first of all continues to leave the accent completely on the Logos-*hypostasis* and to bind the flesh to it. This happens because he considers the principal idiom of the united flesh to be precisely this, tied to the Logos-subject according to subsistence. This is the all-encompassing and dominant 'idiom' of this flesh, by which it becomes a 'this' (*ἡδε*). Everything which otherwise is visible and 'idiomatic' in the *idiomata* 'of this humanity in divine *hypostasis*' is the expression of this *enhypostasis*,<sup>88</sup> and is thus considered on the basis of the divinity.

Whatever *idiomata* appear in him individually which are other than in all (other) human beings, these are fitting for God, such as the sinless birth, his entire infallible life, his perfectly good disposition, his extraordinary power to work miracles, his knowledge surpassing wisdom, his perfect and supernatural virtue<sup>89</sup> . . . If the divine works do not ever appear without the divine nature, the *idiomata* [which show themselves in this concrete human nature] must be proper to the entire *hypostasis*.<sup>90</sup>

Here the fundamental tendency separating Leontius of Jerusalem from his namesake Leontius of Byzantium becomes obvious: the revelation of the *divine* Logos-*idiomata* in the humanity of Christ has a comprehensive significance. It may not leave any gaps, because otherwise there is the danger of a duality of *hypostases*. Because he transposes this divinization into the region of the *idiomata* in contrast to the *ousia*, he believes that he escapes both the reproach of the 'two-persons teaching' as well as that of a mixing of the natures. He does not want a synthesis according to

85. Cf. *idem*, CN II, 21: PG 86, 1581C-1584A.

86. *Ibid.*, 1581C13-14: ἐνὶ καθολικωτέρῳ αἰτίῳ αὐτῶν πάντων ιδιώματι.

87. *Ibid.*, 1581CD.

88. *Ibid.* Can there still be talk of a φύσις ἰδική which Leontius, however, wants to admit?

89. ἡ παντέλειος καὶ ὑπερφυῆς ἀρετὴ (PG 86, 1581D), which is the language of Ps. Dionysius.

90. *Ibid.*, 1581D.

the nature, as the 'mixophysites' teach. The *ousiai* remain untouched.<sup>91</sup> Only the *idiomata* of the divine *hypostasis* communicate themselves. We shall see how this fundamental idea of the communication of properties has an effect on his picture of Christ. Can he at all really exclude the objection of the Nestorians, which reads: If the earthly properties are visible in Jesus, does an earthly *hypostasis* result? What, for example, is the form and figure of the body of Christ?

Leontius can hardly avoid the reproach of presenting purely hair-splitting excuses, in order to escape both Nestorianism as well as monophysitism. But what he analyses and evaluates is nothing other than what is common to both parties, the Nestorians as well as the Chalcedonians: the Cappadocian concept of *hypostasis*. This proves insufficient for taking the Chalcedonian distinction between *hypostasis* and *physis* further towards an acceptable theory of *henosis*. Leontius of Jerusalem also entangles himself in difficulties regarding the theology of the Trinity. He makes the incarnation into an idiom in the *hypostasis* of the Logos in such a way that this is now also invoked for the relative distinction of the second *hypostasis* of the Trinity from the Father and the Spirit. Before the incarnation the characteristics of the pre-existent Logos *vis-à-vis* Father and Spirit in the Trinity are the following: being begotten by the Father, himself not being a begetter, not being the principle of origin of the Spirit, himself not proceeding in the manner of the Spirit.<sup>92</sup> After the incarnation there is added to the *idiomata* of the Logos, 'to be incarnate'. This is now an *idioma hypostatikon* of the Logos, 'which adds to the *prosopon* of the same a differentiating and original (*autogenomenon*) property, by which he is distinguished from the Father and the Spirit, who are one and the same as him in nature'.<sup>93</sup> Through this addition of a new property to the simple *idiomata* of the Logos no 'counting' is introduced into his *hypostasis*.<sup>94</sup>

91. This still remains the case for Leontius of Jerusalem, when he characterizes the becoming of the human nature of Jesus in Mary as *ousiosis*, the uniting of this human nature with the Logos, however, as *synousiosis*. Cf. CN IV, 17: PG 86, 1684B. He speaks in the same passage of the *synthetos Christos*. Cf. the similar language of Leontius of Byzantium, CNE: PG 86, 1352C11-12.

92. Leontius Jer., CN II, 24: PG 86, 1585C. In CN I, 20: PG 86, 1485B the Logos is still ascribed a function in the proceeding of the Spirit. He is *διαπορθευτής* of the Holy Spirit, which recalls the old formula that the Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son.

93. *Idem*, CN I, 28: PG 86, 1493D.

94. *Idem*, CN II, 24: PG 86, 1585D2-3.

(b) *The union in Christ as synthesis*

In the interpretation of the *henosis* Leontius of Jerusalem assigns a particular function to the word *synthesis*.<sup>95</sup> One may suspect that he saw himself induced to do this not only by external reasons. Rather it seemed to him that from the very nature of the matter this concept was especially suited for making his idea of the 'manifold *hypostasis*'<sup>96</sup> which was 'common' to the Logos and the flesh possible and to sustain it. For had he wanted to seek only a particularly expressive word to establish the unity, perhaps another choice would have suggested itself; one can think, for example, of Cyril or Severus. Or he could simply have stayed with the word *henosis*. It is interesting that in the word *synthesis* he finds the word *henosis* is made more precise.<sup>97</sup>

For the *henosis*, which is not also *synthesis*, must be considered either as local juxtaposition (*κατὰ παράθεσιν τοπικὴν*) (for example, a stone set in a gold ring, or two neighbouring countries like Judea and Samaria<sup>98</sup>) or as [connection] by virtue of a moral relationship<sup>99</sup> or as physical (family) relationship (for example, parents-children; individual living things of the same kind; archetype-image).<sup>100</sup>

Thus according to Leontius of Jerusalem, *synthesis* expresses an entitative unity, that is, 'the *synthesis* of the divine and the human natures'.<sup>101</sup> At the same time the compositum *synthesis* enables the two natures to be brought into play.

In the foreword to the *CN* Leontius describes the theme of his work.<sup>102</sup> He develops this on the basis of eight reproaches of the Nestorian against the Chalcedonian formula of the one *hypostasis* in two natures. The first reproach states summarily, 'that we do not think correctly about the *synthesis* of the divine and the human natures'.<sup>103</sup>

95. Cf. also P. T. R. Gray, 'Leontius of Jerusalem's Case of a "Synthetic" Union in Christ', *StudPat* 18,1 (Kalamazoo, Michigan, 1985), 151-4.

96. Leontius Jer., *CN* II, 14: PG 86, 1568A: ὅπ. κοινὴ — ποικιλωτέρα.

97. *Idem*, *CN* III, 8: PG 86, 1632D-1633A.

98. One has seen in this example a reference to the original homeland or also the actual sojourn of Leontius in Palestine; a migration to Constantinople is not excluded by this.

99. *κατὰ προαιρετικὴν σχέσιν*. What is meant is the Nestorian 'connection through relation' among human beings or of human beings to God.

100. In these examples it is a matter of separate persons or things.

101. Leontius Jer., *CN* I *prooem.*: PG 86, 1400A.

102. *Ibid.*: PG 86, 1400A-1401A.

103. To this alleged false understanding of *synthesis* belong in the mind of the Nestorian furthermore (2) the unity of the two natures in the *hypostasis*; (3) the uniqueness of the sonship; (4) the title *theotokos*; (5) the lack of the teaching of the *psilos anthropos*; (6) the lack of the title *theophoros anthropos*; (7) the formula 'one of the Trinity suffered'; (8) in general the acceptance of the *henosis kath'hypostasin*.

On this account Leontius puts forward particular demands for the use of this word.<sup>104</sup>

(1) Negatively: it is not permissible to speak

(a) of a 'composite nature' (*physis synthetos*),<sup>105</sup> because in this mixing would be expressed. We recall how unwilling Severus was, *vis-à-vis* the suggestion of Sergius Scholasticus, to confess an *ousia synthetos* in Christ;<sup>106</sup>

(b) of a 'synthesis of the *hypostases*',<sup>107</sup> which would be Nestorianism;

(c) of a 'composite *hypostasis*' (*hypostasis synthetos*);<sup>108</sup> for Christ is 'not from *hypostases*'.

(2) Positively: only *one* formulation is allowed: 'the natures experience a composition according to the *hypostasis*'.<sup>109</sup> This occurs, however, by reason of the fact that the idiom of the *hypostasis* of the Logos experiences a composition through the incarnation and the assumption of the human nature.<sup>110</sup> Once again it is then stressed that, through this shifting of the event of *synthesis* into the *idiomata*, the *physis* and the *hypostasis* itself are excepted from *synthesis* and change.<sup>111</sup>

Leontius of Jerusalem has thus carefully delimited the use of the term *synthesis*. This must be noted for the later history of the term in the era of Justinian.<sup>112</sup>

### (c) *Hellenistic and biblical interpretation of the incarnation*

The efforts of Leontius of Jerusalem to defend the 'one *hypostasis* of Christ in two natures', which we have just presented, should not be dismissed as due to Hellenism. Against the *mia-physis* tradition Chalcedon and even Nestorianism had something important to defend: the completeness of the human nature, of the human being of Christ. The more one confessed it, the more the difficulty increased in interpreting and showing the true unity in the *hypostasis*. The objections of the Nestorian in the CN meant a serious discussion of the Chalcedonian solution, a discussion which went the whole way. Was it at all possible, by way of Greek ontology, to find an explanation for the ecclesial faith in the

104. Leontius Jer., CN I, 20: PG 86, 1485AD.

105. *Ibid.*, 1485D3-4.

106. Cf. above, pp. 116-20.

107. 1485C8.

108. 1485D5.

109. 1485D2-3: κατὰ τὴν ὑπόστασιν οὖν ταῖς φύσεσιν ἢ σύνθεσις.

110. 1485D: συνθετώτερον ἰδίωμα τῆς τοῦ Λογου γέγονεν ὑποστάσεως.

111. 1485D9-10.

112. Cf. M. Richard, 'Léonce et Pamphile', in *Op Min.* III, no. 58, p. 38.

incarnation, an explanation that may still be cautious, but could still to some extent be reassuring? Was it not shown to be impossible from the very beginning, if Christ, the God-human being, was represented as a *synthesis* from the infinite-finite? The Nestorian places the problem in this perspective.<sup>113</sup>

What is united with another becomes this either as whole with a whole or as part with a part, or as part with a whole. To speak otherwise of union is impossible. Now in the case of the infinite one can speak neither of a whole nor of a part. Hence the God-Logos, because infinite, is not united with the human being from us;<sup>114</sup> if he is united, he is composite and finite, which is godless.

Leontius gets involved in this great theme,<sup>115</sup> being conscious of the fact that it is an 'enormous' question. The sole escape open to him is to refer to God's creative power with regard to being, which alone can make such a *synthesis* possible.

. Could not God, who had devised all that exists and all their compositions (*συνθέσεις*) and had made them exist and to be what they were (*εἶναι τε αὐτά, καὶ τοιῶσδε εἶναι*), produce and devise for himself a newer and closer composition than those known to us, intending on behalf of what exists to join himself to one of those existing, and to make known to them a hitherto unknown manner [of union]?<sup>116</sup>

In this way Leontius achieves a formulation which goes beyond Greek ontology and places faith in the incarnation in a quite immense perspective. Indeed the monk reverses the objection of the Nestorian and says that the immensity of the infinite only becomes evident when it engages in finitude.<sup>117</sup>

Otherwise there is nothing so big for the infinite if it is not contained by the finite [reference to the heavenly bodies]. But if unhindered in its entirety and in its infinity, it can go (*χωρῆσαι*) into the smaller object which is circumscribed by it, while being in no way cramped (*στενοχωρούμενος*), this happens really because of a natural power enclosing the infinite with no constraint at all nor circumscribing [its ability] to effect what it wants.

With these words one is reminded of the inscription on the tomb of Ignatius of Loyola quoted by Hölderlin: *Non coerceri maximo, contineri tamen a minimo divinum est.*<sup>118</sup>

113. Cf. Leontius Jer., CN I, 1: PG 86, 1401B; cf. I, 48: PG 86, 1505D-1512A; from 1509B application of the question to Christ.

114. This formulation returns again in I, 1: PG 86, 1413A7-8: *Οὐκ ἄρα συνετέθη ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος τῷ ἐξ ἡμῶν ἀνθρώπῳ.*

115. In the chapter just mentioned, CN I, 48.

116. *Ibid.*, I, 1: PG 86, 1413AB.

117. *Ibid.*: PG 86, 1412AB.

118. Cf. H. Rahner, 'Die Grabschrift des Loyola', in *idem, Ignatius von Loyola als Mensch und Theologe* (Freiburg, Basel, Vienna, 1964) (422-40), 424.

In support of his opinion Leontius cites Colossians 2,9: 'For in him alone dwells the whole fulness of the godhead bodily.' By the choice of the expression 'enter into' (*χωρεῖν*),<sup>119</sup> he nevertheless has recourse to the interpretation of the *henosis* by the *perichoresis* of divinity and humanity, which he has already transcended by his idea of insubsistence. This, however, is not rescinded. More significant is the discovery that, in order to explain the possibility of a *synthesis* of finite and infinite, as it is realized in the Incarnate One, 'the Christian faith and the Hebrew teaching'<sup>120</sup> from their foundations and in their main features must be brought into play. In this way the biblical-Christian concept of God and Christian anthropology are appealed to. They flow together to form what we can call Leontius of Jerusalem's picture of Christ.

## 2. Leontius of Jerusalem's picture of Christ

From the clear insight into the nature of the *henosis* in Christ as a union in the Logos-subject and according to the subject, in contrast to a nature synthesis (*unio in natura et secundum naturam*), one may expect that Leontius of Jerusalem knows how to preserve the unmingling of the natures in sketching his picture of Christ. To some extent he is also successful where he allows himself to be guided by biblical christology. If Philippians 2,5-11 does not appear often in his writings, nevertheless, together with other passages,<sup>121</sup> it plays a significantly powerful rôle to allow the *kenosis* in the total interpretation of the life and person of Jesus to show to advantage. In view of the fact that he is examining the writing of the Nestorian, we shall also appreciate that the divinity of Christ will be strongly accented. Thus, for instance, CN V, 1 offers a good example of a fairly balanced picture of Christ. Jesus of Nazareth has not ascended in steps to being God, as Leontius renders the teaching of the Nestorian; he is from the very beginning in the womb of the Virgin the hypostatic unity of Logos and *sarx*.

At the same time, however, it was the will of the Logos himself, in the full living through of the flesh even to his physical size, to be poor (with us) . . . Not through robbery or injustice, but in justice and in living through a pure life, after the death of the flesh the

119. PG 86, 1412A15. The *perichoresis* is the manner of the insubsistence.

120. See the important conclusion of CN I, 1: PG 86, 1413BC. To be noted in particular are the two expressions *σύνθεσις τῶν ὄντων* and *τὰ πάντα σύνθετα*.

121. It is a question of Phil 2,5-11; 1 Cor 2,8 in tension with Mt 16,16; Mk 1,1; Jn 17,5; 12,28. In CN V, 23: PG 86, 1745B the Nestorian and Chalcedonian interpretations of Phil 2,5-11 are placed in opposition to each other; the Nestorians perceive in it the two *hypostases* of Christ; Leontius deduces from it the Chalcedonian teaching of the one Logos in two natures.

Logos, who created everything in the word, wanted to raise humanity united with him as the first-born of spiritual immortality and eternal honour and beatitude.<sup>122</sup>

On account of the hypostatic unity the revelation of the divinity always has to proceed at once with the proof of genuine humanity. The whole life of Jesus is thus revelation of his two natures: birth,<sup>123</sup> death,<sup>124</sup> and resurrection.<sup>125</sup> Leontius of Jerusalem resists the temptation to which, according to Leontius of Byzantium, the Chalcedonian aphthartics succumbed,<sup>126</sup> viz. to deduce from the substantial union the immediate uncorruptedness and superiority to suffering of the body of Christ. Both remain reserved for the state of elevation.<sup>127</sup> Jesus proclaims and reveals himself in a twofold regard, as glorified and as stripped of glory. The divinization of the humanity of Christ is only perfect with the resurrection.<sup>128</sup> It confers the *aphtharsia* and the elevation to rule the universe (*κόσμου κατακράτησις*).<sup>129</sup>

In spite of this fundamental distance from the contemporary Chalcedonian aphthartics, and despite his preserving the human historical reality of Jesus, Leontius of Jerusalem does not embrace that sober picture of Christ which his namesake from Byzantium drew.<sup>130</sup> Rather in his sketching of the figure of Christ he gives such a significant rôle to miracles and the miraculous that in certain features he comes close to the aphthartic supranaturalism which we have depicted. Thus for his picture of Christ he simply puts forward the fundamental proposition: 'in no regard is there (in Christ) anything of him or about him which can be thought of as stripped of the divinity'.<sup>131</sup> Does the *kenosis* never

122. Leontius Jer., CN V, 1: PG 86, 1724C.

123. *Idem*, CN II, 21: PG 86, 1581D.

124. *Idem*, CM 33: PG 86, 1789AB.

125. *Idem*, CM 39: PG 86, 1792D–1793A. CN V, 2: PG 86, 1725B. In particular 1725C shows the combination of divinity and humanity, of suffering and glorification.

126. See above, pp. 213–17.

127. Leontius Jer., CN V, 1: PG 86, 1724C: *ἑαυτὸν ὁ ἐνδοξος ἄμα καὶ ἄδοξον ἀνακηρύττων*; cf. Jn 12,16; 13,31.

128. *Idem*, CN IV, 37: PG 86, 1712A: 'The Logos is God according to nature, the flesh, however, (is not God according to nature, but) is divinized in its nature of flesh after the resurrection to the fullest extent (*εἰς τὸ παντελές*).'

129. Cf. *idem*, CN V, 1: PG 86, 1724D. Here too it is emphasized that the truth of the flesh is not annulled, but is only transferred into a higher state. On the other hand the incarnation signifies no change of the divinity. In the whole history of Jesus the two natures remain preserved.

130. Cf. Leontius Byz., CA: PG 86, 1336BC; CNE: PG 86, 1352C–1353A.

131. Leontius Jer., CN IV, 37: PG 86, 1712A: *οὐδὲ κατὰ λόγον τινά, τί τῶν αὐτοῦ ἢ περὶ αὐτῶν γυμνὸν κατανοῆσαι θεότητος*. Latin: *nihil . . . vacuum divinitate*. It is not too bold to invoke precisely such ideas in order to explain the *Christus gloriae* of the Justinian era.

reach so deeply into the history of Christ that the divinity could be fully hidden? Clearly Leontius of Jerusalem here is reluctant to concede this. The reason for this is easily determined. It lies in his not carrying through consistently his own new concept of insubsistence, and in the continuing effect of the Basilian-Cappadocian teaching about the *idiomata*. In the *concrete* interpretation of the unity of the *hypostasis* in Christ, Leontius does not maintain his own *theories*, which could have shown the way out of all difficulties: (1) to distinguish clearly the union in the subject or in the *hypostasis* from the synthesis according to the nature; (2) to respect the execution of the union in the 'insubstisting', as an existential event or act, this execution being rightly appropriated to the creative power of God. On the basis of these theories it would have been possible to secure the balancing of *kenosis* and *doxa* in the one Christ, the incarnate Logos. The incorporation of the Basilian concept of *hypostasis* with its teaching about the *idiomata* was the reason that the new insights of Leontius of Jerusalem were not sufficiently effective. This needs some further clarification.

As the concretizing and individualizing elements in the building up of the individual being, the *idiomata* belong to the domain of 'condition'.<sup>132</sup> If it is now one's intention to explain the insubsistence of the human nature in the *hypostasis* of the Logos by means of the *idiomata*, then one is forced to remain in the area of the nature synthesis (*unio in natura et secundum naturam*). If one wants to show the inseparability of God and human being in Christ, or, expressed positively, to show the substantiality of this unity against the attacks of the Severans and Nestorians with the help of the teaching about the *idiomata*, it is difficult to accord to the *kenosis* the soteriological place which is so important to it in the interpretation of Christ. In fact Leontius of Jerusalem is now endeavouring to show the uninterrupted *henosis* of the natures in Christ on the basis of being able to realize constantly the divine *idiomata* in him. This explains why he is one of the strongest defenders among the Fathers of the divinization of the humanity of Christ. On this basis his being assigned to the ranks of neo-Chalcedonians would also have to be considered; admittedly this classification has still to be tested to see if it is justified.<sup>133</sup>

We now want to observe the monk at work sketching his picture of Christ. He begins with two particular facts in the person of Jesus

132. In contrast to the 'common quality' (*κοινή ποιότης*), which constitutes the type, the species, in question here is the *ἰδίᾳ ποιότης*, the particularization as an individual.

133. On this see the excursus below: On the concept 'neo-Chalcedonianism', pp. 429-34



which signify a felicitous starting-point: the sinlessness of Christ and the creative power of the Logos. The first provides the special opportunity of starting from the spiritual-moral *idiomata*, thus of becoming freed from the 'physical object' as the starting-point for the teaching on *hypostasis*. Being a person and being 'spirit' belong together. Will Leontius of Jerusalem notice this? The second steers us away once again from a pure teaching about properties to the area of the existential.

(a) *Christ is God, because sinless*

In Leontius of Jerusalem the sinlessness of Christ, already mentioned in the confession of Chalcedon, is ascribed a particular relationship to the divinity of Christ.<sup>134</sup> For him it is the most original and proper feature for recognizing the divinity of Christ,<sup>135</sup> because it is realized in the whole Christ, God and human being, and not only in the divinity. Like the Council of Chalcedon, orthodox faith too confesses that Christ has become like us in all things, sin alone excepted (cf. Heb 2,17-18; 4,15; Jn 8,46). Thus here it is not a question of sinlessness and righteousness, insofar as they are realized in the divine essence, but in a finite, and by nature fallible, human being, thus lived out in human freedom. Both Leontii come to speak expressly, each in his own way, about the theme of freedom in the framework of christology. Would not accepting a human freedom in Christ, however, mean standing before the abyss of Nestorianism and its probation teaching? Would not the sinlessness of Christ have to be anchored in his divinity, not only as postulate, as the demand of the divine holiness on his own human freedom, but physically? Apollinarius had built his soteriology on the fact that in Christ the sole physical principle of decision was the 'undefeatable nous'.<sup>136</sup> Where do the free decisions in Christ occur? Does Leontius of Jerusalem have an unambiguous answer? Perhaps it is to be found in the following text.<sup>137</sup>

If therefore, as we admit, both sin and justice come from our (human) condition and from our free will in accordance with our nature, the sinlessness or justice of our Lord Jesus Christ is testified to by the Holy Spirit; and you must admit that this (*pneuma*) is his free will (*autexousion*), by which he is justified, just as we are from our free will (*autexousion*). But if we know that what is the free will (*autexousion*) and principle (*aition*)

134. Leontius Jer., CN I, 19: PG 86, 1484C-1485A.

135. *Idem*, CN IV, 37: PG 86, 1705C: τὸ ἰδικώτατον Θεοῦ γνωριστήριον . . . ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὸ ἀναμάρτητον. In CN II, 21: PG 86, 1581D Leontius describes somewhat more broadly what is 'befitting God' in Jesus' conduct of life, cf. Acts 10,38 (see above, p. 292).

136. Cf. *JdChr* I<sup>3</sup>, 486, n. 21.

137. Leontius Jer., CN I, 19: PG 86, 1484D.

of justice in our nature, is in Christ's nature the Holy Spirit, who is truly true God, how could you not quite clearly, if unwillingly, admit that the divine nature in Christ is from the Holy Spirit?

The decision seems to have been taken already. Leontius of Jerusalem speaks of the divine Pneuma as Christ's principle of freedom. The Pneuma is his *autexousion*. But what does he mean by this Pneuma? What is the situation with Christ's human principle of freedom? Is it already excluded or sacrificed by this reference to the pneumatic *exousion*?

The continuation of CN I, 19 seems to offer a way out.<sup>138</sup>

What the leading spiritual principle (ὁ ἡγεμονικὸς λόγος) effects only partially (μερικῶς) in us, the divine Word effected (κατέρθωσεν) totally (παντελῶς) in Christ, in addition to [or together with] our leading principle, as it exists in him and in others. Therefore [the Logos] himself and no other is the cause of his own justice, either because he is co-existent with the Holy Spirit [i.e. as the second *hypostasis* of the Trinity], or he is said to be Holy Spirit<sup>139</sup> from the nature, not from the *hypostasis*.

According to this difficult text how does the inner constitution of Christ, who proves himself in sinlessness, appear? Leontius does not make it as easy for himself as Apollinarius, who can establish the sinlessness in the divine Logos, insofar as this is the sole spiritual principle of the *sarx*. He also does not argue like Severus, who knows only *one energeia* in Christ, although he also accepts a spiritual soul in Christ. The sinlessness, however, is guaranteed in the sole hegemony and energy which proceeds from the Logos and controls everything. Severus does not ask about a human-intellectual decision. Does Leontius venture to allow Christ's human freedom to participate actively in the sinlessness, that is, in the moral decision? It seems that one can in fact understand him in this way. He certainly accepts a co-operation between Logos (or respectively Pneuma) and human *hegemonikon*. This can be deduced from the unusual manner of expression used to signify the effect of the Logos or of the Pneuma as 'additional to our *hegemonikon*'.<sup>140</sup> By 'our *hegemonikon*' there can and must be understood our genuine, human principle of will, insofar as it is in Christ. Against the background of the Cyrillian-Severan hegemony of the Logos, this discovery cannot be too highly estimated. Logos-Pneuma and human will act as one in Christ. Admittedly the expression 'Logos-Pneuma' has still to be further

138. Leontius Jer., CN I, 19: PG 86, 1485A.

139. The word *pneuma* was used either personally for the third *hypostasis* or essentially for the divine nature. Whether one or the other, the Logos co-works with his humanity.

140. Cf. CN I, 19: PG 86, 1485A3-6, especially: πρὸς τῷ ἡμετέρῳ (ἡγεμονικῷ λόγῳ); the preposition πρὸς with the dative means additionally, besides, apart from, in addition.

deciphered. Behind this Leontius sees nothing other than the divine principle of grace which the human will of Christ also needs to achieve sinlessness. Leontius recognizes that Christ is only a model when his human freedom is brought into play. But in this exercise of freedom Jesus, as a finite human being open to temptation, needs the divine help of grace, all the more so as Leontius of Jerusalem considers the sinlessness of Jesus to be the real proof of the super-humanity of Jesus, that is, his divinity. This sinlessness is guaranteed in Christ by the fact that to his human *autexousion* is hypostatically united the divine principle of grace, namely the Logos or Pneuma of God. That this chain of thought could play a rôle in Leontius of Jerusalem is clear from an objection of the Nestorians, which Leontius himself cites:<sup>141</sup>

If, as the sinless companion (*κοινωνόν*) of its constitution (*hyparxis*), the flesh has the Logos who is by nature omnipotent, how can one call the flesh itself sinless? What kind of victory is that over evil, where such an unconquerable helper is received? To him, and not to the flesh, is due all the praise.

This difficulty could only be resolved if the human being Jesus were to participate in the moral decision in his human will. In the response which Leontius gives to this objection the possibility remains entirely open for the insertion of a spiritual principle in the humanity of Christ. Nevertheless the argumentation here takes a different tack, for first of all the monk draws attention to the fact that it is not a question of the flesh, but of 'our nature' insofar as it is threatened by Satan through sin and death. This threat is so much the greater as the evil one 'dwells (in us) in some way personally (*καθ' ὑπόστασιν*)', as is clear in the possessed. By the Logos himself being united (hypostatically) with our nature, its 'guard' himself dwells in it and makes 'the flesh sinless'. 'And the sinners, who are consubstantial with this [the flesh of Christ], he already here honours with the sinless spiritual essence, but only there admittedly in full perfection.'<sup>142</sup>

141. Leontius Jer., *CN* I, 47: PG 86, 1505AB.

142. *Ibid.*, PG 86, 1505D. P. T. R. Gray, 'Leontius of Jerusalem's Case for "Synthetic" Union in Christ', *StudPat* 18,1 (1985), 151-4, has displayed these soteriological approaches well in connection with three texts from Leontius of Jerusalem, *CN* I (chs. 6, 18 and 47), from the interpretation of the 'one person and *hypostasis*' of Christ as *synthesis*. This hypostatic/synthetic union has three effects. (1) Because the flesh of Christ receives subsistence in God, the rest of humankind shares in the inalienable, immortal being with the Word (ch. 6: PG 86, 1425C). (2) The (universal) human nature is divinized by virtue of this 'essential *synthesis*' in Christ (ch. 18: PG 86, 1468C). This process is executed in two steps: on the basis of the *creatio* there takes place the *recreatio* as a participation in the divine nature which goes beyond being in the image of God; the 'essential *synthesis*' becomes 'divinization' (*ektheiosis*). (3) Only the *unio/synthesis* with the divine nature can clearly overcome the 'hypostatic union' with Satan indicated above, which threatens human beings (ch. 47: PG 86, 1505CD).

We see that the sinlessness of Christ is discussed here from a soteriological point of view. He presupposes that it is a question of our entire corporeal-spiritual nature. This has come into the power of Satan to such an extent that it is as if there is a hypostatic union with him. In Christ the same entire human nature is 'possessed' by the Logos, and Satan no longer has any access: in us, admittedly, in this life it is not yet so definitive as in the person of Christ himself. For us only eternity will guarantee definitive sinlessness.

In this soteriological argumentation we should assume that both for the human being as such as well as for the humanity of Christ, the sinlessness of the spiritual human being is involved, which is realized in the first analysis as a spiritual decision. As Satan is active in the will of the human being, so now in Christ, as the archetype of the Christian, the divine Logos or Pneuma principle is active. Here Leontius of Jerusalem can interchange Pneuma and Logos by having recourse to the old patristic manner of speaking, by which the nature of God is called Pneuma. Although Leontius knows that Pneuma usually signifies the third person of the Trinity, the divinity of Christ is also the divine essential Pneuma.

Here then follows the question, how far Leontius of Jerusalem draws upon pneumatology to explain the sinlessness of Christ. For the explanation of the *impeccabilitas Christi* cannot be seen solely from the *ontological* constitution of Christ. The question must be asked: how does the Logos become *active* in the human will of Christ? It is the problem of the Spirit's bestowing of grace on the humanity of Christ, that is, of the Messiah. This christological pneumatology has its own history. Cyril of Alexandria was not successful in allocating a sufficient function to the Spirit in the interpretation of the baptism of Christ.<sup>143</sup> Dread of the Arian position hindered him from doing this. Because the divine Logos is present in Christ by nature, Cyril's Christ does not need the grace of the Spirit for himself. He receives it only for us.<sup>144</sup> For the humanity of Christ, Leontius of Jerusalem now distinguishes clearly between the *henosis* with the Logos, and being graced or anointed with the Spirit.<sup>145</sup>

Jesus himself had become the Kyrios on account of the divine Logos, and Christ through the anointing of the Spirit; God has made this Jesus, whom the Jews crucified, Lord through the Logos and Christ through the Spirit (cf. Acts 10,38; Rom 1,4).

143. Cf. *Q̄̄rellos* III, 32,2-35,4: B. M. Weischer (Wiesbaden, 1977), 73-79. Similarly in Severus; see above, pp. 136-8.

144. When in Leontius Jer., CN V, 19: PG 86, 1741B the Nestorian speaks of the teaching of the 'Egyptian', which says that Jesus receives the power to be effective not first through the Spirit, but has it by virtue of the Logos in him, Cyril of Alexandria may very well be meant.

145. Leontius Jer., CN V, 18: PG 86, 1741A.

In the twofold lining of the Ark of the Covenant with gold, within and without, the twofold gracing of Christ is also symbolized.<sup>146</sup> Leontius ascribes the inner lining (the *endosis*) to the Logos, and the outer (*perithesis*) to the Pneuma. Thus the latter concerns the messianic work of Christ. Here is the field of probation (cf. Acts 2,22). In the first instance, however, Jesus does not receive the finite gifts of the Spirit, but the uncreated Pneuma itself.<sup>147</sup> But from there it is only a short step to recognizing that there are in Christ also transitory and finite gifts of the Spirit. It was not difficult to discern that the human will of Christ, finite as it was, solely by being hypostatically united with the Logos did not already have the equipment of the Spirit which he needed for his task as messiah and redeemer. We have already seen that, more clearly than others, Leontius contrasted the peculiarity of the hypostatic *henosis* in Christ with a union according to the nature. But with Gregory of Nyssa he knows that the *henosis* must reveal itself in 'moral characteristics'.<sup>148</sup> The problem of the sinlessness and impeccability of Christ is thus brought by Leontius towards a deeper solution, but it is still not yet completely clarified. It is precisely for this reason that he has overtaxed the *anhamarteton* as proof of the union according to the *hypostasis*. Had he expounded more clearly the fact that the human impeccability of Christ can only be realized by pneumatic inspirations and the strengthening of Christ's spirit and will,<sup>149</sup> he would also have recognized that through grace God could bestow at will sinlessness or even impeccability on every human being.<sup>150</sup>

(b) *Christ and the creative power of God*

As the other 'real characteristic of God', which is discernible in Christ, Leontius of Jerusalem names the creative power.<sup>151</sup> One and the same power, which at the beginning formed the human being, is in a particular way evident in and through Christ and has become effective: *in*

146. On this allegory see above, pp. 87-9.

147. *Ibid.*, CN V, 19: PG 86, 1741B.

148. Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, *Ep.* 38 in Basil: PG 32, 328C: τὰ τοῦ ἡθους γνωρίσματα; on this Leontius Jer., CN II, 21: PG 86, 1581CD.

149. Whereby the hypostatic union with the Logos is only the title and, so to say, the unsurpassable proof of justification for this; it must first be transposed into actual help.

150. The Nestorians could have given him a nod in this direction with reference to Theodore of Mopsuestia. Cf. *JdChr* I<sup>3</sup>, 615-19.

151. Leontius Jer., CN I, 19: PG 86, 1480A10-11: τὸ ἰδίως Θεοῦ χαρακτηριστικόν, τὸ δημιουργικὸν λέγω. Here a relationship between Leontius Jer. and Justinian can be shown (on the edict of 551 see below).

Christ, because, as the *Canon of Orthodoxy* stresses, in his divine *hypostasis* he 'has himself created the nature of the *kyriakos anthropos*',<sup>152</sup> through Christ, because the demiurgic activity of the Logos is not only based on the beginning of his earthly existence, but, as the active power of working miracles, remains present throughout his whole life on earth even to his resurrection and exaltation. The evaluation of miracles in the christology of Leontius of Jerusalem can be discerned at a glance in his assessment of the twofold birth of Christ, which has the pronounced tone of a confession of faith, similar to his *Canon of Orthodoxy*.<sup>153</sup>

Nothing else is so eternally, indistinguishably, perfectly, unchangeably, indivisibly, completely and unmovedly begotten, as he [the God-Logos] in his first birth. But also nothing besides his second birth is thus without seed, uncorruptedly [i.e. without violating the virginity], supernaturally begotten and conceived of the Holy Spirit, and without time (*ἀχροῦως*) perfected, formed, and provided with organs, and in everything perfected as a result of the substantial Logos in the chaste womb of the immaculate one<sup>154</sup> to be temple and tabernacle of the Logos, when the human flesh which was perfected from her alone and united instantly (*ἐν ἀκαπεῖ*, in a moment)<sup>155</sup> with him [the Logos].

The interpretation of the second birth stresses the creative happening both for the mother as well as for the son. Thus, as Christ is conceived and born, this does not belong to the 'natural property of the house' (that is, the mother), but to the 'natural property' of the divine Logos, who as God entered this house *clausa porta*, without being confined, and left it in the true reality of flesh, without harming the mother. In this

152. Cf. *idem*, CN II, 14: PG 86, 1568A.

153. *Idem*, CN IV, 9: PG 86, 1669B–1672A: Leontius refers to the teaching of the holy Fathers for this one orthodox confession, which has a christological part (1669B1–C9) and a mariological part: the virginity of Mary at conception and birth (1669C10–1672A); the latter part is understood, however, as testimony to the divinity of Christ.

154. In CM 23: PG 86, 1784D Leontius Jer. speaks of Mary as the holy place (*ἄγιον ἔχωριον*), in which the union of the natures of Christ happened from the very beginning. This is reminiscent of the special mariological-christological terminology in Constantinople, especially in Proclus. Cf. *JdChr* I<sup>2</sup>, 727–30; E. Lucchesi, 'L'ORATIO I "De laudibus S. Mariae" de Proclus de Constantinople. Version syriaque inédite', in *Mémorial André-Jean Festugière* (Geneva, 1984), 187–98.

155. By this expression Leontius Jer. wants to say that in the incarnation of Christ the creation of the body and the reception of it into the one *hypostasis* of the Logos coincide. Cf. Augustine, *C. sermon. Arian.* 8.2. PL 42, 688; cited in *JdChr* I<sup>2</sup>, 771, n. 6. With a play on words Leontius Jer. describes the dogmatic peculiarity of the incarnation in CN IV, 17: PG 86, 1684B: the nature of the Logos has experienced in Mary not the beginning of existence (*ousiosis*), but only the beginning of co-existence (*synousiosis*) (with the *sarx*); the *flesh*, however, received the beginning both of *ousiosis* and also of *synousiosis*. In the coincidence of conception and reception into the hypostatic unity there also results the uniqueness of the sonship in Christ. On this theme see CN III, 1ff., especially III, 7: PG 86, 1621C–1624C; III, 8: 1629A8ff. Our status as adoptive children is distinguished from this: 1629CD.

way the divinity of the Logos shows itself, and his superiority to suffering<sup>156</sup> and the power of his Pneuma (that is, his divinity).

Leontius is interested in assessing the Chalcedonian possibility that, in the one picture of Christ as he appears, the two natures are recognizable at every moment in their *gnorismata*, in their *characteristica* and proper features. In the defence against Nestorianism the expression of the divinity of Christ demands particular attention. In the pattern of his picture of Christ the signal lights of the divine are so closely positioned that no gap remains for the shadows of the teaching of the two *hypostases* to continue. Because the equation — God's most proper characteristic = creative power = miracle — now holds good, the tendency increases to refer back to miracle in order to secure the divinity of Christ on all sides. Thus in one fundamental statement we read: '[Christ] shows in the miraculous occurrences [at the resurrection] that he himself is the creator and preparer of the fleshly and pneumatic nature . . . through the fact that he can work miracles at all times.'<sup>157</sup> Birth from the Virgin, healing of the person born blind, resurrection from the dead: these are the signs in which the divine creative power of Christ shines out most clearly; for this reason they are a demonstration of his divine nature, which must seize the whole life and being of Jesus, especially after the exaltation.<sup>158</sup>

Because the God-Logos is in him according to nature, and the flesh [of Christ] has become entirely divinized after the resurrection, we have no reason, either under a partial aspect or under any other regard, to think anything in him or about him as divested of the divinity (γυμνὸν . . . θεότιτος). To that also, which is not divine by nature, is given the name which is above all names and that Jesus, whom the Jews crucified, has become Lord and God (Phil 2,11; 1 Cor 2,8).

156. Cf. the Nestorian objection in CN IV, 9: PG 86, 1665D–1668A, which wants to deduce theopaschism from the orthodox confession of one *hypostasis*.

157. Leontius Jer., CN I, 19: PG 86, 1480C (and the whole section A–C): θαυματουργεῖν αἰεὶ δυνάμενος.

158. *Idem*, CN IV, 37: PG 86, 1712AB. Cf. CN IV, 17: PG 86, 1684C: 'If no miracle beyond the physical power gives testimony for it [the peculiarity of the birth], then he who was born in accordance with natural powers is not known as God.' Because it is the Logos who forms the body of Christ, he also gives to it the power 'to come out and emerge in a spiritual way'. Virginity in the birth thus belongs to the divine sign and to the proclamation of faith. Cf. CN IV, 9: PG 86, 1669C–1672A. While the Nestorians want to ascribe the virginal birth to the Holy Spirit and his unique overshadowing (cf. Lk 1,35), Leontius sees in it a reference to the constant bond of the *sarx* with the Logos. Our Lord namely is conceived of the Spirit and Mary, as two causes which are of 'different essence' (*heteroousioi*). Thus in Christ the divine *pneuma*-essence is united with the flesh. Cf. CN I, 19: PG 86, 1477AB with reference to 2 Cor 3,17. This miraculous birth of Jesus is, however, the archetype of our rebirth from faith, baptism (CN II, 20: PG 86, 1581B) and incorporation into the Church (CN I, 18: PG 86, 1468BC).

(c) *The miraculous in Leontius of Jerusalem's picture of Christ*

Through a comparison of Leontius of Jerusalem's presentation of Christ with that of other Chalcedonians of his time it should be possible to determine more precisely his position on the question of the 'miraculous' in the figure of Jesus. We shall compare him with Leontius of Byzantium and the aphthartic refuted by him. In the background we should also keep in sight Severus of Antioch, the decided opponent of Chalcedon, and Julian of Halicarnassus and his large group of followers. Like a kaleidoscope, these names present the varying colour tones and lines in the picture of Christ sketched by them. The position of the miraculous in Jesus, the incarnate Logos, was an acute theme in the piety and theology of Constantinople in the first half of the era of Justinian.

(i) On the one side we have the extreme position of the Chalcedonian aphthartics.<sup>159</sup> Because the hypostatic union transfers the human nature of Christ into divine dignity, everything human must be judged from this point. Corruptibility, passibility, mortality do not correspond to the 'normal condition' which befits this humanity united to God. For this reason the divine Logos must give his permission, if his body is to be allowed to have this *pathē*, and in general the ordinariness (the normality) of the life of a human being. What from a Chalcedonian viewpoint is perfectly normal for the Incarnate One, his *kenosis*, becomes the exception. The exaltation, which according to Philippians 2,5-11 is present only at the end of Jesus' life, begins already with his conception. The gilding of christology is perfect. One has only to think out the consequences for piety with its human experiences of the everyday. 'Like to us in all things' becomes a thought that is no longer comprehensible. The 'unmingled' of Chalcedon is bypassed, even if the two natures are acknowledged. Only if one assumes that the Logos must give permission is Christ's human nature preserved from having prescribed for it, as it were necessarily and unrestrictedly, the condition of *apatheia* and *aphtharsia* from the very first moment of the *henosis*. That is so un-Chalcedonian, even more than the christology of Severus of Antioch. The fundamental error consists in having regarded the substantial *henosis* in Christ as a 'nature-unity', in spite of the 'confession of the two natures'.

(ii) Against this aphthartic theologian, Leontius of Byzantium exhibited an emphatically more sober picture of Christ. The miraculous in the life of Jesus is the exception. Of all the theologians of his time he has drawn the fundamental Chalcedonian lines in his interpretation

159. See above, pp. 213-17; especially Leontius Byz., CNE: PG 86, 1333D-1337B.



of the earthly life of Jesus most clearly.<sup>160</sup> According to the judgement of his own contemporaries, however, they lead to the Nestorian picture of Christ. The sparseness of the miraculous in the life of Jesus must in fact have proved unattractive for certain circles of the population and for the ascetics. We can deduce this from the great success which the Julianists achieved at the time in the whole of the East, even compared with Severus of Antioch.<sup>161</sup> Emperor Justinian is indeed the most convincing illustration of this. His theological act ends with an aphthartic experiment.

(iii) The position of Leontius of Jerusalem. Between the exuberance of the Chalcedonian aphthartics at Constantinople and the realism of Leontius of Byzantium, the namesake of the latter takes a middle position which is not easy to determine. With his fundamental dogmatic clarity we can assume from the beginning that he does not fancy the aphthartics mentioned. But that there are certain elements in common cannot be denied. (1) For the interpretation of the picture of Christ Leontius too places great stress on the hypostatic union, the *henosis* or *synthesis*. Thus he wants to present it as the ultimate basis for explaining the miraculous mysteries in the life of Christ, especially the virgin birth, the sinlessness and in particular the resurrection. Impassibility, incorruptibility are indeed present only with the resurrection; they are, however, not the result of an accidental power active in Christ, but the expression of the hypostatic *henosis*.<sup>162</sup> Christ as God raises himself and by this shows himself as God. (2) Despite this stressing of the substantial union in Christ, which Leontius of Jerusalem has in common with the Chalcedonian aphthartics, he does not get involved in their supranaturalness. But is he for that reason already pursuing the realistic line of his namesake? His writing *Against the Nestorians* shows another picture. He develops a doctrine of *theiosis* or divinization, which still moves him very close in feeling to the Chalcedonian aphthartics. The 'divinization' determines the picture of Christ.

The discussion with the Nestorians, whose texts Leontius renders so

160. Cf. above, pp. 217–22.

161. This will be shown later in this work when we depict the development in Syria and Egypt. Cf. *JdChr* II/4, 45–7.

162. Cf. Leontius Jer., CN I, 19: PG 86, 1473CD. Leontius is replying to the objection of the Nestorians: 'If we ascribe *apatheia* and *aphtharsia* to the *synthesis*, we deceive ourselves. The *kynakos anthropos* has that according to the witness [of scripture] from the resurrection.' By this they mean that an act of power by God on the human being Jesus is a sufficient basis for *aphtharsia* and *apatheia*. One cannot see in it a proof of the unity of *hypostasis* in Christ. Leontius cannot give a satisfactory answer to this.

fully in the CN, points in the same direction. It is precisely their objections which force him to many an exuberance in emphasizing the *henosis* and its repercussions on the humanity of Christ. We have recognized, however, that nothing is responsible for these embarrassments other than his taking over of the Basilian teaching about *idiomata*, which in practice the Nestorians too employ, only more consistently than Leontius. With this Basilian concept of *hypostasis* he offers the Nestorians an open flank. Rescue for him would lie in rejecting this interpretation and in having recourse to his own discoveries with regard to the *henosis*. The idea of insubistence, as Leontius envisages it, is of such a kind that it is not related to the Cappadocian conception of *hypostasis* and to the over-emphasis on the *theiosis* which results from this. What is needed is the new interpretation of the concept of subsistence or of the *hypostasis* as such. Leontius' clear distinction between a nature-synthesis and a *hypostasis*-synthesis also moves in this direction. The rôle of the act of creation in the coming into being of the union in Christ also fits in well with the existential approach of his idea of insubstisting. Were one to remove the Basilian-Cappadocian remnants from the *henosis* teaching of Leontius of Jerusalem, the way would be clear for a more profound Chalcedonian teaching about *hypostasis* and for the understanding of the 'hypostatic union'. Leontius of Jerusalem would then be in a position to give to his namesake better conceptual tools to defend his genuine christological realism without suspicion of Nestorianism. Each Leontius would supplement the other. The richer donor would certainly be Leontius of Jerusalem. He could also rescue the aphthartic of Constantinople from his embarrassments: there is a true substantial unity in Christ, in the unity of the subsistence, of the subject, of the *hypostasis*, which allows the natures of God and human being their peculiarity, and which above all creates room for the *kenosis* according to the scriptures. The hypostatic *henosis* does not need to be and should not be made the real cause of the divinization. Soteriology then has its proper foundation. Although all of this is correct and Leontius may be regarded as the best christological author of his time, we detect nonetheless a certain exuberance which must be explained and curtailed.

(d) *The divinized kyriakos anthropos*

Leontius of Jerusalem is a witness for the christological term *kyriakos anthropos*, although in him its original derivation from Philippians 2,11 (the exaltation of the human being Jesus into the glory of the *Kyrios*)

is already obscured.<sup>163</sup> Nevertheless in his writings it is still a title given to Christ, which in a special way can give expression to the divine *doxa* of the *Kyrios*, because Leontius combines with it a conception of the *henosis* as *synthesis*. We shall illustrate this, using the important chapter 18 of CN I.<sup>164</sup>

The Nestorians ask about the recipient of the favour of the incarnation, if one understands it, as Leontius does, as a *synthesis* of the God-Logos 'with the human being taken from us'. Who benefits from the *henosis* — the Logos himself, or the human being with whom he unites himself, or both, or neither the one nor the other, or rather we, or God? The response states that it is we, the redeemed. What is given to us, however, has become clear in Christ, the first-born, head of redeemed humanity.

Only through the greatest benevolence on the part of [the divine nature] to us did its incarnation occur. As a result, through unity with God, to the *kyriakos anthropos* accrued the wealth of the divinization, to him as first-fruits of the human mass [or dough] and the first-born of many brothers and head of the body of the Church, being first and receiving first and without intermediary, because of its [i.e., the divine nature's] union and unification with him in the *hypostasis*, into his own nature.

To the rest of the mass [dough] of humanity and the rest of the brothers from the seed of Abraham, and the body of the Church, pass in a secondary manner and by participation and with an intermediary the effects of the natural union with him, the first *kyriakos anthropos* benefited from us. [This happens] from the union with him who is from the same mass [or dough], even if he is the first-fruits, and as an only-begotten brother, even if he is first born, and from his body, even if as the head he mediates for us, being one mediator between God and human beings, the human being Christ Jesus our Lord.<sup>165</sup>

In this text we have an almost enthusiastic christology of the divinization, which is derived from a forced understanding of *henosis* and *synthesis*. Leontius almost forgets his fundamental propositions about the distinction between a nature-synthesis and a *hypostasis*-synthesis.<sup>166</sup> The sluice gates are opened for the flowing of the divine wealth over into the humanity of Christ (the *aparchē* for us) by the recognition of the fact that the human being has now become the 'proper nature' of the God-Logos. According to Leontius of Jerusalem, God and human being are so closely drawn together that the flowing over of the gifts of the divinity is a matter of course. He must be asked whether he does not see his splendid insights into the peculiarity of the *henosis* in the

163. Cf. above n. 67.

164. Leontius Jer., CN I, 18: PG 86, 1465C–1472A.

165. *Ibid.*: PG 86, 1468B10–C15.

166. He speaks of the *henosis kath'hypostasin* as a *συνανακρατική ένωσις* with the human nature to be *ιδιική φύσις αὐτοῦ* (PG 86, 1468C).

*hypostasis* — in contradistinction to the *synthesis* in the nature<sup>167</sup> — endangered or even abandoned. By his good start Leontius so guarantees a substantial unity in Christ that the manifestation of the divine in Christ can be distinguished from it. Christ is and remains the one incarnate Son of God just as much in the *kenosis* as in the *theiosis*. For Leontius of Jerusalem, however, there belongs to the one whole picture of Christ the assumption of his entire human nature, with body and soul and what the *oikonomia* of God put at Christ's disposal for his supernatural equipment and credentials.<sup>168</sup>

But it is confessed that, in assuming our nature (*τὰ φυσικὰ ἡμῶν*), the Lord was not deprived of what is above our nature (*ὕπερ φύσιν ἡμετέραν*). Much shows this: his conception without semen which is different from the way we come into being, and his virginal birth, as well as his fasting for forty days without feeling hunger, and such like. Therefore in Christ we believe that this was arranged (in a way that) transcends our nature, so that even as his flesh existed, it was also ensouled, and the flesh of the divine Logos was ensouled with a rational and thinking soul.

### *A further comment on distinguishing the two Leontii*

At the conclusion of the analysis of the works of the two Leontii (of Byzantium and Jerusalem), it would seem to be certain that we have in fact to assume that there are two authors. Their identification, attempted of late by Ilie Fracea,<sup>169</sup> cannot be upheld. Reference must be made in particular (1) to the new language of Leontius of Jerusalem in the interpretation of the insubistence of the humanity of Christ in the *hypostasis* of the Logos; (2) to the rich utilization of the term *synthesis*, in the place of *henosis* or together with *henosis*, in Leontius of Jerusalem; (3) to the strong emphasis on miracles and the miraculous as evidence

167. What 'union in the nature and according to the nature' means in contrast to 'union in the *hypostasis* and according to the *hypostasis*' is expressed by Severan texts in the CM of Leontius Jer. We shall cite a major text from the collection, which P. T. R. Gray has studied in his article, 'An Anonymous Severian Monophysite of the Mid-Sixth Century', *Patristic and Byzantine Review* 1 (1982) (117–26): Frag. 12 (120) of 'Julius of Rome', (Apollinarian forgery): 'It is confessed in Him [= Christ] that the created is in union with the uncreated, and the uncreated is in commixture [!] with the created, one nature having brought together a partial activity out of each part, and the Word bringing things to completion in the whole, with the divine completeness — the very thing that comes about in the common man out of two *incomplete* (!) parts, which make up one nature, and are signified by one name' (Leontius Jer., CM PG 86, 1865B16–20 = Apoll., *De unione* 5: Lietzmann, 250–1). See the commentary of Gray, *art. cit.*, 120–2. He emphasizes particularly that in the interpretation of the body–soul analogy Ps. Julius denotes the united natures as 'incomplete parts'. Ps. Julius applies this to Christ. Indeed the divinity is complete, but it must augment the human *sarx* as 'soul', and thus becomes part of the whole. In this view there is a profound violation of the divine transcendence of the Logos

168. Leontius Jer., CN II, 20: PG 86, 1580D–1581A.

169. See above, n 3.

of the divinity of Christ in Leontius of Jerusalem (*CN* IV, 37: PG 86, 1712A) in contrast to the explicit stressing of the rarity of miracles in the life of Jesus in Leontius of Byzantium (*CA*: PG 86, 1336BC; *CNE*: PG 86, 1352C–1353A).

PART THREE

THE THEOLOGICAL ACTIONS UNDERTAKEN BY  
JUSTINIAN I (518-527 AND 527-565)

With the beginning of the Chalcedonian restoration under Emperor Justin I (518–527), his nephew, Petrus Sabbatius, who was called Justinian,<sup>1</sup> appeared in the group of actors on the stage of ecclesiastical politics and theology.<sup>2</sup> From 525 onwards he was accompanied by his consort, Theodora, who influenced him increasingly.<sup>3</sup> The theological actions of Justinian began as early as 519 and were to continue during the whole of his joint regency (until 527) and his sole reign (until 565). We can highlight the tenor of these reasonably clearly by some key phrases.

(1) The movement in favour of the theopaschite addition: 'One of the Trinity was crucified' (with variants); (2) the attempt to win over the

1. This name was given to him at his adoption by Justin. On the early history of Justinian see A. A. Vasiliev, *Justin the First. An Introduction to the Epoch of Justinian the Great* (Cambridge, Mass., 1950), 92–6. When Justin ascended the throne (518), Justinian was already thirty-six years old. The son of a farming family in Illyricum, at the age of twenty-five he had been brought by his uncle to Constantinople (somewhere around 507), and received a comprehensive education, also in Greek, this being considered as preparation for a military career. On Justinian see (1) the sources: L. Bréhier, in Fliche-Martin, *Histoire de l'Eglise* 4, 437, n. 1; CPG 6865–6893. The texts have been made easily accessible by Mario Amelotti and Livia Migliardi Zingale, *Scritti teologici ed ecclesiastici di Giustiniano = Florentina Studiorum Universitas. Legum Iustiniani Imperatoris Vocabularium*. Subsidia III (Milan, 1977); in the following abbreviated as Amelotti-Migliardi Zingale, *Scritti teologici*. On research see: (1) in general: R. Bonini, *Introduzione allo studio dell'età giustiniana* (Bologna, 1979), 123–8: Nota bibliographica; see as well the detailed bibliography of O. Kresten in H. Hunger (ed.), *Das byzantinische Herrscherbild = WdF 341* (Darmstadt, 1975), 415–48; see further the current bibliography in *ByzZ*. (2) special studies: A. Hohlweg, 'Justinian', in *Die Großen der Weltgeschichte*, Vol. II (Zürich, 1972), 748–77 with bibliography 776–7; P. T. R. Gray, art., 'Justinian', in *TRE* 17 (1988), 478–86.

2. After the assassination of Vitalian (520), Justinian became Consul in 521. In 525 he became Caesar, on 1 (or 4) April 527 he became co-regent with Justin, and, after his death, Emperor (1 August 527), cf. A. A. Vasiliev, *op. cit.*, 96, n. 73; A. Hohlweg, *art. cit.*, 750.

3. Cf. A. Hohlweg, *art. cit.*, 750–2; W. Schubart, *Justinian und Theodora* (Munich, 1943), especially 48–58; R. Browning, *Justinian and Theodora* (London, 1971), 64–9 with the spiteful section from Procopius' *Secret History* (9, 10–22) and a critique of it. See in addition Averil Cameron, *Procopius and the Sixth Century* (London, 1985), 67–83 (Procopius and Theodora). As the official concubine of a certain Hecobolus, the governor of Pentapolis, Theodora dwelt in North Africa and, when dismissed by him, on her return journey to Constantinople came into contact in Alexandria with the leading anti-Chalcedonians, like Patriarch Timothy IV (III) and Severus of Antioch. Here she experienced a kind of religious conversion and renounced her former way of life. With this event Theodora's future path in theological questions was established. In 525 she married Justinian; during the Nika riot in 532 she saved his crown. On this cf. J. A. S. Evans, 'The "Nika" Rebellion and the Empress Theodora', *Byz* 54 (1984), 380–2.

Severans (532); the condemnation of Severus of Antioch, Patriarch Anthimus (536) and the fight against them (542/543); (3) a doctrinal decree of 542/543 against the Origenists, within which the anathema against the 'monophysites' is also repeated; (4) the action against the Three Chapters (544–553); (5) the final stage: Justinian's apthartian text (on the incorruptibility of the body of Christ).<sup>4</sup> Because the documents that pertain to these actions stand in clear contrast to each other, the Emperor himself has already offered us the principle for arranging the material, which we have only to follow.<sup>5</sup> It may be assumed that Justinian had come into contact with theologians and theological questions even before the change of 518, but this cannot be documented concretely.<sup>6</sup> If he was already in the capital in 507 and was also stimulated to study by an interest in theology, then one may wonder how it happened that he did not succumb to the influence of the generally admired Severus of Antioch, who was then present in the city. Was the *Henoticon* of Zeno not a temptation for him? Not taking into account the fact that he was destined for a military career, it is probable that the strict-Chalcedonian stance of his uncle Justin and of the powerful Vitalian<sup>7</sup> account for such reserve. One may also think of the influence of the Sleepless Monks, as will immediately become clear.

4. On these activities as a whole see M. Amelotti, 'Giustiniano tra teologia e diritto', in G. G. Archi (ed.), *L'imperatore Giustiniano. Storia e mito* (Milan, 1978), 133–60; also printed in *Scritti teologici*, VII–XXIX; we cite according to this edition. E. Schwartz, 'Zur Kirchenpolitik Justinians', in *idem*, *Zur Geschichte der alten Kirche und ihres Rechts = Ges. Schriften IV* (Berlin, 1960), 276–320; M. Simonetti, 'La politica religiosa di Giustiniano', in G. G. Archi (ed.), *Il mondo dell' diritto nell'epoca giustiniana. Caratteri e problematiche* (Ravenna, 1985), 91–111; G. Prinzing, 'Das Bild Justinians I. in der Überlieferung der Byzantiner vom 7. bis 15. Jahrhundert', in *Fontes Minores VII*, ed. D. Simon, 1–99. For further literature on the activities individually see below; in general: J. Meyendorff, *Byzantine Theology — Historical Trends and Doctrinal Themes* (New York, 1974); M. V. Anastos, 'Justinian's Despotism Control over the Church as Illustrated by his Edicts on the Theopaschite Formula and his Letter to Pope John II in 533', in *Mélanges G. Ostrogorsky II*, 1–11 = *idem*, *Studies in Byzantine Intellectual History* (London, 1979), no. IV.

5. Cf. Amelotti-Migliardi Zingale, *Scritti teologici*, XI with reflections on the systematization of Justinian's themes and writings. Amelotti stresses that the coincidence of clearly divided problem areas and chronological succession is typical of Justinian: 'Si accorda perfettamente con la nostra immagine di Giustiniano il vederlo isolare i problemi e affrontarli via via, quando nel suo convincimento politico o nel sopraggiungere degli eventi la loro soluzione s'impone.'

6. When A. A. Vasiliev, *Justin the First*, p. 135, comments: 'Justinian . . . had an excellent theological education', then that is a conclusion drawn from the later period after 527. It should be noted that Constantinople did not possess a theological school. In the Emperor's first theological action one can still discern considerable uncertainty in theological questions.

7. On the 'Chalcedonian' aura of Vitalian, whose personality at first clearly outshone that of Justinian, see the reports about the acclamations of the people, which after the change of 518 were accorded him in Tyre and Palestine, *ibid.*, 149–58.



## 'ONE OF THE TRINITY WAS CRUCIFIED'

Justinian entered the theological arena quite soon after Justin had seized power, first of all only as the diplomatically active letter-writer who acted for or against the real players. Such were the Scythian or Gothic monks<sup>8</sup> who appeared in Constantinople at the end of 518 and had chosen as a formula of propaganda a sentence which theologically was really harmless: 'one of the Trinity was crucified'. How the recently re-established unity of the Church could quickly be endangered because of this is shown in the various letters of Justinian, together with numerous other documents, which are related to two chronologically separate phases of this one action. This event had a prehistory. A brief review of that will make it easier for us to understand the conflict about the phrase 'one of the Trinity was crucified'.

## I. THE PREHISTORY TO 518/519

## 1. Origin

For methodological reasons it is advisable to distinguish the formula *unus ex trinitate incarnatus est* from the formulas in which suffering (*passus*), death (*mortuus*) or crucifixion (*crucifixus*) is stated of the subject *unus ex (de) trinitate*. We find the formula *unus ex trinitate incarnatus* for the first time in Proclus, the Patriarch of Constantinople (434–446), in the following passages:

(a) Proclus, *Tomus ad Armenios* (CPG 5897) 21: ACO IV, 2, p. 192,7: τὸν ἐνα τριᾶδος, σῶσαρκῶσθαι; Latin: p. 202,25: *unum ex trinitate incarnatum*.

(b) Proclus, *Ep. uniformis ad singulos Occidentis episcopos* (CPG 5915) 7: ACO IV, 2, p. 66,16–17: *unum ex trinitate . . . deum verbum factum hominem*. (On the authenticity cf. Diekamp, *ThR* 16 (1917), 357f.)

8. On the Scythian monks see the *bibliographia selecta* in F. Glorie, *Maxentii aliorumque Scytharum monachorum necnon Ioannis Tomitanae urbis episcopi Opuscula* = CCL 85A (Turnhout, 1978), XVII–XXII; older literature in V. Schurr, *Die Trinitätslehre des Boethius im Lichte der 'skythischen Kontroversen'* = FCLDG 18, 1 (Paderborn, 1935) (in what follows abbreviated as V. Schurr, *Trinitätslehre*), 141–2, n. 137 (sources and bibliography); on the earlier history: J. Zeiller, *Les origines chrétiennes dans les provinces danubiennes de l'Empire Romain* (Paris, 1918) (no presentation of the controversy after 519).

A further instance would be a passage in the so-called *Tomus secundus ad Armenios* in Innocent of Maronia, ACO IV, 2, p. 72,38–39. Schwartz, however, considers this second *Tomus* to be inauthentic (*Konzilstudien*, 43–4).

For the real theopaschite formula too, the *unus ex trinitate crucifixus* or *passus*, Proclus was called upon not only by Severus, but also by Innocent of Maronia and Facundus of Hermiane. This attribution to Proclus, nevertheless, has been decisively contested by M. Richard.<sup>9</sup>

(c) John Maxentius, *Libellus fidei*, X, 17–19 (ed. Glorie, CCL 85A) produces three citations from a work which 'Proclus, the bishop of this city, . . . (wrote) to the Armenians'; in these we find the formulations *unus ex trinitate est, qui crucifixus est* (p. 16,215), *unus est de trinitate, qui passus est* (p. 17,239) and *unus ergo de trinitate est crucifixus* (p. 17,245). However, the three sections from which John Maxentius cites are not present in the *Tomus ad Armenios*.

Innocent of Maronia also transmits these three sections under the name Proclus: ACO IV, p. 73,1–11 (first section), 13–27 (the next two sections follow, concurring in meaning with the *Libellus fidei*, pp. 16,229–17,248; as his source he gives *ex libro III de fide* or *ex sermone de fide*).

(d) Proclus, *Ep. IV ad Ioannem Antiochenum* (CPG 5901): DP, p. 48 IV (Greek) (under the name of Cyril of Alexandria; another manuscript ascribes the fragment to Basil (writing to John of Antioch), yet another to Bishop Pamphilus of Abydos; the latter is familiar as the writer of a (forged) letter to Peter (the Fuller): ACO III, 9–10, where the subject is the Trishagion): *ὅνα τῆς τριάδος κατὰ σάρκα ἐσταυρώσθαι*;

in Severus of Antioch, *C. imp. Gram.* III, 41: CSCO 102, 247 (according to Severus it is a fragment from Proclus, *Ep. ad Ioh. Ant.*, with the incipit: *ut videtur, insignis poetae instar*): *unum ex trinitate carne crucifixum confitemur*;

Latin: Facund. Herm., *Pro def.* I, 1, 9: CCL 90A, pp. 5,61–6,66; PG 65, 876C–877A; Liberatus, *Brev.* 10: ACO II, 5, p. 111,16–20.

## 2. Spread

(a) The Eutychian monk Dorotheus produces the formula at the fourth session of the Council of Chalcedon (17 October 451): ACO II, 1, 2, p. 120,16–20,23f.

(b) Peter the Iberian (453–488) is taught about it in a vision. Cf. John Rufus, *Plerophoriae* (from 515), ch. 37 = PO 8, 86–87.

(c) Emperor Zeno, *Henoticon* (§ 7): 'One of the Trinity . . . became incarnate', see CCT II/1,

9. M. Richard, 'Proclus de Constantinople et le théopaschisme', *RHE* 38 (1942), 303–31 = *Op. Min.* II, no. 52, esp. 323–31. Richard maintains that a formula like this in a letter to John of Antioch would never have met with approval in Antioch in 438, and on the other hand would have been cited by Cyril and his supporters with great pleasure. But there is no echo of either of these responses at all. Theodoret too in the *Eranistes* is unaware of the formula. According to Richard, however, if fragment (d) is not authentic, then neither is fragment (c), since both seem to be from the same hand (according to Schwartz, *Konzilstudien*, p. 28, n. 3 and p. 47). Richard considers it historically illegitimate to deduce from the formula *unus ex trinitate incarnatus est* to the other formula *unus de trinitate passus est*, because not everybody would have regarded such a logical operation as permissible. Richard's reasoning is confirmed by the interpolations at the end of the second *apologia* of Nestorius (in the *Liber Heraclidis*); the interpolations were written after the death of Theodosius II and report violent disputes about theopaschitism in Constantinople, but the formula *unus ex trinitate* . . . does not appear. (We are grateful to Prof. L. Abramowski, to whom we owe this observation.)

253. From here it was taken over into the *libellus* of the Alexandrian *apocrisium* which these handed over to the papal delegation of 497 in Constantinople: CA, *ep.* 102, no. 11: CSEL 35, 472; in Rome this *libellus* was translated by Dionysius Exiguus into Latin: CA, *ep.* 102: CSEL 35, 473.

(d) Emperor Anastasius I: Confession of faith, in Zacharias Rhetor cont., *HE* VII, 8: Brooks, CSCO 88, p. 30, 16–27; Hamilton-Brooks, 173: '... I confess that one of the *persons* [*hypostases*] of the Trinity, God the Word, ... became incarnate ... was crucified ...' In his *suggestio* to Pope Hormisdas of 29 June 519, the deacon Dioscorus comments that Emperor Anastasius has prescribed the *unus de trinitate crucifixus* for the Catholics. On the condemnation of those who refuse to confess 'one of the Trinity was crucified' at a *Synodus Endemousa* in Constantinople (according to Victor of Tunnuna in 499; more correctly in 507), summoned at the instigation of Philoxenus of Mabbog under Emperor Anastasius, see CCT II/1, 270–1. Because the whole Antiochene and Leonine tradition, as this had passed into the Chalcedonian formula, was rejected at the Synod, one understands why the *unus de trinitate crucifixus* was regarded with such suspicion in the West. Cf. H. de Noris, 'Dissertatio I. in historiam controversiae de Uno ex Trinitate passo', in *idem*, *Historia Pelagiana et Dissertatio de Synodo V. Oecumenica* (edition: Padua, 1708 – appendix 105–136; a further dissertation on the Scythian monks, *ibid.*, 137–156, esp. 108). See also V. Grumel, 'L'auteur et la date de composition du tropaire 'O Μονογενής'', *EO* 22 (1923) (398–418), 404–10.

(e) Philoxenus of Mabbog (d. 523), *Dissertationes decem de uno e sancta trinitate incorporato et passo* (*Mēmre contre Habib*): PO 15, 443–542 (Latin); PO 38, 479–633; PO 39, 549–753 (French); PO 40, 203–351 (French).

(f) Severus of Antioch, *C. imp. Gram.* III, ch. 29; cf. John of Beth Aphth., *Vita Severi*: PO 2, 236–237: at the instigation of Severus an imperial delegation was sent to Patriarch Macedonius to ask him where he stood with regard to the sentence *unus de trinitate incarnatus*. The Patriarch of Constantinople rejected the formula. Severus saw in it the touchstone of 'true faith'.

(g) The forged letters to Peter the Fuller; see above, pp. 259–60; V. Schurr, *Trinitätslehre*, 147, n. 151, compiles the texts from these letters, insofar as they contain our formula, which is to be distinguished from the expanded Trishagion of Peter the Fuller. We may assume that the formula 'one of the Trinity became flesh, (or) was crucified' was readily seized as the shibboleth of orthodoxy in the fight against any Nestorianism, before it became the battle-cry against Chalcedon through the *Henoticon* and the Severans. It was well-known in the monasteries of St Euthymius and St Sabas near Jerusalem, especially through the *Tomus* to the Armenians, from whom numerous monks had come to Sabas.<sup>10</sup> It was precisely among these monastic Fathers that Proclus' formula became the instrument for warding off Nestorianism as well as Eutychianism.<sup>11</sup>

The propaganda for this formula quickly encompassed further circles in the Near East. As early as 520 Catholic clerics and monks from Jerusalem, Antioch and Syria Secunda submitted to Emperor Justin a confession of faith, in which the *unus ex sancta et unius essentiae trinitate* was

10. Euthymius himself came from Melitene, the metropolis of Armenia II, and as presbyter there had exercised supervision over the monks before he came to Jerusalem in 405. E. Schwartz, *Kyrrillos von Skythopolis* (Leipzig, 1939), 358.

11. Cf. V. Schurr, *Trinitätslehre*, 145. In the *Vita Euthymii* no. 26, Cyril of Scythopolis comments that the Saint confessed against Nestorius and Eutyches that 'the God-Logos, the one from the holy and consubstantial Trinity, became flesh' (Schwartz, p. 40, 14–15). Sabas himself confessed the formula of Proclus, but not the expanded Trishagion of Peter the Fuller (*Vita Sabae*, no. 32: Schwartz, pp. 117, 25–118, 20), and was distressed about the Nestorian monks who 'venerate Christ, the one from the holy and consubstantial Trinity, but not as our true God' (*Vita Sabae*, no. 38: Schwartz, p. 127, 21–24). On the confession of Abbot Abraham shortly before 500 see V. Schurr, *Trinitätslehre*, 145–6, n. 144.

recommended as the right interpretation of Chalcedonian faith.<sup>12</sup> On the basis of the tradition, originally Constantinopolitan, which was not yet burdened with the Severan controversy, the Scythian monks too will have gained their understanding of the trinitarian theopaschite formula. For them it was the *via media* between Nestorius and Eutyches and did not raise the claim of being a formula of union between the larger blocks, the supporters and opponents of Chalcedon, or the Nestorians and the Severans.<sup>13</sup>

Justinian's first action, while still Justin I's co-regent, concerned the theme 'one of the Trinity who was crucified'.

## II. JUSTINIAN AND HIS ACTIONS IN THE CONFLICT OVER THE FORMULA *UNUS EX TRINITATE CRUCIFIXUS*

### 1. The appearance of the Scythian monks in Constantinople

The Scythian monks,<sup>14</sup> who signified the first theological challenge for Justinian, came from the region south of the mouth of the Danube, which had Tomi as its capital. They lived in tension with their bishop Paternus, and in contrast had close ties with their compatriot Vitalian, particularly through their confrater, the monk Leontius, who was a relative of the army commander. Perhaps they came with their protector into the imperial city when Justin, after seizing power, summoned him and made him *magister militum*. The *dramatis personae* found themselves together: Justin, Justinian, Vitalian, the monks, as well as the legates of Pope Hormisdas, who, perhaps at the direct suggestion of Vitalian,

12. See CA, ep. 232a: pp. 705,6–706,16. The Emperor passed on this confession with his recommendation to Pope Hormisdas (9 September 520: CA, ep. 232, pp. 701–3).

13. On this problem see V. Schurr, *Trinitätslehre*, 148–51. Schurr rightly places the Scythians in that tradition of orthodox circles of the Orient, in which the formula of Proclus 'was spread as the core-word and password of orthodoxy and existed as their property, before the supporters of the *Henoticon* and the Severans used it for propaganda' (149). Schurr considers the theopaschite conflict as the 'advance of the theology of the Palestinian lavras into the West' (see below on Euthymius and Sabas) 'and its breakthrough to victory under Justinian'. See 229 with reference back to 142–67.

14. See B. Altaner, 'Der griechische Theologe Leontius und Leontius der skythische Mönch. Eine prosopographische Untersuchung', *ThQ* 127 (1947), 147–65; *idem*, 'Zum Schrifttum der "skythischen" (gotischen) Mönche', *HistJb* 72 (1953), 568–81; F. Glorie, CCL 85A (Turnhout, 1978) VIII–XVI: *Documenta et Testimonia*; XXIII–XLI: *Prolegomena*. They are monks from the triangle between the mouth of the Danube and the Black Sea, the old land of the Scythians, into which the Goths had penetrated so that a mixed culture resulted. See 'From the Land of the Scythians', *The Metropolitan Museum of Art Bulletin* XXXII 5 (1975) (on the acculturation process between the Goths and the Scythians). Cf. H. Wolfram, *Geschichte der Goten. Von den Anfängen bis zur Mitte des sechsten Jahrhunderts. Entwurf einer historischen Ethnographie* (Munich, 1980), especially 40–136 (Migration to the Black Sea . . .; constitution and culture of the Goths on the Danube and the Black Sea); 448–60: ethnography. See the literature, particularly on 5–13. J. A. McGuckin, 'The "Theopaschite Confession" (Text and Historical Context): a Study in the Cyrilline Re-interpretation of Chalcedon', *JEH* 35 (1984), 239–55.

had been sent to Constantinople (before 25 March 519) to restore the unity of the Church. The hour was thus favourable for the Scythian monks.

We discern a particular intention or a programme in their appearance: they wanted to protect the Council of Chalcedon, probably in the face of Severan opponents, against the reproach of Nestorianism<sup>15</sup> by producing a greater synthesis between the Cyril of the *mia-physis* formula and the unification christology of Proclus. Serving them for this purpose were: (1) a more differentiated assessment of the Cyrillian *mia-physis* formula and of the acknowledgement of its corrective function *vis-à-vis* a one-sided use of the two-natures formula; (2) the simultaneous use of the two formulas 'from two natures' and 'in two natures'; (3) the insistence on the confession of Mary as the 'true and real *theotokos*', directed above all against the Sleepless Monks, as we shall see; (4) the use of precisely this formula *Christus unus ex trinitate incarnatus et passus*; and (5) the manner of speaking of the *Christos synthetos* or *Christus compositus*.<sup>16</sup>

They wasted no time in accusing the Constantinopolitan deacon Victor of heresy before the legates and in handing over to them a *libellus*.<sup>17</sup> The Roman delegation, consisting of the bishops Germanus and John, the deacons Felix and Dioscorus, an Alexandrian who lived in Rome, and the presbyter Blandus, refused to accept the Scythian

15. That the Scythians were of the opinion that the Council of Chalcedon was not sufficient against Nestorius and for this reason needed to be expanded, was reported by the deacon Dioscorus in his *suggestio* to Pope Hormisdas of 15 October 519: CA, ep. 224, no. 7: CSEL 35, 686: 'May Your Beatitude [Hormisdas] know that these Scythians say that all who accept the Synod of Chalcedon are Nestorians, and say "the Synod is not sufficient against Nestorius", and one ought to accept the Synod as they themselves have expounded (it).'

16. With V. Schurr, *Trinitätslehre*, 149, n. 155, for this programme we have to refer to (1) the *suggestio* of Dioscorus (CA, ep. 224, no. 3: p. 685), where the concerns of the monks are given: *habuerunt intentionem de uno de trinitate crucifixo et de Christo composito et de aliis capitulis*; (2) the *Capitula* of John Maxentius: no. 1 (simultaneous use of formulas); no. 2 (*Maria dei genetrix*); no. 4 (*unus de trinitate*); no. 9 (*Christus compositus*); see CCL 85A, 29-30; (3) John Maxentius, *Libell. fid.* XI, 22: CCL 85A, p. 18, 277-279; here Maxentius stresses the connection between the confession of *dei genetrix* and the formula *unus de trinitate* . . . ; (4) John Maxentius, *Dialog. c. Nestorian.*: Book I deals particularly with Mary, the mother of God; Book II develops especially (a) the *unus de trinitate* and (b) *Christus compositus*; (5) the letter of the monks to the African bishops, part I (with the themes named).

17. See the information in F. Glorie, CCL 85A, XXIV, who assigns this meeting and the handing over of the *libellus* to the period between 25 March and 29 June 519. Cf. CA, ep. 228. The *libellus* was also presented to the Patriarch of Constantinople. See *Libell. fid.*: CCL 85A, 5-25. According to CA, ep. 224, the deacon Victor confessed strict-Chalcedonian teaching. Cf. CCL 85A, XXV.

memorandum.<sup>18</sup> Vitalian took the part of the Scythian party from the very beginning and excluded the papal legates from further discussion; to this discussion, however, he invited the Patriarch of Constantinople and the deacon Victor, and probably also the monks.<sup>19</sup> Thus, at least according to external conduct, the strict-Chalcedonian Vitalian became the supporter of the theopaschite-trinitarian formula of the monks, who now decided, probably on his advice, to send a delegation to Rome (the summer of 519), in order to gain Pope Hormisdas for their cause.<sup>20</sup>

## 2. The Scythian appeal to Rome and the stance of Justinian

### (a) *The appeal to the Pope*

Where did Justinian stand? When Pope Hormisdas demanded from his legates a report of success,<sup>21</sup> Vitalian and Justinian seized the opportunity to report to Rome about the monks, concerning whom the papal legates themselves made some very critical remarks.<sup>22</sup> No doubt influenced by the negative attitude of the papal legates, in the heat of the moment Justinian wrote a letter, in which the names of the monks are mentioned<sup>23</sup> and clearly warned against. The Pope should 'receive' them appropriately and 'send them far away'. Their empty prattle (*vaniloquia*) introduced novelties into the Church, which were contained neither in the four Councils nor in the letters of Leo. They should be given 'a corresponding penance and be dismissed'. Such 'restless people' (*inquieta homines*) should not be allowed to disturb the unity and peace

18. John Maxentius, *Libell. fid.*, tit.: CCL 85A, 5.

19. Cf. *Suggestio Dioscori ad Hormisdam*: CA, ep. 224, nos. 6–7. Dioscorus knows nothing about the result of the discussion.

20. Cf. F. Glorie, in CCL 85A, XXVI, n. 27. To the group of travellers belonged the monks John, Leontius, Achilles and Mauritius. Cf. CA, ep. 187 and 191. In Rome they met their compatriot, Dionysius Exiguus, who to support the Scythian cause translated several writings from Greek into Latin, namely Cyril Alex., *Ep.* 45 and 46 *ad Succensum* (cf. ACO I, 5, 295–302); his *epistula synodica* to Nestorius and Proclus' *Tomus ad Armenios*; on the further translations into Latin see B. Altaner, *art. cit.*, *ThQ* 127 (1947), 150, n. 13.

21. Hormisdas pp., CA, ep. 219: 680–681; CA, ep. 220 and 221: 681, 681–682. The legates write on 29 June 519: CA, ep. 217: 677–679.

22. CA, ep. 217, nos. 5–12: 677–679.

23. Justinian, *Ep. ad Hormisd.* (CPG 6867) of 29 June 519: CA, ep. 187, 644–645; Amelotti-Migliardi Zingale, *Scritti teologici*, no. 3, p. 8.

which had been newly regained (after the Acacian schism).<sup>24</sup> What Vitalian wrote is not preserved; however, he probably spoke for the monks, as is clear from the letter of the papal legates of 29 June 519. The monks reportedly attempted to win Vitalian over for their new plans, which would have been all the easier, for, as was stated, a relative of the powerful man was among them.<sup>25</sup> What is significant now is that Justinian evidently had second thoughts about his first letter, and, a few days after sending his letter of 29 June 519, forwarded an 'express letter',<sup>26</sup> which was intended to reach the Pope more quickly than his first. In this second letter new notes were sounded. The Pope was supposed to answer the questions of the 'pious monks' as quickly as possible and send them back to Constantinople with this decision 'before our delegate [with the letter of 29 June] arrives before Your Holiness'. Otherwise there was imminent danger to the unity of the Church. From this letter onwards Justinian favoured the Scythian monks. On 15 October 519 a new letter was sent to Rome, in which Justin's co-regent once again urged that the questions be answered quickly and the trinitarian-theopaschite formula be accepted.<sup>27</sup> On 19 January 520 his pressure on the Pope increased. Together with Emperor Justin and Patriarch John he reported to Rome that from various provinces of the East intercessions had arrived, speaking of certain *capitula* about the inseparable Trinity, which one could not turn one's back on.<sup>28</sup> Indeed the letter of Justinian has been lost; from the response of the Pope to him, however, we know that the topic was nothing other than the

24. In his letter to Hormisdas of 29 June 519 (CA, *ep.* 216; F. Glorie, CCL 85A, XXVI-XXVII) the papal deacon Dioscorus also condemns the monks in strident tones. When these claim that Chalcedon is not sufficient against Nestorius and they demand new discussion, this reveals a criticism of the Fourth Council, the characteristic motive for which fits into what today is described as the neo-Chalcedonian approach. In opposition to this Dioscorus persistently sets his strict-Chalcedonianism. Chalcedon is said to be devalued by this; apart from the Council itself, the letters of Leo, and the letters of the bishops in the CE, the Council needs no further addition, because this would destroy what had already been achieved.

25. Cf. CA, *ep.* 217, no. 11, p. 679: *propter istas novas intentiones Vitaliano magnifico viro subriperunt et talia vindicare.*

26. Justinian, Letter from the beginning of July 519 (CPG 6869): CA, *ep.* 191, 648-649; Amelotti-Migliardi Zingale, *Scritti teologici*, no. 4, p. 9. See the Pope's reply of 2 September 519 (= CA, *ep.* 189), in which he passes over in silence Justinian's inconsistency.

27. Justinian, *Ep. ad Hormisd.* (CPG 6868): CA, *ep.* 188, 645-646, of 15 October 519; Amelotti-Migliardi Zingale, no. 5, p. 10. The letter arrived in Rome on 17 November 519. On the same day the deacon Dioscorus wrote once again against the monks: CA, *ep.* 224, 685-687.

28. Justinian emp., *Ep. ad Hormisd.*: CA, *ep.* 181, 636-637; John Const., *Relatio ad Hormisd.*: CA, *ep.* 183, 638-639.

formula *unus ex trinitate passus est*.<sup>29</sup> On 9 July 520 Justinian once again supported the Oriental petitions with Pope Hormisdas<sup>30</sup> and this time he himself defended the formula of the monks, in part with words from St Augustine, even if in a modified form.<sup>31</sup> The concept of *persona* was inserted into it. In this way he removed the fear of the Latins that through the trinitarian-theopaschite formula the divine nature as such was being made the *organon* of suffering. Justinian considered the question to be so urgent that on 9 September 520 he sent a new letter to the Pope, which Bishop John, the presbyter Heraclianus and the deacon Constantine were to deliver.<sup>32</sup> He requested anew a complete answer (*integrum responsum*) which left nothing further in doubt. To reassure the Pope he once again slipped in his *persona* formula. 'One of the Trinity' is interpreted as *persona in trinitate et ex trinitate*.<sup>33</sup> With this expression a bridge could also be built to the deacon Dioscorus. Against this attempt, however, Maxentius, the real rabble-rouser in the whole theopaschite affair, made a decided stand. For him only the pure formula 'one of the Trinity suffered' was tolerable. He reproached the deacon with only wanting to introduce Nestorianism once again into the Church by this formula 'Christ — one person of the Trinity'.<sup>34</sup> That this accusation was aimed at the Roman deacon becomes quite clear from

29. Hormisd. pp., *Ep.* 112 = CA, *ep.* 206 from the end of March 520. Cf. F. Glorie in CCL 85A, XXXIV, n. 68, with reference to the *libellus* of John Maxentius, IX 14; XI 20: Glorie, pp. 14,190–191; 17,253–255.

30. Justinian, *Ep. ad Hormisd.* (CPG 6870), of 9 July 520: CA, *ep.* 196, p. 656,5–27; Amelotti-Migliardi Zingale, *Scritti teologici*, no. 6, pp. 11–12.

31. Cf. F. Glorie in CCL 85A, XXXIV–XXXV. He states that the formula *unus ex trinitate* can be understood with Augustine as *aliqua ex trinitate persona*.

32. Justinian, *Ep. ad Hormisd.* (CPG 6873) of 9 September 520: CA, *ep.* 235, 715; Amelotti-Migliardi Zingale, *Scritti teologici*, no. 8, p. 14.

33. *Ibid.*, CA, *ep.* 235, p. 715,22–25; Amelotti-Migliardi Zingale, *loc. cit.*, p. 14,14–16: *recte dicitur unus in trinitate cum patre spirituque sancto regnare, maiestatisque eius personam in trinitate et ex trinitate non infideliter credimus*.

34. John Maxentius, *Dialog. c. Nestorian.* II, XXI: CCL 85A, 105–106. Maxentius introduces as the position of the 'Nestorian': *non, unum ex trinitate, sed, unam personam Christum ex trinitate, melius arbitror confiteri*. Maxentius says that it is the Catholic definition to confess: *deum verbum, dominum nostrum Iesum Christum, cum propria carne, unum fateri ex trinitate, licet non sit secundum carnem de substantia trinitatis* (vv. 1016–1020). By this is meant Dioscorus. But even the deposed patriarch of Alexandria, Theodosius (535–566), a decided Severan, introduces the term *hypostasis* in order to interpret correctly the *unus ex trinitate* against 'Sabellians'; cf. (1) his *Tractatus theologici ratio et scopus* (CPG 7136): CSCO 103 (V), p. 25,5–9: *Et inde ausi sunt et ille dicere: essentiam Trinitatis incorporatam esse per unam ex hypostasibus; et idem praedicant de natura divina*. *Ibid.*, 26 (on his work, ch. VI): *... circa inhumanationem unius e Trinitate sancta, Verbi Dei, discimus hypostasim ipsius Verbi tantum incorporatam esse*. To it corresponds (2) the statements in the *Oratio theologica* (CPG 7137), ch. VI: CSCO 103 (V), pp. 51,32–53,30. Reference is made in this to the word *hypostasis* in Ps. Dionysius Areop., *De div. nom.* I 4; the incarnation is said to take place per



the 'reply' of Maxentius to Hormisdas' letter<sup>35</sup> to the African bishop, Possessor, who from 517 was residing in Constantinople. In this reply we read:<sup>36</sup>

Here it is the right place for us to show how and why the heretics, of whom Dioscorus is one, proclaim Christ as *one person* of the Trinity, but do not condescend to confess Christ as *one* from the Trinity. They assent that Christ has the *prosopon* of the God-Logos, but is not himself the God-Logos . . . In this wily way they indeed admit that Christ is a *person* of the Trinity; however, in no way do they want to confess him as *one* of the Trinity.

In his criticism of Hormisdas' letter, Maxentius reduces the *persona* concept of the deacon Dioscorus to the meaning which it had received in the controversy between Cyril and Nestorius in the years 429–431. *Prosopon* is seen as the *prosopon* of the appearance of the divine in Jesus, who is then conceived as a simple human being; thus it is seen as the expression of a purely accidental unity between the God-Logos and the human being Jesus of Nazareth, which Maxentius too still interprets as a behavioural unity and as the indwelling of the Word in the human being Jesus.<sup>37</sup> Thus Maxentius connects this extreme Nestorian understanding of the unity in Christ with the *persona* formula of Dioscorus. This must be regarded as pure polemic.

### (b) *Intervention of the senate and people of Rome*

So far neither the letters from the imperial court nor the journey of the Scythian monks to Rome had been able to move Pope Hormisdas to a decision about the trinitarian-theopaschite formula. The four monks from the East tried yet other ways to achieve their goals. They turned

*unam ex suis hypostasibus* (*ibid.*, p. 52, 10–11). (3) The signature to his *Epistula canonica* (CPG 7138): CSCO 103, 59. (4) His synodal letter to Paul of Antioch (CPG 7142): CSCO 103 (V), p. 84, 13–21.

35. *Epist. quae dicitur esse Papae Hormisdas ad Possessorem* . . . : CCL 85A, 115–121 (of 13 August 520); on this see F. Glorie, *ibid.*, XXXVI: the bishop Possessor had been consulted about Faustus of Riez and his theology of grace. He himself now requests from the Pope enlightenment on this question (CA, ep. 230, of 18 July 520). In his reply (CA, ep. 231, of 13 August 520: CCL 85A, 115–121) Hormisdas speaks of the Scythian monks who have just departed from Rome for Constantinople and he reprimands their *superbia et tumultus* in the sharpest possible words (especially nos. 6–10). Maxentius wanted to defend the Scythian monks against this letter, which he declared was forged, and compiled a long response: *Responsio adversus epistolam*: CCL 85A, 123–153. On Dioscorus see no. XXVI, 134–135.

36. John Maxentius, *Resp. adv. epist. Hormisd.* I, 8 (XXVI): CCL 85A, pp. 134, 348–135, 368. Maxentius wants to allow the word *persona* only if it is understood as *naturalis personae vocabulum*. But then he claims it is sufficient to say: *Christus unus ex trinitate*. See no. XXVII, vv. 368–380.

37. *Ibid.*: CCL 85A, p. 135, 359–365, 381–388. Christ would not be one *iuxta compositionem* (from God the Word and the human nature), but *iuxta alterius in altero habitationem* . . . sive secundum gratiam, duarum personarum socialem unionem unam personam Christum intellegunt.

to the senate and the people.<sup>38</sup> The senator Faustus, a supporter of the strict-Chalcedonian tradition, now commissioned the presbyter Trifolius to examine the teaching of the Fathers to see whether the 'one of the Trinity has been crucified' was found among the Fathers. We have the result of his investigation:<sup>39</sup> he lumped together the theopaschism of the Scythians with that of the Arians and Apollinarians. According to Trifolius the Scythian formula was not to be found in the four Councils, for in this formula, which is foreign to tradition, suffering was expressed of the divinity, whereas the flesh was said to remain free of suffering. For this reason, he said, the Council of Chalcedon condemned this formula when it was presented by the monks Dorotheus and Carosus.<sup>40</sup> Trifolius claimed that the reference by the monks to the *Tomus ad Armenios* of Patriarch Proclus was invalid, because the theopaschite formula was certainly introduced as a forgery,<sup>41</sup> just as similar things were done with the letters of the Fathers Athanasius, Cyril and Leo. 'If anything is found in the words of the holy Fathers which does not agree with the holy letters or the definition of the Council of Chalcedon, then evidently we are dealing with a forgery of the heretics.'<sup>42</sup>

(c) *A side-stage*

The Scythian monks thus found no understanding for their request in Rome, and for that reason they turned in writing to African bishops, who had been banished by the Vandals to Sardinia.<sup>43</sup> Their spiritual leader was Fulgentius of Ruspe. This *epistula* was delivered to the exiles by the deacon John. To a great extent it is a revision of that *libellus fidei* which the Scythians had wanted in vain to present to the papal legates

38. Cf. F. Glorie, *Prolegomena* in CCL 85A, XXXIII. The time of this action cannot be determined precisely.

39. Trifol. presb., *Ep. ad beat. Faustum senat. c. Ioannem Scytham monachum*: ed. F. Glorie, CCL 85, 137-139; also in Schwartz, *PS*, pp. 115-117. On the authenticity, see *ibid.*, 300. On the person of Faustus and his hostile attitude to Byzantium, see *ibid.*, 231, 274.

40. Cf. on this H. Bacht, 'Die Rolle des orientalischen Mönchtums . . .', in *Chalcedon II*, 237-42. Trifolius refers to Chalcedon, *actio IV*, no. 108: Greek — ACO II, 1, 2, p. 120, 23-24; Latin (Rusticus) — ACO II, 3, 2, p. 127, 15-16. Trifolius cites the confession of Carosus and Dorotheus as condemned by the Council (CCL 85, p. 139, 67-70): *confitentes salvatorem nostrum Iesum Christum, qui descendit . . . crucifixus, unum de trinitate esse passum* (according to the translation Ø). The Greek *acta* and the translation of Rusticus (see above) omit the *unum*. Rusticus' text reads: *credimus illum passum trinitatis esse*.

41. In fact the formula *unus de trinitate passus est* cannot be established in the authentic works of Proclus; cf. above, p. 318 with note 9.

42. Trifol. presb., *Ep. ad b. Faustum sen.*, no. 8: CCL 85, p. 140, 94-97.

43. Cf. on this V. Schurr, *Trinitätslehre*, 159-60.

in Constantinople in 519.<sup>44</sup> In none of the imperial or Roman documents with which we have previously dealt is there any sign that the explosive nature of the *libellus fidei*, or of the 'Letter to the bishops', was discerned. It was solely the formula 'one of the Trinity' that caused a sensation. To Roman ears another text must really have been more objectionable, although it begins in a completely Chalcedonian manner.

According to the tradition of the holy Fathers, we confess our Lord Jesus Christ in two united and unconfused natures, that is of the divinity and of the humanity, in one person or *hypostasis*. We do not agree with those who proclaim one incarnate nature of God the Word and shun the faith of the venerable Council of Chalcedon, nor do we accept those who deceitfully proclaim two natures, but in no way confess the one incarnate nature of God the Word, thinking that it is contrary to the confession of the two natures, as if the one incarnate nature of God the Word signifies anything other than the two natures ineffably united.<sup>45</sup>

This statement, already quite clear in itself, can be expanded by means of the writings of the monks and bishops of the Black Sea region, so that a total picture of a Latin christology results, which could become for Justinian the model and content of his future policy. Even in the West it was able to make an impression and provide a stimulus. For this total picture we must have recourse once again to the year 512.

### 3. Latin neo-Chalcedonian christology in the Black Sea region between 512 and 533

After Severus' opponent John the Grammarian,<sup>46</sup> in the texts of the Scythians just named (*libellus fidei* and their letter to the African bishops) we encounter again the willingness to consider both confessions in expressing right faith: the *mia physis* against Nestorius, the *dyo physeis* against Eutyches and his lot. Nevertheless it is justifiable to ask whether this consideration also includes the simultaneous use of both formulas so strongly stressed by M. Richard, which is his condition for allocating the name 'neo-Chalcedonianism'.<sup>47</sup> What is important is his observation that the definition of Chalcedon is already a synthesis with Cyril's

44. Scyth. mon., *Ep. ad Eppos*: CCL 85A, 157–172. F. Glorie notes in the apparatus the variants from the *libellus fidei* (CCL 85A, 5–25).

45. *Ibid.*, (II), 3: CCL 85A, pp. 158,33–159,43, to be compared with *Libellus fidei* VIII, 13: p. 13,161–168, and with John Maxentius, *Capit.* 1: p. 29,4–6. As proof then follows Cyril Alex., *Ep. 46 ad Succensum*, 3 in the translation of Dionysius Exiguus, 4 (see the apparatus on [II], 3). See the English translation of the letter by J. A. McGuckin, *JEH* 35 (1984), 247–55.

46. See above, p. 69, n. 138.

47. M. Richard, 'Le Néo-chalcédonisme', *MSR* 3 (1946), 156–61 = *Op. Min.* II, no 56

formulaic language, even if Richard does not exhaust all the possibilities of this discovery.<sup>48</sup> The extent to which the Scythians wanted to invoke the *mia-physis* formula to interpret Chalcedon, however, still needs to be examined. In fact they came to speak of the confrontation of the two conceptual systems twice. What motive lay behind this?

(a) *The Scythian monks and neo-Chalcedonianism*

Their *libellus* submitted to the papal legates, as well as the letter to the bishops, shows plainly that the Scythian monks are conscious that their synthesis is unfamiliar to Chalcedonians; they know that the one-nature formula is considered to be incompatible with the two-natures formula.<sup>49</sup> For its fresh judgement on the *una natura* the letter to the Africans refers, as shown, to Cyril of Alexandria and his interpretation of the formula, the *libellus fidei* refers in contrast to its recognition by Patriarch Flavian,<sup>50</sup> who also confesses the 'from two natures' rejected by Chalcedon. The monks do not attempt a conceptual analysis in order to be able to produce the equation of 'two natures' and *una dei verbi natura incarnata* (the one nature of the incarnate God-Logos). In this context they also do not get involved in the synonymous usage of *hypostasis* and *physis* present in Cyril, but rather resort to hermeneutics. Through the juxtaposition of formulas that sound contradictory, they call for reflection on the orthodoxy of the other side. The motive which animates them is very commendable; it is already active shortly before their appearance in the 'Letter of the Orientals', which had been addressed in 512 to Pope Symmachus,<sup>51</sup> at the time when the pressure of Emperor Anastasius and his *Henoticon* policy was most noticeable to the supporters of Chalcedon.<sup>52</sup> This letter was a cry for help to Pope Symmachus from Scythia and Thrace, the European provinces in the North-East of the Byzantine Empire. It stemmed from Chalcedonian-orthodox bishops, who abandoned no aspect of Chalcedon, but who, for the sake of their dioceses, did not want to break with the Acacians

48. As the analysis of the *horos* of Chalcedon by A. de Halleux has shown us. See *JdChr* I<sup>3</sup>, 755-62, especially 758, 761-2.

49. Cf. *Libell. fid.* VIII, 13: CCL 85A, p. 13, 164-166: *nec illam sententiam, quam quasi contrariam quidam synodo aestimant, id est, unam naturam dei verbi incarnatam, avertimur*. Similarly Scyth. mon., *Ep. ad Eppos* (II), 3: p. 159, 40-41: *aestimantes hoc [= the one-nature formula] duarum naturarum contrarium*. The *quidam* nevertheless weakens considerably the state of judging the *una natura*.

50. *Libell. fid.* VIII, 13: p. 14, 172-176.

51. *Ep. Orient.*, *Inter epp. Symmachi ppae*: Thiel I, 709-717; see CCT II/1, p. 309, n. 255.

52. Cf. V. Schurr, *Trinitätslehre*, 108-27.

(supporters of the *Henoticon*).<sup>53</sup> We find ourselves in the period between 512 and 518. What dogmatic position is present in the letter of the Orientals? The authors confess the Council of Chalcedon and its two-natures teaching, the *Tomus* of Leo; for this reason they are persecuted by the supporters of the *mia physis*; many of them have been sent into exile.<sup>54</sup> They even admit that 'their Father' Acacius has failed.<sup>55</sup> He is no longer living; were they now, however, to break communion with his supporters, they would be driven out and their dioceses would be deserted. The Pope is requested not to condemn them, but rather to take them into communion with him.<sup>56</sup> Admittedly the Romans must have begun to wonder at the following suggestion for mediation: the Oriental bishops do not want to join in the schism of Acacius, but want to reject the formula of the Alexandrians 'from two natures one nature after the union'. But as a *via media* they propose 'from two natures and in two natures'. The Fathers are said to have spoken already in this way.<sup>57</sup>

Thus it is intended that a simultaneous usage of formulas be allowed, which had been excluded at Chalcedon.<sup>58</sup> The *Epistula Orientalium* thus really confines itself to a 'minor point', the famous *ex duabus* and *in duabus*.

It would certainly have needed some rethinking, both historically and

53. *Ibid.*, 122. Schurr adduces the following considerations for determining the senders: (1) they call Acacius their father, thus they belong to the ecclesiastical territory of Constantinople (unlike the bishops of Illyria, Dardania and Dacia, who belong to the Roman patriarchate); (2) they confess Chalcedon (nos. 3, 4, 9, 10 in Thiel) and the primacy of the Pope over the whole Church. Schurr, 122-4, proves that *epistula* 13 of Pope Symmachus of 8 October 512 (Thiel, pp. 717-22) is the response to this theologically and pastorally distinguished letter from the East.

54. Cf. *Ep. Oriental.*, nos. 3 and 5: Thiel, 711, 712-713.

55. *Ibid.*, nos. 2, 3, 6: Thiel, 710-711, 711, 713.

56. *Ibid.*, nos. 5-8: Thiel, 712-714.

57. *Ibid.*, conclusion of no. 9 and the beginning of no. 10: Thiel, 715-716; on 716 they sketch their position: *sic et nunc illis, 'ex duabus quidem naturis' dicentibus, 'in duabus' autem non confitentibus, nos 'ex duabus' et 'in duabus' pariter dicimus. Ex duabus enim dicentes, ex quibus subsistit unitas, in duabus autem, in quibus visus est et palpatus est et assumptus post passionem et resurrectionem, confitemur, et in quibus veniet iudicaturus vivos et mortuos.*

58. Cf. *JdChr* I<sup>3</sup>, 753-4. We recall that for the Roman legates at Chalcedon the equations held true: 'from two natures' = Dioscorus = monophysitism; 'in two natures' = Leo = orthodoxy. For this reason they did not accept the proposal of Patriarch Anatolius for a christological definition. It is on the basis of this memory that the response of Pope Symmachus is to be judged. Cf. on this CCT II/1, 309-10. The Pope does not deal with the suggestion of the Orientals, but rather warns of the great errors to which the three patriarchal cities of the East (Constantinople, Antioch and Alexandria) had succumbed, namely Nestorianism, the *nefanda ludibria* of Peter the Fuller, and Eutychianism. Cf. Symmach., *Ep. 13 ad Oriental.*, no. 2: Thiel, 718-719: a severe, gloomy picture of the dogmatic offence of the East!

speculatively, for the Orientals' proposal for mediation to be accepted. But in Rome there was no prospect of this.

Do we find this synthesis 'from two natures — in two natures' also among the Scythian monks? Can one discern a connection with the letter of the Orientals of 512? Lest the intentions behind the letter of 512 and those behind the actions of 519 be confused, we would like to highlight the difference immediately. In their letter of 512, the Orientals sought to mediate between the moderate supporters of Acacius and of the Acacian schism and Rome. The union of 518 was still not realized, but a union was striven for. The Scythians, in contrast, had not joined in the Acacian schism<sup>59</sup> and they assumed the union that had been realized in the meantime. They wanted to mediate 'dogmatically', not between Chalcedonians and Severans, but among the Chalcedonians themselves. If this important difference is not taken into account, the Scythians with their proposals of mediation, however, were completely in line with the *Epistula Orientalium*. They came from the same dogmatic tradition as the authors of the letter of 512, but took it further by incorporating the *mia-physis* formula in the discussion and putting it in creative tension with the two-natures formula. Thus we return to the letter of the monks to the African bishops, more precisely to the passage already cited about the two versions of christological language.<sup>60</sup>

In this passage the Scythian monks do not demand explicitly that the main contrary statements be confessed simultaneously or alternately; they ask only that in interpreting one's own confession the other also be considered. Whoever confesses 'one nature of the incarnate Word' should not interpret this as a rejection of Chalcedon, and whoever says the 'two natures' should do this honourably in such a way that they remain open for the discovery that the *mia-physis* formula too is compatible with Chalcedon, if one interprets it like Cyril of Alexandria. For this purpose there also follows a quite lengthy citation from the second letter to Succensus.<sup>61</sup> Accordingly the monks no doubt see the seemingly contradictory formulas as mutually corrective, but they do not demand an actual alternate use of these formulas. Through calling to mind the *mia-physis* formula as interpreted by Cyril they want to show how the *unus ex trinitate crucifixus* can be understood in an orthodox way. Given this openness, it is the monks' opinion that each party is well able to stand

59. See John Maxentius, *Resp. adv. ep. Hormisd.* 1, 8 (XXXIII) CCL 85A, p. 137,450–454: *Monachi autem, quos inique laceras, in tantum ab hoc crimine alieni sunt, ut numquam per dei gratiam catholica communione discesserint.*

60. Cf. above p. 327 and n. 45.

61. Scyth. mon., *Ep. ad Eppos* (II), 3: CCL 85A, p. 159,45–53.

by its formula, be it the two-natures formula or the one-nature formula, on condition that the latter is understood in the sense of the second letter to Succensus. They themselves stand by their pure-Chalcedonian two-natures formula, especially in the polemic against the Headless Ones (Severans),<sup>62</sup> to whom they ascribe the false use of the *una natura*. Through calling to mind the *mia-physis* formula and its Cyrillian interpretation they want to show that the *unus ex trinitate crucifixus* can be correctly understood. For the monks there is, as it were, a parallelism between the two formulas:

*una natura Dei Verbi*  
= *unus*                      *ex trinitate*

*incarnata*  
*incarnatus (crucifixus)*

If the one can be correctly interpreted with Cyril,<sup>63</sup> then so too can the other. The goal of the whole endeavour is not so much to introduce an equally justified use of the two systems of formulas, as rather to validate the Chalcedonian system of language in the sense of the unity of Christ. To be noted is the fact that in this way the monks remain in the Constantinopolitan-Palestinian tradition, as it had been created even before Chalcedon by Proclus. In exactly the same way as it suits the Scythians to insist on a christology of union, the strict-Chalcedonians (Dioscorus and the Sleepless Monks) seek to exclude any danger of theopaschism,<sup>64</sup> by reference to Ephesus and

62. Cf. John Maxentius, *Resp. c. Aceph.* II, 2: CCL 85A, p. 44,13-14: 'Without any doubt there are two natures in Christ'; *ibid.*, VI, 11: pp. 46,106-47,122. The various witnesses for the two natures are noted by F. Glorie in the *Index nominum et verborum selectorum*, s.v. *deitas, divinitas, humanitas, natura*. We highlight: *Prof. brev. cath. fid.* 6: pp. 35,43-36,48; *Resp. c. Aceph.* I, 1: p. 43,6: it is regarded as a foolish confession to set up 'one nature after the union in Christ'; cf. *ibid.*, II, 4: p. 44,27: 'two natures after the union', for which the Chalcedonians gladly refer to Cyril, where, however, this formula is not found.

63. According to John Maxentius, *Resp. c. Aceph.* VI, 11: CCL 85A, pp. 46,109-47,122, the *mia-physis* formula immediately expresses the two natures: *At si voluerint dicere, verbum incarnatum sive unam naturam dei verbi incarnatam, eo ipso quo hoc dicunt, duas procul dubio dicere convincuntur in Christo naturas, duarumque, non unius, nomina naturarum* . . . In this connection Maxentius uses the body-soul analogy in order to explain by means of it the possibility of speaking both of one as well as of two natures: everybody is convinced that the human nature exists *from* two, or better in two natures, body and soul. Thus he claims one could also say 'incarnate soul', or as well 'the one nature of the incarnate soul'. Just as two natures are acknowledged here, this is also true for the incarnate Word.

64. See the positions of the 'Nestorian' in John Maxentius, *Dial. c. Nestor.* II, XII: CCL 85A, p. 92,568-569: *Incarnatus quidem deus est, passus autem deus non est, sed caro dei*; *ibid.*, II, XIII: p. 93,586-588: *Deus quidem passus non est, quia deum passibilem praedicare, sacrilegum est; sed deus sui corporis fecit proprias passiones*; II, XIV: p. 94,639: *Carnem dei dixi passam, non autem dei verbi*. The Formula *unus ex trinitate* is suspicious to the 'Nestorian'. He says it endangers the *homocousios* of Nicaea, and that this would be better safeguarded by *unus in trinitate*; cf. II, XIX: p. 101,874ff. The whole altercation becomes a battle of words, as the 'Nestorian' highlights (II, XXIII: p. 107,

Chalcedon.<sup>65</sup> Dioscorus too is a traditionalist and refuses to go beyond the wording of the two synods, just as on the other side Maxentius does not want the *unus ex trinitate* to be watered down, especially not through the insertion of the word *persona*. According to Maxentius, however, the deacon Dioscorus has made himself guilty of this 'heresy'. Dioscorus says namely: 'One *person* from the Trinity, but not one from the Trinity.'<sup>66</sup> Then he is said in this way to reinterpret the unity of person in Christ in the Nestorian sense: 'they state that "Christ" has the *persona* of the God-Logos, but that Christ is not himself the God-Logos'.<sup>67</sup> The whole bundle of alleged Nestorian ideas about the incarnation is tied to this use of the word *persona* in Dioscorus: the teaching of two persons, of two sons, of the indwelling, of the purely social, i.e. moral unity (*socialis unio*) of human beings.<sup>68</sup> In spite of all contrary protestations the dialogue partner, Dioscorus, is consequently a heretic in the eyes of the Catholicus Maxentius.<sup>69</sup> We observe here that this dispute broke out among the Chalcedonians. Maxentius did not know that the word *persona* in his favourite formula was introduced not only by Dioscorus, but also by Justinian,<sup>70</sup> and above all by Fulgentius in his letter of reply to the Scythian monks. In this letter the word 'person' signifying Christ is strongly accentuated and it is incorporated into a christology which is also acceptable to the Scythians.<sup>71</sup>

The fact that the insertion of the word *persona* into the Scythian

1069–1073): *Neque trinitatem, neque ex<tra trinitatem, neque unum ex> trinitate, deum verbum confiteor: sed filium dei deum pro nostra salute ex femina secundum carnem natum passumque confiteor; tuis autem nolo uti sermonibus: nec eum unum ex trinitate confiteor.* Then he says in conclusion: . . . *aliud est, rebus congruere, et verbis tantummodo dissonare* (II, XXII: p. 108, 1090–1091). He also concedes that the *unus ex trinitate est Christus* can be proved from the writings of the Fathers, but he still does not want to accept it for himself (II, XXV: p. 110, 1166–1168).

65. Cf. *ibid.*, II, XXV: p. 109, 1130–1148.

66. John Maxentius, *Resp. adv. ep. Hormisd.* I, 8: CCL 85A, p. 134, 343–344, especially pp. 134, 348–135, 354.

67. *Ibid.*, p. 135, 352–354.

68. *Ibid.*, p. 135, 352ff., 359ff.; the two-sons teaching, however, is expressly rejected by the 'Nestorian'. *Dial. c. Nestorian*. II, IX: p. 87, 408–410; he confesses Christ, the one Son, in two united natures

69. John Maxentius, *Dial. c. Nestorian* II, XXV, p. 110, 1175.

70. Cf. Justinian, *Ep. ad Hormisd.* (CPG 6870) of 9 July 520: CA, ep. 196, nos. 6–7, p. 656: to say simply *unus ex trinitate* without adding the name of Christ could be ambiguous: *sine Christi namque persona nec credi trinitas religiose potest nec adorari fideliter* (with reference to Augustine).

71. Fulgent. Rusp., *Ep.* 17, ch. 3, no. 6: PL 65, 455CD = CCL 91A, p. 568, 180–183. *Unus est igitur Christus dei filius in natura divinitatis et carnis, in quo singularitas personalis non confundit humanam divinarque naturam, et inconfusa unitio naturarum non facit geminam inesse personam.* Instead of *unus (ex trinitate)* Fulgentius usually prefers to say *Deus unigenitus*. Cf. also *ibid.*, ch. 5, no. 10: PL 65, 457BC; CCL 91A, 570.



formula was unjustifiably rejected did not mean, however, that the term was simply banished from the christology of John Maxentius. On the contrary, in his efforts to secure and deepen the interpretation of the unity in Christ, he made a contribution to its conceptual clarification that is not to be despised.

(b) *The positive contribution of the Scythians to post-Chalcedonian christology*

(i) *Nature-person: abstract and concrete*

In contrast to the period which saw the sharp altercation between Cyril and Nestorius, in the first decade of Justin's restoration many advances in christological language can be established. It is well known what confusion had arisen because of the fact that the difference between the concrete and abstract naming of Christ's divinity and humanity (*divinitas-humanitas vis-à-vis* the concrete terms *deus-homo*) was carefully distinguished only on rare occasions. What Nestorius in fact wanted to exclude unconditionally was the statement that the 'divinity' suffered. He expressed this, however, in concrete terms: the God in Christ did not suffer, the human being Christ suffered. The conflict was sparked off by this. The Scythian monks knew very well how to distinguish in this regard, and their language is more flexible than that of their contemporary Roman partners like the priest Trifolius. The naming of the aspect under which Christ is to be considered as God and human being is strongly emphasized: according to the humanity — according to the divinity.<sup>72</sup> These distinctions have already become a matter of course.

(ii) *The concepts of person and nature*

More significant than this, however, is the attempt to distinguish more clearly between the concepts of person and nature. The problem is recognized.<sup>73</sup> Together with *persona* there often appears the word *subsistentia*, the rendering of the Greek *hypostasis*, while *substantia* means the

72. Cf. John Maxentius, *Prof. brev. cath. fid.* 4: pp. 34,27–35,36; *secundum humanitatem — secundum divinitatem*. The concrete and the abstract significations are combined well: *hunc eundem hominem esse figuram substantiae sive imaginem patris . . . non tamen secundum humanitatem, sed secundum divinitatem* (p. 35,33–36). Admittedly Maxentius does not grasp the real sense of the biblical statement behind this. According to Col 1,15, Christ the human being is the image of the invisible God; cf. Heb 1,3, where the humanity of Jesus is also included.

73. See F. Glorie, *Index nominum*, CCL 85A, p. 362: *persona, personalis, subsistentia: s v Christus*, 325–330; *trinitas*: 375–376.

same as *natura*.<sup>74</sup> What meanings do the monks attach to the individual words?

*Persona* and *subsistentia* have the same meaning.<sup>75</sup> Maxentius, however, speaks of a misuse of the words:

In an ungodly way certain people believe that the Synod [Chalcedon] attributes (the word) *persona* (*prosopon*) to the human being, but the *subsistence* to God the Word;<sup>76</sup> not that they do not know that for the Synod subsistence (*hypostasis*) and person are the same, but so that they may not appear openly to introduce two subsistences or two persons, they [the 'Nestorians'] use this utterly bad argument.<sup>77</sup>

The background to this reproach is the refusal of the papal deacon Dioscorus and the Sleepless Monks to acknowledge the formula 'one of the Trinity was crucified'. Instead they want to say 'one person of the Trinity, but not one of the Trinity'.<sup>78</sup> The reason for this change is said to be the secret Nestorianism of this expansion, as we have already depicted above. What positive meaning, however, does Maxentius attach to *persona* and *subsistentia*, if he wants to acknowledge one and the same significance? In the *Dialogue against the Nestorians* he explains his concept of person and his insistence on the one person in Christ in the following way.<sup>79</sup>

I believe (namely) that God the Word is not united to a human being who already remains in his own subsistence (*in propria manenti subsistentia*) nor to a flesh already [before the union] formed and animated, through which the person of any human being at all is understood to come about; but the subsistence (*hypostasis*) or person of the Word of God assumed a human nature, which never subsisted as common nature besides God the Word, but rather having originated from him and being assumed by him it has become properly *his* (*ipsius*) nature; it remains not in its own (subsistence) but in that by which it has been assumed, that is, in the subsistence or person of God the Word; and for that reason there are not two subsistences, but there is only one subsistence or person of the two natures — namely of the Word and of the flesh.

Up to this time this is certainly the clearest Latin explanation and interpretation of the 'one subsistence or person in divine and human natures' or already of the doctrine of 'insubsistence'.

74. Cf. *ibid.*, 372: s.v. *substantia*.

75. Cf. John Maxentius, *Capitula* I: CCL 85A, p. 29,4–5: *duas (naturas) unitas in una subsistentia atque persona . . .*; *idem*, *Prof. brev. cath. fid.* 1: in the Trinity there are *tres tamen subsistentiae sive personae* (*ibid.*, p. 33,4–5).

76. What is meant is the doubling of *hypostasis* and *persona* in the definition of Chalcedon (v. 21 of the definition; see CCT I<sup>2</sup>, p. 544): 'Concurring into one Person (*prosopon*) and one *hypostasis*.'

77. John Maxentius, *Libell. fid.* IX, 14: CCL 85A, p. 14,177–182. That is, the Nestorians attribute the *subsistentia* to the Logos, whose *persona*, however, is the human being Jesus.

78. *Idem*, *Resp. adv. ep. Hormisd.* I, 8: CCL 85A, p. 134,343–344.

79. *Idem*, *Dial. c. Nestorian.* I, XI: CCL 85A, p. 67,445–455.

The interpretation of being a person is enriched by an important element which advances beyond the *hypostasis* of the *idiomata* of the Cappadocians, namely the definition of a person as 'remaining in itself or in its subsistence' (*manere in seipso* or *manere in sua subsistentia*). Here person is considered as the final 'being for itself or in itself', which is bestowed on the concrete nature of Christ by the Logos. In this way it is possible to leave the human nature its full individuality and still to relate it as a finite existence to the one Logos-subject, without a duality of persons resulting. This 'remaining in itself' we shall encounter again soon in the important deacon Rusticus. It can be assumed that he learned it by watching the Scythians.<sup>80</sup> Unfortunately these new approaches were not yet recognized by their own inventors. Through these approaches alone the equating of *individuum* and person could have been overcome. Shortly after the previous passage, however, Maxentius again fell back into the old position.<sup>81</sup>

Nature is distinguished from person, because person signifies an individual thing [!] in a nature. Nature is known to signify the common matter out of which many persons are able to subsist. On this account each person indeed contains at the same time a nature, but not every nature embraces a person in the same way . . .

'Person' is thus once again equated with the *individuum* of a universal nature. This is indeed 'really' correct, but the very fact that the human nature of Christ is an individual nature for Maxentius and still does not have its own subsistence means that he must be questioned further about what the formal *ratio* of being a person is. He does not get as far as this question. Moreover for Maxentius it is the same whether it is a rational or non-rational nature. 'Person' can be signified as a thing! Boethius, his contemporary, here takes a decisive step forward, as we shall see.<sup>82</sup> Admittedly the Scythians emphasize vigorously that in the incarnation the Word assumed a complete human being with a spiritual soul and a body.<sup>83</sup> The problem of how the concept of person is related to rationality did not occur to them. Nevertheless certain approaches to

80. Cf. Rustic., *C. acephal.*: PL 67, 1239B; A. Grillmeier, 'Vorbereitung des Mittelalters', in *Chalkedon* II, 821.

81. John Maxentius, *Dial. c. Nestorian*. I, XIV: CCL 85A, p. 69,523-528.

82. Cf. V. Schurr, *Trinitätslehre*, 14-74.

83. On Christ's soul see John Maxentius, *Prof. brev. cath. fid.* 2: CCL 85A, p. 34,12-13; Scyth. mon., *Disput. XII capit. B'*: pp. 201,150-155; 204,241-242; *Refut. Nest. dict.* I: p. 215,27-33, 33-36: *Ita et illa ineffabilis divina filii dei maiestas in sua persona et substantia una est, cum assumpta anima sua compote mentis suae sive rationis, et solido ac perfecto corpore suo.*

this in classical antiquity had been made, which would be evaluated for christology and trinitarian theology by their contemporary, Boethius.<sup>84</sup>

(iii) *The interpretation of the union in Christ as compositio*

With remarkable frequency the concept of *synthesis* (*compositio*, composition) used to interpret the union in Christ also begins to establish itself in Chalcedonian christology of the sixth century. As a matter of course it emerges in Latin translation among the Scythian monks. It is, however, taken from the sources which were previously authoritative for them. A clue leads once again to Palestine, to the monastic supporters of the 'one of the Trinity was crucified', namely to the monastic leader Euthymius. Opponents of the Council of Chalcedon and supporters of Theodosius, who had usurped the patriarchal see of Jerusalem, came to Euthymius to make him give up Chalcedon and the two-natures teaching. He gave a historically interesting reply: the teaching of the Council about the one Christ in two natures agrees with that of Cyril of Alexandria. 'When we hear this Synod say that Christ is in two natures, we do not believe that it brings a separation or cutting up into the one *composite hypostasis of Christ*, but recognize that it signifies the distinction of the natures, according to the words of Cyril of Alexandria who is among the saints: "not as if the distinction of the natures was annulled by the union".'<sup>85</sup> According to this statement the expression 'Christ's composite *hypostasis*' would have been used by the Chalcedonians themselves immediately after 451.<sup>86</sup> The other source for this was probably sufficient for the Scythian monks, namely the (alleged?) *acta* of the Synod of Antioch (268) against Paul of Samosata, which the deacon Petronius cites in two long fragments in the 'Letter to the

84. Cf. V. Schurr, *Trinitatslehre*, 66–7, especially n. 122; listed here are: (1) Cicero, *De officiis*, lib. I, cap. 28, § 97. (2) The grammarian Diomedes (second half of the fourth century), *Artis grammaticae libri III*: H. Keil, *Grammatici Latini I* (Leipzig, 1857), p. 334, 19–23: *Persona est substantia rationalis*. V. Schurr, 67 (with S. Schlossmann), considers, however, that in the case of Diomedes it could be a later gloss. Gregory Naz., *Or.* 33: PG 36, 236A speaks of rationality in the area of the divine *hypostasis*. Cf. Gregory Nyss. = Ps. Basil, *Ep.* 38: PG 32, 326C: inclusion of the moral characteristics of individuation in the realization of the *hypostasis*.

85. Cynl Scyth., *Vita Euth.*, no. 27: Schwartz, *Kyrillos von Skythopolis*, pp. 43, 25–44, 4; cf. Cyril Alex., in ACO I, 1, 1, p. 27, 2–3.

86. The *Vita Euthymii* was written only after 554. Cf. E. Schwartz, *Kyrillos von Skythopolis*, 413–14. The suspicion arises that the *hypostasis synthetos* of Euthymius is a formulation of Cyril of Scythopolis.

(African) bishops'. The authenticity is disputed. M. Richard<sup>87</sup> considers them to be Apollinarian forgeries from the fifth or the sixth century. There is as well a second Apollinarian source, namely the Ps. Athanasian writing *Quod unus sit Christus*.<sup>88</sup> In the text of Malchion, who was an opponent of Paul of Samosata, Christ is composed from single elements, the Logos and the human body; he is an indivisible figure which subsists in unity. The execution of the *compositio* demands two real substances, Logos and *sarx*, while Paul is said to be happy with an accidental *participatio* of the human being Jesus in the divine wisdom or to accept only a loose indwelling. 'Entitative unity from two realities': this result the Scythians also found in Malchion's concept of *compositio*;<sup>89</sup> what did not strike them is that in this the soul of Christ has no place and that a nature-synthesis occurs between Logos and *sarx* (*unio in natura et secundum naturam*). The important thing for them is the rejection of Nestorianism. In the writing *One is Christ, unitas et compositio* have the same function, that is, to be one and composite as the counter-terms to dwelling in and purely operating in (*inhabitatio, inoperatio*). They lead here too to the 'one *substantia Christi*' in opposition to the 'two subsistences and two persons' of the Apollinarian opponents.<sup>90</sup> Entitative 'composition from two realities' was for the Scythians the main christological formula.<sup>91</sup> They directed it equally against the Nestorians and the Headless Ones, that is, the confessors of the *mia physis*.<sup>92</sup> It

87. On Malchion and Paul of Samosata, cf. CPG 1706 and 1707. In favour of the authenticity see H. de Riedmatten, *Les actes du procès de Paul de Samosate = Paradosis 6* (Fribourg, 1952), 148–50 (S, 25); against the authenticity see M. Richard, 'Malchion et Paul de Samosate. Le témoignage d'Eusèbe de Césarée', *EphThLouv* 35 (1959), 325–38 = *Op. Min.* II, no. 25. See the texts in CCL 85A, pp. 160,89–161,118.

88. CPG 3737: H. Lietzmann, *Apollinaris von Laodicea*, pp. 295,21–296,9; here CCL 85A, p. 161,105–118.

89. Scyth. mon., *Ep. ad Eppos* (III), 6: CCL 85A, p. 160,81–83: *Hinc etiam a sanctis patribus adunatione ex divinitate et humanitate Christus dominus noster compositus praedicatur*.

90. Cf. *ibid.* (III), 6: CCL 85A, p. 161,115–118.

91. Cf. John Maxentius, *Capitula c. Nestorian*. 9: CCL 85A, p. 30,34–35: *Si quis non confitetur compositum Christum post incarnationem, anathema sit*. According to the *Dial. c. Nestorian*. II, II: p. 78,71–72, the 'Nestorian' refuses to describe Christ as *compositus* because he considers it to be impossible to unite an infinite (*incircumscripta*) and a finite (*circumscripta*) nature. With a view to this the catholicus refers to the human *compositum* (body-soul) as the analogy acknowledged by the Fathers for the divine-human unity (*ibid.*, p. 80,173–177). The 'Nestorian' counters with the statement that a *compositio* presupposes 'parts', and asks whether we can describe God as 'part' of Christ. The catholicus responds: 'The God-Logos is not smaller than Christ, because he himself is Christ [in the flesh]' (*ibid.*, p. 81,193–194).

92. Cf. John Maxentius, *Resp. c. Aceph.* II, 3: against the supporters of the *una natura* Maxentius defends an *adunatio, quae compositionem facit, refugiat simplicitatem, susceptionemque procul dubio a filio dei humanae naturae significet*; the result is then the two natures, *ex quibus et in quibus subsistit una et singularis Christi persona* (CCL 85A, p. 44,21–26).

became the main term of unity in Christ which in all its conditions is so precisely defined, as elsewhere for instance, is the expression *henosis*: the composition occurs at the very moment of conception.<sup>93</sup> It is a creative act, as the resurrection of Christ is too. The whole Trinity participates in it, even if it is only the flesh, the human nature of Christ, that is the object of this creating (and resurrecting). Insofar as Christ is one of the Trinity, one can also say that he 'together with the Father and the Holy Spirit creates and resurrects himself according to the flesh'.<sup>94</sup> Only the acceptance of a *compositio* is protection against ascribing suffering to the simple and impassible godhead itself,<sup>95</sup> or on the other side (in the case of the Nestorian separation) of making suffering a purely human thing that has no significance for our salvation. In short, in the expression *compositio* the Scythians, with numerous theologians of their time, saw a concept which excluded equally two false interpretations of the incarnation, the Nestorian separation and the Eutychian mixing, and which at the same time interpreted positively the unity of Christ as 'essential' (*essentialis*). It was in this way that Maxentius explained his christological *tessera*, the 'one of the Trinity was crucified'.

### III. THE DECISION ON THE THEOPASCHITE QUESTION UNDER POPE JOHN II (533-535)

All the efforts of Emperor Justin and his nephew Justinian, of the patriarchs of Constantinople and of the Scythian monks themselves could not achieve in Rome an acknowledgement of the formula 'one of the Trinity has been crucified'. On 9 September 520 Justinian had written his last attested letter on this question to Pope Hormisdas (CPG 6873). But the topic in no way left him in peace. After he had become the sole monarch (527), from various actions we recognize his resolve to restore the religious unity of the Empire. From that time the confession of the theopaschite formula was not omitted from any document related to christology. The influence of Empress Theodora — in this Chalcedonian-anti-Chalcedonian mixed marriage — is from now on to be taken into consideration.<sup>96</sup>

93. John Maxentius, *Dial. c. Nestorian*. II, II: pp. 81,216-82,226. A *compositio* only after the birth would be an 'indwelling'.

94. *Ibid.* II, XVIII: CCL 85A, p. 100,844-850. Cf. *idem*, *Breviss. adunat. ratio* 2: p. 40,10-14. In this way a Nestorian doctrine of indwelling is excluded from the outset. The union in Christ is *naturalis, non socialis*: *ibid.* 3, p. 40,16-17.

95. *Ibid.* II, II: p. 81,195-219.

96. Victor of Tunnuna, *Chronicon* a. 529: *MGH auct. ant.* XI/2, ed. Mommsen, 197, reports that the Empress demanded the theopaschite formula unconditionally.

The *Codex Iustinianus* I,1,5 contains a confession of faith which is perhaps to be dated 527.<sup>97</sup> In it the *unus ex trinitate* is expressly mentioned.<sup>98</sup> In 532, at the conclusion of the doctrinal dialogue with the Severans, which we have already treated, we encounter our formula once again. According to the report of Innocent of Maronia, it was through it that the accusation was brought against the Chalcedonians before the Emperor, to the effect that they would deny 'that God suffered in the flesh or that he [Christ] was one of the Trinity and that the miracles and the sufferings did not belong to the one and the same person'.<sup>99</sup> At the special audience which the Patriarch of Constantinople, Epiphanius, and archbishop Hypatius had requested in order to deal with the accusations of the Syrians on account of the *unus ex trinitate*, the Emperor asked: 'Do you not confess that both the suffering as well as the miracles belong to the same person of our Lord Jesus Christ, and that he is the God who suffered in the flesh and that he is one of the Trinity?' Hypatius made an explicit *confessio*, in which a positive response was given to all the points raised by the Emperor.<sup>100</sup> Justinian could be satisfied and feel that he was in a position to extend his initiative in favour of the disputed formula to the whole Empire, and above all to be able to make a new approach for it in Rome. On 15 March 533 the Emperor issued in edict form a confession of faith which was addressed to the citizens of Constantinople, but also to the important cities from Trebizond to Jerusalem and Alexandria.<sup>101</sup> Into a text which is compiled in a completely trinitarian, creed-like manner is consciously inserted: 'one of the Trinity, the God-Logos, became flesh'<sup>102</sup> and the denial of the following statement is condemned: 'our Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God and our God, who became flesh and a human being and was fixed to the cross, is one of the consubstantial Trinity'.<sup>103</sup> The second letter, of 26

97. Justinian, *Cum recta intemerataque fides*: *Cod. Iust.* I, 1, 5, ed. Krüger, 6-7; on the dating see *ibid.*, p. 7, n. 2 with reference to *ibid.*, I, 1, 6, no. 3: *quod iam pridem in primordiis nostri imperii cunctis patefecimus*. By this is probably meant the beginning of the sole reign.

98. *Ibid.*, I, 1, 5, no. 2: Krüger, 6b.

99. ACO IV, 2, no. 82: p. 183.

100. ACO IV, 2, nos. 83-6: p. 183. Hypatius in no. 85: *similiter et unum esse ex trinitate secundum divinam naturam iam credentes quam confitentes, secundum carnem vero unum ex nobis placuisse ei credimus fieri*. The formula is cleverly composed and raises no problem for a Chalcedonian. See J. Speigl, 'Das Religionsgespräch mit den severianischen Bischöfen in Konstantinopel im Jahre 532', *AHC* 16 (1984), 280-1.

101. Justinian, *Cum salvatorem et dominum*: *Cod. Iust.* I, 1, 6: Krüger, 7a-8a; Amelotti-Migliardi Zingale, *Scritti teologici*, 32-35 (Greek and Latin according to the *Chronicon Paschale*, ed. Dindorf [Bonn, 1832], 630-633).

102. *Ibid.*: Amelotti-Migliardi Zingale, p. 35,5-6; *Cod. Iust.* I, 1, 6, no. 6: Krüger, 7b.

103. *Ibid.*: Amelotti-Migliardi Zingale, p. 35,14-15; *Cod. Iust.* I, 1, 6, no. 7: Krüger, 8a.

March 533, was sent to Patriarch Epiphanius.<sup>104</sup> Without doubt the main intention was once again to preserve ecclesiastical unity. As Justinian lets the Patriarch know, it was finally determined by the Pope and Patriarch of Old Rome, who received a similar letter. All the themes and formulas of the theopaschite action that are now sufficiently familiar to us return once again.<sup>105</sup> What is striking in all these documents is that neither the formula of the Severans nor that of the Chalcedonians (one nature — two natures) is adduced. It is only in the letter to Patriarch Epiphanius that the four General Councils are mentioned.<sup>106</sup>

In June 533 Emperor Justinian sent the bishops Demetrius and Hypatius (cf. above, p. 230) to Rome to Pope John II (533–535) with a letter of 6 June 533.<sup>107</sup> Justinian's request was now to recognize the Scythian monks and to condemn the Sleepless Monks; this signified precisely the reverse of the request which he had expressed in his first letter to Pope Hormisdas at the end of June 519. As Pope John communicated, the Sleepless Monk, Cyrus, appeared in Rome with some companions who wanted to proceed against the Scythians, but who for this reason were themselves found guilty of heresy. Because they were unwilling to follow the apostolic admonitions of the Pope, they were excluded from the catholic Church until they repented of their error and signed a regular confession. Then, however, the ecclesial community would again be open to them, which would also induce the Emperor to grant forgiveness.<sup>108</sup> The point at issue is most clearly expressed in the letter of John II to the senators of Constantinople.<sup>109</sup> The three questions that required a decision were still those that had been presented in 519:

- (1) whether Christ may be called 'one of the Trinity', that is, 'as one holy person of the three persons of the holy Trinity';
- (2) whether Christ suffered as God in the flesh who, according to divinity, however, is free from suffering;
- (3) whether really and in the true sense Mary may be named the mother of God and mother of the God-Logos who became flesh from her.

104 Justinian, *Epiphano . . . archiep et oecumenico patriarchae: Cod. Iust.* I, 1, 7: Krüger, 8a–10b.

105. *Ibid.*, nos. 4, 5, 6: Krüger, 8b–9a.

106. *Ibid.*, nos 11–21: Krüger, 9b–10b.

107. *Cod. Iust.* I, 1, 8, no. 24. Krüger, 11b; CA, *ep* 84 (also in *ep* 91, nos. 8–22).

108. John II, *Ep ad Iustman. aug.*, of 25 March 534: CA, *ep* 84, nos. 25–28: CSEL 35, 326–327, Amelotti-Migliardi Zingale, *Scritti teologici*, 20–21.

109. *Idem, Ep. ad Senatores: ACO* IV, 2, 206–210. The christological part is summarized in DS 401–2; cf. F. Glorie, in CCL 85A, XXXVIII.



All three questions were now answered positively. The Pope gave a clear, short summary of the faith of the Roman Church on the basis of the *Tomus* and the letters of Pope Leo and of the four councils: *sicut Roma hactenus suscepit et veneratur ecclesia*.<sup>110</sup> So simply ended the fourteen-year dispute which from the very beginning of Justin's reform led to a crisis within the Chalcedonian party not without its dangers, as Emperor Justinian emphasized many times in his letters. The hymn, which according to Theophanes was sung in the Church of Constantinople in 535/536 by order of Justinian, can be regarded almost as a conclusion to this altercation.<sup>111</sup>

Only-begotten Son and Logos of God, immortal by nature.  
For the sake of our salvation you took it upon yourself  
To become flesh from the holy mother of God  
and ever-virgin Mary.  
Without change become a human being and crucified  
Christ God, through death treading death with the feet,  
One of the holy Trinity  
jointly glorified with the Father and the Holy Spirit.  
Save us!

The hymn could be sung by both Severans and Chalcedonians. It was completely orthodox. This was not yet the last word on the first theological action of Justinian. At the Council of 553 with canon 10 of the anathemas against the Three Chapters, the capstone, as it were, was put on a building which was to be dedicated to the *unus e Trinitate crucifixus*:

If anyone does not confess that our Lord Jesus Christ, *who was crucified in the flesh*,<sup>112</sup> is true God and Lord of glory [cf. 1 Cor 2,8] and one of the holy Trinity, let him be anathema.<sup>113</sup>

In this form every sting was taken from the canon. Nevertheless the conflict did not end without losses for the Church of Constantinople.

110. John II, *Ep. ad Senatores*, no. 29: ACO IV, 2, p. 210,5-6.

111. See V. Grumel, 'L'auteur et la date de composition du tropaire 'O Μονογενής', *EO* 22 (1923), 398-418. Cf. CPG 6891. Grumel considers it probable (but only that) that Justinian himself is the author of the hymn, or at least the person who inspired it. In any case the hymn is unknown both in Constantinople and in the Empire before 519. Between 531 and 539 it was adopted into two liturgies. The text is found on 400-1. Grumel sees it closely related to the monophysite patriarch Anthimus; indeed, he is of the opinion that Justinian himself became a monophysite (418). This must be examined more closely in what follows.

112. So too Cyril of Alexandria's twelfth anathema: CED (Greek, 61; English, 61\*).

113. *Constantinop. II., Actio VIII, can. X*: ACO IV, 1, 218 (Latin); *ibid.*, 242 (Greek). See also the fourth anathema in Justinian's letter to the monks: Schwartz, *Drei dogmatische Schriften Justinians*, p. 42,32-36.

The most severely affected were the Sleepless Monks, who were now condemned as Nestorians.<sup>114</sup>

The Sleepless Ones (*Aquimitos*), however, who call themselves monks, the Roman Church also condemns, because they have publicly appeared as Nestorians; on their account I do not neglect to admonish you with pastoral care, for the sake of the canon which does not permit a Christian to speak or to have fellowship with excommunicated people; you should avoid all simple dialogue with them and consider nothing as common between you and them. I do this, therefore, that I may not be found guilty of silence, if I were in no way to have brought this to your notice, most Christian son.

With this condemnation the heyday of the Sleepless Monks came to 'a sudden end'.<sup>115</sup> Their services in establishing the validity of Chalcedon during the Acacian schism<sup>116</sup> were apparently quickly forgotten.<sup>117</sup> However, we can decide for ourselves whether this condemnation was correct, on the basis of the third redaction of the forged letters to Peter the Fuller, which had their origin in the monastery of the Sleepless Monks. In letters VIII–X they had already taken a position with regard to the contentious theme of the Scythian monks. As the *unus ex Trinitate crucifixus est* was explained there, there was no trace at all of Nestorianism.

The enhypostatic God-Logos of the Father, by entering through the ear, effected in a mystical way the pregnancy of the blessed Virgin. Insofar as he is the consubstantial only-begotten Son of the Father and one of the undivided Trinity, uncreated and invisible, he also remains free of suffering and immortal. Thus what is uncreated and immortal does not combine [mix] with creation and does not support talk of the polytheism, when you say one of the Trinity dies. Insofar as he was born of woman, was of the same race, of the same stock, of the same nature as us but without sin, he took suffering upon himself.<sup>118</sup>

The Sleepless Monk thus ascribed to Peter the Fuller genuine theopaschism (on account of the *unus ex tribus*) and in addition, on account of his confession of the Trishagion in its expanded, theopaschite form, condemned him as a supporter of Paul of Samosata, Photinus, Artemos,

114. John II, *Ep. ad Senatores*, no. 30: ACO IV, 2, p. 210,9–15.

115. R. Riedinger, art. 'Akoimeten', in *TRE* 2, 148.

116. Cf. H. Bacht, 'Die Rolle des orientalischen Mönchtums . . .', in *Chalcedon* II, no. VI: 266–91.

117. R. Riedinger, *art. cit.*, 148, says that the Sleepless Monks were already condemned as Messalians in the years 426–427 and driven across the Bosphorus. Important nuances to this, however, are produced by E. Wölflé in his accurate study 'Der Abt Hypatius von Rufinianai und der Akoimete Alexander', *ByzZ* 79 (1986), 302–9. In the years 546–548 Facundus of Hermiane and in 565 the Roman deacon Rusticus visited the monastery of the Sleepless Monks, in order to take advantage of their library in the conflict about the Three Chapters.

118. Ps. Felix, *Ep. II: Coll. Sabb. ep. VIII*: ACO III, p. 21,29–35.

the two-sons teaching and Manichaeism.<sup>119</sup> At the end he explains in a completely unobjectionable way the Church's faith in the incarnation, which he said, however, Peter the Fuller denied.<sup>120</sup>

Just as the Sleepless Monks for their part falsely accused the Scythian monks of theopaschism,<sup>121</sup> so now after fourteen years of conflict they themselves had to accept being condemned unjustly as Nestorians. It is to be regretted that after the resolution of the Acacian schism a new conflict had broken out among the Chalcedonians themselves, which ended with the condemnation of the unwavering defenders of the Council in the difficult years of the *Henoticon* dispute.

119. *Loc. cit.*, p. 22,9-14.

120. See especially *loc. cit.*, p. 23,4-10.

121. We find this once again expressed forcefully in the letter just cited: ACO III, p. 24,21-37, where the *unus ex trinitate* is linked to the Trishagion.

## CHAPTER TWO

### THE STRUGGLE FOR THE SEVERANS AND ITS THEOLOGICAL OUTCOME

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A second group of actions launched by the Emperor after the assumption of office by Justin and Justinian's sole rule concerned the anti-Chalcedonian party, of which Severus of Antioch had become the leader. These actions oscillated between offers of reconciliation and condemnations, between favour and persecution. This changing of attitude was held together on the one hand by the Eusebian-Constantinian motive of equating unity of faith and the welfare of the Empire,<sup>122</sup> and on the other hand by Justinian's consideration for his wife Theodora and her outspoken stance in favour of Severus. However, our main objective is not the depiction of changing ecclesiastical politics, but the development of Justinian's christology.

#### I. JUSTINIAN'S INDIVIDUAL ACTIONS IN DEALING WITH THE ANTI-CHALCEDONIANS (SEVERANS)

##### 1. Measures for persecution<sup>123</sup>

In the early part of 519 the banishment of anti-Chalcedonian bishops began, and at first continued until 522. Vitalian attempted to take his revenge on Severus in particular, who had ridiculed him publicly in his thirty-fourth cathedral homily after the failure of a revolt in 513 at

122. Cf. the *novella* 132: ed. Schoell-Kroll 665: 'The first and the greatest good of all human beings, we believe, is the right confession of the true and pure faith of the Christians, so that in every respect it is strengthened and all the holy priests of the world are bound together in unity and proclaim unanimously the pure faith of the Christians.' As well the motto which Procopius in his *Secret History*, ch. 13, ascribes to Justinian, the effort namely 'to lead all together into one unified faith in Christ' (*ἐς μίαν γὰρ ἀμφὶ τῷ Χριστῷ δόξαν <συναγαγεῖν> ἀπαντας ἐν σπουδῇ ἔχων*): Haury-Wirth III, p. 85, 14–16; O. Veh I, 116–17. It was for no other reason that in the conflict about the Three Chapters on 28 May 547 Justinian delivered to Pope Vigilius, who was staying in Constantinople, two letters of Emperor Constantine to ponder, in order to move him to condemn these Three Chapters. Cf. the Latin translation in ACO IV, 2, 101–104.

123. E. Honigmann, *Évêques et évêchés monophysites*, 142–54, places as the heading for the conclusion of his investigation: L'extinction de la hiérarchie sévérienne (518–538). According to a list that was probably compiled at Constantinople, apart from Severus 52 other bishops lost their sees. The severity of the action against the Oriental monks is movingly depicted in the *Chronicle* of Michael the Syrian. Cf. IX, 14 and 15: Chabot II, 170–8; IX, 19: 185–9.

Antioch.<sup>124</sup> The Chalcedonian bishops too joined in the persecution of their opponents. A notorious case was the successor of Severus of Antioch, Paul the Jew (519–521), who received this epithet from his opponents. At a synod he wanted to commit the Syrian bishops to accept Chalcedon. He could only hold out, however, until 1 May 521.<sup>125</sup> A fierce persecutor of the opponents of Chalcedon was the former *Comes Orientis*, Ephraem of Amida, who was Patriarch of Antioch from 526 to 545. In particular the victims of his measures were the bishops who had hidden themselves in the border regions of his patriarchate. In the winter of 536/537 he visited the most important centres of resistance.<sup>126</sup> Nevertheless, as early as 527, after Justinian's assumption of power, numerous bishops were able to return from exile.

## 2. The doctrinal dialogue of 532 in Constantinople

The pre-conditions for this *Collatio cum Severianis*<sup>127</sup> were created to a great extent by Theodora, albeit with intentions that went further than those of her husband. On account of the harsh suppression of the opponents of Chalcedon in Antioch, many of them attempted to come to the capital in order to regain their lost positions with the help of the Empress. Even in the summer of 531, Justinian had recalled from exile whole groups (*tagmata*) of monks<sup>128</sup> and had stopped the laws of persecution being executed.<sup>129</sup> Thus those six bishops who are already

124. Severus Ant., *Hom.* 34: PO 36, 430–7 (Syriac and French). Severus also composed a hymn for the victory of Emperor Anastasius: PO 7, 710–11.

125. E. Honigmann, *op. cit.*, 148, n. 5.

126. Cf. Michael Syr., *Chron.* IX, 16: Chabot II, 181b; Zacharias Rh. cont., *HE* X, 1: Brooks, CSCO 88, 118–19; ET Hamilton-Brooks, 297–300; J. Lebon, 'Ephrem d'Amid', in *Mélanges ... C. Moeller (1863–1913)* I (Louvain/Paris, 1914), 197–214; E. Honigmann, *op. cit.*, 149. In addition see below (on Antioch).

127. See above, pp. 232–48.

128. Zacharias Rh. cont., *HE* VIII, 5: Brooks, CSCO 88, p. 56, 29–33; ET Hamilton-Brooks, 212. Cf. E. Schwartz, 'Zur Kirchenpolitik Justinians', in *Ges. Schriften* IV, 282; sources: *idem*, *Kyrrillos von Skythopolis*, 389, n. 1.

129. Cf. E. Schwartz, *Kyrrillos von Skythopolis*, 392; Michael Syr., *Chron.* IX, 21: Chabot II, 192b: 'Justinianus ... ordonna que la persécution cessât, et que les persécutés revinssent à leurs demeures. Beaucoup revinrent, à l'exception des évêques qui ne rentrèrent pas dans leurs sièges. L'empereur se préoccupait de la paix des églises; cependant les péchés l'empêchèrent. L'impératrice fidèle, Theodora, se préoccupait encore davantage de la paix des églises et persuadait à l'empereur d'y travailler.' Michael then describes how the Empress accommodated more than 500 of the wanted clergy (especially monks) in a large court of the palace of Hormisdas. Severus, Theodosius and Anthimus and many wanted bishops she accommodated for years in her palace. In contrast to the Emperor's tolerance, which Michael the Syrian depicted positively above, is the negative

known to us as participants in the *Collatio* of 532 also received the invitation to come to Constantinople. From the desert, however, they first demanded imperial assurances of their freedom. When these were given, they were prepared to come into the Imperial City. During the time of their sojourn in Constantinople (531/532) there occurred, however, the notorious Nika riot (January 532), which could almost have cost Justinian his life and crown, had it not been for the perseverance of Theodora and her intervention to save him and his rule.<sup>130</sup> In a devastated city and after the severe political upheavals of the winter of 532, there was not much hope for the doctrinal dialogue. What Justinian was striving for at that time is expressed in the edict of 15 March 533. It contains a profession of faith which does not contradict Chalcedonian orthodoxy, but which could appear acceptable also to the Severans.<sup>131</sup> For in it everything is omitted which could provoke them, above all the two-natures formula and the mention of Chalcedon. In contrast the theopaschite formula is acknowledged.<sup>132</sup> The policy of the *Henoticon* seemed to have returned. The Emperor was seriously concerned to restore the unity of the Church through peace and not through persecution.<sup>133</sup>

### 3. The crisis of the Chalcedonian restoration in the East in the years 535/536

With Emperor Justinian's new religious policy, the Severans recognized the chance to permeate the capital more and more with their influence, and on that basis to make a fresh attempt to abolish Chalcedon. In

judgement in the *Secret History* of Procopius of Caesarea, chs. 15 and 16 (Haury-Wirth III, 94–104; Veh I, 128–42). Procopius deplores nothing more persistently than intolerance and imperial involvement in matters of faith. Cf. Averil Cameron, *Procopius and the Sixth Century* (London, 1985), 119–20, especially with reference to the *Secret History*, 13, 4–5; 18, 30, 34; 19, 11 (with commentary in O. Veh I, 299–300; 305–7).

130. See Procopius Caes., *Persian Wars* I, 24: Haury-Wirth I, 123–34; O. Veh III, 174–88, with commentary 480–2; Procopius experienced the Nika riot personally (Veh, 439). Theodora's address in O. Veh III, 182–4, is 'without a doubt historical' (*ibid.*, 481). According to Procopius, in the putting down of the riot by Belisarius and Mundus more than thirty thousand people of the citizen body died. See R. Browning, *Justinian and Theodora* (above n. 3), 109–12; J. A. S. Evans, 'The "Nika" Rebellion and the Empress Theodora', *Byz* 54 (1984), 380–2.

131. Justinian imp., *Ep. ad Constantinop.* (CPG 9313): *Cod. Iust.* I, 1, 6: Krüger, 7–8.

132. *Ibid.*, no. 7: Krüger, 8a. In the letter to Patriarch Epiphanius of 26 March 533 (CPG 9314): *Cod. Iust.*, I, 1, 7: Krüger, 8–10 and in the letter to Pope John II, of 6 June 533 [CPG 9315]: CA, ep. 84 [= CPG 6874], the four synods were explicitly mentioned and acknowledged as binding. Cf. CA, ep. 84, nos. 17 and 18: CSEL 35, 324.

133. Cf. E. Schwartz, 'Zur Kirchenpolitik Justinians', in *Ges. Schriften* IV (276–320), 283.

November 533 they took advantage of the panic that occurred among the population because of the earthquake, to organize a demonstration by the people against the Fourth Synod.<sup>134</sup> There soon appeared significant opportunities to take drastic measures.

*(a) Empress Theodora and the filling of vacant patriarchal thrones*

After the failure of the doctrinal dialogue of 532 a new initiative to unite the religious parties was introduced: the patriarchal leaders of the anti-Chalcedonian opposition, Severus of Antioch (in exile in Egypt) and Timothy IV (III) of Alexandria were to be invited to the capital in the years 534/535 for direct negotiations. Unexpected obstacles arose, however, which Empress Theodora knew how to turn skilfully to her advantage. On 7 February 535, Patriarch Timothy IV (III) died. The Empress made sure that a decided opponent of the Fourth Council, the deacon Theodosius, could ascend the throne of St Mark. Alexandria, however, was divided and dominated by the Julianist party. In spite of the support of the imperial officials, the new Severan patriarch was driven out as early as 10 February 535 by the Julianist Gaianus. But he too could only hold out for 103 days, when Theodosius was once again appointed, even if for only a short time.<sup>135</sup> At Constantinople the Chalcedonian patriarch, Epiphanius, died (5 June 535). Theodora was successful in bringing to the patriarchal throne of the capital a man who had her trust, Anthimus, previously the bishop of Trebizond. In 532 he had taken part in the doctrinal dialogue of Constantinople while still on the Chalcedonian side.<sup>136</sup> What was important was that in the winter of 534/535 Severus had come to Constantinople and had been accommodated in the imperial palace.<sup>137</sup> He quickly succeeded in bringing the new patriarch over to his side. Thus, under the protection of Theodora, an influential trio (consisting of Severus, Timothy or after his death his successor, Theodosius, and Anthimus) could be constituted, whose goals were expressed in an extensive correspondence. These consisted of nothing other than the abolition of the Chalcedonian restoration of 518/519 and

134. *Chron. Pasch.* 629 BC: the praying crowd called to Christ: 'Take and burn the decree composed by the bishops of the Synod of Chalcedon.' Cf. E. Stein, *Histoire du Bas-Empire* II, 380.

135. Cf. J. Maspero, *Histoire des Patriarches d'Alexandrie* (1923), 110–17 on Gaianus; 117–19 on Theodosius.

136. Cf. ACO IV, 2, p. 169, 11; J. Speigl, 'Das Religionsgespräch mit den severianischen Bischöfen im Jahr 532', *AHC* 16 (1984), 261–85.

137. Cf. John Beth Aphth., *Vita Sev.*: PO 2, 252–3; John Eph., PO 2, 302; Zacharias Rh. cont., *HE* IX, 19; Brooks, *CSCO* 88, 93; ET Hamilton-Brooks, 265. Theodora is here named as the instigator of this summons; cf. Brooks, p. 93, 5–7; ET Hamilton-Brooks, 265; see in addition IX, 20; Brooks, p. 95, 31; ET Hamilton-Brooks, 270.

the return to the positions under Emperor Anastasius, with certain more radical aspects included, which the dead Emperor would not have permitted. In his letters to Severus<sup>138</sup> and Theodosius,<sup>139</sup> Patriarch Anthimus offered nothing other than to restore communion on the basis of the first three councils of 325, 381 and 431 and of the *Henoticon* of Emperor Zeno, the latter being interpreted as a condemnation of Chalcedon and the *Tomus* of Leo I. In his letter of reply Severus spoke of his willingness for an already 'realized conjunction' between Anthimus and himself.<sup>140</sup> He intended to relay this to Patriarch Theodosius. Anthimus asserted to Theodosius as well that the same should be accepted as the basis of communion: the first three synods, Zeno's *Henoticon* (likewise interpreted as a condemnation of Chalcedon and Leo I) and Cyril's twelve anathemas.<sup>141</sup> Theodosius himself in his reply to Anthimus accepted these conditions completely.<sup>142</sup> In a letter to Severus he had already stated that he was fully in agreement with the teaching of Anthimus.<sup>143</sup> Because Emperor Justinian himself was now exposed to the immediate influence of the highly admired Severus — according to Zacharias Rhetor, the Emperor received the exile 'in a friendly manner'<sup>144</sup> — the Chalcedonian reform of 518/519 seemed to hang by only a thin thread. The two most important patriarchal sees of the East were already occupied by the opponents of the Fourth Council. In Jerusalem there appeared to be some uncertainty, as is clear from the letter of Pope Agapetus I to Peter of Jerusalem.<sup>145</sup> Patriarch Ephraem of Antioch was the last support for Chalcedon among the Eastern patriarchates. If

138. Anthimus, *Ep. ad Sever. Ant.* (CPG 7087): in Zacharias Rh. cont., *HE IX*, 21: Brooks, CSCO 88, 96–100; ET Hamilton-Brooks, 271–6; in addition IX, 22: Severus to Anthimus: Brooks, 100–5; ET Hamilton-Brooks, 276–81; IX, 23: Severus to Theodosius: Brooks, 105–7; ET Hamilton-Brooks, 281–3.

139. Anthimus, *Ep. ad Theodos.* (CPG 7088): Zacharias Rh. cont., *HE IX*, 25: Brooks, 111–13; ET Hamilton-Brooks, 287–90; the reply of Theodosius: IX, 26: Brooks, 114–17; ET Hamilton-Brooks, 291–5; *idem*, *Ep. synodica ad Severum* (CPG 7134): CSCO 103 (V), p. 2,30–33 (*Henoticon*).

140. Zacharias Rh. cont., *HE IX*, 22: Brooks, p. 105,13–14; ET Hamilton-Brooks, 280. Cf. John Beth Aphth., *Vita Sev.*: PO 2, 253–6. That Anthimus wished to restore the unity of the Church on this basis is also shown by his letter to Jacob Baradai, bishop of Edessa (CPG 7085), in F. Nau, 'Littérature canonique syriaque inédite', *ROC* 14 (1909), 123–4, particularly at the end where Theodoret and Ibas of Edessa are then named as opponents.

141. Cf. Zacharias Rh. cont., *HE IX*, 25: Brooks, CSCO 88, p. 112,15–25; ET Hamilton-Brooks, 289.

142. Cf. *ibid.*, IX, 26: Brooks, CSCO 88, 114–15; ET Hamilton-Brooks, 293.

143. Cf. *ibid.*, IX, 24: Brooks, CSCO 88, 108–9; ET Hamilton-Brooks, 285.

144. *Ibid.*, IX, 19: Brooks, CSCO 88, p. 93,4–5; ET Hamilton-Brooks, 265; in addition IX, 15: Brooks, p. 84,25–28; ET Hamilton-Brooks, 252–3.

145. Agapet., *Ep. ad Petrum* (CPG 9325 [9319]): ACO III, 152–3.



Theodora and Justinian had shared the same intention, it is possible that Peter would have succumbed to the influence of Severus, and Ephraem too would have lost his see.

(b) *The Chalcedonian reaction*

The supporters of Chalcedon in Constantinople were alarmed. The archimandrite and monks there, strengthened by a delegation of monks from Syria II and from the desert near Jerusalem (Sabas' monasteries), dared to make an attack on Anthimus, Severus, Peter, the former metropolitan of Apamea,<sup>146</sup> and the fanatical monk Zooras, a Syrian from Sophanone and a former stylite, who had settled in the exclusive residential area Sykai, performed baptisms and liturgies and brought numerous supporters to the anti-Chalcedonian party.<sup>147</sup> The monks demanded from Anthimus an unambiguous profession of Chalcedon, the acknowledgement of the *Tomus* of Leo I and the condemnation of Patriarch Dioscorus, who was deposed at Chalcedon. Anthimus, however, refused to meet this demand.<sup>148</sup> Consequently the monks sent a delegation to Pope Agapetus I in Rome, who on 13 May 535 had become the successor of Pope John II.<sup>149</sup> Patriarch Ephraem too, however, turned to Rome through the doctor Sergius of Rēš'ainā, who was intended to deliver a letter to Pope Agapetus I<sup>150</sup> in order to move him to intervene in Constantinople. A journey by the Pope to the East at just this time, however, was also being pushed by Theodahat,<sup>151</sup> the king of the Goths, who hoped in this way to achieve the cessation of Justinian's military operations in Dalmatia and Sicily. In December 532 Pope Agapetus departed for Constantinople, where he arrived in March

146. Peter of Apamea had in any case come to Constantinople. Cf. E. Schwartz, *Kyrillos von Skythopolis*, 392-3; cf. R. Schieffer, *Indices*, ACO IV, 3, 2, 2, pp. 385b-386a.

147. Cf. R. Schieffer, *op. cit.*, 508a.

148. See the *Relatio monachorum*, CPG 9325 (2), delivered at the Council of Constantinople on 2 May 536, ACO III, 134-6, especially no. 62: pp. 134, 27-135, 6.

149. *Ibid.*, p. 135, 9, 23, the monks mention their *libellus* to Pope Agapetus. Whether this, however, was presented to the Pope at Rome or only in Constantinople is not clear. The *relatio* itself was composed after the death of Agapetus I (p. 136, 6-7).

150. Cf. Zacharias Rh. cont., *HE* IX, 19: Brooks, CSCO 88, 93-4; ET Hamilton-Brooks, 266-7. Pope John II had died on 8 May 535.

151. On the Goths under (King) Theodahat and the intentions of the latter regarding the papal journey of Agapetus I, cf. Procopius, *Gothic Wars* I, 3, 6-11; Veh II, 22-23, 40-47, 46-93, with commentary 1014-16, especially, however, 1017-21. Theodahat negotiated secretly with Justinian's delegation, the bishops Hypatius and Demetrius, for the purpose of yielding Tuscany to Justinian in return for the conferral of the dignity of senator on the Goth and his transfer to Byzantium. On Agapetus I see Veh's commentary, 1017. Theodahat was assassinated in 536.

536.<sup>152</sup> In a short time his presence changed the situation. Anthimus was deposed as patriarch and only acknowledged as bishop of Trebizond; but it was intended that he should reclaim his see only after he had proven his Chalcedonian orthodoxy. His successor on the patriarchal throne was the priest Menas,<sup>153</sup> whom the Pope himself ordained as bishop on 13 March 536. The new patriarch as well as Justinian signed confessions of faith which contained the well-known formula of Hormisdas, admittedly expanded by additions (in § 3), in which was contained the Chalcedonian doctrine of the two natures in the one person of Christ.<sup>154</sup> Agapetus I even sent a letter to Patriarch Peter of Jerusalem.<sup>155</sup> In this he expressed his surprise that Peter did not bring to the notice of the Pope in Rome the uncanonical appointment of Anthimus. With a feeling of satisfaction he commented moreover that since the days of Peter the Apostle it was the first time that an Eastern bishop has been ordained by the bishop of Rome.<sup>156</sup> In its significance the harmony between Agapetus I and Emperor Justinian certainly compared with that between Emperor Justin and Pope Hormisdas, insofar as now the imminent restoration of the *Henoticon* policy was excluded, and Constantinople was definitively won for the Chalcedonian restoration. The monks of the capital contributed to the extension of what had been won, and presented Pope Agapetus I with an indictment against Anthimus.<sup>157</sup> They demanded that decisive action be taken against Severus, Peter of Apamea, Zooras and people of like mind<sup>158</sup> and that the writings of Severus should be burned. A similar document was

152. Cf. Zacharias Rh. cont., *HE* IX, 19; Brooks, *CSCO* 88, 94; ET Hamilton-Brooks, 267. See E. Stein, *Histoire du Bas-Empire* II, 342-5 (on Theodahat).

153. Patriarch Menas (13 March 536 — 24 August 552); Grumel, *Regestes* I<sup>2</sup>, nos. 232-43; CPG 6923-34.

154. Menas Const., *Libellus fidei* (CPG 6923), of 13 March 536: Grumel, *Regestes* I<sup>2</sup>, no. 232; CA, *ep.* 90; *Libellus . . . Iustiniani* (16 March 536): CA, *ep.* 89 (CPG 6876 with 6874-5). *Vis-à-vis* the Hormisdas formula of 519 the texts are expanded by the naming of the four synods, as well as the dogmatic letters of Leo I; in the mention of the Council of 381 (§ 2) the canon about the elevation of the See of Constantinople is omitted. Also the theopaschite formula, approved by John II, does not appear here. Nevertheless Pope Agapetus I in CA, *ep.* 82 and 91, of 18 March 536, confirms Justinian's confession of faith (CA, *ep.* 91, nos. 8-22 of 6 June 533), in which this formula is contained (in no. 14).

155. JW 897; CPG 9325 (5) = [9319]; ACO III, 152-3; PL 66, 47-50; read out at the synod of 536.

156. ACO III, p. 153, 16-21.

157. *Libellus monachorum ad Agapetum*, CPG 9325 (3): ACO III, pp. 136-47. In this they describe the activity which the 'Aposchists' had developed in the imperial city by baptisms and liturgies. In particular they want to achieve the complete exclusion of Anthimus, also as far as the Church of Trebizond is concerned (p. 140, 34).

158. ACO III, p. 141, 15-28.

presented to Pope Agapetus by the Oriental bishops, their *apocrisarii* and clerics,<sup>159</sup> in which it was demanded that action be taken against Severus, Zooras, Isaac the Persian and against Anthimus. Thus everything pushed for a synodal purification of the denounced evils, in other words a council which could have taken place in Constantinople under the presidency of Pope Agapetus. But then Agapetus fell ill, and died on 22 April 536.<sup>160</sup>

#### 4. The Synod of Constantinople 536 and its christological outcome

##### (a) *The task and course of the Synod*

After the unexpected death of Pope Agapetus I, Emperor Justinian probably felt himself obliged, as it were, to execute his will and to complete the measures introduced against Anthimus and those of like mind.<sup>161</sup> Hence he ordered Patriarch Menas to summon all of the bishops present in Constantinople to a *synodos endemousa*. It was intended that further participants should be those bishops whom Pope Agapetus had already sent to the Imperial City in 535, furthermore the deacons and *apocrisarii* of the patriarchs of Antioch and Jerusalem, as well as the metropolitans of Cappadocia I, Galatia I and Achaia. 'The convocation by the Emperor and the presence of the representatives of the Apostolic See elevated the synod far above the level of an *ἐνδημοῦσα* almost to the status of an ecumenical synod.'<sup>162</sup> What was also called for was to make people realize in an impressive way that the Chalcedonian restoration was already endangered and that it had undiminished validity. This was the real significance of the synod; it was not to give doctrinal clarifications to the christological problem. Had it taken place with Agapetus

159. ACO III, 147-52 = CPG 9325 (4).

160. E. Caspar, *Geschichte des Papsttums II* (1933), 226, n. 3, ventures to suspect that possibly Theodora eliminated the 'troublesome man' by force, although he cannot establish a suspicion of this kind in contemporary sources. See, however, the monstrous general comment of Procopius in the *Secret History*, ch. 13: O. Veh, 119. See the *Vita Agapeti* in the *Liber pontificalis*, ed. Duchesne, 287 and E. Caspar's critique, 226.

161. Cf. E. Schwartz, 'Zur Kirchenpolitik Justinians', in *Ges. Schriften* 4, 287-8.

162. *Ibid.*, 288. Schwartz also remarks that the *acta* were sent around to absent metropolitans and bishops for their signature (with evidence in n. 1).

presiding, this task would have been expressed in a unique manner.<sup>163</sup>

The Synod had five 'actions' (on 2, 6, 10, 21 May and 4 June 536). At the conclusion of the session on 6 August 536 a constitution against Anthimus, Severus, Peter and Zooras was decreed by Emperor Justinian (CPG 6877). The person of the deposed Anthimus was the central point. In an elaborate process the deposed patriarch was summoned before the Synod. Three delegations, each consisting of seven bishops, priests and deacons, were despatched to find and summon him. They found him neither in the palace of Hormisdas nor in the other houses and monasteries where he could have been presumed to have been, nor in his villa, where, however, two of his friends, Stephen and Longinus, were staying. Then delegations reported each time on their return about the futile search. In fact Anthimus was staying, probably under the protection of Empress Theodora without Justinian's knowledge, in a room of their palace. Even after the intervention of Agapetus, the Empress in no way abandoned her endeavour to bring to power once again the three deposed patriarchs, Anthimus, Severus and Theodosius.<sup>164</sup> In any case Theodora wanted to spare her protégé, Anthimus, interrogation and condemnation *in praesentia* by the Synod. This she also achieved; the *damnatio in absentia*, however, was not to be prevented.

On account of the fact that the accused could not be found, and new deadlines had to be set repeatedly for his appearance before the Synod, the greater part of the five sessions (*actiones*) consisted in the reading out and hearing of the reports of the lack of success by the delegations.<sup>165</sup>

163. On the Synod of Constantinople 536 see CPG 9313–29; Grumel, *Regestes* I<sup>2</sup>, nos. 233–8; Hefele-Leclercq, *Histoire des Conciles* II/2, 1142–55; Concile à Constantinople et à Jérusalem en 536. E. Schwartz, *art. cit.*, 287–90; A. de Halleux, 'Trois synodes impériaux du VI<sup>e</sup> s. dans une chronique syriaque inédite', in R. H. Fischer (ed.), *A Tribute to Arthur Vööbus* (Chicago, 1977), 295–307; on the Synod of 536: 296–300. On the Synod of Jerusalem, of 19 September 536, see CPG 9331. On Anthimus see E. Honigmann, 'Anthimus of Trebizond, Patriarch of Constantinople (June 535 – March 536)', in *idem*, *Patristic Studies* = ST 173 (Rome, 1953), 185–93.

164. Liberatus, *Brev.* 20: ACO II, 5, p. 136, 19–24, reports on their attempt to win Pope Agapetus' deacon Vigilius for the abolition of Chalcedon and on the deacon's willingness. On the question of the authenticity of this report see E. Honigmann, *art. cit.*, 189.

165. *Actio* I of 2 May 536: first delegation for the search: ACO III, no. 72, 153–4; corresponding report on the lack of success in *actio* II, of 6 May: ACO III, nos. 79–85, 159–60. Second delegation: no. 86, 160–1. Corresponding report on the lack of success in *actio* III, of 10 May 536, nos. 109–18, 174–6. Third delegation with a deadline of six (in all ten) days: *ibid.*, no. 119, 176–7, appointed at the third session, but dated from the 15 May 536, added to the *acta* of the fourth session of 21 May 536, with the corresponding report on the lack of success: ACO III, no. 121, 177.

*(b) Judgement and christological result of the Synod**(i) Conclusion of the fourth actio*

After the last report of lack of success in all searches on 21 May 536 the fourth session was closed with a final questioning of the members of the Synod on the *causa* Anthimus, and a *memoriale* of the monks of Jerusalem, which concerned Zooras in particular. Patriarch Menas asked first the Italian, then the Greek bishops for their *sententia*.

The Romans were brief and stated in Latin that they would adopt the judgement of deposition, which Pope Agapetus delivered before his death.<sup>166</sup> In the name of the Greek bishops Hypatius, the metropolitan of Ephesus, took the floor and formulated the charge against Anthimus:<sup>167</sup>

Anthimus has made himself guilty of many transgressions:

(1) In uncanonical manner he seized the patriarchal see of Constantinople and endeavoured to secure the agreement of the clergy and people.

(2) Secretly, however, he subscribed to the teaching of Eutyches, although he still made a profession of the four synods and also pretended to accept Leo's *Tomus*.<sup>168</sup> This was, however, to deceive the Emperor, the apostolic see of Rome and the patriarchs.<sup>169</sup> But Pope Agapetus I discovered that he denied ecclesial dogmas, in particular the teaching of the two natures which the Synod of Chalcedon defined against Eutyches.<sup>170</sup> Thus he is a supporter of Dioscorus and Eutyches.

(3) Because he has evaded the canonical process and has missed the acceptable moment for repentance, he must now be separated, as an unsuitable member, from the body of the holy Churches, deposed as bishop of Trebizond and, according to the judgement of the holy Pope [Agapetus], be declared to have forfeited every holy office and authority (*ἀξίας καὶ ἐπὶ πύλας*).

With the whole Synod, Patriarch Menas endorsed this charge and the corresponding judgement, which was confirmed by acclamations of the bishops and the monks and with the shout to anathematize Peter of Apamea, Zooras and Severus as well. In this way the ground was laid for the fifth *actio*. Monks of Jerusalem wanted to achieve a further resolution by the Synod, namely a decree to destroy the Eutychian monasteries, in particular those of Zooras.<sup>171</sup> Patriarch Menas recognized the explosive nature of this demand and stressed that in accordance with the

166. ACO III, no. 124, 178.

167. *Ibid.*, no. 126, 178–80.

168. *Ibid.*, pp. 178, 31–179, 8.

169. *Ibid.*, p. 179, 11–14.

170. *Ibid.*, p. 179, 25.

171. *Ibid.*, no. 129, p. 181, 20–32; the dens of the heretics should be smoked out. For what purpose then, it is asked, does Peter of Apamea need a monastery? Only to be able to have all the heretics there! Severus, Peter and Zooras, this 'trio the Trinity anathematizes' (p. 181, 28–9).

canons such decisions had to be presented to the Emperor and the Apostolic See for examination and ratification.<sup>172</sup>

(ii) *The fifth actio of 4 June 536 and its significance for the reform of 519*

The significance of the Synod of 536 consisted in the fact that the crisis threatening Justin's Chalcedonian reform of 518/519 was removed and the patriarchate of Constantinople was kept for Chalcedonian faith. This result was achieved in a twofold way: (1) through the condemnation of the leaders of the reaction and their definitive deposition; (2) through a new confession of the four synods and of Leo's *Tomus*. With an abundance of documents the Synod secured this result, which was then ratified by an imperial constitution. Unfortunately the theological discussion of 536 was of less value here than at the doctrinal dialogue of 532. It was in the first three documents that all the charges against the three or four opponents of Chalcedon were collected, which were not free of exaggerations and distortions.<sup>173</sup> The four accused were unjustly placed in a retinue of the heresies of Eutyches, Nestorius and Manes, to which Patriarch Dioscorus was also said to have belonged, although the fact that he distanced himself from the archimandrite was on record. Severe accusations were made particularly against Severus, his past life, his association with magic and demons, his hypocritical behaviour in the *Henoticon* question and his disruption of the peace of the Alexandrian Church. His writings had to be committed to the fire, as were formerly the books of Manes and Nestorius.<sup>174</sup> All were accused of paraliturgical celebrations of the eucharist and baptism,<sup>175</sup> and of showing contempt for the Apostolic See of Rome.<sup>176</sup> From the declarations of the various groups at the Synod there emerges the positive result that there is the newly attained unity of Constantinople, Antioch and Jerusalem on the one hand, and on the other with the Apostolic See of Rome, indeed with the 'entire holy, catholic and apostolic Church',<sup>177</sup> through the explicit confession of Chalcedon and Leo's Tome. This found expression

172. *Ibid.*, no 130, 181-2.

173. See the *libellus* of the bishops of Syria Secunda to the Emperor: *ibid.*, 30-2; the *libellus* of the monks to the same addressee: *ibid.*, 32-8; the *libellus* of the monks to Patriarch Menas: *ibid.*, 38-52.

174. See the analysis of the documents in Hefele-Leclercq II, 1150-2.

175. Cf. ACO III, p. 111,25.

176. *Ibid.*, p. 112,25ff.

177. Cf. the *libellus* of the monks to the Synod: *ibid.*, pp. 43,37-44,15.

in the individual *sententiae* of the Synod<sup>178</sup> and in Justinian's constitution.<sup>179</sup> Through this Synod Justinian himself was freed from his wavering and uncertainty, particularly through the intervention of Pope Agapetus I, which he especially highlighted.<sup>180</sup> At the Synod itself no further attempt was made to stress what was common in the faith in Jesus Christ. The 'formation of a confession' had been firmly cemented.

At the Council of Constantinople (680/681), too, Anthimus was not forgotten as a heretic. He was cited there on the basis of some fragments from his *logos*<sup>181</sup> to Emperor Justinian, as confessing one *physis*, and correspondingly one will and one *energeia*, as well as one *sophia* and one knowledge (see below).

## II IMPERIAL DOGMATIC DECREES ON SEVERAN CHRISTOLOGY

Emperor Justinian seized the opportunity of the division of the miaphysite Church of Alexandria into the supporters of Patriarch Theodosius (535/536) and those of Gaianas to restore the Chalcedonian hierarchy there. At the suggestion of the Roman deacon Pelagius, a monk, Paul, from the Tabennesi monastery<sup>182</sup> was ordained as patriarch (538). Violent actions, bad example in the conduct of his life (accumulation of riches), an (unproven) reproach of his being involved in disposing of a scheming deacon led to his deposition on the order of Justinian. His case was handled by a special commission appointed by the Emperor

178. See *ibid.*, 110–19; p. 110, 20–21.

179. CPG 9329 with [9330] = 6877: *Constitutio Iustiniani imp. c. Anthimum, Severum, Petrum et Zooram* (of 6 August 536): ACO III, 119–23; Nov. 42: Schoell-Kroll, 263–9.

180. ACO III, p. 120, 6–25; Nov. 42: Schoell-Kroll, p. 264, 43–55.

181. See Anthimus, *Sermo ad Iustinianum* (CPG 7086): Mansi XI: *Concil. Constantinop. III* (680/1): a) *actio* X, col. 440–1; *actio* XI: col. 516–17. The citations are part of a *logos* which in Latin is translated on one occasion by *liber*, and on another occasion by *sermo*; Mansi XI, col. 441 speaks moreover of *logos protos*; in col. 517 the same text is described as *logos prophonetikos*, which can mean that it was presented to the Emperor or addressed to him (Latin: *sermo acclamatorius*). In the *acta* of the Synod of 536 no reaction to this is found. No one still accused Anthimus of a concrete heresy, which would certainly have been the case if this *sermo* had been well known. Could it have been composed after his deposition (536) and addressed to the Emperor? Then it would hardly have been preserved in the patriarchal library, it was, however, contained in a *liber chartaceus* which in 680/681 was taken out to examine the fragments. Because at the Council of 680/681 these fragments were cited in the context of the monoenergist question, just as Justinian's letter to Zoilus (CPG 6879), we shall consider it together with this letter (see below).

182. Cf. E. Stein, *Histoire du Bas-Empire* II, 389–92. Pelagius, as deacon of the Roman church, belonged to the delegation which Pope Agapetus I sent to Emperor Justinian on 15 October 535. Even after Pope Agapetus' death he remained as the Roman *apocrisiarius* in Constantinople

at Gaza in Palestine, to which the patriarchs Ephraem of Antioch, Peter of Jerusalem, Archbishop Hypatius of Ephesus and the papal *apocrisarius* Pelagius belonged (the beginning of 540).<sup>183</sup> After the city of Alexandria and several monasteries seemed to have been won for the Chalcedonian confession under the combined pressure of this patriarch Paul and the imperial officials, Emperor Justinian seized the opportunity to explain the faith by some dogmatic writings: (1) to the new patriarch Zoilus (540–551), who had been elected at Gaza; and (2) to the ‘converted’ Alexandrian monks. In a reasonably conclusive manner he wanted to settle accounts with Severus of Antioch and his supporters.<sup>184</sup> This combination of disciplinary action and dogmatic instruction which we discern in the case of Alexandria corresponds completely to Justinian’s consciousness of a twofold responsibility, on the one hand for the *honestas sacerdotum*, that is, the lifestyle of the bishops, and on the other for the ‘true dogmas of God’. This is the way he expressed it in the introduction to *novella VI*, addressed on 7 April 535 to Patriarch Epiphanius of Constantinople.<sup>185</sup> In the writings which were sent out of ‘solicitude for the dogmas’ to the patriarch and monks of Alexandria (CPG 6879 and 6878), we find Justinian’s most detailed discussion of Severan christology. Let us look at these documents more closely and attempt to determine their place in the theological development of the sixth century. We shall no doubt be able to moderate E. Schwartz’s harsh judgement of Justinian as ‘the imperial dilettante’ (in theological matters).<sup>186</sup>

183. Cf. Liberatus, *Brev.* 23: ACO II, 5, 138–140; Procopius Caes., *Secret History* 27, 3–22; Haury-Wirth III, 166–9; O. Veh I, 229–31; Zacharias Rh. cont., *HE* X, 1: Brooks, CSCO 88, 119–120; ET Hamilton-Brooks, 297–8. John of Nikiu, *Chron.*, ch. 92, 1–10: trans. Charles, 145–6; J. Maspero, *Histoire des patriarches d’Alexandrie*, 144–51; in addition see E. Stein, *op. cit.*, 391–2, n. 1. See too R. Aubert, art. ‘Gaza (Concile de)’, in *DHGE* 20 (1984), 176–7.

184. See Amelotti-Migliardi Zingale, *Scritti teologici*: III. Scritti relativi ai monofisiti, to which are accounted: (a) the troparion ‘Ὁ μωυνογενῆς υἱός’ (CPG 6891), *ibid.*, 43–4; (b) the constitution against Anthimus, Severus, Peter and Zooras, with which we have already dealt (CPG 6877), *ibid.*, 45–55; (c) the dogmatic letter to Zoilus (CPG 6879), *ibid.*, 57–63; (d) the letters to the Alexandrian monks (CPG 6878), for which reference is made to E. Schwartz, *Drei dogmatische Schriften Justinians* (Munich, 1939), 5–43; Latin translation in *Subsidia* II, 5–79, according to the Greek text of E. Schwartz. PG 86, 1104–46. See R. Haacke, ‘Die kaiserliche Politik in den Auseinandersetzungen um Chalkedon’, in *Chalkedon* II, 155–63.

185. Justinian imp., *Nov.* 6, *praef.*: Schoell-Kroll, 35–6: *Nos igitur, maximam habemus sollicitudinem circa vera dei dogmata et circa sacerdotum honestatem*. Cf. M. Simonetti, ‘La politica religiosa di Giustiniano’, in G. G. Archi (ed.), *Il mondo del diritto nell’epoca giustiniana. Caratteri e problematiche* (Ravenna, 1985) (91–111), 93–4; G. Pilati, *Chiesa e Stato nei primi quindici secoli* (Rome, Paris, Tournai, New York, 1961), 59–73.

186. Cf. E. Schwartz, *Drei dogmatische Schriften Justinians* = *ABAW.PH* 18 (Munich, 1939), 114.



## 1. The dogmatic letter to the Alexandrian monks

This letter gives a good overview of the state of Justinian's christology in 540, before the outbreak of the Three Chapters dispute. The Emperor has appropriated well the Chalcedonian view of the incarnation and reproduced it in a manner which did not yet show the preferences that were otherwise regarded as marks of his christology, the *unus ex trinitate* excepted. It was indeed because of the latter that he began here too with an explanation of trinitarian faith.<sup>187</sup>

### (a) *On the mia-physis formula*

The disputed formula quickly appears (no. 5, p. 8,25–26). Because the addressees were previously supporters of the one-nature formula, the Emperor lays the main stress on the explanation of the two-natures teaching (nos. 6–21) and on combating the *mia physis* and its tradition. The only terminological concession which distinguishes him from the Chalcedonian definition is the addition of the formula 'from two natures' to the synodal 'in two natures' (nos. 8–9, p. 9). In order to make it easier for the monks to give up the *mia-physis* formula, for which they could refer to Cyril, the Emperor strives particularly to highlight Cyril's relationship to the two-natures language. In this way he takes over the intention of the Cyrillian florilegium, which we have already presented in detail.<sup>188</sup> It is important for him that Cyril himself interprets the monophysite formula in the sense of the two natures (nos. 15–17, p. 10): the words 'one nature' refer to the *Logos asarkos* before the incarnation; the Father (Cyril), however, did not stop there, but added: 'which became flesh, so that he represents to us through this incarnate [nature] the other, that is, the human nature' (no. 16, p. 10,26–27). Severus could not deny that Cyril used the two-natures language. He wanted, nevertheless, to limit this phrase strictly, and to represent it as occasioned by special circumstances. Justinian would like to demonstrate, however, that this was the constant practice of the 'Father' acknowledged on all sides.

From all that has been said [cf. Cyril's texts in nos. 156–66], it is proved that Cyril, who dwells among the saints, before, in and after the condemnation of Nestorius did not cease to proclaim constantly the profession of the two natures. (no. 167, pp. 35–6)<sup>189</sup>

187. We shall follow the edition of Schwartz, *ibid.*, 7–43, and his division according to nos. 1–200, and cite the page and line of this edition.

188. See above, pp. 22–3.

189. Cf. M. Simonetti, 'Alcune osservazioni sul monofisismo di Cirillo d'Alessandria', *Aug* 22 (1982), 493–511.

Justinian knows that Severus rejects the entire two-natures tradition: 'To speak of two natures is full of every condemnation, even if it is used by several holy Fathers in an unobjectionable manner' (no. 151, p. 31).<sup>190</sup>

(b) *Mia physis synthetos*

Not only is the classical *mia-physis* formula repudiated, but also especially the Apollinarian manner of speaking of the 'one composite nature' (nos. 57–68). In this context we need to note what Justinian has to say about the use of the body-soul paradigm (cf. nos. 27–56, pp. 12–16). On account of its use by Apollinarius it is considered by him with suspicion, especially because of the teaching of the *synthesis* associated with it and its application to Christ. The main text for this is the Apollinarian 'Treatise on the Incarnation', ch. 13 (nos. 60–61, pp. 16–17), with the description of Christ as a 'single living being' from Logos and *sarx*, for 'the flesh is, as flesh of God, one living being with him, composed to (form) one nature' (no. 61, p. 17, 7–8). What Justinian particularly takes exception to is the fact that this synthesis teaching is found in an alleged letter of Pope Julius and in a letter of Athanasius to Jovian (nos. 71–72, p. 18). To prove these texts to be forgeries, the Emperor proceeds in a way similar to that of Leontius of Byzantium (in *AFA*):<sup>191</sup> he compares them with authentic texts of Apollinarius (nos. 74–76, pp. 18–19). In the first text he finds the offensive formula of 'the one essence from God and human being', which is 'one' because there has been 'a composition of God with the human body' (no. 74, pp. 18–19). This way of speaking teaches nothing other than a mixing (*synkrasis*) of divinity and humanity in Christ (no. 76, p. 19). Even Polemon, the student of Apollinarius, is said to have recognized that the *synthesis* teaching was wrong, and that the *mia-physis* formula was also affected by this (nos. 65 and 66, p. 17). 'From what has been said it is clear that those who take the one incarnate nature of the God-Logos as composite follow the error of Apollinarius. In contrast Cyril, who dwells among the saints, did not speak of the one incarnate nature of the Logos other than meaning two natures, which is why he adds: we speak of two natures' (no. 67, p. 17). Cyril thus rejects the manner of speaking of the 'composite nature, as of the one *physis* from flesh and divinity' (no. 67, p. 17, 33–35, with further evidence from Cyril against the expression *synthesis*: nos. 68 and

190. This text of Severus is cited by Eustathius monk, *Ep. ad Timotheum Schol.* (CPG 6810): PG 86, 904D, now ed. Allen, no. 6, ll. 52–54; the citation is from Severus' *Ekthesis pisteos*.

191. See above, pp. 237–8, n. 40. Justinian mentions that he exposed the forgery through investigations in the papal archives (no. 86, p. 21).

69, pp. 17–18). Justinian thus attacks the expressions *synthesis-synthetos* by clearly emphasizing their misuse by Apollinarius, which consists in the fact that Christ, God and human being, is considered as a 'nature-unity'. Insofar as the *mia-physis* formula is derived from this understanding, it is to be strictly rejected, just as much as the expression (*mia*) *physis synthetos*. Only the denotation *Christos synthetos* may be allowed, similar to the *mia-physis* formula in Cyril's understanding (cf. nos. 70 and 69, p. 18). Here we can confirm that the Emperor, more than any of the theologians of his time, recognizes the distinction between Christ conceived in an Apollinarian way (= a nature-synthesis in the strict sense) and the Cyrillian understanding of the 'one nature', which should not be interpreted as a profession of 'one *ousia*' (no. 70, p. 18).

For Justinian there exists a community of like mind in the use of the *mia-physis* formula between Manes, Apollinarius, the Headless Ones, and, closer at hand, Timothy Aelurus, Dioscorus of Alexandria and Severus (cf. nos. 89, 93, 94–107). Timothy Aelurus is especially dangerous because he denies Christ's human nature the 'signification as *physis*' (*logos physeos*), which exposes him as a docetist (no. 107). Detailed counter-arguments from scripture and the Fathers are intended to prove this (cf. nos. 108–149). The Emperor states that Severus is wrong when he claims that he cannot discover the formula of the two natures in the Fathers (nos. 151–153); Cyril is indeed a clear witness for it throughout his entire work (nos. 153–168, pp. 32–6).

### (c) *Conceptual clarifications*

The fact that Emperor Justinian adapted well to the state of teaching about the incarnation in 540 in Constantinople emerges from his clear observations (1) on the Chalcedonian usage of christological concepts (nos. 168–186, pp. 36–9), (2) on 'number' in trinitarian and incarnational teaching (nos. 187–191, pp. 39–41), and (3) on the *Trishagion* (nos. 192–198, pp. 41–2). Nevertheless he does not contribute anything of his own which goes beyond what had been achieved by the leading authors of the sixth century (John the Grammarian, then Hypatius, Leontius of Byzantium and Leontius of Jerusalem).<sup>192</sup> He is also dependent on them in judging the historical development, as his interpretation of Cyril shows. This is true at least until 540.

192. On the assessment of his florilegia see M. Richard, cited in CCT II/1, 62.

(i) *Decision for the Chalcedonian two-natures language*

From the clear rejection of Severus and his interpretation of the history of concepts there follows for Justinian a firm choice in favour of Chalcedonian language (nos. 168–169, p. 36), which is supported by a new proof from the Fathers. Although the Severans must concede the twofold reality<sup>193</sup> in Christ, divinity and humanity, and that the 'kerygma of the Fathers'<sup>194</sup> speaks clearly of the two natures, they would still refuse to draw from that the linguistic and conceptual consequences. Furthermore *physis*, *ousia*, *morphē* remain for them synonymous with *hypostasis* and *prosopon*, which is said to be the pretext for the errors of all heretics (no. 169, p. 36, 28–30). Corresponding to his comments to Patriarch Zoilus, after a brief florilegium<sup>195</sup> the Emperor now suggests a purification of language:

'We have said this to prove that *ousia* and *physis* and *morphē* state the same, but that *ousia* and *hypostasis* are not the same, as the heretics say in their error, and that it is allowed to learn from the *theologia* about the holy Trinity.' This is aimed at the refusal of Severus to apply the Basilian language used of the Trinity also to the *oikonomia*, to the incarnation (no. 175, p. 37). Justinian says that Cyril himself left the way free for this (nos. 176–178, pp. 37–8) and distinguishes in his *Dialogues on the Trinity* (CPG 5216; PG 75, 697) between *ousia* (the *koinon*) and the *hypostasis* (*kath'hekaston*) (no. 178, p. 37).<sup>196</sup> From other Fathers the Emperor then deduces that *prosopon* and *hypostasis* are also used synonymously.<sup>197</sup> In any case, in this manner he settles his own way of speaking, even if he does not give a complete picture of the history of the terms.

(ii) *The number 'two' in christology*

For the claim that Cyril rejected the formula *mia physis*, the Emperor relies on Cyril's writing *That Christ is one*<sup>198</sup> (no. 185, p. 39). In this, to be sure, the argument is directly against the (alleged) statement of Apollinarius (or rather of some extremists of his party), that the body of Christ is 'consubstantial' with his divinity. Cyril denies this energetically, as well as the Apollinarian justification of it, that is, that it is only in this way that one can conceive that Christ is a single son. He actually reverses the argument of his opponents and says: if there is not another and another (*heteron* and *heteron*) in Christ, how can one

193. No. 168, p. 36, 26: τῶν κατ'ἀλήθειαν πραγμάτων.

194. *Ibid.*, p. 36, 24.

195. The Ps. Athanasian writing *C. Apoll.* II 1, John Chrysostom, Basil, Cyril (*Thesaurus*): nos. 170–174, pp. 36–7.

196. Justinian, however, remains silent about the fact that the passage adduced from Cyril says nothing about adopting this distinction for the teaching about the incarnation.

197. Nos. 178–180, pp. 38–9, with citation from Gregory Nazianzen and Gregory of Nyssa, directed against Apollinarius: nos. 181–183, p. 39.

198. Cyril Alex., *Quod unus sit Christus*: PG 75, 1289BC; Durand, SC 97, p. 370, 24–30 with n. 1, pp. 370f.

then speak of union, *henosis*, at all? 'In any case not if it is a question of something which is already one numerically; only in the case of two or more things does one speak of union' (no. 185, p. 39). Thus from this text Justinian assumes that Cyril rejected the *mia physis*. To that he adds a reflection on the number two, which was a horror for Severus. The Emperor alludes to him when he speaks of heretics who refuse to apply the number to the united realities (God and human being) in Christ (no. 187, pp. 39-40). He says what a contradiction it is that they still confess that Christ is perfect God and perfect human being. When they refuse to apply the number two to this, they deny the twofold *teleion*. Justinian states that that leads directly to Apollinarius,<sup>199</sup> against whom he is fighting with all his resolve (nos. 189 [with Gregory of Nyssa]-191, pp. 40-1). It is worth noting how he formulates it: 'From what has been said it is clear that where a union results from various realities, the number of what are united is discerned in every respect' (no. 192, p. 41). Because Severus does not consider that, the Emperor says, he applies the Trishagion, which holds for the Trinity, solely to the Son, who then, however, cannot participate in the *doxa* of the Father and the Spirit. This is how Arius and Nestorius talk. Hence Justinian makes himself the defender of the Constantinopolitan understanding of the Trishagion, or the advocate of the number three for the Trinity and of the number two for christology. In doing this he does not ascend to speculative heights, as Leontius of Jerusalem had done. His solution, destined for the monks, can, as it were, provide insight with the use of a calculator.

In eleven anathemas Justinian then summarizes his trinitarian teaching (no. 199, A. 1-3) and his teaching on the incarnation (A. 4-11). What he contributes to the purification of language is the pure adoption of the strict-Chalcedonian tradition. We find no trace of neo-Chalcedonian tendencies. At the end (no. 200, p. 43) there follows the confession of the four synods in a way that could not be expressed more clearly.

## 2. The dogmatic letter to Patriarch Zoilus of Alexandria (539/540)

Emperor Justinian is certainly more radically seized by the theological tension of the Chalcedonian-Severan altercation about the understanding of Christ in the sixth century than any simple dilettante could succeed in being. The excerpt from his letter to Patriarch Zoilus, which is

199. Lietzmann, Frag. 81, cit. no. 188, p. 40.

transmitted in the *acta* of the Council of Constantinople in 680/681,<sup>200</sup> shows this. Though the question handled there is about one or two activities in Christ, this letter to Zoilus, at least in terms of content, is related to further texts which deal with one or two *energeiai* with regard to Christ's knowledge. With this question a new theme is broached in the sixth century.

Excursus: *On the question of Christ's knowledge in the sixth century*  
In the first place this concerns fragments from a *logos* of the deposed Patriarch Anthimus, which were cited in *actiones* X and XI at the Third Council of Constantinople. A further document which has only now become accessible illustrates this background with special clarity, namely the large fragments from the *Tomus* of the deposed Alexandrian patriarch Theodosius (end of 537) to Empress Theodora, which were previously unpublished.<sup>201</sup> These excerpts are part of a chapter of B. L. Add. 14532 with the title: 'On the teaching of the *Agnoetai*: by Theodosius, Constantine and Anthimus.'<sup>202</sup>

(a) *The initiative of the deacon Themistius (c. 536–540)*

With the exile of Patriarch Theodosius to Derkos near Constantinople a discussion that was originally Alexandrian moved to Constantinople. Apparently the deposed Patriarch Anthimus was also active in it. We shall present first the texts of Anthimus and Theodosius and analyse their interpretation of Christ's ignorance. It is easier to proceed from Anthimus to Theodosius than vice versa, for the latter introduces impor-

200. Justinian emp., *Ep. dogmatica ad Zoilum* (CPG 6865); Amelotti-Migliardi Zingale, *Scritti teologici*, 57–63; PG 86, 1145–50.

201. Theodosius Alex., *Tomus ad Theodoram Augustam* (CPG 7133; previously only known from the short Greek citations in Mansi X, 1121B, 1121C; XI, 273, 445; F. Diekamp, *DP*, 314, XLII). The new Syriac texts offer in addition other important fragments; they are presented provisionally by A. Van Roey, 'Théodose d'Alexandrie dans les manuscrits syriaques de la British Library', in J. Quaegebeur (ed.), *Studia Paulo Naster oblata, II Orientalia Antiqua = OLA* 13 (Louvain, 1982), 287–99; on the *Tomus ad Theodoram Aug.* see 289–90, no. 4: B. L. Add. 12154, fol. 141V–151R . . . De saint Théodose . . . (fol. 148R, 7–148V, 25 also in Add. 14541); 298, no. 15: the *Tomus ad Theodoram* was written only after 536 (when Theodosius moved to Constantinople). One may assume that it was already in existence when Justinian wrote his letter to Zoilus. Theodosius was in exile first of all in Derkos, but soon (in 538) in the capital with numerous other anti-Chalcedonians, probably in Theodora's palace. See the evidence in E. Stein, *Histoire du Bas-Empire* II, 385, n. 2. Prof. A. Van Roey kindly placed at my disposal his Latin translation of the fragments, as well as a Latin translation of large parts of B. L. Add. 12155 and a further text from Add. 14532, which will be evaluated here. See now Van Roey-Allen, *OLA* 56, pp. 42–56.

202. A. Van Roey, *art. cit.*, 293: in this the three bishops named take a position on the teaching of Themistius.

tant differentiations which are lacking in the radicalism of Anthimus.

The dispute about the knowledge or ignorance of Christ began in Alexandria with the deacon Themistius, a supporter of Severus and an opponent of Julian of Halicarnassus.<sup>203</sup> Of his own free will or under pressure he came to Constantinople, where a break occurred between the deposed patriarch and the deacon regarding the question of Christ's knowledge.<sup>204</sup> The discussion dragged on into the time of the Chalcedonian Patriarch Eulogius of Alexandria (581–608), who informed Pope Gregory I (d. 604) of it. The main arena for this discussion was thus Constantinople, particularly through the activity of the deposed patriarchs Theodosius and Anthimus, and in addition of the bishop Constantine and the monk Theodore. It is probably to Constantinople that still another witness of the conflict points, namely Ps. Caesarius in his *Erotapokriseis*, which we are able to quote in its new edition.<sup>205</sup> As a Severan and an opponent of Julian of Halicarnassus, Themistius probably only drew the conclusions from Severus' christological anthropology: as the body of Christ was subjected to mortality and corruption, so too was Christ's human spirit finite and, in relation to knowledge, subject to human limits, as for instance John 11,34 and Mark 13,32 showed.

In the minds of the Fathers these texts were dubious, because the Arians had already used them to deduce an argument against the divinity of the Logos. The Nicenes solved the difficulty by ascribing Christ's ignorance to the humanity of Jesus.<sup>206</sup> In this way embarrassing

203. Cf. E. Amann, art. 'Thémistius', in *DTC* 15, 219–22. See CPG 7285–92. According to Liberatus, *Brev.* 19: ACO II, 5, p. 134,18–22, he was already a deacon under Patriarch Timothy IV (III) (517–535); it is said that Timothy was the first to whom he presented his ideas on Christ's ignorance of certain things. According to Leontius Schol., *De sectis* (CPG 6823), V, IV–VI: PG 86, 1232, this doctrinal conflict flared up under Patriarch Theodosius (535–566), but only after his translation to Constantinople.

204. Liberatus, *Brev.* 19: ACO II, 5, p. 134,18–22, speaks of the origin of the dispute: Themistius says to Patriarch Timothy IV (III): *si corpus Christi corruptibile est, debemus eum dicere et aliqua ignorasse, sicut ait de Lazaro (Jn 11,34), hoc Timotheus negavit dicendum. a cuius communione Themistius desciscens schisma fecit, et ab ipso dicti sunt in Aegypto Themistiani.* Cf. Timothy presb., *De iis qui ad ecclesiam accedunt* (CPG 7016): PG 86, 41B, 'no. 2: *Agnoitae*'; also Sophronius of Jer., *Ep. synod.*: PG 87/3, 3192Cff. On Themistius see as well T. Hermann, 'Monophysitica', *ZNW* 32 (1933), 287–93; Photius, *Bibl. cod.* 108: Henry I, 14; PG 103, 381; cf. E. Schulte, *Die Entwicklung der Lehre vom menschlichen Wissen Christi bis zum Beginne der Scholastik* = *FCLDG* 12, 2 (Paderborn, 1914), 121–4.

205. See R. Riedinger, *Pseudo-Kaisarios. Die Erotapokriseis* = *GCS* (Berlin, 1989). I am grateful to the editor for letting me have the galley proofs and his comprehensive *index verborum*.

206. See the witnesses in A. Vacant, art. 'Agnoètes', in *DTC* 1, 589–93; J. Marić, *De Agnoetarum doctrina. Argumentum patristicum pro omniscientia Christi hominis relativa* (Zagreb, 1914). In the appendix 113–20, Marić offers the patristic witnesses to the *Agnoetai* known up to his time.

situations arose only for those Fathers who considered 'ignorance' as 'blameworthy *pathos*' and saw Christ's sinlessness as endangered by it. 'Ignorance' (*agnoia*) was already seen by the ancient Greeks in relation to moral evil, indeed as the font and reason for false moral decisions. Thus with regard to Christ, if ignorance were to be conceded in him, his 'sinlessness' would be undermined.<sup>207</sup>

Let us examine briefly this theme 'ignorance and propensity for sin (*peccabilitas*)' in connection with the *Agnoetai* dispute begun by Themistius. With regard to this we have in B. L. Add. 12155 excerpts from a treatise by the monk Theodore, which was called the *Confutatio brevis* ('Ἐλεγχος ὡς ἐν συντόμῳ')<sup>208</sup> and was subdivided into various (perhaps three) tractates (*mīmṛē*).<sup>209</sup>

(b) *The monk Theodore and his controversy with Themistius*

The kernel of the response of the monk Theodore to the individual *audaciae* (according to Van Roey-Allen perhaps *ἐπιχειρήματα*) consists in his warning to distinguish various degrees of ignorance and corresponding to this various degrees of culpability. In the second *audacia* Themistius had stated the following:

If every ignorance is culpable and subject to blame and the charge of sin, then each of us should investigate in how many matters and things he finds himself in ignorance, and whether anyone can endure the just judgement of God, after he had found himself to be in ignorance in all these things.<sup>210</sup>

Theodore begins his critique with two issues: (1) Can Themistius at all judge the extent and the peculiarity of his ignorant mistakes? (2) The

207. Cf. Leontius Byz., CNE III, 32: PG 86, 1373B. The reproach against the Nestorian runs: 'With the darkness of ignorance you cover him [Christ], if he knows nothing, for he is united to the Logos only according to dignity. How can you see him, however, filled with ignorance and not also with sin? Sin stems from ignorance as the river from the source . . . You call him ignorant to such an extent that he did not even once know the tempter who tempted him.' For the other stance see below Leontius Schol., *De sectis*, X, III: PG 86, 1264AB.

208. Theodore monk, *Confutatio brevis* (CPG 7295): the detailed information on sources and references is as follows. A. Van Roey was kind enough to translate lengthy sections of this and to add notes: see now Van Roey-Allen, *Monophysite Texts of the Sixth Century* = OLA 56, pp. 92–102. (Here Theodore names a further title of Themistius, which is not cited in CPG 7285–92, namely an *Apologia pro Theophobio*), see also OLA 56, p. 93. This text is as no. 388 (Theodore's *Confutatio brevis*, with the anathemas of the 'dyophysite synod', that is, of Justinian's edict against the Origenists; see E. Schwartz, ACO III, 213–14; IV, 1, 248, n.) in the long florilegium of B. L. Add. 12155. Cf. W. Wright, *Catalogue* II, 921–55; see CPG 7295, *Nota*, with reference to T. Hermann, art. 'Monophysitica', ZNW 32 (1933), 287–93.

209. Cf. Photius, *Bibl. Cod* 108: PG 103, 381; Henry II, 78–9.

210. See Van Roey-Allen, OLA 56, p. 92, 7–11.



concept of 'sin' needs to be differentiated. Themistius always assumes that 'sin' is what deserves *supplicium* (death penalty) and (severe) penalty. It is a severe, actual sin. But 'sin' can also mean that in ignorance one can be 'capable' of sin and thus too deserving of disapprobation (*improbatio*) and blame (*inrepatio*). In this sense the teachers said that every ignorance is subject to blame and also to sin. For this extended concept of 'sin' Theodore refers to John Chrysostom.<sup>211</sup> Hence Themistius is said to suffer from a lack of understanding and an inability to distinguish.

Theodore, however, does not want to allow even this potential sinfulness on the basis of ignorance for Christ as a human being. He is 'incapable of evil, that is incapable of sin (*impeccabilis*), as we all confess' (OLA 56, p. 93,52-53). For the angels (seraphim) and for many creatures in general it is true that there is a certain lack of wisdom and an *inclinatio ad peccatum*. Theodore cites a certain text of Cyril, which cannot be verified, as well as Basil, *De spiritu sancto*: PG 32, 137B; SC 17bis, 382; but above all he refers to his father Severus, *Contra Felicissimum* (CPG 7032). This text shows that Severus simply refers omniscience and thus absolute sinlessness back to the hypostatic union of the Logos with a body endowed with a rational soul.<sup>212</sup> With regard to the question of Christ's ignorance Theodore clearly distinguishes between 'factual sinlessness' (*impeccantia*) and 'absolute incapability of sinning' (*impeccabilitas*) on account of the hypostatic unity (OLA 50, p. 95,102-111). With Cyril, Theodore knows of the fact that Christ *naturaliter ignorat in sua humanitate, sed cognoscit accipiendo*, for he became like us in all things (Heb 2,17). Finally, the 'Father' Theodosius is cited as already being dead.<sup>213</sup> Theodore (OLA 56, p. 98,199-215) thus also concedes an *ignorantia* in Christ with reference to Athanasius, *Ep. II ad Serapionem* (PG 26, 621-624), because from it one can conclude:

211. John Chrys., *In illud: Vidi dominum* (CPG 4417), hom. 3: PG 56, 115, where *ψόγος* (*improbatio*, *inrepatio*) and *τιμωρία* (*supplicium*) are distinguished.

212. Van Roey-Allen, OLA 56, p. 94,91-94: *Corpus sanctum et sine peccato inde ab ipso utero, animatum et rationale, sibi univit Verbum hypostatice et non indigebat dono ut fiat divinius sapientia et gratia. Qui enim sine peccato est non caret sapientia; qui autem caret sapientia etiam peccato subiectus est.* There follow further *testimonia* from Severus, which certainly contain nothing other than the teaching of Cyril of Alexandria, whom he also cites further: the human being Christ is filled with the wisdom and omniscience of the Logos.

213. *Ibid.*, pp. 97,191-98,198: *Ratio substantiae nostrae naturae, aut [Theodosius], non possidet ex seipsa intelligentiam rerum futurarum. Et si propter hoc solum scandalisatur aliquis in Christo, dicit sapiens Cyrillus, simul cum hoc et alia reprehenduntur. In hoc. In quonam? In eo quod non ex seipsa humanitas Domini Nostri Christi profert cognitionem rerum magis divinarum et propterea dicitur ignorare.* Van Roey-Allen comment that this text cannot come from Theodosius' *Oratio theologica*, because here there is no trace of the Agnoetic dispute, but it comes perhaps from the *Tomus ad Theodorum*.

See, (Athanasius) calls ignorance (the fact) that (human beings) have (their) knowledge only by receiving and acquiring, and not from themselves. (OLA 56, p. 98,219-221)

He concludes:

This valiant one [Themistius] does not know, as usual, that it is not the same to know or not to know, and to have knowledge by receiving or by nature; hence he declares the statements (of Cyril) to be contradictory. (OLA 56, p. 102,360-363)

Thus with Cyril and Severus, the Severans have an integrated solution to the Agnoetic question: the humanity of Christ is indeed by nature subjected to ignorance (without sin), but through the hypostatic union there is omniscience and with it impeccability. A 'created grace of Christ', which is granted to his humanity by the Holy Spirit, they do not invoke. It is only Theodore who knows the problem 'ignorance and sin'.

(c) *Anthimus and his interpretation of Christ's knowledge*

A first fragment contains typical monophysite and monoenergist theses.<sup>214</sup>

We confess the one incarnate nature of the God-Logos, which together with its own flesh is to be adored in worship, in this one incarnate nature of the God-Logos; we do not permit talk of an ignorance of the divinity or (of an ignorance) of his rational and intellectual soul by which that is animated which is assumed from us, is consubstantial with us, a passible body which is united to the God-Logos according to the *hypostasis*. If there is only one *hypostasis*, one nature of the incarnate God-Logos, then without doubt there is also only one will, one activity, one wisdom and one knowledge for both.

The intention of the text is perfectly clear: the vision of the one *physis* and *energeia*, which is already familiar to us, is now extended to the 'one wisdom and one knowledge'. The divine and human knowledge in Christ are equated with regard to scope. Neither in the one nor in the other is there ignorance or not-knowing. In practice this means that there is only one knowledge, the divine, which also fills the human spirit of Christ.

The *acta* of the Council of 680/681 produce from the same *logos* of Anthimus a very interesting patristic justification, namely from Cyril's commentary on John, with the depiction and interpretation of the raising of the daughter of Jairus.<sup>215</sup> Christ raised the dead not only by word and command; he also put his flesh into action in doing this. Through

214. Anthimus, *Sermo ad Iustinian*. (CPG 7086): Mansi XI, col. 440E-441A.

215. Cyril Alex., *In Ioannis Evangel.* IV: PG 73, 577C3-15. This text is cited twice: Mansi XI, col. 441-442, 517-518.

speech and touch together occurs a single coherent activity: 'vivifying as God through a command effecting everything; he also enlivens, however, by the touch of his hand and shows by this the one activity grown together from both (*μὴν τε καὶ συγγενῇ δι' ἀμφοῖν ἐπιδείκνυσαι τὴν ἐνέργειαν*)'.<sup>216</sup> Anthimus adds his own reflections to this.

Because we also know that the property of the divine intellectual activity consists in the knowledge of all things, we are taught that there is only one and the same divine activity; how should we also not confess that there is in the one Christ only one and the same knowledge of all things (as we have already said) according to his divinity and according to his humanity?<sup>217</sup>

We shall add yet another fragment from this *logos* to Emperor Justinian, which is contained in B. L. Add. 14532.<sup>218</sup>

Because we follow the prophetic speech we in no way attribute ignorance to the one Son, our Lord Jesus Christ (composite and indivisible). For to say that the God-Logos, insofar as he is God-Logos, does not know the last day and the (last) hour (cf. Mt 24,36 and Mk 13,32), is full of Arian, or rather Judaic impiety. (To say that he does not know it) in his humanity makes a division of the one Lord into two persons, two Sons, two Christs, two natures and two *hypostaseis*, and into their separate activities and properties and a complete (division). Saint Gregory Nazianzen also taught this in his second speech on the Son, saying: 'Is it not clear for all that he [Christ] as God knows [the day], but says as a human being that he does not know, if one separates the visible from the intelligible.'<sup>219</sup> See how this wise teacher explained the word of the gospel, saying: 'if one separates the visible from the intelligible', and taught us that we can attribute ignorance to him [Christ] when we make use of a division in *theoria* about the one composite Christ and ask about the content of the substance of his animated flesh.

And [Anthimus] a little later: 'For us there is one *hypostasis* and one incarnate nature of the God-Logos, as there is also without doubt only one will. We know too only one activity, and one wisdom, and there is (only) for both one knowledge. Therefore whoever says that he knew as God, but as a human being he did not know, separates in an unconscionable

216. It will be seen how important this passage became for Ps. Dionysius the Areopagite and for the *mia-energeia* teaching in general.

217. Mansi XI, col. 441/442C.

218. See Van Roey-Allen, *OLA* 56, p. 65. I am most grateful for being able to use the Latin translation in advance of its publication.

219. Gregory Naz., *Or.* 30 (CPG 3010) (= *Or. theol.* IV), 15: PG 36, 124B; Gallay-Jourjon, *SC* 250, p. 258,14-16; Barbel, 200-1. This same passage from Gregory Nazianzen is also dealt with by Constantine, the bishop of Laodicea, in a *logos prosphonetikos* before Empress Theodora, cf. CPG 7107-10, together with p. 574; but the *logos* just named is not noted. Referring to it Constantine explains to the Empress that in the one Christ one should only distinguish in thought between the knowing divinity and the ignorant humanity. Considered in itself and by itself (its essence) the humanity is said not to have any knowledge of the last day or any divine powers, but certainly has everything in the state of union. Only in *theoria* can one speak of 'asking', 'receiving', 'being anointed with the Holy Spirit', 'having become Lord and Christ' (*quasi tantum naturam carnis animatae in se et separatim considerans*). I have to thank Prof. A. Van Roey for the Latin translation of these fragments from B. L. Add. 14532, fol. 177Vb, of which only the main thoughts can be communicated here. See now Van Roey-Allen, *OLA* 56, pp. 70-1.

way the one indivisible Son into two natures, two *hypostaseis*, just like the impious Theodoret. We believe, however, with God's grace, as we have already said: his divine, rational and intellectual soul, consubstantial with our souls obtained, after its union with God the Word, an existence together with his body, consubstantial with our bodies; immediately with its union to that (body) it had all of his divine activity, wisdom, and omniscience, so that every single knowing is the same for both the God-Logos and the rational and intellectual soul.'

Anthimus thus presents a picture of Christ conceived totally from above. As the order and sole power to raise the dead proceeds from the Logos, mediated by the simultaneous corporal contact, so too the one knowledge, the divine omniscience, comes from the Logos into Christ's humanity.<sup>220</sup> The idea of the 'one activity' (*mia energeia*) is consistently applied to the region of knowledge.

(d) *The one activity in Christ and the question of Christ's knowledge in Patriarch Theodosius*

In his treatise on Christ's knowledge to Empress Theodora, only just recently researched and edited, Patriarch Theodosius of Alexandria (535–566), who was summoned to Constantinople and deposed by Justinian, produces a much more differentiated interpretation of Christ's knowledge than Anthimus could offer. In it we can see the oldest and most significant treatment of the question in the East. It was certainly composed between 536 and 540.<sup>221</sup> The solution of the question was conditioned by specific options: (1) on the classification of ignorance either under the 'blameless' or the 'not blameless' affections (*πάθη διαβλητά, ἀδιάβλητα*); (2) on the assumption or non-assumption of an autonomy of Christ's human knowledge, whether occurring autonomously in the human nature or on the presupposition of a 'single activity' (*mia energeia*) from above, which allowed the human knowing in Christ no spontaneity and independence. The Apollinarian nature-unity (Christ = *synthesis in natura et secundum naturam*) now had a concrete effect on the partial region of the *one energeia*, namely knowledge. Whoever followed the line: one nature, one will, one activity, would have to proceed consistently to the *μία γνώσις*, the one knowledge. The

220. Severus too accepts only the one universal knowledge and the substantial, divine wisdom in Christ; if there is talk of an increase in wisdom and grace (Lk 2,40), then that is only an advance in the 'revelation' of his divinity (*congruenter ostendens divinitatem suam, non autem tanquam adauctam habens sapientiam et gratiam et ex non plenitudine ad plenitudinem deveniens. Quid enim plenius esset quam substantialis Sapientia, ex qua omnis rationalis creatura sapiens efficitur?* Cf. Severus Ant., C. imp. Gram. III, 31: CSCO 102 [V], p. 87,3–7).

221. *Tomus ad Theodoram augustam* (CPG 7133), introduction, edition and Latin translation prepared by Van Roey-Allen, OLA 56, pp. 16–56.

Chalcedonian-Leonine two natures, two activities demanded in contrast two powers of knowing and two manners of knowing. With their teaching the Chalcedonians were put on the defensive. Theodosius attacked the initiative so vigorously that from the Chalcedonian side only a tentative, partial reply resulted. We will find it in Justinian's letter to Patriarch Zoilus.

*The Tomus of Patriarch Theodosius to Empress Theodora*

The starting-point of Theodosius' *Tomus* to Theodora<sup>222</sup> is the truth of Christ's human nature, which is consubstantial with us. As has been customary since Cyril, it is emphasized by the theologians of the *mia physis* in an almost stereotypical manner that this nature has a rational soul which experiences all the natural, blameless affections (passions), the *πάθη ἀδιάβλητα*: hunger, thirst, sleep, tiredness, piercing of the body, pains, wounds, death, sadness, anguish and the like. These experiences occur only in the flesh which the Logos allows to undergo suffering willingly from time to time. As the human soul according to its nature is distinguished from the flesh, but still on account of the union considers in 'sympathy' the flesh's experience of pain as happening to itself, so too it is the case with the Logos as far as the experiences of suffering of his humanity are concerned.

In the case of the 'Emmanuel' one must admittedly distinguish three types of this appropriation (*appropriatio*):

(1) the first manner: the assumption, with the permission of the Logos, of the natural, blameless, true passions which happen to the ensouled flesh;

(2) the second manner: the assumption of our poverty (need, *indigentia*), as this corresponds to the natural, essential limitedness of human nature; it enables the Emmanuel to request, to receive, to be made holy, to be anointed with the Holy Spirit, to become Lord and Christ, to receive the name above all names, also 'not to know the future'.

Nevertheless the needy soul of Christ receives the divine riches from the very moment of the union, although they would not come to it on the basis of its essence (*secundum rationem essentialem et naturalem carnis*).

(3) Christ also appropriates our rebellion against God, offence, sin — indeed not real — but because as head of the whole body of the Church he has taken on himself everything that is ours: our sin, our forsakenness.

222. We follow the Latin translation of Van Roey-Allen for CPG 7133, OLA 56, pp. 42-56: Wright II, 982-3.

Christ becomes a sinner not by his own decision, but indeed by his becoming a member of sinful humanity.

Theodosius sees in this *second manner* of appropriation the decisive solution to the question. He underpins his interpretation with six Cyrillian citations from works that precede or follow the Council of Ephesus. It is based on the unmingled unity of infinite divinity and of finite, burdened humanity.<sup>223</sup> If one surveys these passages, it turns out that Cyril was ready to concede a genuine appropriation of ignorance in Christ. But then he decided to consider this natural need as only one *de iure*, not as one *de facto*, as real. Fundamentally Christ's human nature was in need of knowledge as a natural necessity. In reality, however, this lack was always already filled, as Cyril states in his commentary on Matthew (on the passage, Mt 24,36: 'no one knows the day or the hour').

He says that he does not know, not as God; admittedly he was not only the God-Logos, but became and was a human being who does not know the future according to his nature and the measure of humanity, but often receives this from God's revelation.<sup>224</sup>

Here Cyril speaks first of all of the possibility that human ignorance in general can be dispelled by divine revelation. All the more has Christ a right to this. This right is given with the *henosis*.

This is also the opinion of Patriarch Theodosius in his assessment of the long fragment from Cyril. Christ appropriated the imperfections of our nature, which it has by reason of the constitution of its essence, and also ignorance of the future. As Logos, however, he has this knowledge and an omniscience (*et omnium [rerum] scientiam habet*). Does the divine knowledge thus simply abolish creaturely ignorance? Can one no longer truly say that Christ also assumed ignorance? For Theodosius it would be an abolition of the economy of salvation to deny the genuine appropriation of the whole complex of imperfections and deficiencies in Christ. But the Patriarch does not advance beyond a *de iure* appropria-

223. Cyril Alex., (a) *De sancta trinitate dial.* (CPG 5216) VI: PG 75, 1008D: received sanctification of Christ's humanity; (b) *Quod unus sit Christus* (CPG 5228): PG 75, 1277C; Durand, SC 97, 348-9: Christ receives the anointing; (c) *ibid.*: PG 75, 1320C = SC 97, 430-1; (d) Isaiah commentary (CPG 5203) on Is 11,2: PG 70, 313BC: Christ as a human being receives the gifts of the spirit of wisdom, not for himself, but for us; (e) *Scholia de incarn. unigen.* (CPG 5225), c. 5: PG 75, 1374BC; ACO I, 5, p. 187,1-10: the Word which is perfect in everything has appropriated human need (*indigentia*); (f) *Comm. in Mt* (CPG 5206): PG 72, 444-5: ignorance of the day of judgement: Cyril concedes that Christ perhaps also appropriated this, which in a natural way he had in his human nature (or must have been able to have had).

224. OLA 56, p. 49,254-257; PG 72, 444.

tion.<sup>225</sup> By virtue of this 'ignorance *de iure*' the Emmanuel could say that he does not know the day of judgement, although he knew it by virtue of his divine knowledge.<sup>226</sup>

Because he, however, was not purely a simple human being like us — although a human being like us, he remained what he was, God — so we do not say that he — not even in his humanity — was robbed of these things: for his animated flesh received through its union with the Logos all divine holiness, efficacy (*efficacitatem*) and also wisdom and omniscience.<sup>227</sup>

Theodosius thus decides for Cyril's solution, that in Christ there existed only an ignorance of his humanity *de iure*:

The 'Father' (Cyril) shows clearly that the Emmanuel did not have ignorance in reality, not even according to his humanity; only through appropriation did he hide himself in accordance with the economy of salvation . . .<sup>228</sup>

That Cyril in reality does not recognize an ignorant Emmanuel, he states more certainly than any other, when he says in the second book of his *Thesaurus*:

Christ acts in accordance with the economy of salvation (*οικονομεί*), when he says that he does not know the hour, although in reality he does.<sup>229</sup>

From scripture and the Fathers Theodosius wants to prove that Christ, according to all three types of appropriation (here we are highlighting only the second), appropriated our being and lot. In this way he believes he has mastered the question of Christ's humiliation in all its aspects, particularly in relation to the honourable and dishonourable passions and the passions that are worthy or unworthy of God (sins): Christ suffers natural things, because he is in essence a human being; he suffers need, as this pertains to nature; from the outside he also appropriates our sin, by becoming the head of a sinful body (thus not from inside through his own sin).

For the problem of Christ's knowledge Theodosius takes over a method used by the Cyrillians/Severans to solve the question of one nature or two natures. As the Severans want to distinguish the two natures only in *theoria*, so too the assumption of human ignorance is only

225. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 50,311–313: *Quemadmodum enim conveniebat naturae humanae et eius rationi substantiali et rationali, in inopia omnium illorum erat etiam Emmanuel.*

226. *Ibid.*, p. 50,313–314: *Ideoque non mentiebatur quando ut homo humiliabat seipsum in ignorantiam futurorum.*

227. *Ibid.*, pp. 50,314–51,319.

228. *Ibid.*

229. Cyril Alex., *Thesaurus* (CPG 5215): PG 75, 377D.

in *theoria*, even if according to a clear entitlement: Christ, viewed in the state of separation, has in his humanity true not-knowing. In the status of the union Theodosius, with reference to the Fathers, does not allow real ignorance. As the separation of divinity and humanity in Christ exists only in *theoria*, so too does the assumption of ignorance. For this reason the Fathers too concede no real ignorance:

Agree therefore with the holy Fathers that the rational soul (of Christ) through the union [with the Word] at the same time received his holiness, divine power, wisdom and omniscience<sup>230</sup>

Theodosius gains a special argument for Christ's omniscience as a human being by classifying knowing among the *activitates*, that is, the *energeiai*. Then, however, it is true for him that in Christ there is only one *physis*, one *hypostasis*, one activity, that is, the fundamental Severan thesis for the one Christ. His concluding judgement shows that he is just reproducing Severus:

With regard to the activity — for knowledge is an activity and not less the foreknowledge of the future — the holy Fathers have handed on to us that there is only this one (*energeia*), namely the divine, in the composite Christ. It is not in accordance with tradition to say that he [Christ] acts in the one and does not act in the other [N B against Leo], knows (in the one and) does not know in the other. For we must confess either (1) that there is both in his humanity and in his divinity a knowledge [proper to each] — which is foolish and ungodly, or (2) that there is only one *divine* knowledge — which is true, correct and has been said by the holy Fathers about the Emmanuel. For this reason no ignorance at all remains in him<sup>231</sup>

Christ's knowledge thus has a special position. It is classified as 'activity', as *energeia*, and is distinguished from the *πάθη*, the passions. In the domain of the *energeia* there is for Theodosius not *in alio et in alio* in Christ.<sup>232</sup> Everything is concentrated in the Logos and proceeds from him. Although Theodosius speaks only of Christ's knowledge, the willing of Christ also belongs naturally to the one *energeia*. To the 'one knowledge' there corresponds necessarily the 'one *theosis*'.<sup>233</sup> There is

230 OLA 56, p 54,447–451 Theodosius attempts to collect all opposing statements from individual Fathers. A text from Gregory Naz, *Or II de Filio* PG 36 124A, which he quotes, cannot be substantiated here.

231 OLA 56, p 55,479–487

232 *Ibid*, pp 55,497–56,503 *Relate autem ad activitatem divinam nequaquam (possumus dicere 'in alio et in alio') Non enim idem sapiens est et non sapiens, potens et impotens, bonus et non bonus, vita et non vita, gratia et non gratia, veritas et non veritas — dicit enim de eo, ut dixi 'Plenus gratia et veritate' (Jn 1,14) — nisi quis haec omnia dicere vult de eo ratione differenti humanitatis sicut enim de nobis, separatim considerans ea ex quibus compositus est Christus*

233 Which is intimated by talk of *potens* = omnipotent



no room for human freedom, for that would once again be Nestorian separation.

Theodosius applies to the domain of the *energeia* precisely Cyril's and Severus' linguistic rules with regard to *physis*: as one can speak of two natures before the union in *theoria*, and after the union, however, only of one, so too this holds true with regard to Christ's knowledge.<sup>234</sup> It is only in *theoria* that I may speak simultaneously of Christ's omniscience and ignorance, as long as I consider the natures in themselves.

But when you still say, after thinking of the union, that God the Logos knows the future, but that the rational, intellectual soul which is consubstantial with us and united to him does not perceive it, how do they escape the danger of division and separation? How do they avoid saying that there are two sons and two natures?<sup>235</sup>

The one divine light of omniscience and God's infinite knowledge thus flows into Christ's human soul with the *henosis*, and allows no shadows of the human limitations of knowledge to return to it. This consideration from above is so determined that the human spiritual faculties are not even considered as the organs for executing the divine omniscience. To speak as well of one will in Christ (namely the divine) suggests itself. If this were the case, however, the principle of Christ's redemptive obedience as a human being would be radically placed in jeopardy, even though Theodosius still stresses so often that Christ has a rational soul. All of its possible functions are performed by the Logos. It is for this reason that in 540 monoenergism, as it will be discussed in the seventh century, is already present in all its rigour and is defended expressly.<sup>236</sup> There is no longer talk of the involvement of the human *intellectual faculties*.

According to Theodosius the *actiones* or *activitates* have to be distinguished from the *passiones naturales*. Here he is forced to bring into play the divine and the human natures, each in its own way.

234 When for the question of the distinction of a twofold manner of knowing in Christ Theodosius refers to the well-known 'mental or theoretical distinction' in Cyril, he probably has in mind the *Ep ad Succensum* II *Ep* 46, PG 77, 245A. This purely mental distinction in Cyril, however, concerns only the 'two natures', not the two ways of knowing. The application to Christ's knowledge does not occur here.

235 OLA 56, p. 56,515-519.

236 In the fragmentary text of the *Tomus ad Theodorum* one cannot discern whether Christ's human faculty of knowing is still used as *organon* and 'co-moved'. This obscurity continues to exist in all the Severan authors with the exception of John Philoponus of Alexandria (see *JdChr* II/4, 129-31 (T. Hainthaler)).

But in relation to the natural passions (*passiones naturales*) it is permissible to speak of 'in one — in the other'; one and the same is mortal in the humanity and immortal in the divinity; the same is possible in the humanity and impossible in the divinity.<sup>237</sup>

To these *passiones*, which are conceivable only in Christ's humanity as an executive organ, belong hunger, growth, loathing. The divinity is free of these. That means an extraordinarily great deal for the picture of Christ and the interpretation of his redemptive action. In this picture Theodosius cannot grant to Christ's human, intellectual faculties an active rôle, but only a passive, purely instrumental one. All *energeia* and *dynamis* in Christ are from the divine side of Jesus and flow from above down below. In this way the 'unmingled and undivided' of christology in general, even of the non-Chalcedonian type, is endangered and glossed over. In this picture of Christ the divine activity is almost as powerful as in Apollinarianism, even if the human soul is always stressed.

(e) *Ps. Caesarius, Erotapokriseis and the idea of Christ's knowledge*

It is only now that the preconditions have been established for questioning a contemporary of the patriarchs Theodosius and Anthimus about his idea of Christ's knowledge. This is Ps. Caesarius and his *Erotapokriseis*, which, according to its editor and researcher, R. Riedinger, is to be dated shortly before 550.<sup>238</sup> In order to guarantee a higher authority for the work, the compiler, whose mother tongue was not Greek, put it under the name of Gregory Nazianzen's brother, Caesarius (d. 368/369). Of course, the consequence of this was that in particular the authors of the third and fourth century had to be exploited for questions of the sixth century, were the forgery not to be detected immediately.

One of those topical questions from the sixth century which had to be embedded in the older forms of presentation was the problem of

237. OLA 56, p. 55, 493–495.

238. *Pseudo-Kaisarios. Die Erotapokriseis. Erstmals vollständig herausgegeben von R. Riedinger* (Berlin, 1989). For an induction into this work we refer the reader to the introduction, pp. VII–XI, and in addition to the bibliography, XII–XIV. As the most important preliminary study, see *idem*, *Pseudo-Kaisarios. Überlieferungsgeschichte und Verfasserfrage* (Munich, 1969). The *Erotapokriseis* of Ps. Caesarius are significant because 'they paraphrase extant and lost writings of the Fathers from Clement of Alexandria (around 190) to Proclus of Constantinople (435–436). Thus they enable one to check the original transmission of these texts, and in other cases even to reconstruct lost writings . . . The *Erotapokriseis* . . . were composed with great probability by a protégé of Empress Theodora (died 548), who could use the rich library of the Sleepless Monks for his paraphrases': R. Riedinger, art. 'Akoimeten', in *TRE* 2, 151–2. How Ps. Caesarius stands with regard to Theodora will no doubt have to be stated more precisely (see below).

Christ's knowledge, which occurs in our context. We can already surmise that here the Arians and their opponents had to emerge as the major combatants, although it is patent that it is the Agnoetic dispute of the sixth century which is under discussion. This does not exclude the fact that the fundamental trinitarian dogma is still stressed strongly. But this occurs in such a way that one can recognize that the first and second phases of the Arian conflict are over, and that there exists agreement about the eternity and truth of Christ's divine sonship, the *homoousios*, and about the main trinitarian formula of one *physis* and three *hypostases* (= *prosopa*).<sup>239</sup> There also exists agreement about the fact that the incarnation which is ascribed to the Logos means no increase or change to the Trinity (Q. 12). This Trishagion (Q. 13) too does not signify a problem for the unity of the godhead; because it is sung in the singular (*hagios* . . .) and not in the plural (*hagioi*) by the angels, it does not express any polytheism.<sup>240</sup>

### *The knowledge of Christ*

With Question 15 the theme of Christ's knowledge is introduced.<sup>241</sup> The ignorance of the day and hour of the consummation (Mt 24,36) is indeed one of the major themes since the discussion with the Arians. The point of the question is not clearly seen at the beginning: in Question and Answer 15 everything is related to the inner-divine relation of Father, Son and Spirit, and the community of *gnosis* is stressed (with reference to Jn 17,10, that is, the whole community of goods between Father and Son, which is understood in the trinitarian sense) (Q. 15,12-15).

Q. 16 poses the insistent question, however, that if everything is common between Father and Son, even knowledge, then does the commonality also encompass knowledge of the Father's will? 'Caesarius' is evasive in the counter-question: what is greater — 'day' or 'hour', or the 'Father'? The answer is self-evident and the conclusion unambiguous: whoever knows the greater cannot be subjected to ignorance with regard to the lesser (Q. 17). Ps. Caesarius thus does not distinguish between the inner-divine knowledge of Father and Son, and the knowledge of the Father (or of the day of judgement) by Jesus as a human being.

### The Question-Answer 18 on the solution of the well-known difficulty

239. This is particularly expressed in Questions 10-13; ed. Riedinger, 17-18.

240. Ps. Caesarius also fights against Sabellianism (Q. 10) and emphasizes the persons very strongly by the statement that there are three *prosopa* and three *hypostaseis*, linking both terms in an emphatic manner: *hypostasis enprosopos* and *prosopon enhypostatou*. The word *enhypostatos* is frequent in Ps. Caesarius, but always has the old meaning of real, actual. See the index in Riedinger with nine occurrences.

241. *Erotap.* 15; Riedinger, 20.

'the Father is greater than I' (Jn 14,28) also remains in the intra-trinitarian domain. The Father differs from the Son only by being the Father. Everything else is included in the unity of essence. The incorporation of Christ's humanity does not occur.

In reply to Question 20, once again the 'ignorance of the day of judgement' is broached in order to fulfil a promise made earlier to give a more detailed explanation.<sup>242</sup> Once more at the beginning only the intra-trinitarian equality of Father and Son is solidly introduced as an argument against the Son's ignorance of the day of judgement, but then with John 1,14 the Incarnate One is described as incarnate Logos and as speaker of the words of Matthew 24,36.<sup>243</sup> In the whole section the divinity and the equality with God of the Incarnate One is stressed so strongly that only one conclusion remains possible: the ignorance of the day of judgement is conceived as a statement about Christ that is meant 'economically' or 'intellectually' (allegorically) (*ὅπερ οἰκονομικῶς καὶ νοητῶς φησιν*).<sup>244</sup> In reality, in the Son as Logos there is the same knowledge as in the Father.

The following sentence seems to offer hope for a more adequate solution that does justice to the incarnation: 'there are *two* knowledges; we are taught namely by the scriptures about a twofold knowledge, one according to the *energeia* [activity], the other according to seeing'.<sup>245</sup> However, it is only after a digression that one discovers that by this is meant the reciprocal knowledge before and after sexual union and even this union itself;<sup>246</sup> this is illustrated by Adam and Eve and other biblical persons. The application to Christ is intended to follow from a distinction which has only the number two in common with the biblical example: the Son knows the day and the hour very well, because he indicates their omens and terrors, and through his description of the characteristics he manifests his divine knowledge; but he does not want to answer the corresponding question in more detail, but by stressing

242. *Erotap.* 20: Riedinger, pp. 22,1–24,70, where Epiphanius, *Ancoratus*: Holl, pp. 27,14–30,23, is paraphrased. Cf. R. Riedinger, *Pseudo-Kaisarios* (1969), 285–6.

243. In Ps. Caesarius it is striking that the term *βρωτός* for a human being (see Riedinger, *index verborum*), and in addition the birth from Mary is depicted as *θεανδρική προέλευσις* Q. 20,23). We shall later discuss his relation to Ps. Dionysius the Areopagite.

244. *Erotap.* 20: Riedinger, p. 22,25–26.

245. *Erotap.* 20: Riedinger, p. 23,32–33: *δύο δὲ γνώσεις, διττὴν καὶ εἰδήσιν ὑπὸ τῆς θείας γραφῆς παιδεύμεθα, τὴν μὲν κατ' ἐνέργειαν, τὴν δὲ κατ' ὄψιν*. Here Ps. Caesarius transcribes the *Ancoratus* of Epiphanius: Epiphanius, *Ancor.* 20, 1–10: Holl, 28–9.

246. *Erotap.* 20: Riedinger, pp. 23,48–24,62. Here Epiphanius, *Ancor.*: Holl, p. 29,4–8,13–19, is paraphrased.

his ignorance wants to exhort the believers to prepare for this hour.<sup>247</sup> Any ignorance, be it only that of a day or of an hour, is categorically denied for the creator of the aeons, in whom are all the treasures of knowledge (Col 2,3).

Nevertheless there is in God a distinction in the knowledge between Father and Son which corresponds to the twofold knowledge previously developed: an, as it were, theoretical knowledge of God about the judgement (which the Son also has) and the corresponding *praxis*, that is, the carrying out of the judgement. This 'practical knowledge of the judgement' is thus also for the Son of Man not yet reality; it will become so on the day when he comes again.<sup>248</sup> To this extent there is still an 'experience' which is yet to come.

### *Refutation of the Agnoetai*

Perhaps for the first time in the sixth century we encounter the term *Agnoetai* in Question 30 to Ps. Caesarius.

Sufficiently instructed about our previous questions, we request still further the statements (*phonas*) of the *Agnoetai* to be refuted; they say namely that the Redeemer does not know the tomb of Lazarus, also does not know about the woman with the flow of blood who seizes the hem (of his garment), and that he was not at all perfect God, for he made advances and increased in wisdom and age as the Gospel says (Lk 2,52; 2,40).<sup>249</sup>

One does not need to be surprised by the emergence of the name *Agnoetai*, for shortly after 536 there occurred in Constantinople the break between Patriarch Theodosius and Themistius, and the formation of a group ('sect') around the deacon began quickly. That it soon received the name *Agnoetai* is only natural and could have been arrived at in the monastery of the Sleepless Monks, where we supposedly find the compiler of the *Erotapokriseis* at work in these years. What Ps. Caesarius offers as an answer,<sup>250</sup> however, reveals no contact with the type of approach which Theodosius and Anthimus attempted to the problem of Christ's knowledge.<sup>251</sup> With regard to the examples of Jesus' ignorance adduced in Question 30, he takes refuge in their classification under 'economical speech', that is, it belongs to the free incarnational adaptation of Jesus to our manner of limitation. Thus in Matthew 16,13 or

247. Here the model is Isidore of Pelus., *Ep.* I, 117.

248. *Erotap.* 21: Riedinger, p. 24,1-14. Cf. Epiphanius, *Ancor.*: Holl, p. 30,1-5,14-15.

249. *Erotap.* 30: Riedinger, p. 30,1-5.

250. *Erotap.* 30: Riedinger, 31-2.

251. This could be an indication that Ps. Caesarius did not belong to the inner circle of Theodora's protégés and is not to be reckoned as a real Severan. He is not initiated into Theodora's 'secrets'.

Luke 2,52.40 no demonstration of real *agnoia* is produced (p. 31,10); rather the equality of the Son with the Father is proven by the scriptures (Jn 11,34). God's questions to the fallen Adam and to Cain (where is your brother Abel?) and the questions of Jesus in Bethany are not an objection to the knowledge of God and of Jesus. These cases do not attest to an *agnoia*, but only an *oikonomia* of God and of Jesus in intercourse with human beings,<sup>252</sup> that is, the tailoring of God's knowledge to our capacity to understand.

How Ps. Caesarius conceives the communication of the fullness of God's knowledge to the human spirit, he does not say. Nevertheless he belongs to the theologians who grant to Christ's soul a function of its own, and explicitly reject the substitution of the human spirit by the 'Logos', understood in an Arian or Apollinarian way.<sup>253</sup> Christ's human soul is necessary as the receptacle of the psychic and psychosomatic sorrowful experiences, which the Arians only all too happily wish to ascribe to the Logos principle as such, in order to show it as created.<sup>254</sup> In fact, in Questions and Answers 23-29 Ps. Caesarius lists numerous psychosomatic activities of Christ which are intended to underpin the reply to the Arians: hunger and thirst, spiritual anguish, bodily sweating caused by anxiety, growth and development. But the compiler is immediately at pains to exclude particularly 'unholy wickedness', the opposite of sinlessness (p. 29,7), and *agnoia*, ignorance (p. 31,10), and to explain the help of the angel after the temptation in the desert (p. 30) and the consolation after the anxiety on the Mount of Olives (p. 29) as not being real need. The taking over of all these passions is explained explicitly as the assumption of *ἀδιάβλητα πάθη*, as morally unquestionable weaknesses (Q.-A. 24, p. 27), in order to refute the Manichaeans. Hence we also observe from Ps. Caesarius' statements that the Agnoetic question was acute in Constantinople between 536 and 550. Nevertheless his manner of approaching the problem, fearful as he is of yielding too much to the 'humanity', is still different from that of Theodosius and Anthimus. He does not speak of the *mia energeia*, the one flow of activity, which is present in the picture the two deposed patriarchs had of Christ. For this reason we cannot regard Ps. Caesarius simply as a Severan. In him we encounter none of the main formulas of Severus or Theodosius, neither the *mia physis* nor the *mia energeia*.

252. *Erotap.* 31: Riedinger, p. 33,5, in general p. 33,4-23.

253. Cf. especially the Questions 25-29: Riedinger, 27-30.

254. Cf. *Erotap.* 28: Riedinger, 28 with reference to Epiphanius, *Ancor.*: Holl, p. 45,14-26.

He is rather a 'late-Henotistic', who avoids both the *mia-physis* formula as well as the *dyo-physeis* formula.<sup>255</sup>

How seductive Theodosius' view was will be evident at the end of the sixth century in the theology of Eulogius of Alexandria (581–608). This patriarch seems to be immediately dependent on the *Tomus* of Theodosius to Theodora. We shall refer to this briefly.

(f) *Christ's ignorance in Patriarch Eulogius of Alexandria (580–607)*

Although Eulogius is a Chalcedonian, albeit with a neo-Chalcedonian tint,<sup>256</sup> he takes over extensively the teaching and arguments of Theodosius.<sup>257</sup> In an important argument the two theologians are alike: like Theodosius, Eulogius of Alexandria too takes refuge in the purely intellectual consideration of the different states of Christ's human nature, of the real *status unionis* in contrast to the only mental *status separationis*.<sup>258</sup>

Whoever ascribes ignorance either to his divinity or to his humanity will never escape the crime of certain recklessness. If, as the blessed Cyril teaches, we separate fact from fact in subtle thoughts (*ennoiai*) or in the imagination of the spirit according to the art of *theoria*, then we see the characteristics of each of the two natures, as they are in themselves. The sign that is proper to the simple and pure humanity is ignorance. In this regard ignorance can be ascribed to Christ's humanity, considered as simple and pure human nature.

When Eulogius refers here to Cyril, without adducing evidence,<sup>259</sup> he has probably copied Theodosius, who indeed with reference to Cyril speaks of Christ's two knowledges 'in thought', but probably means by this only a passage from the second letter to Succensus about the 'mental distinction' of the two 'natures'. The writings of Theodosius were

255. Typical in this regard is the *apokrisis* to Question 35: Riedinger, p. 35,24–26: 'on account of the indivisible and inseparable union of the Logos and the flesh and of the *one hypostasis*, which should not be taken apart by any reflection or thought'. Severus would not have neglected to mention as well here the *mia physis* and the *mia energeia*. There seems to be a greater affinity to Ps. Dionysius the Areopagite, as the frequent expression *theandrikos* will show us.

256. Cf. E. Schulte, *op. cit.*, 124–7; C. Moeller, 'Chalcédonisme et néo-chalcédonisme', in *Chalcedon I*, 690–3; S. Helmer, *Der Neuchalcedonismus* (Bonn, 1962), 236–43. See *JdChr* II/4, 66–72 (T. Hainthaler).

257. On his works see CPG 6971–9. We are basing ourselves on Photius, *Bibl. cod.* 230 PG 103, 1080D–1084D; Henry V, 57–60.

258. Photius, *Bibl. cod.* 230: PG 103, 1084B. On Cyril's distinction 'in thought' (*ἐν ἐννοιαῖς*) see *Ep. ad Succens.* I: PG 77, 232D–233A; *Ep.* II: PG 77, 245A. See above n. 234.

259. Which E. Schulte, *op. cit.*, 125, also establishes; see *ibid.* on the reference to Gregory Nazianzen, who is also mentioned by Theodosius.

certainly familiar to him, because they were highly esteemed in Alexandria, as Patriarchs Theodore and Damian testify.<sup>260</sup>

Theodosius and Eulogius of Alexandria show us how in the evaluation of ignorance in Christ and its rejection Chalcedonians and non-Chalcedonians can meet.<sup>261</sup> Nevertheless the profound difference in the justification cannot be overlooked. Theodosius argues above all on the basis of the idea of the *one energeia* or from a decided rejection of the two activities in the sense of Leo I. Eulogius, however, is a determined defender of Leo's *Tomus*.<sup>262</sup> If Eulogius nevertheless accepts Christ's omniscience, even with regard to human knowledge, it is because he ascribes an immediate significance to the *henosis* as such, thereby abandoning the *mia-energeia* teaching.

Christ's humanity too, which has been united to the inaccessible and essential wisdom in one *hypostasis*, cannot be in ignorance about anything either of the present or of the future . . . [cit. Jn 16,15: everything that the Father has is mine], if they do not want in their temerity to ascribe ignorance to the Father himself.<sup>263</sup>

Gregory the Great takes over the teaching of his friend Eulogius, when in 600 an enquiry came from the deacon Anatolius,<sup>264</sup> and confirms

260. Damian Alex., *Epistula synodica ad Iacobum Baradaeum* (CPG 7240): Michael Syr., ed. Chabot II, 333; Theodore Alex., *Epistula synodica ad Paulum Antiochenum* (CPG 7236), Chabot, CSCO 103 (V), p. 211,17-22.

261. Eulogius probably also takes over from Theodosius the third mode of appropriation described above, which is present in the incarnation: Christ, as 'head' of the imperfect humanity, appropriates its sin and curse: cf. Theodosius, above, p. 370, with Photius, *Bibl. cod.* 230: PG 103, 1082BC: *Figurate dicitur illum pro nobis peccatum et maledictum factum esse; neque enim fuit quidquam horum. Sed veluti sibi caput vindicat ea quae sunt reliqui corporis, ita Christus ea quae corporis sunt sibi assignat*. Thus we see how Eulogius too strives to distinguish various ways of appropriating the imperfections. Cf. the comments on Theodosius' second mode with PG 103, 1082C: *Secundum rei veritatem* . . .

262. Photius, *Bibl. cod.* 225: PG 103, 940B-949D; Henry IV, 99-108; cf. *cod.* 226: PG 103, 949D-953A; Henry IV, 108-11, comments which are directed particularly against Theodosius.

263. Eulogius, *C. Agnoitas*: Photius, *Bibl. cod.* 230: PG 103, 1081A; Henry V, 57-8. One can discern here the Patriarch's affinity with the Chalcedonian apthartics, whom Leontius of Byzantium combated. They claim the *aphtharsia* (incorruptibility) for Christ's body before the resurrection purely on the basis of the *henosis*. F. Diekamp, *Analecta Patristica* = OCA 117, 154-60, produces a long fragment from a treatise of archbishop Stephen of Hierapolis against the *Agnoetas* (CPG 7005). The major part of the writing is lost. The bishop's position is summarized at the end as follows: 'No one should ascribe ignorance to Christ's divinity in the Arian manner or to his humanity in the way of Paul [of Samosata] or of Nestorius. As one and the same according to the person and *hypostasis* he has the clear knowledge of this day and of this hour (cf. Mt 24,36; Mk 13,32) and of his holy Father and the life-giving Spirit, with whom he blesses, sanctifies and enlightens every human being who comes into this world . . . (cf. Jn 1,9).' Cf. the following citation from Gregory the Great.

264. Gregory M., *Registrum epistularum* (CPL 1714), X, 21 (to Eulogius, from August 600): Norberg, CCL 140A, pp. 852,20-855,111.



that it stands in agreement with the Latin Fathers, especially with Augustine. Many scriptural passages refer in their statement to Christ's humanity.<sup>265</sup>

But the Only-begotten, who became a human being for our sake, knew in the nature of the humanity the day and the hour of judgement, not on the basis of the human nature, but 'because God became a human being, he knows the day and the hour of judgement by virtue of his divinity'.<sup>266</sup>

Nevertheless, 'whoever is not a Nestorian can in no way be an *Agnoetes*'.<sup>267</sup> For how can one who confesses the incarnate wisdom of God himself say that there is something which the wisdom of God does not know, or that the Word of God created something which he did not know (Jn 1,1)? For the rest Gregory refers to examples in the Old Testament, where there is talk in a human way of God's not knowing (Abraham, Gen 22,12; Adam, Gen 3,9; Cain, Gen 4,9-10).

(g) *The attitude of De sectis*

*De sectis* describes the *Agnoetai* as Theodosians.<sup>268</sup> Themistius is not referred to here. It is said that the only thing which separates the *Agnoetai* from the Theodosians is the view of the knowledge of Christ's humanity. After the presentation of a dialogue between the two<sup>269</sup> the author of *De sectis* formulates his own position.

Firstly it is said that one should not investigate this question meticulously. Secondly the synod [= Chalcedon?] composed no teaching about this. Thirdly all the Fathers were of the opinion that Christ did not know,<sup>270</sup> which follows from the fact that he was like us in all things. Moreover the scriptures also report Christ's learning (Lk 2,52), which implies a not-knowing.<sup>271</sup>

265. In Mk 13,32 (neither the Son nor the angels knows the day and the hour) it is the Son of Man that is meant, not the Son who is consubstantial with the Father; cf. *ibid.*, p. 853,38-42

266. *Ibid.*, pp. 853,53-854,58.

267. *Ibid.*, p. 854,76-77.

268. Leontius Schol., *De sectis*, X, III: PG 86, 1261D. Cf. *ibid.*, V, VI: PG 86, 1232D.

269. According to which the *Agnoetai* say: 'Because Christ is like us in all things (*κατὰ πάντα . . . ὅμοιος ἡμῖν*), he did not know.' As a scriptural proof for this ignorance they cite the well-known passages: Mk 13,32; Jn 11,34. The Theodosians say in contrast: Christ said that *κατ'οικονομίαν*, so that the disciples would stop asking questions. After the resurrection he no longer said that the Son does not know it.

270. An apposite statement, which is to be understood against the background of the anti-Arian discussion.

271. Leontius Schol., *De sectis*, X, III: PG 86, 1264AB: 'We say, however, that one must not investigate this so precisely. For the synod also did not presumptuously compose any teaching about this. One must only know that many of the Fathers, nearly all, apparently say that he did not know. For if it is said that he is like us in all things and we do not know, it is evident that he too did not know. And the scripture too says that he increased in age and wisdom. Clearly he learned, therefore he did not know.'

It is remarkable that here, after Eulogius, the *Agnoetai* are in fact soberly and clearly justified (the reasoning produced by the *Agnoetai* is almost verbatim the same as *De sectis* gives for the opinion of the Fathers), and Christ's ignorance is declared to be in conformity with the Fathers and the scriptures. *De sectis*, however, also abstains from a speculative proof.

### *Evaluation*

The question about Christ's human knowledge, resulting from the tension between the Severan and the Julianist interpretation of Christ's earthly corporeality, engaged the theologians during several decades of the sixth century. During this time the Severan party was in command. From the very beginning the way in which the question was posed was unsatisfactory and correspondingly so too were the solutions. The Chalcedonian *asynchytos* was almost forgotten in this discussion. Only tentatively does the idea emerge that Christ's human spirit needs the 'revelation' in grace and the communication of divine knowledge, even if the title for this grants him a special position, namely as 'Son' to have every right to the entire 'estate' of the Father. Nevertheless with this claim the receiving vessel remains finite. Here too a place for the *kenosis* must remain secured.

### *Justinian's letter to Zoilus*

To judge from the lemma with which Justinian's letter is cited at the Council of Constantinople (680/681), it is probably the reply to a letter of Patriarch Zoilus. Unfortunately it is known and preserved only in this fragment. The interest of the Council concerned, however, the teaching of the two activities in Christ. It is precisely to this theme that the selected text is geared. It proclaims unreservedly Leo I's teaching of Christ's twofold manner of action, corresponding to the *utraque forma*. In this way Justinian's letter sketches in fact a completely different picture of Christ from that of Theodosius, who was writing at the same time and also in Constantinople.<sup>272</sup> Justinian's document does not give the impression that he already knows about the Patriarch's *Tomus* to Theodora. Nevertheless the Emperor evidently assumes that there were discussions about the *mia energieia* also in Alexandria.

The Emperor establishes his thesis of the twofold activity in Christ

272 We follow the text in Amelotti-Mighardi Zingale, *Scritti teologici*, 58-61; Greek in Mansi XI, 429-32; Latin according to J. Merlin, *Concilia generalia* II (Paris, 1524), here: 59-61; another Latin translation according to Hardouin III: *ibid.*, 62-3; cf. Mansi XI, 819-20.

straightforwardly from Cyril, in the same way that Theodosius establishes his conception. The first citation is from Cyril's *Thesaurus*,<sup>273</sup> in which is emphasized the natural distinction between divine and creaturely action, without direct reference to the divine-human activity of Christ. A second Cyrillian text from the *Treatise on right faith* to Emperor Theodosius leads closer to the *mono-dyo-energetic* problem, indeed even to the psychology of Christ. The significance of this text lies in the emphasis on the human, intellectual-psychological activity.<sup>274</sup>

The whole Word which is from God was united to the entire human nature, as it is in us. For he has not left unconsidered the better in us, the soul, and not only devoted the efforts of his coming to the flesh. For he has used both his own flesh as instrument (*organon*) for the works of the flesh and for the natural weaknesses which have nothing to do with sin, and also the soul (to experience) the human, blameless infirmities. Indeed after a long walk he hungered and he endured fear, sadness, dread of death, and death on the cross. No one forced him to do this; of his own accord he surrendered his own life for us, in order to reign over the living and the dead; the flesh as ransom for the flesh of all, truly a worthy gift; the soul for the souls of all as ransom (*antilytron*) for all . . .

We have here one of the few places in which there is also talk of the spiritual soul as an *organon*. Nevertheless we are still far removed from the problem of Christ's knowledge, as Theodosius treated it. Still it is of significance that Justinian clearly presents by way of summary the teaching of Christ's twofold manner of action, once again with Cyril.

It is human passion to die; divine activity to become living again; he shows what is discernible from each: that which he is with us and at the same time that which he is beyond us as God.<sup>275</sup>

A clear confession of Chalcedonian teaching follows as conclusion:

You see how the venerable Father [Cyril] has passed on the [teaching of the] activities of the two natures in the one *hypostasis* or the one person of Christ, our God<sup>276</sup>

### Summary

On the basis of the reputation which Justinian enjoys in the more recent writing on the history of doctrine, the impression made by the imperial documents which we have just analysed is surprising: they contain a pure, strict-Chalcedonian christology, a christology orientated on Leo I. Evidently the Emperor drew hope from the 'conversions' which he

273. Cyril Alex., *Thesaurus* (CPG 5215), ass. 32. PG 75, 453BC; ACO II, 5, p. 147, 27-29.

274. Cyril Alex., *Or. ad Theodos imp de recta fide* (CPG 5218), 21: PG 76, 1164AB, ACO I, 1, 1, p. 55, 14-24.

275. *Ibid.*, 43: PG 76, 1200A; ACO I, 1, 1, p. 72, 3-5.

276. Amelotti-Mighardi Zingale, *Scritti teologici*, p. 60, 13-14.

believed he could ascertain in Alexandria to be able to restore unity of faith along this line. His real goal, which he hoped to achieve in his efforts to win the Severans between 532 and 536 and in the two letters addressed to Alexandria, was always the unity of teaching, the true guarantee of the welfare of his reign. On the basis of this intention, in which his whole consciousness of responsibility peaked, is the conclusion of his dogmatic constitution of 536 to be understood, which is considered to be one of the most powerful texts of Byzantine influence on Christian teaching. The unity of faith should be restored by command.

### *Commanded unity*

We forbid, however, all who attempt to rend asunder the catholic Church of God  
 whether it be according to the teaching of the heretical Nestorius,  
 or according to the tradition of the senseless Eutyches,  
 or according to the blasphemy of Severus,  
 who thought similar things to them,  
 or their followers

to bring sedition into the holy churches and to say anything about the faith. Rather we ordain all these [named] to remain silent, not to summon gatherings around them, to receive no proselytes (*accedentes*), and not to dare to baptize unlawfully (*parabaptizare*), or to defile holy communion and to give it to others (of like mind) or to expand the forbidden teachings. Whoever does this either here in this imperial city or in another lays himself open to all danger [penalty]. We also forbid everybody to receive these [named] . . .<sup>277</sup>

277. Justinian emp., *Constitutio contra Anthimum, Severum, Petrum et Zooram*: Amelotti-Mighardi Zingale, *Scritti teologici* II, p. 52,23-32 (Greek); p. 53,21-29 (Latin).

## CHAPTER THREE

### THE TWOFOLD CONDEMNATION OF THE ORIGENISTS

#### I. EMPEROR JUSTINIAN'S DECREE AGAINST THE ORIGENISTS FROM THE YEAR 543

While the theopaschite formula 'one of the Trinity was crucified' was still being fought about and the struggle to win over or to defend the Severans was in progress, in Palestine a new chance was presenting itself for imperial intervention in theological controversies. These controversies have passed into history under the name 'Origenist disputes of the sixth century'.<sup>278</sup> At first Constantinople remained untouched by these, but then became the place where the decisive battles were fought. This is thus a fresh instance of the removal of doctrinal discussions from the province or the other patriarchates into the capital and into the Emperor's palace.

Let us recall (1) the prehistory (cf. Scythian and Palestinian monks) of the theopaschite question and its conclusion in the imperial city with the participation of the Pope; (2) the negotiations with the Alexandrian and Syrian Severans in the years 532–536 and their condemnation at the Synod of 536, and the subsequent imperial documents; (3) the transfer of the discussion about Christ's knowledge or ignorance from Alexandria (cf. Themistius) to Byzantium as the result of the removal of Patriarch Theodosius to Derkos near Constantinople at imperial decree. The most important document on this issue, which has only just been made accessible by A. Van Roey, was written under the protection of Empress Theodora.<sup>279</sup> Also in all its phases the prehistory of the Origenist controversies under Justinian had taken place away from Constantinople.<sup>280</sup> Only with the so-called 'Synod of the Oak of 403' in the second Origenist dispute (cf. Patriarch Theophilus of Alexandria) were St John Chrysostom and Constantinople drawn very painfully into the affair.<sup>281</sup> During his sojourn in the capital the Alexandrian Patriarch wrote a letter against the Origenists (*hoi ta Origenous phronountes*) in order to justify his action against the four 'Tall Brothers' and their defender, John Chrysostom. Nine fragments

278. Cf. F. Diekamp, *Die origenistischen Streitigkeiten im sechsten Jahrhundert und das fünfte allgemeine Concil* (Münster, 1899), §§ 4–6, 32–66; L. Duchesne, *L'Église au VI<sup>e</sup> siècle* (Paris, 1925), 156–218; E. Schwartz, 'Zur Kirchenpolitik Justinians' (1940), in *Gesammelte Schriften* IV, 276–320; E. Stein, *Histoire du Bas-Empire* II, 392–5, 654–83; A. Guillaumont, *Les 'Kephalaia Gnostica' d'Évagre le Pontique et l'histoire de l'origénisme chez les Grecs et chez les Syriens* = *PatSorb* 5 (Paris, 1962), 124–70.

279. See Theodos. Alex., *Tomus ad Theodoram aug.* (CPG 7133): A. Van Roey–P. Allen, *Monophysite Texts of the Sixth Century* = *OLA* 56, pp. 42–56.

280. See the overview in H. Crouzel, art. 'Origenes', in *LThK* 7 (1962), IV: Origenist. Streitigkeiten, col. 1233–5. On the first Origenist dispute (Methodius of Olympus, Peter I of Alexandria, Eustathius of Antioch), see J. F. Dechow, 'Origen's "Heresy": From Eustathius to Epiphanius', in *Origeniana Quarta* (Innsbruck, 1987), 405–9.

281. Cf. A. Biglmair, art. 'Eichensynode', in *LThK* 3 (1959), 722.

from that letter are preserved in an anti-Origenist florilegium of the second quarter of the sixth century.<sup>282</sup> The eighth fragment is devoted to the idea of the spherical form of the resurrected body, which we still have to discuss. However, even after the activities of Patriarch Theophilus there were still Origenists in Egypt, as the Egyptian *chora* in the middle of the fifth century will show us. From the struggle there with Gnostic, Manichaean and Origenist circles of monks and clerics which took place away from Alexandria, we can only assume that no news of this reached the imperial city,<sup>283</sup> although imperial officials on the Nile were involved in it.

The decisive impulse to involve the imperial authority in the Origenist turmoil came from Palestine — a century after the cessation of the battles in the Upper Egyptian countryside, which had presumably remained hidden from the imperial court.

Emperor Justinian was drawn into the Origenist affair and made the main player by two groups: from the Origenist side as well as from the anti-Origenist side.

### 1. Origenists in Constantinople

As we have already shown, the theme 'Origenism' became acute with the appearance of the monk father Sabas in the capital in the years 530–532. The *Vita Sabae* reports that the monk father discovered that among his companions Leontius of Byzantium was an Origenist, and as a result of this separated himself from him and left him behind in Constantinople.<sup>284</sup> We do not need to return to the discussion about the peculiarity of Leontius' Origenism.<sup>285</sup> A. Le Boulluec speaks of an 'origénisme politique', a formula which on the one hand places Leontius among the pro-Origenist actors, but on the other does not make him a real representative of Origenist theses and doctrines. According to E. Schwartz, Leontius (after the separation from the archimandrite Sabas) quickly arranged 'to act as the *apocrisiarius* of the monks in Jerusalem and the *ἐρημος* at the court'.<sup>286</sup> His presence in Constantinople and his

282. It is found in the *Cod. Athous Vatopedinus* 236 (12th century). The fragments of Theophilus are edited by M. Richard, 'Nouveaux Fragments de Théophile d'Alexandrie', in *NAWG.PH* 1975, 57–65 = *Op. Min.* II, no. 39; the fragments 3–11, pp. 61–5.

283. Cf. A. Grillmeier, 'La "Peste d'Origène". Soucis du patriarche d'Alexandrie dus à l'apparition d'origénistes en Haute Égypte (444–451)', in *ΑΛΕΞΑΝΔΡΙΝΑ, Μέλ. C. Μονδέρσι* (Paris, 1987), 221–37.

284. Cyril Scyth., *Vita Sabae* 73, 74. Schwartz, pp. 176, 10–20; 179, 8–10; Festugière III/2, pp. 105, 10–20; 109, 9–11.

285. See above, pp. 188–9. The discussion concerns principally the thesis of D. B. Evans, *Leontius of Byzantium. An Origenist Christology*.

286. See the information in E. Schwartz, *Kyrillos von Skythopolis* (1939), 388–92. 'Whoever had bestowed on him [Leontius] the function of an *apocrisiarius* or *τοποτηρητής* cannot be deduced from the passages cited; there hardly remains any conjecture left other than that the Emperor himself did it' (390–1).

participation in the doctrinal dialogue (532) and in the Synod (536) are already familiar to us. But he is not the leading Palestinian Origenist in the imperial city. Among the eighteen monks who participated in the Synod of 536 were the two real leaders of the movement, who also remained there after the Synod, namely Domitian, *higumenos* of the monastery of Martyrius, and the deacon Theodore Askidas from the New Lavra. In Constantinople itself these two monks, with the support of Leontius, gained in Papas Eusebius (d. 543), the presbyter and cimeliarch of the main church of the imperial city,<sup>287</sup> an influential agent at court, who in 537 successfully recommended them as archbishops of the important metropolitan sees in Ancyra (Domitian) and Caesarea in Cappadocia (Theodore Askidas). Both hardly took care of their episcopal cities, but rather intrigued assiduously with the Emperor on behalf of the Origenists in Palestine.<sup>288</sup> They were able, however, to conceal their own dogmatic standpoint from the ruler.

## 2. The anti-Origenists and the involvement of the Emperor in the new theological dispute

Given this tactical position, how could the Emperor have taken action *against* Origenism? Would the Emperor have been willing to allow himself to be diverted from his plan for reconciliation based on christology?<sup>289</sup> Here we need to note the following. (1) As will emerge, in the new dispute as far as the *subject-matter* is concerned, there is ultimately one decisive theme, the question of the salvation of Christians and its solution based on the correct understanding of the person of Christ. (2) Also from the *tactical* point of view the Origenist dispute did not signify a diversion from the christological theme; it became rather a prelude to Justinian's final and decisive christological action, namely the Three Chapters dispute and its crowning conclusion, the Council of 553. This is linked particularly to the name of Theodore Askidas.

We are approaching a new phase in the struggle about Chalcedon in

287. Cf. *ibid.*, 263, Register s. n.; F. Diekamp, *Die origenistischen Streitigkeiten*, 37.

288. Cyril Scyth., *Vita Sabae* 83; Schwartz, pp. 188, 24–189, 9; Festugière III/2, 119.

289. On the following see F. Carcione, 'La politica religiosa di Giustiniano nella fase iniziale della "seconda controversia Origenista" (536–543). Un nuovo fallimentare tentativo d'integrazione tra monofisismo e calcedonianesimo alla vigilia della controversia sui Tre Capitoli', *StRtOrCr* 8 (1985), 3–18, in discussion with R. Devreese (who maintained that this dispute occurred accidentally) and L. Perrone, *op. cit.*, 203–4 (una reazione al predominio eccessivo esercitato per lungo tempo dal problema cristologico).

which, however, the goal should not be lost sight of: to win the Severans back to the unity in faith of the Empire. Theodore Askidas steered the Emperor's enthusiasm for theological action towards the possibility of winning the opponents of Chalcedon for the detested Council by a new interpretation of it, but at the same time he distracted the Emperor from the Origenists. The game the Emperor became involved in was not without its danger. He was ready to concede to the leaders of the Origenists a mediating rôle in the christological dispute,<sup>290</sup> for which they were highly unsuited. That does not mean, however, that there was a 'Chalcedonian Origenism' or that Leontius of Byzantium can be shown to be its main actor.<sup>291</sup>

The immediate prehistory of the Origenist turmoil occurred on Syrian and Palestinian ground, particularly in the monasteries around Jerusalem (and Gaza), as will be shown.<sup>292</sup> It was only through leading anti-Origenists from the Holy Land that Constantinople became the stage of the final battle in the question concerning Origenism. For the course of events there are two reports with differing depictions of what happened: (a) the report of the deacon Liberatus and (b) the report of Cyril of Scythopolis.

(a) *The report of the deacon Liberatus*<sup>293</sup>

The main rôle is played by the Roman deacon and papal *apocrisiarius*, Pelagius. He appeared in Gaza, where on the instructions of the Emperor he had participated in the investigation of the affair of the Alexandrian patriarch, Paul.<sup>294</sup> On the journey there he met anti-Origenist monks in Jerusalem. These monks brought to the *apocrisiarius* in Gaza a *libellus* (indictment) with extracts from the writings of Origen, and offered to travel with the deacon to Constantinople in order to obtain the condemnation of Origen and the quoted propositions. This initiative was carried out. Pelagius made himself the advocate for the matter with the Emperor. Probably through envy of the powerful favourite, Theodore Askidas, Patriarch Menas (536-552) joined him and supported the petition to Justinian to condemn Origen and the *capita* which had been submitted. The Emperor accepted the idea readily (*facillime*) and immediately ordered the twofold damnation which had been suggested.<sup>295</sup> On imperial orders it was signed by the patriarchs Menas, Zoilus of Alexandria, Ephraem of Antioch and Peter of Jerusalem, and finally by Pope Vigilius in Rome.

290. D. B. Evans, *Leontius of Byzantium. An Origenist Christology* (Washington D.C., 1970), 131, succeeded in showing this.

291. See above n. 285; F. Carcione, *art. cit.*, 7; for a critique of D. B. Evans see the detailed reviews of A. de Halleux in *RHE* 66 (1971), 977-85; *Mus* 84 (1971), 553-60.

292. See in *JdChr* II/3 (on Palestine). The Origenism which was certainly also continuing to have an effect in Egypt does not seem to have been considered by the Emperor.

293. Liberatus, *Brev* 23: ACO II, 5, 138-40; F. Diekamp, *Die origenistischen Streitigkeiten*, pp. 39, 26-40, 14.

294. See above, p. 356.

295. Liberatus, *Brev.*: ACO II, 5, p. 140, 7-8: *iubente eo dictata est in Origenem et illa capitula anathematis damnatio.*



*(b) The report of Cyril of Scythopolis*<sup>296</sup>

This report contains the following details.

After the Synod of Gaza, Papas Eusebius made his way to Jerusalem. Allegedly he still knew nothing of the Origenist heresy, and thus must first have been won over by Leontius of Byzantium and persuaded to intercede with the Emperor on behalf of the forty monks who had been expelled from the Great Lavra. He compelled the abbot Gelasius either to take the forty expelled monks back again, or to banish as well four decided opponents of the Origenists from the Lavra. The abbot and his anti-Origenist subordinates chose the second alternative and discharged Stephen and Timothy, opponents of the Origenists, and four other monks. However, this turned out to the Origenists' disadvantage. Those who were expelled won over Patriarch Ephraem of Antioch for their cause and showed him the already well-known work of Antipater of Bostra (CPG 6687). At a synod the Patriarch anathematized the Origenist teaching. This had severe repercussions on the Origenists of the New Lavra in Palestine and their leader Nonnus. They forced the Patriarch of Jerusalem, Peter (524–552), to strike Ephraem's name from the diptychs, which again produced great agitation in Jerusalem and the non-Origenist monastic groupings. Patriarch Peter proceeded diplomatically: he asked Sophronius, the abbot of the Theodosius monastery, and Gelasius, the abbot of the Great Lavra, to come to him and requested from them the text of an indictment (*libellus*) against the Origenists, with the petition not to proceed with the disputed striking of Ephraem's name from the Jerusalem diptychs. The *libellus* was quickly composed and handed over to the Patriarch. Together with a report of his own about the novelties of the Origenists, the Patriarch sent the list of charges to Emperor Justinian. The result was the imperial edict of 543.

The two reports (of Liberatus and of Cyril of Scythopolis) are different in many points and raise particular questions regarding the course of events:

(1) Liberatus: immediate return of Pelagius to Constantinople after the Synod of Gaza, accompanied by a delegation of monks and the calling in of the Emperor.

(2) Cyril: between Gaza and the journey of the monks there are various events: Papas Eusebius visits Jerusalem; six monks are discharged from the Lavra; they repair to Antioch where a synod is held; the ecclesiastical communion between Antioch and Jerusalem is broken.

But now, however, because we have to place (with A. Jülicher and E. Stein)<sup>297</sup> the Synod of Gaza at the beginning of 540, there is sufficient time for the events in Palestine and Antioch reported by Cyril. Thus the attempt by F. Diekamp<sup>298</sup> to establish a chronology is unnecessary.

### 3. The imperial decree<sup>299</sup> of 543

It was not complicated for the initiative of the Palestinian anti-Origenists to acquire a hearing before Emperor Justinian, through the offices of the deacon and *apocrisiarius* Pelagius, not least because of the preparatory

296. Cyril Scyth., *Vita Sabae* 85: Schwartz, 191–2; Festugière, III/2, 121–2.

297. E. Stein, *Histoire du Bas-Empire* II, 391–4.

298. F. Diekamp, *Die origenistischen Streitigkeiten*, 41–6 recommended the report of Cyril of Scythopolis as the starting-point, and in improving the old dating by A. v. Gutschmid established the following: the Synod of Gaza at Easter 542, the Synod of Antioch for the summer of 542, the breaking-off of communion between Jerusalem and Antioch as well as the dispatch of the anti-Origenist writs to Constantinople in late autumn 542, Justinian's edict in January 543.

299. Justinian emp., *Edictum c. Origenem* (CPG 6880): ACO III, 189–214; Amelotti-Migliardi Zingale, *Scritti teologici*, 68–118 (Greek); 69–119 (Latin); this edition forms the basis for our comments.

work done in Palestine.<sup>300</sup> According to F. Diekamp, the enthusiasm of the monks led to one of the 'most important documents of Justinian's religious politics', which was 'at the same time a faithful expression of the views and convictions dominant among the anti-Origenists'.<sup>301</sup> Nevertheless we should not expect too much from this document. The reproaches raised against 'Origen' are already hackneyed and allow little to be detected immediately of the more profound religious significance of the controversy, either among the Origenists or among the anti-Origenists. Only a more intense study of the background could lead to one's sensing the depth and the seriousness of the internal discussion of 'Origen' in the monastic circles around Jerusalem and Gaza. This is true at least for the edict of 543, which remains caught almost completely in the tumultuous Origenist debate before and after 400. Admittedly names like Stephen Bar Sudaili from Syria, who emerged in Palestine in 540, or like Evagrius and his 'Origenism' which came into view in 533, or the crossing of Origenism, Gnosticism, Marcionism and Manichaeism in Upper Egypt in the middle of the fifth century, are smoke signals witnessing to a smoldering subterranean fire, which threatened the ascetical world of the Near East for almost two centuries. We shall attempt first of all to gather from the imperial edict the themes of the accusations raised against the Origenists and to establish their content. Our real task consists in demarcating the peculiarity of the Origenism condemned in the decree of 543 within the history of doctrine.

(a) *On interpretation or method*

(i) In making a judgement about the reports on the Origenists, the heresiological principles of the polemicists concerned must be noted (Methodius of Olympus, Jerome, Epiphanius, Theophilus of Alexandria for the fourth and fifth centuries; Emperor Justinian and the reports of the monks for the sixth century).<sup>302</sup>

300. This does not mean that Justinian simply took over the *libellus* of the monks.

301. F. Diekamp, *op. cit.*, 46.

302. On the problem of heretics in Justinian, one must distinguish between the heresies condemned in the *Codex Iustinianus* and the imperial theological sources. In comparison to the latter, the former bear witness to a less assured theological judgement, because no theologians participated in the formulation of the *Cod. Iust.* Cf. on the *Cod. Iust.*: A. Berger, 'La concezione di eretico nelle fonti giustiniane', in *Atti della Acc. Naz. dei Lincei* 352 (Rome, 1955), 353-68. Berger treats the difference of the catalogue of heretics in the *Cod. Theod.* in comparison to the *Cod. Iust.* He established that in the *Cod. Iust.* the concept of heretic was defined independently of the Church for the domain of imperial law, for use by state authorities (365). The 'definitions' of 'heretics in general' and the individual heresies in the *Cod. Iust.* are, according to Berger, so

(ii) The attempt must be made to distinguish between 'Origenian', that is, what belongs to the historical Origen, and 'Origenist', that is, the extension and further interpretation of approaches offered by the historical Origen.<sup>303</sup>

More and more, however, it is being recognized that the 'Origenist' problem cannot be explained on the basis of purely patristic sources or official imperial documents pertaining to ecclesiastical matters, but must also be researched from the viewpoint of the history of religions. These investigations are extraordinarily demanding. We shall attempt to close to some extent the gaps that exist by giving references to the corresponding areas of research.<sup>304</sup>

(b) *Justinian's picture of the Origenist heresy*

At the beginning of the decree of 543 Origen is seen as being in absolute opposition to God. As is also customary with other heretics, he has mixed with correct teaching some of his otherwise godless writings. But this is not his property, but the possession of the holy Church of God.<sup>305</sup> The Emperor places the *dogmata* of Origen beside the 'pagan [Platonic], Arian and Manichaean errors'.<sup>306</sup> Such general classifications

different that one can hardly understand 'come gli organi esecutivi dello Stato potessero liberarsi dall'imbarazzo creato da un tale stato di cose' (356). With Biondi, Berger stresses the necessity of the collaboration of law-givers and theologians — a collaboration which more or less existed for the imperial edicts.

303. On judging the 'heresy' of Origen see H.-J. Vogt, 'Warum wurde Origenes zum Häretiker erklärt?', in *Origeniana Quarta* (Innsbruck, 1987), 78–99, with Seminar I: texts for the main paper (Vogt) 100–11; with Seminar II (J. F. Dechow): 'The Heresy Charges Against Origen', *ibid.*, 112–22. Important material for clarifying the problem 'Origen — Origenists' is found in A. Le Boulluec, 'Controverses au sujet de la doctrine d'Origène sur l'âme du Christ', *ibid.*, 223–37, with further literature; M. Harl, 'La préexistence des âmes dans l'oeuvre d'Origène', *ibid.*, 238–58; U. Bianchi, 'Origen's Treatment of the Soul and the Debate over Metempsychosis', *ibid.*, 270–81; H. Crouzel, 'L'Apocatastase chez Origène', *ibid.*, 282–90; G. Dorival, 'Origène et la résurrection de la chair', *ibid.*, 291–321. These are the important investigations into the major charges raised by Justinian against 'Origen'.

304. We refer first of all to G. Widengren, 'Researches in Syrian Mysticism. Mystical Experiences and Spiritual Exercises', *Numen* 8 (1961), 161–98; J. W. Sedlar, *India and the Greek World. A Study in the Transmission of Culture* (Totowa, New Jersey, 1980); H. Waldmann, 'Ansätze zur Integration östlichen Gedankengutes bei Origenes (Mazdaismus, Zurvanismus)', in *Origeniana Quarta* (Innsbruck, 1987), 459–64. There are further references in *JdChr* II/3 (on Syria).

305. Justinian emp., *Ed. c. Origen.*: Amelotti-Migliardi Zingale, *Scritti teologici*, p. 73, 1–3. In the continuation of the text the 'pagan [Platonic]', the Manichaean and Arian elements in Origen are stressed in the sharpest possible words.

306. *Ibid.*, 68–9: *Origenem eiusque dogmata, paganorum et Arianorum et Manichaeorum erroribus affinia asserere.*

can be greatly misused heresiologically. Certainly there can be in them many a valid reference, but to prove them is extraordinarily difficult.<sup>307</sup>

### *The particular errors of 'Origen'*

#### *(i) Errors in the theology*

The Emperor begins with Origen's 'blasphemies' against the holy and consubstantial Trinity. He is said to teach a strict subordinationism in the Trinity; the Son cannot see the Father, and the Holy Spirit cannot see the Son; indeed Son and Spirit are creatures. The divine power is limited; all genera and species are equally eternal with God.<sup>308</sup> What the Alexandrian is reproached with here is to be found in Athanasius under the title 'blasphemies of Arius', precisely the denial of the *homousios*, in addition to the claim that the Father is invisible to the Son.<sup>309</sup> As a charge against Origen the trinitarian errors are noted in Jerome's letter to Avitus.<sup>310</sup>

#### *(ii) Errors in the doctrines of creation and salvation (oikonomia)*

##### *(1) The pre-existence of souls and their fall*

The longest part of the imperial edict is devoted to the explanation and refutation of the Origenist teaching of the pre-temporal creation of all human souls, of their fall, and also of the teaching of reincarnation.<sup>311</sup> To this is also joined a brief reference to the plurality of worlds which God created before ours and will create after ours.<sup>312</sup> Shenute will show us what a large rôle this latter idea played among the monks in Upper

307. G. S. Gasparro, 'Il problema delle citazioni del Peri Archon nella Lettera a Mena di Giustiniano', in *Origeniana Quarta* (Innsbruck, 1987), 54-76, provides a first-rate aid for interpreting Justinian's decree. In general the four volumes of the *Origeniana* (1975, 1980, 1985, 1987) published to date contribute a great deal to our topic.

308. Justinian emp., *Ed. c. Origen*. Amelotti-Migliardi Zingale, *Scritti teologici*, p. 71, 1-17. The sole source from the fourth century for this statement of God's limited power is Theophilus of Alexandria's Easter Letter from 402 (Jerome, *Ep.* 98, 17, 18; *Ep.* 124, 2). Cf. G. S. Gasparro, *art. cit.*, 61-3, with n. 79 and 80.

309. Cf. *JdChr* I<sup>3</sup>, 372-3.

310. Jerome, *Ep.* 124 *ad Avitum*, 2: CSEL 56, pp. 97, 6-98, 6; J. Labourt, *Saint Jérôme Lettres* (Paris, 1961), VII, pp. 96-7: Christ as Son is not generated, but created; the invisibility of the Father for the Son; cf. Gorgemanns-Karpp, *Origenes Vier Bücher von den Prinzipien*, 89, n. 9, on the various texts in Rufinus, Jerome and Epiphanius, *Haer.* 64, 8; cf. G. S. Gasparro, *art. cit.*, 63-5; these charges of Jerome are here correlated with fragments I and IV-VIII of Justinian's florilegium from the *PA*. Cf. Amelotti-Migliardi Zingale, *Scritti teologici*, 107, 109-111.

311. Justinian emp., *Ed. c. Origen.*: Amelotti-Migliardi Zingale, *op. cit.*, pp. 71, 16-97, 12.

312. *Ibid.*, p. 71, 21-26.

Egypt at his time.<sup>313</sup> The Emperor has only a brief comment on this:

We regard these (blasphemies) forbidden for all Christians; we have patent proofs for this ungodliness and consider it superfluous to deem it worthy of refutation.<sup>314</sup>

As a side-issue we also bracket the teaching of the ensoulment of the celestial bodies, the sun, the moon and the stars.<sup>315</sup> In contrast the teaching of the creation of human souls in their pre-existence, of their fall and of their enclosure in bodies is treated in detail. Originally the souls were created as pure intelligences (*noes*, *mentes*) and as powers (*dynameis*, *virtutes*) and destined for the vision of God. Through surfeit (*koros*) of or revulsion to this vision they turned to wickedness, and grew cold (*psychos*, cold) in the love of God, and for that reason received the name *psychai* (actually 'those grown cold') and as a punishment were banished into bodies.<sup>316</sup> According to Justinian this is based on a false interpretation of the creation of human beings in the image and likeness of God (Gen 1,26). Origen can relate that scriptural text only to the creation of the body, because the souls were already regarded as pre-existent. Regarding the pre-existent souls, their orders (*taxis*), their activity before the fall, their faculty of memory concerning the earlier condition, the possibility of sin being committed before they are included in a body, the significance of staying in the body, Justinian poses similar questions to those which the archimandrite Shenute posed a good century before in his instruction to the monks and clergy of Upper Egypt.<sup>317</sup> Emperor Justinian traces the teaching of the pre-existence of souls and their fall back to Manes.

For he [Origen] was educated in the mythologies of the Hellenes and was interested in spreading them; he pretended to explain the divine scriptures, but in this manner mixed his own pernicious teaching in the documents of the holy scriptures; he introduced the pagan

313. In *JdChr* II/4, 193-7, we go into this teaching in more detail.

314. Justinian emp., *Ed. c. Origen.*: p. 71,24-26.

315. *Ibid.*, p. 97,13-16; on this G. S. Gasparro, *art. cit.* 65-6, with reference to the fragments XXI and XXII from the *PA*, which are found in Jerome, *Ep.* 124,4,9: CSEL 56, 99-100, 107-111. Here (66) too is the evidence for the spread this idea in the polemic against Origen (to which Pamphilus, Theophilus of Alexandria, Epiphanius and Jerome testify). But perhaps the above reproaches will be clarified again on the basis of the text of Shenute against the Origenists, as we still have to point out (in Vol. II/4); see T. Orlandi (ed.), *Shenute, Contra Origenistas. Testo copto con introduzione e traduzione* (Rome, 1985), §§ 0385-7.

316. *Ibid.*, pp. 73,11-75,1.

317. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 75,10-26; 79,15-29 to be compared with Shenute, *Contra Origenistas*: ed. T. Orlandi, especially §§ 0333-0344, 0357. Because Shenute's instruction places these problems in a broader context and treats them in a more original way than Justinian, we shall discuss them in detail in the context of Shenute's fight against the Origenists and Gnostics (*JdChr* II/4, 193-213).

and Manichaean error and the Arian madness, so that he could give to them what the holy scriptures could not understand precisely. (p. 73,4-8)<sup>318</sup>

It is significant that the Emperor joins to the criticism of Origen's protology and anthropology an explanation of the Church's teaching on human beings and lets this flow into a brief christological and soteriological interpretation of history.<sup>319</sup>

But if the souls pre-existed and, according to Origen's myths, were in another order (*taxei*), why then did God form only Adam? For instance at the same time had only Adam's soul sinned and therefore only one body was formed by God? If there were other souls before that, it would have been necessary at the same time to make other bodies to receive these souls. How could a sinful soul, according to their theses (*logous*), be sent for punishment into a body and nevertheless be placed by God in the garden of desire? For if it were exiled into the body to undergo punishment, then it would not have been transferred into that paradise, but to a place of punishment.

But God so loved human beings, whom he created after all creatures, that God in his goodness after the transgression of the command given to them and the consequent expulsion from paradise (when the human race increased and the volume of sin became full, because the thoughts of human beings were inclined in wicked desire towards evil) did not abandon his image, but rather, according to the revelation of the scriptures, in various ways reproached and cultivated it. As we after a severe illness require greater care, the only-begotten Logos of God, the one, that is, one person of the holy Trinity, on account of his fondness for human beings became a human being; but in doing that he remained God. His divine essence was not changed into the human, nor the human into the divine; he is discernible in each of the two natures, unmingled and undivided . . . Although human nature from the beginning was divested of paradise on account of disobedience . . . the only-begotten Son of God inseparably united our nature according to the *hypostasis* in the womb of the holy and glorious *theotokos* and perpetual virgin Mary and thus bestowed on us a great grace and gave us the kingdom of heaven.

The question that interests us in particular, whether Justinian also deals with Origen's teaching of the pre-existent soul of Christ, is touched upon only briefly. Apparently for the Emperor it is already refuted by his general anthropology.<sup>320</sup> However, he comments briefly:

But because Origen added as well to the other blasphemies that the soul of the Lord was pre-existent and the God-Logos was united to it before he came from the virgin; St Athanasius himself thus removed this madness in his letter to Epictetus when he says: 'Rightly they

318. On the idea of *koros* see M. Harl, 'Recherches sur l'origénisme d'Origène: la "satiété" (*κόρος*) de la contemplation comme motif de la chute des âmes', in F. L. Cross (ed.), *StudPat* 8 (Berlin, 1966), 373-405. This motif is found in the *PA* as elsewhere in the polemic of the fourth century. Cf. G. S. Gasparro, *art. cit.*, 61; Justinian emp., *Ed. c. Origen.*: p. 73,13-15 and anathema I, *ibid*, 117. We refer here again to Shenute, *Contra Origenistas*. ed. T. Orlandi, esp. §§ 0333ss., 27ff. On the doctrine of the relationship of body and soul among the Manichaeans see J. W. Sedlar, *India and the Greek World* (Totowa, New Jersey, 1980), 214-19.

319. Justinian emp., *Ed. c. Origen.*: pp. 79,22-81,12 (Latin). Cf. the brief repeated summary, p. 83,4-14.

320. *Ibid.*, pp. 87,30-89,6.

will all condemn themselves who believe that there was before Mary the flesh (born) from her, and that the God-Logos had before it [the flesh] a human soul and before the advent [in the incarnation] was always in it.<sup>321</sup>

This brevity is also explained by the fact that in the submission presented by the Palestinians to Justinian the typically Evagrian intensification of the Origenist teaching on the pre-existence of Christ's soul was not yet a target.<sup>322</sup>

(2) *The Origenists and the migration of souls*

To the teaching on the pre-existence of souls is connected the other on the migration of souls. Justinian's edict contains as fragment XV the following text from *PA*.

If [on the contrary] the soul descends from the good and leans towards wickedness and embraces this more and more, then if it does not change its ways it becomes brutish through irrationality and animalistic through malice. [And shortly after that:] and it chooses to become an animal and to assume, may I say, a life in water and perhaps (τάχα!) it slips (ἐνδύεται) into the body of this or that irrational animal to the extent that the advancing fall into wickedness deserves.<sup>323</sup>

This text contains many difficult problems which have been discussed many times.<sup>324</sup> Within the framework of a history of christology we see it as our task to give a brief bibliographical report on the history of the problem and to refer here already to the fact that Shenute's instruction against the Origenists in Upper Egypt must now be taken as a text for comparison.

321. Cf. Athanas. Alex., *Ep. ad Epict.* (CPG 2095), 8: PG 26, 1064A14-B2; G. Ludwig, *Epistula ad Epictetum* (Jena, 1911), p. 13,7-10. Cf. R. W. Thomson, *Athanasiana Syriaca Part I: CSCO 258 (V)*, p. 61,18-21: 'So when one understands the meaning of this saying, he rightly condemns those who thought that what was taken from Mary existed before her, and that the Word had a human soul before her and was always in her before his coming.' On the Syriac translation see R. Y. Ebied/L. R. Wickham, 'A Note on the Syriac Version of Athanasius' *Ad Epictetum* in MS. B. M. Add. 14557', *JTS* 23 (1972), 144-54 (in debate with J. Lebon, 'Altération doctrinale de la Lettre à Épictète de saint Athanase', *RHE* 31 [1935], 713-61).

322. On the teaching about Christ's soul see A. Le Boulluec, 'Controverses au sujet de la doctrine d'Origène sur l'âme du Christ', in *Origeniana Quarta*, 223-37. In n. 1, p. 233, the author refers to further studies: J. L. Papagno, 'Flp 2,6-11 en la cristología y soteriología de Orígenes', *Burg* 17 (1976), 395-429; M.-J. Pierre, 'L'âme dans l'anthropologie d'Origène', *POC* 34 (1984), 21-65; R. Williams, 'Origen on the Soul of Jesus', in R. Hanson/H. Crouzel (ed.), *Origeniana Tertia* (Rome, 1985), 131-7.

323. Justinian emp., *Ed. c. Origen.*: 112-13 (Greek/Latin). Cf. Origen, *De principis* (CPG 1482) I, 8, 4: Görgemanns-Karpp, *Origenes Vier Bücher von den Prinzipien*, 262-5.

324. G. Dorival, 'Origène a-t-il enseigné la transmigration des âmes dans les corps d'animaux?' (A propos de P Arch I, 8, 4)', in H. Crouzel/A. Quacquarelli (ed.), *Origeniana Secunda* (Rome, 1980), 11-32, gives an excellent treatment of this question.

*Metempsychosis teaching in Origen?*

The accusation that Origen taught the migration of souls existed as early as the beginning of the fourth century.<sup>325</sup> The point at issue is in particular the text and interpretation of *PA* I,8,4. Is the translation of Rufinus a faithful rendition of Origen's thought? Various solutions are offered.

*First thesis:* In *PA* I,8,4 Origen either explicitly dismissed metempsychosis or at least rejected it with regard to the migration of souls into the bodies of animals. Rufinus renders *PA* I,8,4 faithfully.<sup>326</sup>

*Second thesis:* The abbreviated translation of Rufinus falsifies Origen's thought:

(a) with reference to Justinian: Origen considers metempsychosis as a hypothesis, which Justinian attests with his *tacha* (perhaps). To this extent there is not a total falsification in Rufinus, but certainly a partial one through the erroneous attribution of scriptural arguments, which belong to Origen, to other authors (*quidam*).<sup>327</sup>

(b) with reference to Jerome:

(i) *Ep.* 124,4: CSEL 56, p. 100,19–24: summary of *PA* I,8,4;

(ii) *Ep.* 124,14: *ibid.*, p. 116,6–17: citation of a text from *PA* IV,4,8. In *PA* I,8,4 Rufinus completely falsifies Origen's thought: Origen is said to have presented the migration of souls into the bodies of animals as certain teaching. Justinian's fragment is to be interpreted wholly on the basis of metempsychosis. There are still further witnesses who render the true thought of Origen.<sup>328</sup> Thus it would be possible to reconstruct Origen's text approximately.<sup>329</sup>

According to G. Dorival, however, it is impossible to reconstruct Origen's original text *PA* I,8,4.<sup>330</sup> The only thing which can be accepted after evaluating all of the sources<sup>331</sup> is that, at the time when Origen wrote his *PA*, Alexandrian Christians accepted the banishment of souls into the bodies of animals. Origen himself in his late works, the writings against Celsus (249), criticized in harsh words the metempsychosis into the bodies of animals and rejected it as Platonic and Pythagorean teaching.<sup>332</sup> Now, however, in the development of his teaching between his first work *PA*, which is transmitted as a

325. Pamphilus, *Apol. Orig.* 5: PG 17, 579. In this question the migration of souls from human body to human body (also from man to woman) has to be distinguished from the migration of souls from human bodies to animal bodies.

326. Thus with variants: M. J. Denis, H. Crouzel, W. Theiler, M. Simonetti. The fragments in Jerome and Justinian create difficulties.

327. Thus F. H. Kettler, *Der ursprüngliche Sinn der Dogmatik des Origenes* (Berlin, 1966), 14–21.

328. Namely Gregory Nyssa, *Dial. de anima et resurr.* (CPG 3149): PG 46, 112–113; in Görgemanns-Karpp, *op. cit.*, 282–3; and *De opif. hom.* (CPG 3154), 28: PG 44, 229–232; in Görgemanns-Karpp, *op. cit.*, 280–3.

329. Thus P. Koetschau, according to G. Dorival, *art. cit.*, 16–17 with n. 23. G. Dorival suspects that F. H. Kettler also inclines towards this viewpoint.

330. G. Dorival, *art. cit.*, 17–19. The attempt of Görgemanns-Karpp is also not recognized.

331. In G. Dorival, *art. cit.*, 23–8.

332. Origen, *C. Cels.* III, 75; IV, 17; IV, 83; V, 49; VIII, 30; cited in G. Dorival, *art. cit.*, 29.



whole, and his last work, *Contra Celsum*, the Alexandrian shows 'une remarquable stabilité de la pensée'.<sup>333</sup> Thus with this fundamental position there is scarcely a chance for the teaching of the banishment of human souls into the bodies of animals.<sup>334</sup>

Because Justinian indeed sees Origen's teaching in connection with pagan philosophy on the one hand and with Manichaeism on the other, we need to refer to the state of research.

After some oscillation among Platonists of the second century, for instance Albinos and perhaps also Plotinus, on questions of the banishment of souls into the bodies of animals,<sup>335</sup> later Platonists took an increasingly clearer stance against it. In Porphyry it is completely excluded, as the teaching about souls in his *Symmikta Zetemata* shows in particular.<sup>336</sup>

(3) *A special eschatological opinion: the spherical form of the resurrected body*

It is a question of the 'rather singular idea of the spherical bodies of the resurrected' (*nozione assai singolare dei corpi sferici dei resuscitati*),<sup>337</sup> which is attributed to Origen himself.<sup>338</sup> This teaching is not found in the works of the Alexandrian which are known to us. It appears to be the result of speculations which started from the concept of 'form', *eidos*, and confused it with that of 'appearance', 'figure', *schema*, 'in the banal sense of the visible, physical body'.<sup>339</sup> This 'interpretation' (lecture) of

333. G. Dorival, *art. cit.*, 4.2, 30. The only development which occurred for Origen between Alexandria and Caesarea in Palestine was 'une évolution de la situation concrète d'Origène' (31). In Alexandria popular circles held the doctrine of the migration of souls into the bodies of animals; in Caesarea it was taught at the most in philosophical or heretical circles.

334. Cf. also W. A. Bienert, 'Die älteste Apologie für Origenes?', in *Origeniana Quarta* (Innsbruck, 1987), 123-7.

335. Cf. H. Dörrie, 'Kontroversen um die Seelenwanderung im kaiserzeitlichen Platonismus', *Hermes* 85 (1957), 414-35 = *idem*, *Platonica Minora* (Munich, 1976), 420-40.

336. Cf. H. Dörrie, *Porphyrios' 'Symmikta Zetemata', Zetemata 20* (Munich, 1959) and above, pp. 200-12 (on Leontius of Byzantium); G. Dorival, 'La transmigration des âmes', in *Origeniana Secunda* (Rome, 1980), 31: 'À l'époque d'Origène, la doctrine de la transmigration dans les corps d'animaux n'a plus bonne presse dans les milieux philosophiques qui ont tout particulièrement contribué à former Origène.' Interesting, wide-ranging perspectives in the history of religion and philosophy are certainly opened up by J. W. Sedlar, *India and the Greek World* (Totowa, New Jersey, 1980), 22-32: V. Soul-Wandering. He concludes (p. 32): 'Clearly the Greeks themselves were puzzled as to where the metempsychosis-idea came from: they agreed only that it was an idea somehow alien to their own, mainline tradition ...'

337. G. S. Gasparro, *art. cit.*, 61.

338. Justinian emp., *Ed. c. Origen.*: p. 99,7-35 and in anathema V, p. 117.

339. See G. Dorival, 'Origène et la résurrection de la chair', in *Origeniana Quarta*, 291-321; esp. III, 315-19. On 315-16 Dorival has important documentation for this, namely fragment 8 from the letter of Patriarch Theophilus of Alexandria against the Origenists (anno 403), which M. Richard discovered: 'Nouveaux fragments de Théophile d'Alexandrie', *Op. Min.* II, no. 39, pp. 63-4. The entry in CPG 2612 has to be expanded. Cf. G. S. Gasparro, *art. cit.*, 61 with nn. 70-73; 74-75 with reference to G. Dorival, H. Crouzel and A.-J. Pestugière; the last mentioned wanted to trace the teaching of the spherical form of the resurrected body back to a gross error

Origen by the Origenists is said to be favoured by two elements: (i) by his reduction in the resurrected of the typical composition of the human body (there are no members, no face, no entrails, etc.); (ii) by the fact that Origen's teaching of the 'corporeal form' was difficult to understand, and, in addition, from the time of Methodius, Origenists and anti-Origenists had associated with *eidos* the notion of the external form, of the physical appearance.

Now an external form is necessarily defined by geometrical data in space. Moreover, the sphere is the most perfect form in text-book Platonism, as is also the form of the corporeal vehicle of the soul after death; on the other side, the resurrected are compared (but not put on a par) with the resplendent celestial bodies which are spherical (*PA* III,6,4). It is not surprising, consequently, if the notion of a resurrected, spherical body is elaborated by people with reference to Origen, or rather by people who want to deepen his teaching and to draw out all the implications, everything that was not said.<sup>340</sup>

Theophilus seeks to refute the notion of the spherical form of resurrected bodies by referring to the appearances of the resurrected Christ:

Christ, risen from the dead, appeared to his disciples not in the form of a sphere.<sup>341</sup>

Others refer to the transfigured body of Christ and ascribe to it the normal human form.<sup>342</sup> It is Antipater of Bostra who deals most thoroughly with the mysteries of the life of Jesus in order to refute by that means the Origenist teaching on the resurrected body.<sup>343</sup> In this context we do not need to go into more detail about Origen's general teaching on the resurrected body.<sup>344</sup>

of the Origenist and anti-Origenist monks of the sixth century (in *RSPT* 43 [1959], 81-6). This, however, is definitively refuted by fragment 8 (just discussed) from the letter of Theophilus of 403, and in addition by the polemic of Antipater of Bostra, who wrote in 460 (G. Dorival).

340. Thus G. Dorival, *art. cit.*, 319.

341. Cf. M. Richard, 'Nouveaux fragments de Théophile d'Alexandrie', *Op. Min.* II, no. 39, p. 64,7-8; Christ's resurrected body is already the guarantee for our own resurrected form (p. 64,14-15).

342. Thus Jerome, *Contra Iohannem Hieros.* 29: PL 23, 398A, without making reference to Origen.

343. Antipater Bostr., *Contradict. in Euseb.* (CPG 6687), ch. 15, in John Dam., *Sacra parallela*: PG 96, 496CD with reference to Phil 3,20; 1 Cor 15,43-44; on the transfiguration (Mt 17,2ff.): 497AB. On the appearances of the resurrected Jesus: 489D; 497B; Christ's return which is already intimated by the transfiguration (497B; Lk 9,27).

344. On this see G. Dorival, 'Origène et la résurrection de la chair', in *Origeniana Quarta*, 291-321; cf. H. Crouzel, in *BLE* 81 (1980), 175-200, 241-66.

(4) *The teaching of the universal restoration* (apokatastasis pantōn)

As Origen's last aberration Justinian names the teaching of the universal restoration.<sup>345</sup> In this is completed the *διαδοχή τῆς πλάνης* (*erroris successio*) which is associated with the name of the Alexandrian. With this there is a whole complex of partial statements which have to be presented briefly. We shall start with the edict of 543.

For the legacy of his [Origen's] error steals into the souls of the weaker ones and brings it about that they follow him in the sins which he committed from the very beginning. Because Origen's following has not yet received enough of the ungodliness of the pre-existence of souls and his other blasphemous prattle about the holy Trinity, under the influence of his perverse words that add this as well to their own error, the punishment of all godless human beings and even of the demons will have an end; both the godless human beings and the demons will be restored to their pristine order (*ἀποκατασταθήσονται εἰς τὴν προτέραν αὐτῶν τάξιν*).<sup>346</sup>

This is said to contravene Christ's words (Mt 25,46.34.41). For morally weak human beings it is claimed that such an outlook has a demoralizing effect. If, moreover, the *supplicium* of the damned will have an end, this means as well, Justinian says, that the promise of eternal life for the righteous becomes empty. 'Eternal' must have the same meaning in both cases (p. 101,22-23). Why is there then an economy of salvation in Christ at all, with incarnation, crucifixion, death, tomb and resurrection of Christ? Why is there a *martyrium*, if devils and the godless have the same final state as the saints?<sup>347</sup>

The edict of 543 against Origen was intended to be given through Patriarch Menas to all bishops and monasteries in Constantinople. It was sent to all the patriarchs of the Imperial Church, also to Pope Vigilius. All Christians were intended to get to know it. In the future no bishop is to be ordained without renouncing all earlier heretics and finally those condemned under Justinian, beginning with Sabellius and up to Theodosius of Alexandria (with Peter of Apamea and Severus), but especially Origen, in whom pagan unbelief and Arian error are united.<sup>348</sup>

345. Cf. H. Crouzel, 'L'Apokatastase chez Origène', in *Origeniana Quarta*, 282-90.

346. Justinian emp., *Ed. c. Origen.*, p. 100,4-10 (Greek); p. 101,4-10 (Latin).

347. In Amelotti-Migliardi Zingale, *Scritti teologici*, p. 101,25-27; *loc. cit.*, pp. 100,38-104,18 (Greek); 101,34-105,17 (Latin) this is refuted with testimonies from Gregory Nazianzen (PG 35, 437,945), Basil (PG 31, 1264-1265,444), John Chrysostom (PG 47, 313; 61, 75) and a list of scriptural citations.

348. Twenty-four texts from *Peri Archon* are adduced as proof: Amelotti-Migliardi Zingale, *Scritti teologici*, 106-16 (Greek); 107-17 (Latin).

Nine Anathemas,<sup>349</sup> which summarize the main theses of the decree, form the conclusion of the imperial edict.

1. The pre-existence of the souls of human beings as spirits and holy powers, their surfeit (*koros*)<sup>350</sup> of the vision of God and their growing cold in love; their banishment into bodies as punishment.
2. The pre-existence of Christ's soul, its union with the Logos before the birth from the Virgin.
3. Formation of Christ's body in the womb of the Virgin before its union with the Logos and the soul. Leontius of Byzantium too had concerned himself with this problem in a cautious way.<sup>351</sup>
4. Likening of the Logos on his descent with all the powers of the various levels of being.
5. The spherical form of resurrected bodies. According to A. Guillaumont, *op. cit.*, 143, this notion is not yet present in the Origenism of the fourth century. However, the new state of the sources after a discovery by M. Richard (1975) is presented by G. Dorival, *Origeniana Quarta* (Innsbruck, 1987), 315–19 (see 3. above).
6. The animation of the celestial bodies and the water above the firmament.
7. Christ's crucifixion for the demons in the other world.
8. Restriction of God's creative power and the eternity of the world.
9. Temporal limiting of the damnation of demons and human beings (their *apokatastasis*).

What once for Epiphanius was the main issue in the Origenist errors and was still criticized by Theophilus of Alexandria, the subordination of the Son to the Father, is no longer mentioned, and for this reason too the reproach is not renewed that it was the cause of the error of Arianism.

(c) *The assessment of Justinian's decree*

The peculiarity of Justinian's decree against Origen finally becomes clear in a special way through G. S. Gasparro's literary-historical analysis of the florilegium from the *Peri Archon* appended at the end of the decree. With this its place too in the history of the struggle against Origenism is defined. Of the twenty-four citations from the *PA* in Justinian, nine correspond to the letter of Jerome to Avitus (Fr. I, XII, XIII, XV, XVI, XIX, XXIII, V, XX).

The compiler of the extracts follows the order of Jerome's text for Fr. XII–XXIII, with two transpositions. There is also a series of correspondences in individual themes between Justinian and Jerome in such number and in their ordering that one can hardly speak of an accident.

349. See the nine propositions: *ibid.*, 116–19 (Greek and Latin); German in F. Diekamp, *Die origenistischen Streitigkeiten*, 49–50. Diekamp enumerated ten anathemas. The last is a personal condemnation of Origen, which is related to the previous nine. There is a French translation, also with ten anathemas, in A. Guillaumont, *Les 'Kephalaia Gnostica' d'Évagre le Pontique* (Paris, 1962), 140–1.

350. On the word and idea of *koros*, surfeit, see the decree of 543: Amelotti-Migliardi Zingale, pp. 72, 15 and 116, 14. However, see above n. 318.

351. Cf. Leontius Byz., *Epil* 8: PG 86, 1944C1–D3. See the text above, p. 197. In the theological reflection to some extent he approaches the 'Origenist' reflection rejected in anathema III.

According to G. S. Gasparro, one can thus not assert that Justinian obtained his information about Origen exclusively from the florilegium in *PA* (attached to his decree). For in the decree there are subjects which are not documented in the florilegium. But taken together the decree and the florilegium reproduce an anti-Origenist schema, which in the course of the first Origenist crisis of the fourth and fifth centuries provided the basis for the three main opponents of Origen: Epiphanius, Theophilus of Alexandria and Jerome. The connecting thread for the presentation of the main theses of Origen is *epistula* 124 of Jerome, both for the compiler of the florilegium and also for the author of the decree itself. However, G. S. Gasparro does not want to claim that the letter of Jerome was the exclusive basis for the compilation of the florilegium. The compiler, however, finally made his own choice regarding the principal theme of Jerome and into this incorporated other subjects of the anti-Origenism of the fourth century. The author of the imperial letter used substantially the material contained in the florilegium, but in addition drew upon the remaining anti-Origenist repertoire that was handed on. To an extent that cannot be verified the florilegium could reflect the *capitula* which, according to Liberatus, the anti-Origenist monks had with them to bring about the condemnation of the Origenists by the Emperor through the mediation of the *apocrisiarius* Pelagius. The christological and religious problematic of the whole discussion about the decree of 543 against Origen thus hardly leads beyond that of the turn of the fifth century. Nevertheless it is possible that the faith and asceticism of a great part of the Palestinian monks were seriously endangered — in a manner that is not expressed at all in the imperial document. For this reason as well the crisis was in no way overcome.

#### 4. A contemporary witness for the Origenist question of 543

It is worth noting that in his *Erotapokriseis* Ps. Caesarius also comes to speak of Origen's teaching on the pre-existence of souls, Christ's soul included. In connection with the teaching on the fall of Satan, he singles out from the Origenist errors this one thesis and rebuts it in detail.<sup>352</sup> In question 168 he formulates the Origenist teaching on souls as follows:

What do you think of the leather clothes which Adam and Eve put on after their expulsion (*ekptosin*)? For we have heard from someone who expressed it well: human beings existed as rational spirits and rational, incorporeal living things. After sinning in disobedience against

352. See Ps. Caesarius, *Erotapokriseis*, 167–75: ed. Riedinger (Berlin, 1989), 145–53. That there is not yet any reference to the state of the Origenism question of 553 should also be adduced as an argument for the composition of the *Erotapokriseis* shortly after 543.

God the *nous* was abstracted and cooled, and for this reason was called soul because the warmth of the *nous* became cold and could no longer remain with the higher ones (*anō*) and stay with them in service, but has put on this body which scripture calls leather clothing; intended as a penalty for the sinner and as a gaol for punishment.<sup>353</sup>

This teaching of the pre-temporal fall is decidedly rejected, in the main with arguments that had been given in Epiphanius. Here we must forgo an analysis of the sources. The counter-argument insists particularly on the reference to holy and righteous people like Abel, Job, up to the patriarchs and Anna, whose life cannot be understood, it is said, as punishment in the prison of the body (cf. Qs. 168–170). Ps. Caesarius concludes here with the call:

Remove, O Christ, those who swindle the pre-existence of souls, so that we do not succumb to the risk of calling your soul too a cooled *nous*. (p. 148, 23–24)

## II. THE NEW CONDEMNATION OF THE ORIGENISTS IN CONNECTION WITH THE SECOND COUNCIL OF CONSTANTINOPLE (553)

### 1. The sources

(a) See CPG 6886: *Epistula Iustiniani ad Synodum (Constantinopolitanum 553)*: Amelotti-Migliardi Zingale, *Scritti teologici*, 122–5; CPG 9352: *Canones XV contra Origenem*: ed. J. Straub, ACO IV, 1, 248–9 (Appendix).

(b) F. Diekamp, *Die origenistischen Streitigkeiten im VI. Jahrhundert und das fünfte allgemeine Concil* (Münster, 1899); Text: 90–7. A. Guillaumont, *Les 'Kephalaia Gnostica' d'Evagre le Pontique et l'histoire de l'origénisme chez les Grecs et les Syriens* = *PatSorb* 5 (Paris, 1962), 143–70; M. Richard, 'Le traité de Georges Hiéromoine sur les hérésies', *REB* 28 (1970), 242–8 = *Op. Min.* III, no. 62; the main section is cited in J. Straub, *Praefatio*, ACO IV, 1, (XXVI–XXIX) XXVIII; F. Carcione, 'La politica religiosa di Giustiniano nella fase conclusiva della seconda controversia origenista (543–553). Gli intrecci con la controversia sui Tre Capitoli', *StRiOrCr* 9 (1986), 131–47.

### 2. The history of research

F. Diekamp, *op. cit.*, 82–120, proved that the documents CPG 6886 and 9352 are related to the Fifth Council; on 120–4 he referred to the fact that in earlier authors there had been a confusion of the synods of 543 and 553. In his analysis of the text, 90–7, he was able to show that the letter of Justinian which was referred to and the fifteen anathemas belong together. Neither offers Origen's teaching, but that of the Origenist

353. *Ibid.*, Q. 168, p. 146, 1–7. Here Ps. Caesarius is dependent on Epiphanius, *Ancor.* 62–63; Holl, 74–6.

monks in Palestine.<sup>354</sup> Particular elements used to prove this relationship were highlighted by J. Straub in ACO IV, 1, XXVI–XXIX. Any doubts about it were finally removed by M. Richard, who in 1961 discovered in the National Museum at Ohrid the complete treatise on heresies by the monk and presbyter George, composed in the first half of the seventh century. Of the sixteen chapters of the work, chapter 9 is devoted to the Origenists: 'About the Origenists, in which too Evagrius and Didymus [will be discussed].'<sup>355</sup> Chapter 9 concludes in § 16 once again with reference to the Council of Constantinople, in the anathemas of which it is said one can recognize the entire godlessness, inhumanity and falsity of the Origenists.<sup>356</sup>

Thus there can be no doubt that the Council of 553 dealt with Origenism, or with Origen, Evagrius and Didymus. A similar confirmation was finally found in Syriac.<sup>357</sup>

### 3. The chronology

Because the condemnation of the Origenists clearly belongs to the Council of 553, but cannot be placed after the opening of it on 5 May 553, an interim solution has to be sought.<sup>358</sup> It consists in the fact that Emperor Justinian instructed the bishops<sup>359</sup> to deal with the question of

354. Cf. A. Guillaumont, *Les 'Kephalaia Gnostica' d'Évagre le Pontique*, 148–9, where the conclusions of Diekamp are confirmed; cf. Justinian emp., *Ep. ad Synod.*: Amelotti-Migliardi Zingale, *Scritti teologici*, p. 123, 5–6: *cum ergo compertum habeamus esse Hierosolymis quosdam nimirum monachos qui Pythagorae, Platonis Origenisque Adamantii impios errores sectentur ac doceant . . .*

355. George mon., *De haeresibus ad Epiphanium* (CPG 7820), 9: M. Richard, *Op. Min.* III, no. 62, pp. 257–62. The §§ 1–3, pp. 257f. concern Origen, but end, however, (in § 3) with the information: 'In recent times the Fifth Synod gathered at Constantinople anathematized this one [Origen], together with Evagrius and Didymus who were of like mind.' In § 4 in contrast the anathemas I–IV and the corresponding passages in Justinian's letter are largely rendered verbatim. Cf. Richard, 258, with F. Diekamp, *op. cit.*, 90–2.

356. George mon., *De haeresibus*, 9: Richard, p. 262, 7–9.

357. A. de Halleux, 'Trois synodes impériaux du VI<sup>e</sup> s. dans une chronique syriaque inédite', in R. H. Fisher (ed.), *A Tribute to A. Vööbus* (Chicago, 1977), 295–307. On Constantinople II: 300–2. A. de Halleux stresses (301): 'Tout en demeurant, de la sorte, discrètement antisévérienne, la présentation du synode de 553 porte essentiellement sur l'origénisme, qui fut effectivement condamné par les pères déjà rassemblés à Constantinople, en quinze anathématismes répondant à une lettre de Justinien.' The names of Didymus, Origen and Evagrius (and perhaps of Theodore Askidas) are not in the right order here; in any case at least two of them are badly 'corrupted' (défigurés) by a copyist.

358. Cf. F. Diekamp, *Die origenistischen Streitigkeiten*, 129–38.

359. *Ibid.*, 133: 'In August [552] and in the following months participants arrived in Constantinople; the opening of the synod, however, was delayed for a long time, because the Pope [Vigilius] refused to participate in a gathering in which the Oriental bishops formed the overwhelming majority.'

the Origenists, which, contrary to his expectation, had not been settled by his decree of 543. These bishops had already arrived months before the opening of the Council which was intended to be devoted to the question of the Three Chapters. This 'synodal act' took place on the level of a *synodus endemousa* and was not considered by the Emperor himself as a session of an ecumenical council.<sup>360</sup> Nevertheless the commission with regard to the Origenists was clear:

Read through the submitted *ekthesis* carefully and condemn and anathematize at the end each of its individual chapters, together with the ungodly Origen also all who think and feel the same. (pp. 124,25-27; 125,25-27)

#### 4. The anti-Origenist canons of 553 in English translation<sup>361</sup>

I. If anyone accepts the mythical pre-existence of souls and the monstrous restoration that follows from this (*apokatastasis*), let him be anathema.

II. If anyone says that the origin of all rational beings was incorporeal and immaterial intelligences (*noes*) without any number or names, so that they formed a *henade* on account of the sameness of essence (*ousia*), of power (*dynamis*) and of activity (*energeia*) and on account of their union (*henosis*) with the God-Logos and knowledge (*gnosis*); that they became sated with (*koron labein*) the divine vision and turned to what was worse, each corresponding to its inclination (*rhope*) to it, and assumed lighter or denser bodies and were labelled with names with respect to the fact that the difference of names exists, like bodies and powers too, from above; and that for this reason some became the cherubim, others seraphim, and again others principalities, powers, dominations, thrones, angels and all the other heavenly orders which exist and were so named, let him be anathema.

III. If anyone says that the sun, the moon and the stars are themselves part of the same *henade* of rational beings and that what they are happened through a turn to what was worse, let him be anathema.

IV. If anyone says that the rational beings (*logika*) became cold in divine love and were bound to more dense bodies of our kind and were named human beings, and that those who had attained the acme of evil were bound to cold and dark bodies and are called the demons and spirits of evil, let him be anathema.

V. If anyone says that from the condition (*katastasis*) of the angels and archangels will be the condition of the soul, from that of the soul the demonic and the human, from the human, however, once again there would be angels and demons, and that every order (*tagma*) of the heavenly powers has arisen either entirely from those lower or from those higher or from higher and lower, let him be anathema.

VI. If anyone says that the genus of demons has a twofold manner of appearance, composed from human souls and from higher spirits which have fallen into this state; that, however, one (single) *nous* from the whole *henade* of rational beings remained unmoved with respect to the vision and the divine love, which, having become Christ and the king of all spiritual beings, leads the entire corporeal nature, the heavens, the earth and what is in between; and that the

360. F. Diekamp, *ibid.*, 135 emphasizes that the letter to the bishops concerning the Origenists does not even once contain the term 'synod', although it is addressed to a gathering of bishops, as the conclusion of the letter shows. Cf. Amelotti-Migliardi Zingale, *Scritti teologici*, p. 124,24 (Greek); 125,24-25: *sanctissimi patres, ut in unum collecti*.

361. ACO IV, 1, 248-9. See the Greek text and a German translation in Görgemanns-Karpp, *Origenes*, 824-30 (text); 825-31 (translation).



cosmos really has in itself elements that are older than it, dryness, moisture, warmth and cold and the idea according to which it was formed and through which it came to be; thus that the all-holy, consubstantial Trinity did not create the world and this had come about in this way, but that the *nous*, as they say, as the demiurge existing before the world, gave created being, let him be anathema.

VII. If anyone says that Christ [= *nous*] is said to exist in the form of God and before all the ages was united to the God-Logos and at the end of the ages emptied itself into what is human and showed mercy, as they say, on those who in multifarious ways had fallen out of the *henade* and, with the intention of leading them up, came to all and assumed the form of the various bodies and acquired their names, by becoming all things to all (cf. 1 Cor 9,22), to the angels an angel, to the powers a power, and to the other orders and types of rational beings he was changed to each in the appropriate manner and thus participated in us similarly in flesh and blood (cf. Heb 2,14) and became for human beings a human being, and whoever does not confess that the God-Logos emptied himself and became a human being, let him be anathema.

VIII. If anyone does not say that the God-Logos, consubstantial with the Father and the Holy Spirit, is the one who became flesh and a human being, thus that the one from the Trinity is the Christ in the real and not only in a figurative sense, on account of the *nous*, as they say, which emptied itself because it was united to the God-Logos himself and thus was properly named Christ; whoever for this reason names that [*nous*] Christ and this [Christ] God on account of the other, let him be anathema.

IX. If anyone says that it was not the Logos of God who descended into Hades in the flesh, endowed with a spiritual and rational soul, and as the same once again ascended into heaven, but what is called by them the *nous*, which they impiously characterize as the real Christ, having become such through knowledge of the monads, let him be anathema.

X. If anyone says that the Lord's resurrected body is an ethereal and spherical body, that the other resurrected bodies too will be like this, that moreover the Lord will shed his own body first and in a similar way the nature of all the bodies will return to nothing, let him be anathema.

XI. If anyone says that the coming judgement means the annihilation of all bodies, and at the end of the fable immaterial nature stays and in the future nothing of matter will continue to exist, but only the pure *nous*, let him be anathema.

XII. If anyone says that the heavenly powers too and all human beings and even the devils and the spirits of evil will be united unchanged to the divine Logos, like the *nous* itself, which is called Christ by them, which was in the form of God and emptied itself, as they say, and that the sovereignty of Christ will have an end, let him be anathema.

XIII. If anyone says that neither Christ nor one of the rational beings will exhibit a difference in any way at all, neither according to essence, nor knowledge, nor power over everything nor efficacy, but that all will be at the right hand of God, like their so-called Christ, and also will participate in their concocted pre-existence, let him be anathema.

XIV. If anyone says that all rational beings will form a *henas* through *hypostases* [persons] and numbers being annulled with the bodies, and that the end of the worlds and the laying aside of bodies and the abolition of names follow the knowledge relating to the rational beings, and that there will be sameness of knowledge as of *hypostases* and that in the fabricated *apokatastasis* there will be only pure intelligences [*noes*], as they exist in their foolishly invented pre-existence, let him be anathema.

XV. If anyone says that the change (*αλλαγῆ*) of the intelligences is the same as their earlier change when they had not yet descended or fallen, that their beginning is the same as their end and their end the measure of their beginning, let him be anathema.

## 5. The origin of the Origenist propositions condemned in 553

Through the research of A. Guillaumont the real source of an important part of the teachings condemned in the fifteen anathemas of 553 has been

discovered, especially for the propositions 6–9 and 12–13: it is Evagrius' *Kephalaia Gnostica* in their original form as they are preserved in only one of the two Syriac translations.<sup>362</sup> By combining this information with the results of earlier research it is now possible to clarify to some extent the development of the anti-Origenist decisions between 543 and 553. The following documents have to be compared:<sup>363</sup>

- (1) The anathemas of 543 which have already been cited.
- (2) Theodore of Scythopolis, *Libellus de erroribus Origenianis* (CPG 6993): PG 86, 232–6.<sup>364</sup> The author abjures his Origenist past. His formulations represent a mediation between Justinian's anathemas of 543 and 553.
- (3) The propositions condemned in 553 at the instigation of Emperor Justinian, for which two things had to be clarified: their relationship to the anathemas of 543 and their position with reference to the Council of 553.
- (4) The list of the Origenist errors in the *Vita Cyriaci* of Cyril of Scythopolis (written after the Council of Constantinople): it is a witness which is independent of the fifteen anathemas.<sup>365</sup>

We shall briefly characterize the differences between the four lists of errors.

(i) *The list of Theodore of Scythopolis (PG 86, 232B–236B)*

Nine of Theodore's *Kephalaia* correspond almost verbatim with the nine anathemas of the edict of 543. The following, however, are new:

no. 4 (233C): Christ's reign will have an end.

no. 11 (236A): 'We shall be equal to . . . our redeemer Christ, our God; and the God-Logos must be united to us, as he has been united to the flesh received from . . . Mary, according to the substance and the *hypostasis*.'

no. 12 (236B): Bodies, Christ's body too, are destined for dissolution.

362. See A. and C. Guillaumont, 'Le texte véritable des "Gnostica" d'Évagre le Pontique', *RevHistRel* 142 (1952), 156–205. The first communication of this was given at the Third International Conference on Patristic Studies, Oxford 1959; *StudPat* 3 = TU 78 (Berlin, 1961), 219–26; *idem*, *Les 'Kephalaia Gnostica' d'Évagre le Pontique* (Paris, 1962), esp. 151–70; *idem*, *Les six siècles des 'Kephalaia Gnostica' d'Évagre le Pontique* = PO 28, 5–264 with a new edition of the until then well-known (ed. W. Frankenberg, 1912) Syriac translation (S<sub>1</sub>, pp. 16–256) and a first edition of the Syriac translation S<sub>2</sub> (version intégrale, 17–257) following the unique MS B. L. Add. 17167 from the Surian monastery. See PO 28, Introduction, 5–14.

363. This comparison is carried out by A. Guillaumont, *Kephalaia Gnostica*, 140–51, with n. 91. See 140–1: the anathemas of 543; 144–6: the anathemas from 553; 151, n. 91: the *libellus* of Theodore of Scythopolis (PG 86, 232B–236B); 150–1: the list of the *Vita Cyriaci*.

364. On this see F. Diekamp, *Die origenistischen Streitigkeiten*, 125–9; A. Guillaumont, *Les 'Kephalaia Gnostica' d'Évagre le Pontique* (Paris, 1962), 151, n. 91; J. Irmscher, 'Teodoro Scitopolitano. De vita et scriptis', *Aug* 26 (1986), 185–90.

365. This survey of the Origenism question, which was composed after 553, will be dealt with in our presentation of the Origenist disturbances in Palestine (Vol. II/3).

According to A. Guillaumont, the new elements, which the Palestinian Origenists added to the traditional Origenism condemned by the edict of 543, seem reasonably clear. We are on the way from the first to the second edict.

(ii) *The two edicts of 543 and 553*

If we look from 553 back to 543, we find the following covered in the first edict:

- (1) the teaching of the pre-existence of souls (I); the incorporeal *noes* and their fall (II);
- (2) the teaching of their exile into the body (IV);
- (3) stars as fallen, rational beings (III);
- (4) spherical form of resurrected bodies (X);
- (5) *apokatastasis* which includes demons (XII and XV).

The differences:

- (a) What is lacking in the later edict:

*Vis-à-vis* the edict of 543, that of 553 has nothing corresponding to its anathema VII (Christ's crucifixion for the demons in the coming world) and anathema VIII (limitation of divine power; eternity of the world); the body is no longer conceived as the place of punishment (I).

- (b) What is added by the later edict:

In comparison to that of 543 the edict of 553 develops the theory of the body significantly more intensely. It is connected with a doctrine of the 'names' which, like the bodies, differentiate the fallen beings from each other (II and IV). The theory of the coherent transition from one order of rational beings to another is also new (V).

Two things in particular are important.

(a) The radical understanding of the *apokatastasis*; it encompasses not only the reintegration of the demons, as in 543, but beyond that the annihilation of bodies (X and XI), names and every difference among the substances. This is postulated on account of the very clearly formulated principle: the beginning is identical with the end (XV). The pristine *henade* will be completely restored (XIII and XIV).

(b) It is precisely 'this concept of a *henade*, that all intelligences form together in their pre-existence and their condition of "nakedness" which will be completely restored again at the end, which is entirely lacking in the anathemas of 543 and represents a fundamental element of the conciliar text of 553'.<sup>366</sup>

366. A. Guillaumont, *Les 'Kephalalaia Gnostica'*, 147.

## 6. The theological and ascetical significance of the condemnation of Origenism in 553

The condemnation of Origenism in 553 did not have the world-wide echo which the Three Chapters dispute would create. The discussion was fought out successfully in particular with the formerly affected monks, and within this group especially the monks of Palestine. Even there it affected predominantly, according to the principles of Evagrianist asceticism, only a class, indeed an exotic group of monks, who after a hard *praktikē* were trained for the *theoria*, and after this preparation confessed the extreme Evagrianist christology.<sup>367</sup> Nevertheless it is fitting to note the explosive nature of this position. It was only in the sixth century that it had its effect, as the canons of 553 and later our statements on the patriarchate of Jerusalem will show.

(a) The subject of the incarnation. The most important change to the form of the traditional economy of salvation concerned the determination of the subject of the incarnation. It was no longer the Logos, the second *hypostasis* of the Trinity, but Christ's pre-existent soul, which first received its typically Evagrianist mark only in the *Kephalaia Gnostica*. It becomes the pre-existent *nous* 'which is united to the knowledge of the unity' (*Keph. Gnost.* I, 77). Because the 'anointing' exists in this union through the knowledge, this *nous* (= soul) is already called 'Christ', before the incarnation (*Keph. Gnost.* IV, 18,21). It itself does not belong to the Trinity; it is the 'tree of life', which is planted at the fountain of living water, the Trinity, and saturates itself from it (*Keph. Gnost.* V, 69). Thus this *nous*, with which the Logos is connected but not identical, comes into the flesh.<sup>368</sup> It is the mediator between Logos and *sarx*.

(b) This *nous*-Christ is the demiurge or mediator of creation. The Trinity itself is the creator only of spiritual beings (*logikoi*); for the creation of the corporeal nature or the world it is served by the 'Christ', that is, the *nous* which is united by vision to the Logos (*Keph. Gnost.* IV, 58).

(c) All decisive works of the economy of salvation or of the redemption, from birth to the descent into Hades, are ascribed to this *nous*-

367. For this christology see *JdChr* I<sup>3</sup>, 561-8 with further literature.

368. See A. Guillaumont, *op. cit.*, 153, n. 98; *JdChr* I<sup>3</sup>, 565-8; A. Grillmeier, 'Markos Eremita und der Origenismus', in *TU* 125 (Berlin, 1981), 269-72: on the christology of Evagrius (with texts from the commentary on Pss 131,7; 44,8; 104,15; 118,3); cf. *Keph. Gnost.* S, VI 14: PO 28, 223.

Christ. The death of the Incarnate One as such has no significance. An assumption of the flesh into heaven, as is already the case with the resurrection of the body, is irrelevant for salvation. For 'the extended, material body is incapable of knowledge' and there is connection with God only through knowledge (cf. *Keph. Gnost.* IV, 80).

(d) From this conception of 'Christ' it follows that all rational beings can ascend above natural contemplation to the 'essential *gnosis*' and can thus become *Christoi*. This idea is the Evagrianist foundation for the doctrine of the *Isochristoi*, which the Palestinian Origenists around Nonnus and Theodore Askidas defended. Evagrius himself had expressed the same goal with the less pretentious Pauline title 'co-heirs of Christ' (Rom 8,17) (*Keph. Gnost.* III, 72 and IV, 8). Endowed with this 'essential knowledge', every *nous* now has in the same way Christ's prerogatives, to be called 'God', to exercise the functions of the demiurge and to create new worlds (*Keph. Gnost.* V, 81).<sup>369</sup>

(e) Now the multiplicity which was present with the corporeal world is overcome and all rational beings, Christ's *nous* included, have become the perfect *henade* (Anathema XIV).<sup>370</sup> With the annihilation of the corporeal, separate existences (*hypostases*) and number are annulled. At the end existence and knowledge are identical. According to A. and C. Guillaumont<sup>371</sup> there are in Evagrius elements of Platonism and Neoplatonism, Stoicism, Gnosticism and Hellenistic Judaism, but these have also been further developed independently. Without a doubt this process was continued among the Origenists of the fifth and sixth centuries, in whom there are many aspects reminiscent of Proclus, especially in the interpretation of the transition from one to many and the doctrine of the *henades*.<sup>372</sup> Not without reason does Abba Cyriacus ask, as Cyril of Scythopolis reports, about the 'hell' which spat out these Origenist thoughts; they are not from God, 'it is Pythagoras, Plato, Origen, Evagrius, Didymus from whom they have borrowed these abominable

369. PO 28, 211: 'Lorsque le *nous* recevra la science essentielle, alors il sera appelé aussi Dieu, parce qu'il pourra fonder aussi des mondes variés.' There is no talk of this idea in the fifteen anathemas, but it certainly figures in the catalogue of Abba Cyriacus: cf. Cyril Scyth., *Vita Cyriaci* XII: Schwartz, p. 230,9-10; Festugière, *Les moines d'Orient* III/3, 47 (XII): 'ils disent, que dans l'apocatastase, nous serons les égaux du Christ'.

370. There it reads: πάντων τῶν λογικῶν ἐνὰς μία ἔσται. Cf. Görgemanns-Karpp, *Origenes*, 830.

371. A. and C. Guillaumont, art. 'Evagrius Ponticus', in *RAC* 6 (1966) (1088-1107), 1104-5; *idem*, art. 'Évagre le Pontique', in *DSP* 4 (1961), 1731-44.

372. On this development see W. Beierwaltes, *Denken des Einen. Studien zur neuplatonischen Philosophie und ihrer Wirkungsgeschichte* (Frankfurt, 1985), esp. the chapters 'Henosis' (123-54); 'Entfaltung der Einheit. Zur Differenz plotinischen und proklischen Denkens' (155-92).

and blasphemous teachings'.<sup>373</sup> The true path of the monk to perfection is the 'humble way of Christ', not these frivolous speculations, brotherly love, hospitality, virginity, help for the poor, psalmody, vigils, tears of remorse, fasting, prayer, meditation on death.

373. Cyril Scyth., *Vita Cyriaci* XIII: Schwartz, 230; Festugière, *Moines d'Orient* III/

## CHAPTER FOUR

### THE THREE CHAPTERS DISPUTE (544–553)

The so-called Three Chapters dispute became the most significant and at the same time the most contentious theological action of Emperor Justinian.<sup>374</sup>

## SECTION ONE

### PREHISTORY

The action involving the three names did not occur by accident. It had a prehistory which strongly agitated the East as early as the fifth century, a prehistory with several clearly definable initiatives arising from different motives. On the surface it was fundamentally a matter of condemning the three names: Theodore of Mopsuestia, Theodoret of

374. For details about the Three Chapters dispute see E. Caspar, *Geschichte des Papsttums. Von den Anfängen bis zur Höhe der Weltherrschaft*, Vol. 2 (Tübingen, 1933), 243–86; C. J. Hefele/H. Leclercq, *Histoire des conciles d'après les documents originaux*, Vol. 3 (Paris, 1909), 1–156; E. Schwartz, 'Zur Kirchenpolitik Justinians', in *idem*, *Gesammelte Schriften* IV (Berlin, 1960), 276–328; W. Pewesin, 'Imperium, Ecclesia universalis, Rom. Der Kampf der afrikanischen Kirche um die Mitte des 6. Jahrhunderts', in *Geistige Grundlagen römischer Kirchenpolitik = FKGG* 11 (Stuttgart, 1937); E. Amann, art. 'Trois-Chapitres', in *DTC* 15, 1868–1924; H.-M. Diepen, *Les trois chapitres au concile de Chalcédoine. Une étude de la christologie de l'anatolie ancienne* (Oosterhout, 1953); R. Haacke, 'Die kaiserliche Politik in den Auseinandersetzungen um Chalkedon (451–553)', in *Chalkedon* II, 164–77; A. Grillmeier, 'Vorbereitung des Mittelalters', in *ibid.*, 806–34; E. K. Chrysos, *The Ecclesiastical Policy of Justinian in the Dispute concerning the Three Chapters and the Fifth Ecumenical Council* (Thessaloniki, 1969) (modern Greek); on this see G. Weiss, *ByzZ* 64 (1971), 373–5; W. de Vries, 'The Three Chapters Controversy', in *WuW* Suppl. 2 (1974), 73–82; F. Carcione, 'La politica religiosa di Giustiniano nella fase conclusiva della seconda controversia origenista (543–553). Gli intrecci con la controversia sui Tre Capitoli', *StRiOrCr* 9 (1986), 131–47; R. Schieffer, 'Zur Beurteilung des norditalischen Dreikapitel-Schismas. Eine überlieferungsgeschichtliche Studie', *ZKG* 87 (1976), 167–201; *idem*, 'Das V. Ökumenische Konzil in kanonistischer Überlieferung', *ZSavSt.K* 90 (1973), 1–34; A. C. Outler, '“The Three Chapters”. A Comment on the Survival of Antiochene Christology', in R. H. Fisher (ed.), *A Tribute to Arthur Vööbus* (Chicago, 1977), 357–64; J. Speigl, 'Der Autor der Schrift De Sectis über die Konzilien und die Religionspolitik Justinians', *AHC* 2 (1970), 207–30; *idem*, art. 'Dreikanitelstreit' in *LexMA* 3 (1986), 1381–2; D. T. D. Connors, 'Justinian's Policy

Cyrus and Ibas of Edessa. Their number could be added to by names like Diodore of Tarsus and other teachers from the Antiochene school. The expression 'Three Chapters'<sup>375</sup> should be taken first of all in this broad sense.

## I. INITIATIVES BETWEEN 432 AND 449<sup>376</sup> WITH SEVERAL CENTRES OF ACTION

### 1. The centre of Edessa

The prehistory began with the fight of Bishop Rabbula of Edessa against Theodore of Mopsuestia (d. 428) and his supporters in Edessa before the peace of 433.<sup>377</sup> The driving motive was the complete exclusion of Nestorianism. Andrew of Samosata informs us about this in a letter to Alexander of Hierapolis;<sup>378</sup> his source was probably Ibas of Edessa, who reported that Theodore of Mopsuestia had been anathematized by Rabbula, and not only Theodore but all who read his writings, possessed his codices and did not bring them to be burned. Rabbula was a confessor of the *mia physis*.<sup>379</sup> He also began his campaign against the 'school of the Persians' in Edessa, which was completely aligned with the teaching

375. F. Carcione, *art. cit.*, 135, n. 17: "The expression "chapter" is nothing other than the translation of the Latin "*capitulum*", which corresponds in its turn to the Greek *κεφάλαιον*. In ecclesiastical Greek this expression was synonymous with anathema, and it was in this sense that Justinian and his contemporaries used it in the case being considered. With his edict [of 543] the Emperor wanted to pronounce three anathemas, each corresponding to a condemnation of the writings of the three accused respectively, whereby the one directed against Theodore of Mopsuestia also included his person. Soon, however, the name for Justinian's politico-ecclesiastical action was used to designate the object of this action. "Three Chapters" then denoted no longer the three anathemas formulated by the Emperor, but the accused themselves; hence condemnation of the Three Chapters signified acceptance of the Justinianic condemnation, while defence of the Three Chapters signified its rejection."

376. Cf. M. Richard, 'Acace de Mélitène, Proclus de Constantinople et la Grande Arménie', in *Op. Min.* II, no. 50. The main source is the Armenian 'Book of Letters': J. Ismireantz (Tiflis, 1901); M. Tallon, *Livre des Lettres* (Beirut, 1955); L. Frivold, *The Incarnation. A Study of the Doctrine of the Incarnation in the Armenian Church in the 5th and 6th Centuries according to the Book of Letters* (Oslo, Bergen, Tromsø, 1981).

377. There is a detailed presentation in G. G. Blum, *Rabbula von Edessa. Der Christ, der Bischof, der Theologe* = CSCO 300, Subs. 34 (Louvain, 1969), 165-95; L. Abramowski, 'Der Streit um Diodor und Theodor zwischen den beiden ephesinischen Konzilien', *ZKG* 67 (1955/6), 252-87.

378. Andrew Sam., *Ep. ad Alex. Hierap.* (CPG 6374) from the beginning of 432: ACO I, 4, 2, 86-7; cf. G. G. Blum, *op. cit.*, 165, nn. 1 and 2. Andrew also puts John of Antioch in the picture about it. Cf. L. Abramowski, *art. cit.*, 254.

379. ACO I. 4. 2. v. 86.34-35.



of Theodore.<sup>380</sup> It was there that his scriptural commentaries were translated into Syriac (by Qioras, Ibas, Cumas and Probus). According to Simeon of Beth Aršam,<sup>381</sup> Ibas had received the 'Nestorian teaching' of Theodoret of Cyrus and had passed it on to the 'school of the Persians' (the presbyter Eliša' bar Qūzbāyē). The Antiochene school thus had a great power-base in Edessa. Rabbula believed that in the interests of a true christology he had to close the school and expel its teachers and students from the city, which probably happened as early as 431.<sup>382</sup> Hence already in the first phase of the conflict we have the three names — Theodore of Mopsuestia, Theodoret and Ibas of Edessa — on whom the Three Chapters dispute will concentrate.

## 2. The centres of Alexandria and Constantinople

After the death of Rabbula (dated to 8 August 436) the agitation against Theodore was taken up anew by the archimandrite Basil, the deacon of Patriarch Proclus.<sup>383</sup> The Patriarch of Constantinople had already previously been drawn into the conflict by a synod of the Armenians and two of their presbyters. On their own initiative they came with critical *libelli* and a volume of excerpts from Theodore, 'presumably compiled in Edessa or Melitene',<sup>384</sup> to Patriarch Proclus in Constantinople in order to ask his judgement on Theodore.<sup>385</sup> The result was the famous *Tomus ad Armenios* (435). Theodore's name was suppressed in order not to provoke any alarm among the strict supporters of Nestorius and in the circles of John of Antioch.<sup>386</sup> The deacon Basil, clearly not satisfied with Proclus' 'diplomatic solution of the Armenian affair' (L. Abramowski), came to Cyril richly equipped with documents (the *libelli* of the Armenians, the *Tomus* of Proclus and his own writings) to move him to an open attack on Theodore. The initiative, however,

380. On the history of this school see G. G. Blum, *op. cit.*, 169–74, esp. 174, n. 36, C. Schaublin, *Untersuchungen zu Methode und Herkunft der Antiochenischen Exegese = Theophaneia* 23 (Cologne, Bonn, 1974), 11–15.

381. Cf. Assemani, *BO* I, 203–204. 350; for more information on Simeon see *JdChr* II/4, 311–30.

382. G. G. Blum, *op. cit.*, 174, n. 36. Ibas' exile lasted to the death of Rabbula (436). On the discussion about the year of Rabbula's death see 7–8, n. 16.

383. On this see G. G. Blum, *op. cit.*, 190–1 with n. 37; Innocent Maron. (CPG 6847): *ACO* IV, 2, p. 68, 23–37.

384. See L. Abramowski, *art. cit.*, 254.

385. See Liberatus, *Brev.* 10: *ACO* II, 5, pp. 110, 19–29; 110, 31–111, 6, with verbatim excerpts from Innocent Maron.: *ACO* IV, 2, p. 68, 6–14. 14–25.

386. On the prehistory and history of Proclus' *Tomus* see *JdChr* I<sup>3</sup>, 729–30, esp. n. 9, see a correction of my comments in L. Abramowski, *art. cit.*, 266, n. 44a.

founded.<sup>387</sup> With his entire original dossier, enlarged by a further *libellus*,<sup>388</sup> the deacon then sought to win Proclus for the fight against Theodore; this was not successful. A third *libellus* from the deacon was forwarded to Emperor Theodosius II with the same purpose; once again this was in vain.

Another action against Theodore was initiated in 435 by the Antiochene deacon and archimandrite Maximus before the Emperor and Proclus.

Instead of direct measures Proclus now sent the *Tomus ad Armenios* to Antioch with an accompanying letter, in which the Orientals were called upon to subscribe, and he included excerpts transmitted from Armenia . . . The forwarding of the *Tomus* and the accompanying written material provided the occasion for John to summon a synod in Antioch . . . This synod decided to subscribe the *Tomus*, but the appended excerpts were not condemned, because they were recognized to be the property of Theodore.<sup>389</sup>

### 3. The centre of Jerusalem

In 438, while on a journey to Jerusalem, Cyril of Alexandria met a high court official, who presented him with a comprehensive indictment with many signatures, in which it was reported that the Oriental indeed rejected Nestorius, but in his place now honoured Theodore. In a letter<sup>390</sup> Cyril communicated that he had written to Antioch that one should suppress the 'impious dogmas' of Theodore in the Church. He said that after his return to Alexandria the deacon and archimandrite Maximus had come to him, depicting in the blackest colours the situation in Antioch, and had requested Cyril to intervene in the fight with an explanation of the symbol of Nicaea, misinterpreted by the supporters of Theodore; Cyril stated that he had done this. This *tomus*, Cyril said, had gone to the Emperor through Maximus in a 'splendid parchment volume'. In addition he had written three books against Diodore and Theodore.<sup>391</sup> Cyril's appeal to Antioch and the reactions there, however, threatened to imperil the work of the union of 433. Upon the

387. ACO IV, 2, p. 68,25-28; on this see L. Abramowski, *art. cit.*, 255.

388. ACO IV, 2, p. 68,28-30; according to Tillemont's proof and the reference of Abramowski (255), this second *libellus*, whose author is concealed by the title, is preserved in the *acta* of the Council of 553: see *actio* V, no. 14: ACO IV, 1, pp. 83,5-85,5.

389. L. Abramowski, *art. cit.*, 255-6.

390. Cyril Alex., *Ep. 70 ad Lamp.* (CPG 5370): PG 77, 341AC; read out in *actio* V of 553: ACO IV, 1, 86, no. 18.

391. Cf. Cyril Alex., *Ep. 69 ad Acac. Melit.* (CPG 5369): PG 77, 337-40, cited in *actio* V of 553 (ACO IV, 1, 107-8, no. 72). Theodore's seductive 'Nestorianism' (*ante litteram*) is stressed here in sharp words: *sicut doctor vult, sic sapit grex* (p. 108,13-14).

Antiochenes explaining that they would rather be burnt than condemn the two church teachers, Diodore and Theodore,<sup>392</sup> Cyril made a volte-face and advocated restraint in order to avoid a schism. Proclus too wrote a letter to the deacon Maximus<sup>393</sup> to move him towards moderation (he exhorted him as follows: *nihil ad confusionem vel tumultum Ecclesiarum pacem habentium agi*). As with Cyril (*Ep.* 72), so too with Proclus,<sup>394</sup> it was recalled that the condemnation of the dead was not admissible. Even Emperor Theodosius II had considered this subject, which had been brought to him in writing by Proclus or by John of Antioch and his synod of 438.<sup>395</sup> Accordingly it did not come to an imperial condemnation of Theodore of Mopsuestia. The attempts which we have depicted foundered because of the diplomatic ability of John of Antioch (d. 441/442) and of the vigilance of Pulcheria.<sup>396</sup> The lively correspondence of these years between the two synods of Ephesus was not forgotten in 553, as the various documents which were read out at the Fifth Council have shown us.

#### 4. The theatre of Armenia

Although Rabbula had accepted the peace accord of 433 between Cyril of Alexandria and the moderate Antiochenes, he continued the fight against Theodore of Mopsuestia and carried it into Armenia (probably from as early as 432), because translations of the works of Theodore into Armenian had been delivered there through the 'school of the Persians'. His associate in this action was Acacius of Melitene, who warned the Armenian Patriarch Sahak about Theodore of Mopsuestia and above all about Nestorius.<sup>397</sup> Here we shall pass over developments in Armenia, because these will be dealt with in their own right in the appropriate context.

392. Cf. Cyril Alex., *Ep. 72 ad Proclum* (CPG 5372): PG 77, 344-5; read out in *actio V* of 553: ACO IV, 1, 109-10, nos. 77, 78.

393. Proclus, *Ep. 11 ad Maxim.* (CPG 5908): in Facundus of Hermiane, *Pro def. tr. cap. VIII* II, 5-7: CCL 90A, 232-3.

394. *Ibid.*, p. 232, 51-52; cf. p. 234, 97-102.

395. Cf. Theodos. emp., *Ad synod. Ant.*: Coll. Cas. no. 310: ACO I, 4, 241; Facund. Herm., *Pro def. tr. cap. VIII* III, 5: CCL 90A, p. 235, 41-46; Liberatus, *Brev.* 10: ACO II, 5, p. 112, 20-25.

396. See E. Schwartz, *Codex Vaticanus gr. 1431 = ABAW.PH* 32, 6 (Munich, 1927), 91-3; Facund. Herm., *Pro def. tr. cap. II* II, 9-15: CCL 90A, 46-7 is important.

397. Cf. Acacius Melit., *Ep. ad S. Sahak* (CPG 5794); Latin in Richard, *Op. Min.* II, no. 50, 394-6; French in M. Tallon, *Livre des Lettres* (Beirut, 1955), 29-33; on this, G. G. Blum, *op cit.*, 182-95; L. Abramowski, *art. cit.*, 254.

### 5. Further development

With the death of Rabbula, in Edessa itself his opponent Ibas occupied the episcopal see,<sup>398</sup> as a result of which the 'school of the Persians' could once again revive, but not without severe internal conflicts in this Church.<sup>399</sup>

As bishop of Edessa, Ibas had strong opponents, especially among the monks, and in particular the monk Barṣaumā<sup>400</sup> from the monastery Basmul, who died probably in 457/458. The opposition agitated against him in Antioch, Alexandria and Constantinople, and accused him before Emperor Theodosius II of heresy and the misappropriation of ecclesiastical property. A commission established by the Emperor, consisting of the bishops Photius of Tyre, Eustathius of Beirut and Uranius of Himeria, investigated the reproaches in the early part of 449 at Beirut and Tyre. These inquiries, however, ended with an acquittal for Ibas (CPG 8902 [3]).

An exhibit in the Three Chapters dispute would be a letter of Ibas to Mari<sup>401</sup> which had been written in 433 after the establishment of peace between Cyril and the Orientals. In this the author depicted the discord which had arisen in the Oriental Church after the Council of Ephesus (431).<sup>402</sup> The writing provoked the fiercest opposition in the followers of Rabbula in Edessa (to 449).

In Edessa it ended up in a new hearing under the Comes Theodosius, at which Ibas' letter to Mari and the accusations from Beirut were read out.<sup>403</sup>

Statements of Ibas were circulated with the intention of making him

398. See L. Hallier, *Untersuchungen über die Edessenische Chronik mit dem syrischen Text und einer Übersetzung* = TU 9, 1 (Leipzig, 1892), 110, no. LIX etc.; G. G. Blum, *op. cit.*, 196, n. 1.

399. See G. G. Blum, *op. cit.*, 196–207.

400. See A. Vööbus, *History of Asceticism in the Syrian Orient II* = CSCO 197, Subs. 17 (Louvain, 1960), 196–208. According to a letter of Emperor Theodosius II (ACO II, 1, no. 48, p. 71) to Barsauma of 14 May 449, he is cognizant of the fact that in the Anatolian cities there are several bishops with 'Nestorian impiety'.

401. On the person of Mari see M. van Esbroeck, 'Who is Mari, the addressee of Ibas' letter?', *JTS* 38 (1987), 129–35. On the basis of the discovery of a letter from 452, written in Arabic, van Esbroeck can prove as fairly certain that the Persian Mari came to know Ibas in the school of Edessa, that later he became a Sleepless Monk in the Eirenaion, and finally was archimandrite in a monastery in the vicinity of the Eirenaion. This position is contrary to that of G. G. Blum, *op. cit.*, 166–7.

402. Ibas Edess., *Ep ad Marim Persam* (CPG 6500–1): Greek translation: ACO II, 1, 3, pp. 32–4 (391–3); Latin translation: (a) ACO II, 3, 3, pp. 39–43 (478–82) (*versio antiqua*); (b) ACO IV, 1, 138–40 (from the *acta* of Constantinople II [553]); (c) CCL 90A (Facundus of Hermiane) 170–3.

403. See CPG 9013; the christologically suspect propositions are found in G. G. Blum, *op. cit.*, 199–202.

appear to be a 'Nestorian'.<sup>404</sup> The altercation reached its climax at the synod summoned in Ephesus in 449 by Emperor Theodosius II.

The Council was occasioned in part by the unrest in Edessa about Ibas. In the imperial document summoning it a prior decision against him had been pronounced.<sup>405</sup> The proceedings and hearings of Beirut and Edessa were discussed again at Ephesus and the letter to the Persian Mari was read out.<sup>406</sup>

Ibas was then deposed as bishop and excluded from the ecclesial community.<sup>407</sup> Together with him Theodoret of Cyrus, Domnus of Antioch (CPG 8938 [6] and [7]) and Irenaeus of Tyre were divested of episcopal office and banished from the Church (22 August 449).

The basis for the Three Chapters dispute in the sixth century, however, was laid at the Council of Chalcedon through the revocation of the condemnation of 449 and the rehabilitation of Theodoret of Cyrus (26 October 451) and Ibas of Edessa (26 and 27 October).<sup>408</sup>

## II. A PROPOSAL OF EMPEROR JUSTINIAN IN 532

At the end of the doctrinal dialogue of 532 Justinian had proposed a compromise,<sup>409</sup> viz., accepting Chalcedon to safeguard correct understanding. He pronounced, however, a condemnation of Diodore of Tarsus, Theodore of Mopsuestia, Theodoret of Cyrus and Ibas of Edessa, but also of Nestorius on the one side and of Eutyches on the other, which was intended to mollify the Chalcedonians.<sup>410</sup> This proposal did not

404. The reproaches against Ibas contained the misunderstandings which prior to Ephesus (431) were customary in the struggle about the correct linguistic usage regarding the *communicatio idiomatum* between Alexandrians and Antiochenes. See *JdChr* I<sup>3</sup>, 731–7 (the trial of Eutyches and the Synod of Ephesus II [449]).

405. Cf. J. Flemming, *Akten der ephesinischen Synode vom 449, syrisch mit G. Hoffmanns deutscher Übersetzung und seinen Anmerkungen herausgegeben* = *AGWG.PH* 15, 1 (Berlin, 1917); the Emperor's decree concerning Ibas: 5–7; F. Haase, *Altchristliche Kirchengeschichte nach orientalischen Quellen* (Leipzig, 1925), 293ff.

406. See J. Flemming, *op. cit.*, 14–21 (*Relatio de Iba prima*); 20–33 (*Relatio de Iba secunda*) according to CPG 8938 (1) e and f; the reading out of the letter to Mari: *ibid.*, (1) g; Flemming, 32–55.

407. See CPG 8938 (1) h; J. Flemming, *op. cit.*, 54–69. Cf. G. G. Blum, *op. cit.*, 200–1.

408. See A. Schönmetzer, 'Zeittafel', nos. 121–124, in *Chalcedon* II, 951. We should note that the text of the letter of Ibas was not commented on at Chalcedon itself. Cf. ACO II, 1, 3, 32–3.

409. See above, p. 247. In this context we also recall Leontius of Byzantium's disowning of Theodore of Mopsuestia: PG 86, 1360D. Cf. E. Schwartz, 'Zur Kirchenpolitik Justinians', in *Ges. Schriften* IV, 300, n. 2.

410. See S. P. Brock, 'The conversations with the Syrian Orthodox under Justinian (532)', *OCAP* 47 (1981), 116–17.

spring from his hostility towards the Antiochenes, nor from a particular interest in the condemnation, but was driven by the determination to bring about the union of post-Chalcedonian parties which were denouncing each other. Even though this proposal was not accepted, it still showed the Emperor's theological uncertainty, and the ease with which he was prepared to relinquish the strict-Chalcedonian position in favour of a compromise, without demanding that the Severans accept the substance of the Chalcedonian definition. What he demanded after the Syrians' statement was precious little:<sup>411</sup>

'They should accept the synod at Chalcedon as far as the expulsion of Eutyches was concerned, but they need not accept the definition of the faith made there . . .' The Severans close their report with the meaningful statement: 'These things failed to persuade the orthodox.'

In order to restore the unity of faith, the Emperor was prepared to sacrifice a great deal — but without success.

411. *Ibid.*, with the revised translation of B. L. Add. 12155, translated by F. Nau in *PO* 13, 192-6

## SECTION TWO

### COURSE AND RESULT

The central action against the Three Chapters was the Fifth Ecumenical Council, the Second Council of Constantinople from 5 May to 2 June 553. The occasion, the course and the subsequent history of this Synod were bound to stir up the entire Imperial Church in East and West. In point of fact it was a question of the Emperor's aim, through a new interpretation of Chalcedon, to win over the Severans and still to save the Eusebian and Constantinian ideal of imperial unity. However, there were parties at work in Constantinople who knew how to make Justinian's undertaking a massive game of intrigue for their own purposes.<sup>412</sup>

#### I. 'REVENGE FOR ORIGEN'

In spite of the condemnation of Origenism in 543, Theodore Askidas had been able to remain doggedly in his position at court in order to continue working for his party or sect. After his opponent, the papal *apocrisiarius* Pelagius, had left the field by returning to Rome, he could bring his influence to bear on the Emperor unchallenged.

Theodore had subscribed the Emperor's first decree against the Origenists, probably also from the conviction that the real Origenism had not yet been fatally hit. Still he must have been aware that further information and petitions from Palestine against his supporters and their real 'heresy' would reach the Emperor.<sup>413</sup> For this reason he devised the

412. Liberatus, *Brev.* 24: ACO II, 4, pp 140,13–141,11, reports in detail about the rôle of Theodore Askidas, bishop of Caesarea in Cappadocia (ACO IV, 3, 2, 2, p. 457a). In a writing of 14 August 551 (E. Schwartz, *Vigiliusbriefe* = SBAW 1940, 2 (Munich, 1940), 10–15), Pope Vigilius complained agitatedly against the doings of Theodore Askidas: for instance, p. 9,27 (*auctor totius scandali*); p. 15,20 (*novus error Theodori*). In this writing Vigilius declared Theodore deposed as bishop (p. 14,14–20), but this had no effect. Theodore Askidas was witness to the oath that Pope Vigilius swore before Justinian on 15 August 550 (ACO IV, 1, no. 11, 198–9), condemning the Three Chapters, Theodore's stance against Ibas at the Council of 553: ACO IV, 1, no. 9, pp. 143,14–146,32; his condemnation of the Three Chapters: ACO IV, 1, p. 222 (8). Cf. E. Schwartz, 'Zur Kirchenpolitik Justinians', 50–71.

413. Facundus of Hermiane, *Pro def. tr. cap.* I, II, 3–4: CCL 90A, 8–9, considers in detail the intentions of the Origenist Domitian, bishop of Ancyra, and his accomplices (like Theodore Askidas). He speaks of the *furor* of these crypto-Origenists about the condemnation of 543, and

plan to use all means to direct the Emperor's eagerness for theological decisions away from Origenism, towards a target which in the Church of Constantinople could always claim immediate interest,<sup>414</sup> namely the continuation of the fight against Nestorius by using the names of Theodore of Mopsuestia, Theodoret of Cyrus and Ibas of Edessa. The attack on Theodore of Mopsuestia was all the more striking as he had already been forgotten within the borders of the Imperial Church.<sup>415</sup> As the great authority, he continued to have an effect on the Nestorians who had emigrated to Persia. On that account Chalcedon could not really be suspected of concealing Nestorianism under the name of Theodore of Mopsuestia. The dangerous nature of this name had its effect indirectly, namely through Theodoret and Ibas. Both had been deposed by the Synod of Ephesus II (449), and in contrast had once again been restored to office by Chalcedon and admitted to the Synod. The misdemeanour of Theodoret consisted in having composed several writings against Cyril or the Council of Ephesus.<sup>416</sup> More than Theodoret's name, however, that of Ibas was sullied by the letter to Mari already referred to. In order to demonstrate that this letter was heretical, the person and work of Theodore of Mopsuestia had to be anathematized, for Ibas' letter contained an unambiguous *laudatio* of the bishop, who had died in peace with the Church.<sup>417</sup> What were fatal were the characterization of Theodore as 'teacher of the Church' and the highlighting of his ongoing effectiveness in distant Persia. From there a secret weapon against Chalcedon could also be forged.

Theodore Askidas, however, knew the situation too well to attack

Domitian's *libellus* to Pope Vigilius (CPG 6990), in which the bishop confessed *deo extorquente: quod eius complices Origeniani, cum viderent non se posse proprium dogma defendere, neque sibi quidquam spei de conflictu restare, ad ultionem eorum quae contra Origenem gesta sunt, haec Ecclesiae scandala commoverunt*. In contrast to this G. Every, 'Was Vigilius a Victim or an Ally of Justinian?', *HeyJ* 20 (1979), 257-66, is inclined to consider that the Origenists were not the instigators of the Three Chapters dispute (264).

414. On the Byzantines' passion for orthodoxy see B. Lourdas, 'Intellectuals, Scholars and Bureaucrats in the Byzantine Society', *Kleronomia* 2 (1970), 272-92.

415. Facundus Herm., *C. Mocian.*, 63: CCL 90A, p. 415, 536-538; PL 67, 866C: *nunc in praeiudicium magnae synodi Chalcedonensis resuscitatur eius quaestio ante centum et viginti annos finita et oblivioni iam tradita*.

416. Theodoret Cyr., *Impugntatio XII anathematismorum Cyrilli* (CPG 6214); *Libri V contra Cyrillum et concilium Ephesinum (Pentalogus)* (CPG 6215); *Pro Diodoro et Theodoro* (CPG 6220); see *JdChr* I<sup>3</sup>, 692-700.

417. Ibas Edess., *Ep. ad Marim Persam*, here according to Facundus Herm., *Pro def. tr. cap* VI, III, 11: CCL 90A, p. 171, 74-78 (among those pursued by Rabbula were also teachers who were already dead): *quorum unus est beatus Theodorus, praeco veritatis et doctor Ecclesiae, qui non solum in sua vita colaphizavit haereticos per veritatem suae fidei, sed et post mortem spiritalia arma in libris propriis ecclesiae filiis dereliquit*.



Chalcedon directly and openly. Neither the Emperor nor the people of Constantinople nor the supporters of the Council in the Great Church in general could have collaborated in this. Hence Theodore invented the thesis that Ibas' letter had not been written by him at all; he successfully convinced the Emperor of this. In this way the restoration of Ibas by Chalcedon could also not be blamed on the Council, and the Emperor was free to anathematize the heretical composition of unknown origin, without riling the Chalcedonians. Thus to all appearances the condemnation of the Three Chapters served only to win back the Miaphysites. Nevertheless, Justinian denied later to the East Illyrian bishops, whose opposition was expressed in a synodal writing, that the condemnation of the 'Three Chapters' should be understood as a concession to the Severans.<sup>418</sup> He emphasized that in the first place he reacted in this way on account of the intrinsic godlessness of the Three Chapters themselves, and on account of the danger that they would serve as camouflage for genuine Nestorianism, which in this way, with the suppression of the name of Nestorius, would infiltrate the Church.<sup>419</sup>

## II. THE INDIVIDUAL DECREES OF THE EMPEROR IN THE QUESTION OF THE THREE CHAPTERS BEFORE THE FIFTH ECUMENICAL COUNCIL

### 1. *In damnationem trium capitulorum* (CPG 6881)

In a first treatise Emperor Justinian accepted the plan thought out by Theodore Askidas, and pronounced the threefold anathema:

(a) against the person of Theodore of Mopsuestia together with his works;

(b) against the anonymous letter to the Persian Mari and anyone who claimed that the author was Ibas of Edessa;

(c) against Theodoret's writings against Cyril.<sup>420</sup>

418. Justinian emp., *Ep. c. tria capitula* (549/550) (CPG 6882): Schwartz, *Drei dogm. Schriften* (1939), pp. 47,26–48,5; PG 86, 1043CD; see especially the sentence: he says he uttered the threefold condemnation, 'so that the will of those is fulfilled who would have separated themselves from the catholic Church'.

419. *Ibid.*: Schwartz, *op. cit.*, p. 47,30–33; PG 86, 1043D.

420. Justinian emp., *In damnationem trium capitulorum* (CPG 6881), from the year 544/545, is only extant in excerpts: in E. Schwartz, 'Zur Kirchenpolitik Justinians', in *Ges. Schriften* IV, Appendix, 321–8, with additions to W. Pewsies, *Imperium, Ecclesia universalis*, Rom (Stuttgart, 1937), 150–8, with an evaluation of Facundus Herm., *Pro defensione trium capitulorum libri XII* (CPL 866): CCL 90A, 3–398; Amelotti-Migliardi Zingale, *Scritti teologici*, 129–35 (on the basis of the edition in CCL 90A) with nineteen certain fragments and an uncertain one from

This first treatise did not attain great significance, was not included in a contemporary collection, and has been lost in its entirety. More informative will be the citations which first appear in the totality of Facundus' *defensio*.

## 2. Justinian's letter against the Three Chapters (CPG 6882)<sup>421</sup>

This letter is probably addressed to the episcopal participants of an Illyrian synod<sup>422</sup> who had refused to subscribe the edict of 543/544. Justinian's reply is a good introduction to the manner in which he had accepted the ideas of Theodore Askidas. Two main areas illustrate the Emperor's argumentation: (a) he is determined factually to incriminate the Three Chapters; and (b) he energetically wards off the objection that the action against the Three Chapters is directed against Chalcedon.

### (a) *The incrimination of the Three Chapters*

The Emperor reacts in a quite agitated way to the Illyrian writing<sup>423</sup> and shows that he is convinced of the heresy of the Three Chapters (PG 86, 1045A). Whoever defends them would openly contradict the Synod of Chalcedon, deceive the simple and deliver the Christian people to schism (PG 86, 1045AB). It would be particularly misleading to characterize Cyril as an Apollinarian (*ibid.*, C), as the letter of Ibas also claimed (PG 86, 1047A, 1049C). The Emperor says that whoever defends this letter makes himself guilty of the two-persons teaching, like Theodore of Mopsuestia and Nestorius (PG 86, 1051BC).

It is typical of Justinian to adduce the *Unus ex sanctae Trinitatis personis* to ward off this teaching of two persons (PG 86, 1053D). We should note that the letter of Ibas is condemned because he is said to reproach Cyril on account of the *mia-physis* formula, but falsely interprets it as mixing divinity and humanity (PG 86, 1055A). Cyril, Justinian main-

Facundus. B. E. Daley, 'The Origenism of Leontius of Byzantium', *JTS* 27 (1976) (333-69), 334, sees in Justinian's first edict against the Three Chapters still 'a part of his [Leontius'] legacy', although Leontius died shortly before its publication. See below on the Council of 553.

421. E. Schwartz, *Drei dogmatische Schriften Justinians* = *ABAW.PH* 18 (Munich, 1939), 47-69; Amelotti-Migliardi Zingale, *Scritti teologici*, *Subsidia* II, 81-121 (= the Greek text of Schwartz), with a Latin translation; PG 86, 1041-95; PL 69, 275-327; a German translation (of Schwartz, 47) by H.-G. Beck, *Byzantinisches Lesebuch* (Munich, 1982), 223-4.

422. Cf. Victor Tunnun., *Chron.* (549): Mommsen, in *MGH, auct. ant.* XI/2, p. 202,6: an Illyrian synod wrote to Emperor Justinian.

423. Cf. the introduction to CPG 6882: Schwartz, p. 47, 11-17; PG 86, 1043B; several times he labels the bishops as men without education (*agrestes, agroikoi*). See H.-G. Beck, *op. cit.*, 223-4.

tains, meant nothing other than that 'in Christ there is one *hypostasis* or person of the divinity and humanity' (PG 86, 1055B).<sup>424</sup>

In all Three Chapters Justinian finds the teaching of two persons. It is in this sense that he interprets Theodore's formula: 'two natures, one power of God, one person'.<sup>425</sup> The letter of Ibas repeats this teaching.<sup>426</sup> It is not necessary to follow any further in its Justinianic version this historical interpretation of the Antiochene teaching, which was directed above all to warding off Apollinarianism.<sup>427</sup> The Emperor makes no effort to incorporate the historical situation of the Antiochene christology into his judgement of it. This would also have contradicted the interests of Theodore Askidas, who indeed aimed at the condemnation of the three *capita*. Thus the rift between the Antiochenes and the Alexandrians, in spite of all the Emperor's attempts to secure union, was reopened. The union of 433, which Ibas had expressly confessed, was invalidated.

What was new, however, and insinuated by Theodore Askidas, was the Emperor's often repeated claim that Ibas had not at all composed the letter to Mari ascribed to him. It was stated that it had been foisted upon him.<sup>428</sup> The Emperor incorporated this assumption too into his interpretation of the Chalcedonian rehabilitation of Ibas.

Justinian attempts to prove the anonymity of the letter of Ibas: Ibas swore that after 433 he had not written anything against Cyril (cf. Schwartz, *op. cit.*, no. 63, p. 64,29-33). The letter to Mari, however, was written after 433. Hence Ibas is not implicated in the authorship (p. 64,34-35). The Synod condemned the contents of the letter, which it also vainly demanded from Ibas. For this reason he was deposed (p. 65,2-5).

In contrast we should note that in sessions X and XI of the Council of Chalcedon<sup>429</sup> on 26 and 27 October 451, the reports of Tyre (CPG 8903) and of Beirut (CPG 8902) and the *relatio*

424. In this context, in opposition to Cyril and Severus, however, Justinian distinguishes clearly between the concepts *physis* and *hypostasis* (PG 86, 1055B11-14). He also tries to find this distinction already in Cyril (*ibid.*, CD). He says that in contrast Theodore of Mopsuestia took the term 'nature' for 'person', and in this way came to his teaching of two persons (1073AB).

425. Cf. Schwartz, *Drei dogm. Schriften*, no. 49, p. 59,23-25; no. 51, p. 60.

426. Cf. ACO IV, 1, no. 3, p. 138,27-28: *duae naturae, una virtus, una persona, quod est unus filius dominus Iesus Christus*. With regard to this Justinian says that the result is the teaching of two persons: Schwartz, *op. cit.*, no. 49, p. 59,34-35; PG 86, 1071C. Cf. Schwartz, no. 61, p. 63,32-35.

427. See *JdChr* I<sup>3</sup>, 610-34, 692-707.

428. Schwartz, *op. cit.*, p. 48,14: 'the so-called letter of Ibas'; p. 52,28-29; cf. PG 86, 1045C, 1055D; see especially, however, Schwartz, no. 63, pp. 64,22-65,22; PG 86, 1081D-1085A.

429. See A. Schönmetzer, 'Zeittafel', in *Chalkedon* II, 951, nos. 122, 124; CPG 9011, 9013; the numbering of the *actiones* in  $\Phi^{\alpha}$  reads IX and X; ACO II, 1, 3, pp. 11-16, 16-42. The Latin translation: II, 3, 3, pp. 15-20, 20-52.

of the clergy of Edessa were read out (CPG 9013[2]), but also the incriminated letter of Ibas,<sup>430</sup> without any doubt being expressed about its authenticity.

The fabrication of the inauthenticity of the letter of Ibas is devoid of any foundation.

(b) *The condemnation of the Three Chapters — no renunciation of Chalcedon*

Justinian then replied to the Illyrians' claim that through the condemnation of the letter of Ibas 'the definition of Chalcedon will suffer damage' (PG 86, 1079C). How did the Emperor attempt to rebut this objection, which he took very seriously?<sup>431</sup>

(i) In order to dispel any doubt about his fidelity to Chalcedon from the very beginning, Justinian expressly confessed that Chalcedon was orthodox and that the ecumenical councils numbered four.

This was established by the definitions of the holy Synod of Chalcedon; the Synod expressed no novelty against the faith. Rather all over and in everything it followed the confession of faith which the Lord gave through his holy apostles and which the holy apostles proclaimed, the 318 holy Fathers handed on to God's Church and the 150 Fathers ratified by the dogmatic explanation about the divinity of the Holy Spirit. This faith too is followed by the holy Fathers who gathered at the earlier Council of Ephesus. The holy Council of Chalcedon, however, anathematized those who handed on another symbol or another explanation of faith beyond that presented by the 318 Fathers.<sup>432</sup>

(ii) The person of Ibas and his reinstatement in office are not an incrimination of Chalcedon, because at first the Council was summoned without Ibas, and the bishop manifested a new attitude towards the Fourth Council. He distanced himself from the letter to Mari<sup>433</sup> and by doing so released, as it were, this letter for condemnation without Chalcedon being incriminated by this.<sup>434</sup>

Admittedly this letter from beginning to end oozes impiety (*asebeia*) and hybris *vis-à-vis* Cyril.<sup>435</sup>

How can one defend Chalcedon better than by teaching the opposite of the so-called letter of Ibas and of Theodore's letters? Against their

430. Ibas Edess., *Ep. ad Marim Persam*: Greek: ACO II, 1, 3, pp. 32,9–34,27; Latin: ACO II, 3, 3, pp. 39,26–43,2; ACO IV, 1, pp. 138,6–140,23.

431. Cf. Justinian emp., *Ep. c. tria capit.*: Schwartz, 63–6; PG 86, 1079D–1087A.

432. *Ibid.*: Schwartz, p. 64,4–11; PG 86, 1081BC. The conciliar decision excluding any further formula of faith (going beyond that of 325), which had been taken at Ephesus (431) (cf. DEC 65, \*65) and which had been raised repeatedly by the traditionalists against Chalcedon, was also in fact formulated by the Council of 451. This was also intended to acquit the Council of Chalcedon. Cf. ACO II, 1, 2, p. 130 (326), 4–11.

433. Schwartz, *op. cit.*, p. 65,18–22; PG 86, 1083D–1085A.

434. Cf. Schwartz, *op. cit.*, p. 64,29–36; PG 86, 1083AB.

435. Schwartz, *op. cit.*, p. 65,35–36; PG 86, 1085C.

teaching of two persons 'the Synod maintains the hypostatic union (*kath'hypostasin henosin*) of the two natures and proclaims one person (*prosopon*) or rather the one *hypostasis* of Christ, of the only-begotten Son of God'.<sup>436</sup> In everything the Synod of Chalcedon follows the First Council of Ephesus, honours Cyril with the titles 'Father' and 'Teacher', and confirms that synodal letter to which are appended the twelve chapters (anathemas).<sup>437</sup>

(iii) Chalcedon, however, is also not implicated by the alleged letter of Ibas, because the parts of the *acta* which contain it do not belong to the authentic *acta* of Chalcedon as these were preserved in Rome, in the Patriarchate and imperial palace of Constantinople.<sup>438</sup> The proscribed letter is in contradiction to the definition of Chalcedon and does not belong to it. Hence its condemnation cannot implicate the Fourth Council.

In his conclusion the Emperor once again makes the 'rustic' bishops of Illyrium aware of their backwardness. He criticizes their *ekthesis pisteos* (of 549). They should either study the Fathers or be silent. Justinian also rejects the presumption of prescribing how the Emperor should respond to the Egyptian Patriarch Zoilus. The bishops should now be quite clear, for Justinian writes that whoever defends Theodore of Mopsuestia and his writings, the alleged letter of Ibas and Theodoret's writings which were directed against right faith, should be reckoned among the heretics, and is excluded from the catholic Church whose head is Christ, the only-begotten Son of God.<sup>439</sup>

### 3. Emperor Justinian's edict of 551 (CPG 6885)

With the decision of Empress Theodora to carry through the condemnation of the three *capita* by bringing Pope Vigilius from Rome to Constantinople (22 November 545) the Three Chapters dispute entered its really tragic phase, which was severely damaging for the Church in

436. Schwartz, *op. cit.*, p. 63,34-35; PG 86, 1081A5-8. Cf. *JdChr* I<sup>3</sup>, 758-9.

437. What is meant is Cyril's third letter to Nestorius (CPG 5317). At Ephesus, however, no vote was taken on this letter. It was only read out and included in the *acta*: ACO I, 1, 2, pp. 36,19-20,26. At Chalcedon as well, corresponding to the union of 433, one could not have recourse to Cyril's third letter to Nestorius and his anathemas. Thus at Chalcedon there was no ratification of the twelve anathemas. On the symbol of Ps. Theodore of Mopsuestia which was condemned at Ephesus (431) (ACO I, 1, 7, pp. 97,26-100,4), and subsequently at Chalcedon, see CPG 3871.

438. Schwartz, *op. cit.*, p. 66,13-23 (no. 65); PG 86, 1087AB.

439. On the whole subject cf. Schwartz, *op. cit.*, nos. 80-81, p. 69; PG 86, 1093C-1095B.

East and West.<sup>440</sup> The Pope arrived in Constantinople only on 25 January 547. On the way to the East he had sojourned in Sicily until the summer of 546 and had received there numerous petitions of the Sardinian and African bishops, urging him not to condemn the Three Chapters. The Roman clergy had also expressed this warning at his departure.<sup>441</sup> On his arrival in the Imperial City the Pope excommunicated Patriarch Menas and deposed him. The excommunication applied to all the other signatories of the condemnation of 544/545 (CPG 6881).<sup>442</sup> However, on 29 June 547, at the request of Empress Theodora,<sup>443</sup> the Pope and the Patriarch were reconciled. In the middle of June 547 Vigilius secretly condemned the Three Chapters in two identically worded letters to the Emperor and the Empress (CPG [9336]), letters which Justinian later had read out at the Council of 553 (*Actio VII*).<sup>444</sup> The so-called *Iudicatum* of the Pope, a document of 11 April 548 (CPG [9337]),<sup>445</sup> in which he communicated to Patriarch Menas his condemnation of the Three Chapters, admittedly while still adhering to Chalcedon,<sup>446</sup> was intended to play a special rôle. Yet the West, especially Africa, saw in this *Iudicatum* a renunciation of Chalcedon. The opposition to it was so fierce that Vigilius had to request the Emperor to return the document to him to be annulled.<sup>447</sup> The freedom of action which the Pope had hoped for and which he thought he had

440. See R. Haacke, 'Die kaiserliche Politik in den Auseinandersetzungen um Chalkedon (451-553)', in *Chalkedon II*, 95-177, especially 166-74. Cf. E. Schwartz, 'Zur Kirchenpolitik Justinians', 308.

441. Facundus Herm., *Pro def. tr. cap.* IV, III, 5: CCL 90A, 122.

442. His *apocrisarius* Stephen had separated himself from communion with Patriarch Menas immediately after his acceptance of the decree: Facundus Herm., *op. cit.*, IV, III, 4: CCL 90A, 122. In nos. 4-7 the African depicts how the West joined forces against this Three Chapters affair.

443. Cf. Theophanes, *Chron.* A. M. 6039: de Boor, p. 225, 25-28. According to E. Schwartz, 'Zur Kirchenpolitik Justinians', *Ges. Schriften* IV, 309, n. 3, the Empress did not have any 'strong interest in the dispute'. She died on 28 June 548.

444. Cf. ACO IV, 1, 187-8; cf. CPL 1694. Numerous Western bishops, worked on by Theodore Askidas, also subscribed.

445. *Iudicatum Vigili ppaē* (frag.): CA, ep. 83: CSEL 35/1, 316-17, ACO IV, 1, pp. 11, 21-12, 6.

446. Vigilius later spread it about that he had been forced to produce the *iudicatum* and that he had been insufficiently informed. On the Western reaction to this *iudicatum* see E. Schwartz, 'Zur Kirchenpolitik Justinians', *Ges. Schriften* IV, 310-13. The Pope's fiercest opponent was the deacon Rusticus, who revealed how the *iudicatum* came about. Probably even before 550 Vigilius was formally excommunicated by an African synod because of his condemnation of the Three Chapters. A defence of these Three Chapters was brought before the Emperor: Victor Tunnun, Mommsen, p. 202, 12; Facundus Herm., *C. Mocianum*: CCL 90A, 401-12, nos. 2, 24, 48, 50.

447. Cf. Vigilius, *Constitut.*: CA, ep. 83, no. 297: CSEL 35, 315; E. Amann, art. 'Trois-Chapteres', in *DTC* 15, 1895-6.

regained, he surrendered definitively, however, on 15 August 550, by having to swear before Justinian, Theodore Askidas and the *patricius* Cethegus on the four gospels and the nails of the cross that he would work towards the condemnation of the Three Chapters in the sense of the Emperor and that he would inform him of all the actions of the opposing party.<sup>448</sup> In the meantime the Emperor attempted to improve his argumentation against Theodore of Mopsuestia and his posthumous condemnation. From one of the synods summoned at Mopsuestia (17 July 550) he hoped to learn when the dead bishop had been struck from the diptychs there.<sup>449</sup> In this way he hoped to show that the *damnatio post mortem* had already been practised.

The Emperor attempted to use his previous method of attaining a goal by means of edicts on a final occasion by his *confessio fidei* of June 551.<sup>450</sup> It is the last great document in the Three Chapters dispute before the Council of 553. From it we can ascertain two facts: one about the state of Justinian's christology before the Council of 553, the other about the then current basis for condemning the Three Chapters. One is closely related to the other.

The Eusebian-Constantinian ideal of unity as a motive for a comprehensive *homologia* is proclaimed in the document from the first line. The explanation of the trinitarian doctrine presents no special problem (Schwartz, p. 72, 13–28; PG 86, 993D–995B). The christological remarks dominate the *confessio* (Schwartz, 72–90; PG 86, 995–1013); then there follow thirteen *Kephalaia* (*capita*) which will be of particular interest to us.

In our last discussion of a truly christological document, the dogmatic letter to Zoilus (CPG 6879), we were able to establish that Justinian still embraced strict-Chalcedonian christology. Now our attention is

448. *Vigilii iuramentum* (CPG [9342]): ACO IV, 1, 198–9. Cf. Vigilius, *Ep. ad univ. populum* (5 February 552) (CPG [9346]): Schwartz, *Vigiliusbriefe*, pp. 4, 26–5, 1.

449. CPG 9340; ACO IV, 1, 115–30. In one letter to Justinian and in another to Vigilius it was ironically reported that in the list of former bishops no Theodore was to be found, but there was certainly a Cyril. It was also claimed, however, that a Cyril had never been bishop of Mopsuestia. Thus it was alleged that the name of Cyril was put into the diptychs in the place of the heretic Theodore. Cf. ACO IV, 1, 129–30, no. 65.

450. Justinian emp., *Confessio fidei* (CPG 6885): E. Schwartz, *Drei dogmat. Schriften Justinians* = *ABAW.PH* 18 (Munich, 1939), 72–111; this text with its *versio lat. antiqua* in Amelotti-Migliardi Zingale, *Scritti teologici*, *Subsidia* II, 129–69. Cf. R. Schieffer, 'Zur lateinischen Überlieferung von Kaiser Justinians *Ὁμολογία τῆς ὀρθῆς πίστεως* (*Edictum de recta fide*)', *Kleronomia* 3 (1971), 285–301; *idem*, 'Nochmals zur Überlieferung von Justinians *Ὁ. τ. ὁ. π.* (*Edict. de recta fide*)', *Kleronomia* 4 (1972), 267–84. Our citations here follow Schwartz and PG 86, 993–1035.

directed to the formulas and concepts which he utilizes in the new document.

(a) *The distinction between hypostasis and physis also in the oikonomia*  
In a way different from Severus, Justinian takes over the distinction between *hypostasis* and *physis* (*ousia*) from the trinitarian formula to use it also for the *oikonomia*, that is, for christology in the framework of the Chalcedonian teaching of the one *hypostasis* in two natures, the *mia physis* being rejected.<sup>451</sup> In the Trinity there is one nature (*physis* or *ousia*) and three *hypostases* (Latin: *subsistentiae*). Arius alone confesses three natures in God.<sup>452</sup> From the three *hypostases* in the Trinity only one entered into composition with the flesh.<sup>453</sup> Because there are not three natures (*physeis*) in the Trinity, so too no one can say that 'one of the three natures is composed with the flesh', which once again is directed against the *mia physis*.<sup>454</sup> Justinian defines the *termini* of the *synthesis* well: it happened not from nature to nature, but from divine subject (*hypostasis*) to created nature. For this reason too the Emperor does not like the so-called body-soul analogy for explaining the *synthesis* in Christ, for this expresses a synthesis of nature to nature. He knows of its appearance in the Fathers; he says that they used it to illustrate the 'unity' in Christ.<sup>455</sup> But there was also a misuse on the other side, namely representing the unity in Christ as a nature unity and in this sense speaking of *mia physis*.<sup>456</sup>

Thus in Justinian the trinitarian and incarnational terminology are brought into harmony. The distinction between the two types of union: (1) 'of nature to nature' (Apollinarians, monophysites) and (2) 'of subject to nature' is well understood and maintained (cf. Schwartz, p. 86,30-33; PG 86, 1009D-1011A).

The Emperor finds the distinction between the concepts *hypostasis* (*propon*, *subsistentia*) and 'nature' (*physis*) or 'essence' (*ousia*, *substantia*) already present in the Fathers:

451. Schwartz, p. 80,15-17; PG 86, 1003AB. Here it is presupposed that this formula is understood in the sense of a mingling.

452. Schwartz, p. 86,28-29; PG 86, 1009D. This is a distortion of the Arian teaching.

453. Schwartz, p. 86,25-26; PG 86, 1009D.

454. Schwartz, p. 86,27-28; PG 86, 1009D.

455. Schwartz, p. 82,8-14; PG 86, 1005AB.

456. *Ibid.*, Schwartz, p. 83,12-14: *isti autem hominis exemplo utuntur, ut unam naturam sive substantiam (ousian) deitatis et humanitatis Christi introducerent, quod demonstravimus alienum esse pietatis.*



For all the Fathers in harmony teach us that 'nature' (*physis*) or 'essence' (*ousia*) or 'form' (*morphē*) is one thing, but *hypostasis* (Latin: *subsistentia*) or 'person' (*prosopon*) is something else, and 'nature' or 'essence' or 'form' signifies what is common (*koinon*), *hypostasis* or 'person', however, what is particular (*idikon*).<sup>457</sup>

(b) *The unhistorical basis for condemning the Three Chapters*

Although in the decree on correct faith we find the fundamental Chalcedonian formula of one *hypostasis* in two natures and a clear rejection of the *mia-physis* formula, nevertheless the terminology is refined beyond Chalcedon in the sense of a cautious new interpretation. On the basis of the usage of concepts which had grown in the course of the sixth century, Justinian judges the teaching of the Three Chapters from the fifth century, hence from a period in which the Antiochenes attempted to ward off the crass Apollinarian understanding of the unity in Christ by emphasizing the totality of Christ's humanity. Their suspicion that they were dealing with Apollinarianism gave rise to their rejection of formulas like 'from two natures one', 'one nature of the incarnate Word', 'union according to the *hypostasis* and *physis*', which were to be found in the Cyril of the anti-Nestorian period. These especially offended them. From the viewpoint of the sixth century, however, what was lacking in the Antiochene response of Diodore of Tarsus up to Theodoret was more sharply presented than it could have been in 431, given the historical state of affairs. The fact that the Antiochenes themselves had made advances in the direction of a more profound understanding of the unity in Christ was suppressed in the polemics. This comes to expression particularly clearly in the thirteen *Kephalaia* (*capitula*) or anathemas of the decree.<sup>458</sup> Because these were taken over by the Council of 553 in a somewhat altered form and were expanded and focused, they should be evaluated in this context. We shall assess them here only in order to form a judgement about whether there is already something typically 'neo-Chalcedonian' in Justinian himself with his decree about correct faith.

Excursus: *On the concept 'neo-Chalcedonianism'*<sup>459</sup>

J. Lebon created this expression in imitation of the terms old-Niceneism and neo-Niceneism, which had become customary for the history of doc-

457. Schwartz, p. 86, 18–21; PG 86, 1009C.

458. Schwartz, pp. 90, 16–94, 34; PG 86, 1013C–1019B.

459. Cf. C. Moeller, 'Le chalcédonisme et le néo-chalcédonisme', in *Chalkedon I*<sup>5</sup>, 648. On the history of the problem (with a bibliography) see A. Grillmeier, 'Der Neu-Chalkedonismus', in *idem*, *Mit ihm und in ihm* (Freiburg, Basel, Vienna, <sup>2</sup>1978), 371–85; S. Helmer, *Der Neuchalke-*

trine of the fourth century between 325 and 381.<sup>460</sup> This terminology was intended to establish and typify a change in conceptual usage and in the understanding of the trinitarian dogma, as this had taken place between the Council of Nicaea and the First Council of Constantinople. If the old-Nicenes employed the concepts *hypostasis* and *physis* (*ousia*) synonymously, the neo-Nicenes distinguished both words, so that they could speak of three *hypostases* and one *physis* (*ousia*) in the Trinity.<sup>461</sup> In particular this was the work of Basil and Gregory Nazianzen.<sup>462</sup> The latter took over this distinction of concepts from the doctrine of the Trinity (*theologia*) into the doctrine of the incarnation as well, the *oikonomia*. While Cyril of Alexandria followed this linguistic convention for the *theologia*, for the *oikonomia* he held fast to the old synonymous use of *hypostasis* and *physis*, which continued to be the old-Alexandrian tradition. This, then, had particular repercussions in his adoption of the fundamental christological formula of the Apollinarians on the basis of the so-called 'Apollinarian forgeries': 'the one *hypostasis* [nature] of the incarnate Logos'. With this formula Cyril fought above all against Nestorius, and in general against the Antiochene christology of Diodore, Theodore of Mopsuestia and Theodoret. They confessed 'two natures' in Christ, which was now interpreted, in old-Alexandrian terms on the basis of the synonymy of *physis* and *hypostasis*, as the teaching of two persons or two *hypostases*.

The dissolution of the synonymous use of *hypostasis* and *physis* — already presaged in the Constantinopolitan tradition (Proclus of Constantinople<sup>463</sup>) — did not bring the hoped for peace at Chalcedon, but division. Old-Alexandrian-Cyrrillian and Chalcedonian formulas were opposed in an irreconcilable manner.

Apart from the Imperial Church's attempt at reconciliation, as expressed in the *Henoticon* of Emperor Zeno,<sup>464</sup> individual theologians

*donismus* (Bonn, 1962); S. Takayanagi, 'Neo-Chalcedonianism: Its Significance in the History of Christology', *Katorikku Kenkyu 'Catholic Studies'* 47 (1985), 99–143 (Japanese), xi–xiii (English summary).

460. Cf. J. Lebon, *Le monophysisme sévérien* (Louvain, 1909), 522, also 119–23, 155–63, 507. He posits two characteristics for this: a particular group of Chalcedonian theologians had recourse to Cyril of Alexandria to validate the Council; these theologians were to some extent the first scholastics, who built up a scientific teaching about the incarnation with the help of philosophy.

461. Cf. A. de Halleux, "'Hypostase" et "Personne" dans la formation du dogme trinitaire (ca 375–381)', *RHE* 79 (1984), 313–69, 625–70.

462. *JdChr* I<sup>3</sup>, 538–9.

463. See *JdChr* I<sup>3</sup>, 727–30.

464. On this see CCT II/1.

now made proposals aimed at mediation, which were situated on the level of linguistic formulas. On the basis of such observations J. Lebon spoke of 'neo-Chalcedonianism'.

Two opponents of Severus of Antioch, the monk of Majuma, namely the monk Nephalius, and the grammarian John of Caesarea, believed that they could restore unity by proposing a simultaneous usage of both the Alexandrian *mia-physis* formula and the Chalcedonian *dyo-physeis* formula — one to ward off Nestorianism, the other to exclude Eutychianism.<sup>465</sup>

When in his well-known article on Nephalius<sup>466</sup> J. Lebon's student C. Moeller took up this suggestion and expanded it, a misunderstanding arose; as neo-Chalcedonianism Moeller characterized a 'dialectical theology' which, he said, worked with two traditions and attempted to bring them together by means of a rational explanation.<sup>467</sup> Were one to follow these tracks laid down by Lebon and Moeller, however, one could include in fact under the term 'neo-Chalcedonianism' a fair share of the literature immediately preceding Chalcedon. For this reason the year 433, with the union between Cyril and the Antiochenes, had really anticipated the neo-Chalcedonian synthesis (*néo-chalcédonisme avant la lettre*).

Here M. Richard intervened, simply by means of a few pages.<sup>468</sup> He stressed rightly that Cyril from the very beginning belonged to the christology worked out at Chalcedon.<sup>469</sup> He established, however, a firm boundary: neo-Chalcedonianism is distinguished from strict Chalcedonianism by the fact that it uses both major christological formulas (*mia physis* and *dyo physeis*) 'as the essential condition of a correct presentation of faith'. This is the way in which C. Moeller, subsequent to M. Richard, formulated it.<sup>470</sup> In this way a useful definition was found.

In the course of this investigation we have sought witnesses of this neo-Chalcedonianism dialectic. In Constantinople<sup>471</sup> they formed only a small group, insofar as we look strictly at the antithesis of the two basic christological formulas: Nephalius (after 507), John the Grammarian from Caesarea, who could be refuted by Severus, however, only when the latter was in exile

465. See C. Moeller, 'Le chalcédonisme et le néo-chalcédonisme', in *Chalkedon I*<sup>5</sup>, 637–720, esp. 670–1 (Nephalius); 672–6 (John the Grammarian).

466. C. Moeller, 'Nephalius d'Alexandrie', *RHE* (1944/5), 73–140.

467. *Ibid.*, 117.

468. M. Richard, 'Le Néo-chalcédonisme', *MSR* 3 (1946), 156–61 = *Op. Min.* II, no. 56; further studies in A. Grillmeier, 'Der Neu-Chalkedonismus', in *idem*, *Mit ihm und in ihm* (Freiburg, Basel, Vienna, <sup>2</sup>1978), 371, n. 1 (b).

469. T. Šagi-Bunić and A. de Halleux have significantly deepened this knowledge: see *CCT I*.

470. C. Moeller, in *Chalkedon I*, 666f.

471. Here we also include Nephalius and John the Grammarian insofar as the altercation between them and Severus was certainly already in progress when the latter was residing in the Imperial City (508–511). Nephalius was the reason for this journey.

(519). It was above all the Scythian monks under their leader John Maxentius who saw to it that there was a longer-lasting and more vehement discussion about neo-Chalcedonianism in the Imperial City.<sup>472</sup> Later in the Palestinian region we shall encounter Theodore of Raithu. For this whole group the antithesis of one and two natures stood at the centre of their conception. That ecclesiastical orthodoxy could bother at all about the *mia-physis* formula resulted from its 'baptism' by Cyril of Alexandria.

C. Moeller also adduced Leontius of Jerusalem as a representative of the necessity of using both formulas to express right faith.<sup>473</sup> But here we have to differentiate. We have three texts in which Leontius does not demand the 'alternating usage', but only allows it after a 'consideration of goods' or after a discernment of spirits. For one should not parrot everything that the heretics say.

*First text: 'Discernment of spirits'*<sup>474</sup>

Not so, my pious ones, not so, but let us consider what matters (*ta diapheronta*) (cf. Rom 2,8; Phil 1,10), we who have exercised our senses in distinguishing good and evil. We test everything and retain the good (1 Thess 5,21).

Thus for the sake of truth — to the gallows with all who say with a heretical intention: 'one incarnate nature of the God-Logos'. But all who speak of a duality of the undivided, united natures in an impious understanding are also to be detested. In contrast, however, all who speak of the one incarnate nature of the God-Logos, but as of one other nature, namely that of the flesh to which the nature of the Logos is united according to the *hypostasis*, are to be accepted; and all who confess the duality of the inseparably united natures of Christ, not insofar as they are seen as *ousia*, but in relation to the *hypostasis* itself of the natures, that is, to prove the one person (*prosopon*) of both, by respectfully deeming each of the two confessions as the same.

*Second text: 'From two' and 'in two'*<sup>475</sup>

Because we proclaim in common that the Lord is *from* two natures and at the same time *in* two natures, we are prepared to curse the Synod, every being (*pasan physin*), even an angel himself who descended from heaven, if he did not want to confess the same (cf. Gal 1,8). Why do they not agree to confessing the same with us, by saying with us 'from two' together with the 'in two'? Why do they not condemn Severus and Dioscorus and their like-minded supporters? Because Flavian of blessed memory says in his confession of faith: 'the one nature of the God-Logos, nevertheless become flesh and a human being . . . from both', we too do not hesitate to confess that our one Lord Jesus Christ is from both, because the holy Synod [of Constantinople 448] also says this full of respect; why, after all this, should the Synod not agree?

472. See above, pp. 327–38; cf. S. Helmer, *Der Neuchalcedonismus* (Bonn, 1962), 117–27.

473. C. Moeller, 'Le chalcédonisme et le néo-chalcédonisme', in *Chalcedon I*<sup>5</sup>, 686: 'Il [Léonce de Jérusalem] admet les deux formules comme nécessaires à la foi.'

474. Leontius Jer., *CM, Testimonia SS.*: PG 86, 1812CD.

475. *Idem*, *CM*: PG 86, 1844BC.

*Third text: 'Necessity of hermeneutics'*

(After Leontius has reproached the false use of 'undivided' by the Nestorians and praised the corrected use by Cyril,<sup>476</sup> he examines the *mia-physis* formula in Cyril):

We can also interpret that other expression 'the one incarnate nature of the God-Logos' with Arius, as if the Son would have had no immutable nature; or with Apollinarius, as if the Logos himself had taken the place of the ensouled *nous* and animated the non-rational flesh; or with Eutyches, as if the Logos himself was changed into flesh.

Thus if we do not test carefully the thoughts of those confessing, we shall never understand correctly this or that expression. The Father [Cyril] says that one should not accept heretics, because they err against the [right] understanding of the union of the natures, even if their expressions sound good. For they call the natures undivided not according to the *hypostasis*, but according to the relationship.<sup>477</sup>

In none of the three important texts from the *CM* does Leontius of Jerusalem demand the alternating confession of the two antithetical formulas: 'one *hypostasis* in two natures' — 'the one incarnate nature of the God-Logos'. He simply establishes that in the Cyrillian one-nature formula and in the other christological expressions there is the possibility of a false and a correct understanding, a discovery which theologians of the sixth century elsewhere, for instance in Africa, make. The right interpretation is to be acknowledged; the false one is to be rejected. For this reason Cyril and Flavian of Constantinople are the two authorities.

Hence Leontius of Jerusalem cannot be reckoned among the neo-Chalcedonians in Richard's sense, who demand simultaneous speech in two different conceptual systems. At the most his juxtaposition of 'from two natures' and 'in two natures' approaches this demand. For this juxtaposition, however, he has recourse to Flavian's Synod of 448.<sup>478</sup>

Leontius of Jerusalem, however, is distinguished from the strict Chalcedonians of the type of Leontius of Byzantium<sup>479</sup> by the emphasis he places upon the union and by his teaching of divinization, and in this

476. *Idem*, *CM*: PG 86, 1853AB.

477. *Idem*, *CM*: PG 86, 1853BC.

478. In these texts we already have important elements which we shall encounter in Justinian's edict, *Keph.* 9, and in the Council of 553. We should interpret this as an indication that Leontius of Jerusalem was read (and lived?) in Constantinople and probably wrote from the context of the questions being asked there.

479. These are at a great distance from Cyril. Thus for instance Leontius of Byzantium, in stressing Christ's human will and freedom, stands in opposition to Cyril (above, pp. 222-6). Strict-Chalcedonians, like Hypatius, recognize Cyril as an authority only to a limited degree; cf. the noteworthy text, *ACO* IV, 2, p. 175,33-38: 'We accept [from Cyril] what is in agreement with his synodal letters [i.e. those ratified by Ephesus or Chalcedon]; what does not agree with these we do not condemn, but we also do not observe it as ecclesiastical law. As we said above, we consider as synodal letters those letters which were accepted and ratified by the holy Councils [Ephesus and Chalcedon], namely the one to Nestorius as well as the one to the Orientals.'

he comes close to Cyril. Nevertheless he lays the foundation for his christology on the basis of the Cappadocian teaching about *idiomata*, not through recourse to Cyril.<sup>480</sup>

We now want to characterize as 'neo-Chalcedonians in the extreme or integral sense'<sup>481</sup> those theologians who demand for the correct presentation of faith in Jesus Christ, the incarnate Son of God, the simultaneous use of two systems of formulas: the *mia-physis* formula against Nestorianism, understood as the teaching of two *hypostases*; the two-natures formula against Eutyches, as representing a christology of mingling. They want to remain Chalcedonians, but overlook the incompatibility of the two conceptual systems. 'Moderate neo-Chalcedonianism' we shall call that christological position which remains on the basis of Chalcedon (with the distinction of *physis* and *hypostasis* and the formula of the one *hypostasis* in two natures), but seeks to *supplement* the language of Chalcedon by the additional incorporation of Cyrillian terms and formulas, especially from the twelve anathemas, without demanding, however, the simultaneous use of the *mia-physis* formula or allowing it (this occurring, at the most, under definite conditions).

With respect to his theology of union and his tendency towards divinization Leontius of Jerusalem can be reckoned among the moderate neo-Chalcedonians, insofar as some of his theological emphases indicate a convergence towards Cyril which goes beyond the Cyrillianism of Chalcedon.

### (c) *Neo-Chalcedonian terminology?*

(i) The decree of 551 does not demand the simultaneous use of the *mia-physis* formula and the two-natures language, and thus is not an instance of extreme neo-Chalcedonianism. For *Keph.* 9 cannot be interpreted in this sense.<sup>482</sup> The Emperor indeed admits that the *mia-physis* formula can be correctly understood, namely in the sense of the twofold consubstantiality of the one Christ with the Father according to the divinity, and with us according to the humanity; but according to Justinian there is also a fundamentally false understanding of this formula in the sense

480. Leontius of Jerusalem differs from him in important points. Leontius of Jerusalem makes a clear distinction between a nature union and a hypostatic union (above, p. 276). For him *synthesis* is the central point, not *henosis* (above, pp. 294-5). Instead of Cyril's hegemony of the Logos, Leontius of Jerusalem clearly recognizes the endowment of Christ's humanity with grace by the Spirit (above, pp. 300-4).

481. Instead of 'neo-Chalcedonianism' one could also speak of 'neo-Cyrillianism'.

482. Schwartz, 92; PG 86, 1015D.

of Apollinarius and Eutyches, which is anathematized. From this viewpoint Justinian cannot bring himself to allow the *mia-physis* formula the function of a necessary corrective to the Chalcedonian formula.

(ii) Nevertheless we can discover in the decree of 551 traces of a moderate neo-Chalcedonianism, in the sense of supplementing the strict-Chalcedonian terminology with elements of the language determined by Cyril's twelve anathemas.

(1) 'Distinguishing according to the *theoria*' (Keph. 8)

If anyone confesses number [=duality] of the natures in our one Lord Jesus Christ, that is, in the incarnate Logos, and thereby takes their [the natures'] distinction (*diaphora*), from which he is composed, as not only according to the *theoria*, in which it [the distinction] is not annulled on account of the union, but uses the number for division (*dihairesis*), let him be anathema.

'Distinction according to vision or *theoria*' is a typically Cyrillian point of view,<sup>483</sup> with which the Alexandrian attempts to reconcile the 'unmingled' with the 'undivided' of the two natures. He contrasts a difference of God and the human being in Christ, which *secundum rationem* always remains, with the real being one of both in the one Christ. The presence of a simple distinction according to 'vision' guarantees as well the 'unmingled' of both natures, and also their real 'undivided'. The introduction of this concept of *theoria* thus signifies no change to the Chalcedonian two-natures teaching, but only an intensified protection against its misinterpretation.

(2) 'From two natures' — 'in two natures'. This synthesis, rejected at Chalcedon, as everybody knows, is now undisputed (Schwartz, 74,14-16 with 16-17; PG 86, 997A). Justinian has no dread of Chalcedon's two natures nor of the number 'two' (see below).

(3) 'The one composite Christ.'<sup>484</sup> After the appearance of the Scythian monks in Constantinople the word 'composition' (*synthesis*, *synthetos*; *compositio*, *compositus*) played an increasing rôle. Now it becomes the key word in Justinian's christology.

'From two natures, that is, from divinity and humanity, one composite Christ' (Schwartz, 74,14-16). 'Because we speak of composition, we must also confess both that there are parts in the whole and that the whole is known in its parts' (Schwartz, 74,20-21; PG 86, 997A); 'Division or separation we do not introduce into his one *hypostasis* (Latin: *uni eius subsistentiae*); we indicate, however, the distinction of the natures from which he is composed . . . because each of the two natures is in him' (Schwartz, 74,18-20; PG 86, 997A); whoever refuses to speak of the number of the natures in Christ attempts to introduce mingling (Schwartz, 86,11-13; PG 86, 1009B).

483. Cf. Cyril Alex., *Ep. 46 ad Succens.* II: PG 77, 245A.

484. See also below (5).

Such language would have been an abomination for Severus.

(4) 'Union according to the *hypostasis*.' 'Each of the two natures remains in the definition and reason of its own nature; for the union happened according to the *hypostasis*' (Schwartz, 74,22-24; PG 86, 997AB). This 'hypostatic union' is justified on the basis of Philippians 2,6-7 (Schwartz, 74,29-30; PG 86, 997B). What does union according to the *hypostasis* mean?

It says 'that the God-Logos, that is, the one *hypostasis* from the three *hypostases* of the godhead in [this] its own *hypostasis* . . . created (*edēmiourgēsen*) for himself from her [i.e. from Mary] a flesh animated with a spiritual and rational soul, which is [his] human nature' (Schwartz, 74,24-27; PG 86, 997B).

A little later Justinian repeats this statement almost verbatim, expanding it, however, with an interesting explanation: 'which means that the God-Logos is united to the human *nature* and not to the *hypostasis* or *person* of another' (Schwartz, 86,30-33; PG 86, 1009D-1011A).

To some extent the two texts reveal to us how Justinian envisages the 'hypostatic union', not in a conceptual, ontological analysis, but as a concrete happening: the union coincides with the act of creating Christ's human nature. Other Fathers already saw it this way.<sup>485</sup> But two things should be noted. (i) Justinian says *plasmavit sibi (edēmiourgēsen heautoi)*, that is, the divine *hypostasis* creates this spiritually ensouled human nature for himself, for the purpose of being *hypostasis* for it and to exist humanly in it as divine *hypostasis*. Fundamentally this is a good concrete explanation of the insubsistence or *enhypostasis* of Christ's human nature in the hypostatic Logos.<sup>486</sup> (ii) The Emperor does not think of considering *formally* the *ratio* of the *hypostasis* or subsistence in order to determine the 'hypostatic union'. He remains on the level of existence.

(5) *Unus de sancta Trinitate* (Schwartz, 72,33; PG 86, 995C). This formula is *not* Cyrillian, but a pre-Chalcedonian element (Proclus) and belongs to the Emperor's linguistic repertoire from the time of his first theological action. For him it is the expression of the unity of Christ in the real divine subject, the person of the Word. The 'incarnate Word' is the bearer of suffering (Schwartz, 74).

After the incarnation he is also one of the Trinity, the only-begotten Son of God, our Lord Jesus Christ, *composed* from *both* natures. We confess Christ as composite, however, in the tradition of the teaching of the holy Fathers. (Schwartz, 76,29-32; PG 86, 999BC)

485. Cf. the passages in *JdChr* I<sup>3</sup>, 771-2, n. 6.

486. Cf. the highlighting of this text in P. T. R. Gray, *The Defense of Chalcedon in the East* (451-553) (Leiden, 1979), 157.



(d) *Evaluation*

*Vis-à-vis* the historical text of the definition of 451 some innovations can be established which do not change Justinian's fundamental Chalcedonianism, but rather on the whole refine a further interpretation already introduced.

(i) First of all the term 'one *hypostasis*' is no longer applied, as at Chalcedon, to the outcome, the end-result (*apotelesma*; cf. Leontius of Byzantium), but to the pre-existent Logos, for whom alone it is correct.

(ii) The assumed human nature participates in a *hypostasis* only by inexisting in the *hypostasis* of the Logos.

(iii) This happens by means of a creative action of the Logos, centred on the Logos, who creatively makes (*demiourgein*) for himself permanently the human being, for it remains inseparably 'his nature'.

(iv) Justinian terms the unifying action as *henosis*, but most often as *synthesis*. The two expressions are fundamentally of equal value; however, *synthesis* appears to have the advantage of excluding a *synchysis*, a mingling. We should note too that Justinian uses the formula 'the one composite *hypostasis* of the Logos', but he does not allow the other, 'the one composite nature' (*mia physis synthetos*).<sup>487</sup>

If some say, however, that one must speak of Christ as of a composite *hypostasis* then also of a composite nature (*mia physis synthetos*), then we shall show that this is foreign to piety.<sup>488</sup>

For in this formula *physis* would be employed absolutely, without the addition of *idiomata*, so that *physis* is purely conceptual, indeterminate and thus 'anhypostatic'. There can be no synthesis at all with such an absolute. The union or synthesis certainly occurs between the Logos-subject and a concrete *physis*. Through its creation for the Logos-subject the *physis* receives, however, its *hypostasis*, its *subsistentia*, its *personalitas* in the Logos himself; in him too the beginning of its existence is based.<sup>489</sup>

(v) Finally Justinian's formula of incarnation immediately before the Council of 553 has several variations.

(1) 'We speak of the union of two natures and of the one *hypostasis*' (Schwartz, p. 86,30; PG 86, 1009D).

(2) 'The Logos of God is also as one become flesh, one *hypostasis*, recognized, however,

487. Schwartz, pp. 86,36-88,1; PG 86, 1011A.

488. Schwartz, p. 86,21-23; PG 86, 1009CD.

489. Schwartz, p. 88,10-12; PG 86, 1011B.

in each of the two natures, namely in the divine [nature], in which he exists [according to Phil 2,6], and in the human [according to Phil 2,7]' (Schwartz, p. 86,33-36; PG 86, 1011A).

### (3) The result is:

'Before the incarnation there were not two natures of the Lord, nor after the incarnation was there one from the two,<sup>490</sup> even if they are recognized as in one *hypostasis*' (Schwartz, p. 88,24-26; PG 86, 1011D).

In the decree of 551 Justinian thus certainly handed on the Constantinopolitan christology of his time not merely as a 'dilettante', but with a commendable understanding of the problems of incarnational theology. We find no flirting with the Severan or Theodosian *mia-physis* teaching. There can also be no talk of a pronounced neo-Chalcedonianism, for example in the sense of John the Grammarian. Although *hypostasis* (*prosoyon*) is clearly contrasted to *physis* and *ousia*, there is still no attempt to gain a definition of *hypostasis* which goes beyond the 'individualized' *physis* or *ousia*. Sadly we miss the endeavour to judge the Antiochene/anti-Apollinarian christology of the fourth and fifth centuries fairly, even though the Emperor clearly saw through the falseness of the Apollinarian teaching.

In Justinian we find for the first time the sketch of a complete interpretation of Christ's person and its union of divine and human nature in the one divine *hypostasis* of the Logos. This sketch reproduces fundamentally the Chalcedonian formula of the one *hypostasis* in two natures, but for its stronger interpretation in the sense of *henosis* it draws upon a series of Cyrillian elements. From time to time it is evident that in important points Leontius of Jerusalem can be considered as a model for this.

With this consideration we have already anticipated the synthesis of the Fifth Ecumenical Council.

### III. THE FIFTH ECUMENICAL COUNCIL OF CONSTANTINOPLE (553) AND ITS CHRISTOLOGICAL STATEMENT

The Second Council of Constantinople took place in eight *actiones* from 5 May to 2 June 553. It was summoned by Justinian himself. The Emperor did not participate in it *in persona*, just as Pope Vigilius did not either, but he had a decisive influence on the discussions and the decisions about the Three Chapters.<sup>491</sup> The framework within which

490. This is equivalent to a rejection of 'one nature from two natures'.

491. Cf. J. Straub, *Praefatio* to ACO IV, 1, XXXII-XXXIV.

the Synod, which was composed principally of bishops from the East Roman Empire,<sup>492</sup> was intended to proceed was determined by the *forma* that the Emperor ordered to be read out before it began.<sup>493</sup>

### 1. The task of the Council according to Justinian

In this *forma* the Emperor unmistakably called to mind the Eusebian-Constantinian principle of unity as the basis of his *rei publicae gubernatio*.

We have made it the starting-point and foundation of our rule to unite the separated bishops of the holy Churches of God from the East to the West, and to end all conflict which was instigated against the holy Synod of Chalcedon by the supporters of the impious men, Eutyches and Nestorius.<sup>494</sup>

Chalcedon's agreement with the three previous synods is the foundation of the Emperor's understanding of a council. Clearly the dread of Nestorianism stands as a leitmotiv in the foreground. According to Justinian, however, it is now the new tactic of the opponents of the Council not to revive Nestorianism directly, but to smuggle it into the Church by a detour through Theodore of Mopsuestia, the teacher of Nestorius, as well as through Theodoret's writings against Ephesus and Cyril, and finally through the letter allegedly written by Ibas to the Persian Mari.<sup>495</sup> True (Chalcedonian) faith can only be defended by excluding

492. See E. Chrysos, *Die Bischofslisten des V. Ökumenischen Konzils (553) = Antiquitas*, R. 1, Vol. 14 (Bonn, 1966). The total number of participating bishops was 168: *op. cit.*, 44–51; the dogmatic canons of the Council were subscribed by 166 bishops. All (Eastern) patriarchs presided in common, with the newly nominated Patriarch of Jerusalem, Eustochius, being represented by three bishops (ACO IV, 1, 221, nos. 4–6). From imperial Egypt only ten bishops participated under the Chalcedonian Patriarch Apollinarius. Pope Vigilius did not belong to the Council and was considered at least by the Emperor as a defendant. Cf. E. Chrysos, *op. cit.*, 53; ACO IV, 1, pp. 200,38–201,2 (= *actio* VII, no. 14; the Pope did not receive a title). There were 94 (?) participants from the Patriarchate of Constantinople (Chrysos, *op. cit.*, 80–109), 41 from Antioch (*ibid.*, 113–25), and five from Jerusalem (or four according to L. Perrone, *La chiesa di Palestina* [Brescia, 1980], 218–19; ACO IV, 1, 3–4, nos. IV–VI, XX). There were as well the synodal members from East Illyricum: one from Dacia (but four were present in Constantinople), eight from Macedonia (Chrysos, *op. cit.*, 128–38). Finally the lists of bishops from 553 name nine bishops from Africa (as representatives of three of the six provinces). Because no bishop participated from the anti-Chalcedonian Churches which were in the process of becoming organized (Syria) or were already organized (Egypt), the plan to win over these Churches by condemning the Three Chapters had in essence already foundered.

493. See ACO IV, 1, 8–14 (CPG 6887).

494. *Ibid.*, no. 7, p. 10,13–17. Cf. F. Carcione, 'Vigilio nelle controversie cristologiche del suo tempo', *StRiOrCr* 10 (1987), 37–51. The Emperor stresses his rôle as the custodian of orthodoxy, cf. *ibid.*, 49–50.

495. ACO IV, 1, no. 8, pp. 10,24–11,3.

these 'impious Three Chapters' (*impia tria capitula*). Pope Vigilius too 'not only once or twice, but often anathematized these impious Three Chapters, both in writing and orally'.<sup>496</sup> On 7 January 553 Vigilius tied his own hands by agreeing in reply to a letter of Patriarch Eutychius (CPG 9355[2]) to an ecumenical council held under his presidency, with all his rights being preserved.<sup>497</sup> Finally, however, because his conditions were not fulfilled, he refused to participate in the Council which the Emperor ordered to be opened on 5 May 553 under the presidency of Patriarch Eutychius (in union with the other patriarchs or their representatives). In his *Constitutum* (I) of 14 May 553, inspired (and redacted) by the deacon Pelagius,<sup>498</sup> the Pope delivered his judgement on the Three Chapters. In this the Pope condemned in 60 chapters various errors which were taken anonymously from the works of Theodore of Mopsuestia (CPG 3858[b]). He explained his assent to Ephesus (I) and Chalcedon, his agreement with Proclus and Cyril and his rejection of Theodore's heretical teachings. The latter's name, however, should not be stated and no judgement should be passed on one who was dead.<sup>499</sup>

Then there followed anonymously five errors which are attributed to Theodoret.<sup>500</sup> If one wanted to condemn Nestorian errors under the name 'Theodoret', then Chalcedon itself would be affected. Finally Vigilius claimed that the letter of Ibas was orthodox and had been accepted by the Fathers of Chalcedon: *orthodoxa est Ibae episcopi a patribus pronuntiata dictatio*.<sup>501</sup> The efforts of the Pope were in vain. When he

496. *Ibid.*, no. 10, p. 11, 11–15. Justinian then adduces parts of the so-called *iudicatum* of Pope Vigilius of 11 April 548 (CPL 1694 [9337]) with this threefold condemnation. On the text see CA, *ep.* 83, nos. 299–302, pp. 315–17; ACO IV, 1, pp. 11, 21–12, 6.

497. *Ep. Vigili ppa ad Eutychium* (CPG 9355 [3]): ACO IV, 1, 16–18; 236–8 (Greek). The conditions which Vigilius set were the following: participation of the Latins and the holding of the synod in Sicily or Italy, which the Emperor did not accept.

498. *Vigilii Constitutum* (I) (CPL 1694): CA, *ep.* 83, 230–320; JW 935. See ACO IV, 1, XXIX on the three texts of Vigilius which belong together: *Constitutum* I; *Ep. II ad Eutychium* (8 December 553): ACO IV, 1, 245–7; the so-called *Constitutum* II of 23 February 554: ACO IV, 2, 138–68.

499. Cf. CA, *ep.* 83: CSEL 35/1, 237–93.

500. Cf. *ibid.*, 293–6.

501. Cf. *ibid.*, nos. 236–79, pp. 296–309; for the cited sentence see p. 305, 26–27. With the assertion that Ibas' letter had been accepted as orthodox by the Fathers of Chalcedon, Vigilius erred with the whole of the Western Church. Cf. ACO II, 1, 3, 32–4; R. Haacke, in *Chalcedon* II, 165, n. 90; E. Zettl, *Die Bestätigung des V. Ökumenischen Konzils durch Papst Vigilius* (Bonn; 1974), 12–13. Cf. CPG 6500–1 on the letter of Ibas; G. G. Blum, *Rabbula von Edessa . . .*, CSCO 300 (Louvain, 1969), 196–203.

tried to present his *Constitutum* to the Emperor on 25 May 553, the latter did not accept it.<sup>502</sup>

In the Church of the East before 553 these three persons named were judged critically, but without the demand that they or their writings be anathematized, as Leontius of Byzantium showed us.<sup>503</sup> According to his *Constitutum* I the Pope, together with the Western bishops, defended the Three Chapters, in contrast to his *iudicatum* of 11 April 548, in which he had condemned them.<sup>504</sup> For the Fathers of the Council of 553 Pope Vigilius had excluded himself from the ecclesial community, because he had confessed the heresies of Nestorius and Theodore of Mopsuestia. His name should be struck from the diptychs.<sup>505</sup> With reference to the earlier contrary statements of the Pope, in *actio* VIII of the Council on 2 June 553, the bishops then condemned the Three Chapters.<sup>506</sup> Pope Vigilius and the Council thus stood in open opposition which signified an extremely severe crisis for the relationship of East and West and simply for the Imperial Church. Was this the last word of the Pope to the Council and on the question of the Three Chapters?

Until recently there was uncertainty about whether Vigilius finally ratified the Fifth Council or not. We are concerned in particular with two documents: (1) the letter *Scandala*, that is, *Epistula* II of Pope Vigilius to Eutychius of 8 December 553, and (2) the letter *Aetius* of 23 February 554, or the so-called *Constitutum* II.<sup>507</sup>

502. It is for this reason, it seems, that his text was never published. Cf. E. Zettl, *op. cit.*, 13.

503. Cf. Leontius Byz., *DTN*; on this see *JdChr* II/1, 66–7; there is talk, however, of Theodore's 'blasphemies' (cf. PG 86, 1384B). The Chalcedonians in the East and West were disinclined to anathematize the three names, especially because the first to do this, and with increasing ferocity after 532, were the anti-Chalcedonians in *praeiudicium synodi Chalcedonensis*, as Facundus of Hermiane said: *Pro def. tr. cap.* IV, IV, 23: CCL 90A, p. 127, 172.

504. On the motives for this change see E. Zettl, *op. cit.*, 13: 'There remains hardly any other solution than to accept that Vigilius now reached the convictions of the Latins that the condemnation was not possible without prejudice to the Council of Chalcedon.'

505. *Conc. Const. II, actio VII* (from 26 May 553): ACO IV, 1, 201–2 (CPG 6888). In this Justinian describes the Pope's individual stages and establishes: *praeterea ipse semetipsum alienum catholicae ecclesiae fecit defendens praedictorum capitulorum impietatem, separans autem semet a vestra communione. his igitur ab eo factis alienum christianis iudicavimus nomen ipsius sacris diptychis non recitari, ne eo modo inveniamur Nestorii et Theodori impietati communicantes* (p. 202, 5–9). Nevertheless Justinian does not want to know anything about abandoning unity with the Holy See as such, initiated either by himself or by the Council Fathers (202, 11–12). In practice he distinguishes between '*sedem*' and '*sedentem*'.

506. See the *Sententia Synodica*: ACO IV, 1, 208–15 (Latin); 239–40 (Greek).

507. The *Constitutum* II (CPG [9365]; CPL 1696) (ACO IV, 2, 138–68) was discovered by E. Baluze in *Cod. Paris. Lat.* 1682; cf. E. Zettl, *op. cit.*, 17–19. The introduction and the signature at the end are missing. The letter *Scandala* (CPG [9364]; CPL 1694) (ACO IV, 1, 245–247) is now attested to by three MSS: *Cod. paris. gr.* 1115, fol. 36v–38v; Arundel 529, fol. 87r–91r and Athous Ivron 381, fol. 314r–316r; cf. J. Straub, *Praefatio*, ACO IV, 1, XXV.

Doubts about the authenticity<sup>508</sup> of the so-called *Constitutum II* (*Aetius*) persisted undeservedly for a long time. *De facto* they were dismissed in the dissertation of E. Zettl CSSR, *Die Bestätigung des V. Ökumenischen Konzils durch Papst Vigilius. Untersuchungen über die Echtheit der Briefe Scandala und Aetius* (JK. 936,937), which was written in 1929 under the supervision of C. Silva-Tarouca, but was not published. The author was successful in proving clearly that the two letters of Vigilius are authentic. This important study was first given a correct evaluation by J. Straub in the course of the edition of the *acta* of the Fifth Ecumenical Council.<sup>509</sup> The relationship between Pope Vigilius and the Fifth Ecumenical Council is now explained and clearly presented by J. Straub in the *praefatio* to ACO IV, 1, XXIX-XXXII.

Particularly important is proof of the agreement between the letters *Scandala* and *Aetius* (*Constitutum II*) on the one hand, and of both with the *acta* of the Council on the other.

On 2 June the Council had ended with the definition of the *sententia synodica* and the canons (*anathemata*); the letter [*Scandala*] was subsequently added to the *acta*, which were concluded with the subscriptions. The Pope, who himself stayed away from the Council, was not included among the signatories; rather he made known his assent to the condemnation of the Three Chapters in the form of an *epistula decretalis*, a *constitutum*. Not once did he refer to the decision of the Council, but took over verbatim nonetheless the formulations of the *sententia synodica* which appeared to him decisive, and especially Canons XII and XIII, in order in this way to proclaim his agreement with the Council, while preserving the 'Petrine doctrine'.<sup>510</sup>

In each of the three MSS in which the letter *Scandala* is transmitted it is remarked that this letter of 8 December 553 was addressed to Eutychius and to the Council.<sup>511</sup> Thus in an official writing,<sup>512</sup> that is, with full papal authority, Vigilius condemned the Three Chapters. Justinian had attained his goal, but between himself and the Pope the primacy of papal (teaching) authority remained unclarified.<sup>513</sup>

508. It was decidedly denied (together with the authenticity of *Scandala*) by C. Silva-Tarouca, *Fontes Historiae Ecclesiasticae medii aevi in usum scholarum* I (Rome, 1930), 52, with n. 2; furthermore it was called into doubt by E. Amann, art. 'Trois-Chapitres', in *DTC* 15 (1950), 1868-1924, esp. 1923; by C. Moeller, in *Chalcedon* I<sup>5</sup>, 687-90; *idem*, 'Le cinquième concile oecuménique et le magistère ordinaire au VI<sup>e</sup> siècle', *RSPT* 35 (1951), 413-23; I. Ortiz de Urbina, 'Quali sententia "Tria Capitula" a sede romana damnata sunt?', *OCP* 33 (1967), 184-209, still denied its authenticity.

509. Cf. J. Straub, 'Die Verurteilung der Drei Kapitel durch Vigilius (*Vigilii Epistula II ad Eutychium*)', *Kleronomia* 2 (1970), 347-75; *idem*, Foreword to E. Zettl, *op. cit.*, on its publication by the author himself in *Antiquitas*, R. 1, Vol. 20 (Bonn, 1974), V-IX.

510. J. Straub, *Praefatio*, ACO IV, 1, XXX.

511. *Ibid.*

512. Greek: διατυπώσει τοῦ παρόντος ἡμῶν γράμματος (ACO IV, 1, p. 247,28). Hence E. Caspar, *Geschichte des Papsttums* II (Tübingen, 1933), 282, speaks unjustly of a 'private retraction' (of the *Constitutum* of 14 May 553). Cf. also *Aetius* of 23 February 554: *praesentis nostri plenissimi constituti auctoritas* (ACO IV, 2, p. 168,12).

513. Cf. J. Straub, *Praefatio*, ACO IV, 1, XXXII, who also comments that it remains questionable whether *Constitutum II* (= *Aetius*) was appended subsequently to the *acta* of the Council.

## 2. The christological statement of the Council

### *Preliminary comment*

From the course of the Three Chapters dispute as a whole and of the Second Council of Constantinople in particular we have in fact a twofold question to answer: (1) What did the Council, with all of the documents pertaining to it, condemn?; (2) What positive statement did it contribute to the history of the Church's christology?

On the one hand the first question needs very complicated investigations, but on the other it can receive a relatively simple response. The Three Chapters dispute, like the earlier Arian-anti-Arian conflict in the fourth century, called for an almost incalculable documentation, in the concrete instance here innumerable extracts from the works of Theodore of Mopsuestia, Theodoret of Cyrus and Ibas of Edessa's letter to Mari, made by friend and foe of the Three Chapters. One will immediately recognize that, in spite of the important research work that has already been carried out, the critical examination and judgement of these documents still demands an extraordinarily great expenditure of time and energy. One point attracts attention in a special way: does the material produced by opponents and defenders offer a reliable basis to answer the question whether the Three Chapters were rightly or falsely condemned? The question is important, for it concerns the authority of an ecclesiastical assembly assumed to be ecumenical. In the first instance it concerns patristic scholars,<sup>514</sup> ecclesiastical historians and researchers

514. See the important research of M. Richard, 'La tradition des fragments du traité *Περὶ τῆς ἐνανθρωπήσεως* de Théodore de Mopsueste', *Mus* 56 (1943), 55-75 = *Op. Min.* II, no. 41. CPG and CPL now offer an excellent listing of the sources of the textual material cited and discussed in the whole dispute about the Three Chapters, and for the Three Chapters under the names:

I. CPG: (1) Theodore of Mopsuestia: CPG 3827-73. We should note in no. 3856 *De Incarnatione* that one must distinguish between a *traditio genuina* and a *traditio alterata*, which already indicates the whole problem. Does this distinction stand the test? In a work discovered posthumously on the fragments of Theodore in Lagarde, the well-known Orientalist R. Köbert (d. 1987) made critical comments on the Syriac texts in Lagarde, pp. 104,27-105,24 and Sachau, pp. 70,2-71,9 and their mutual relationship. It is still not published, but it is being prepared for publication by L. Abramowski.

(2) Theodoret of Cyrus: CPG 6200-78, esp. no. 6214 (*Impugnatio XII anathematismorum Cyrilli*) with reference to ACO IV, 3, 1; no. 6215 (*Libri V c. Cyrill. et concil. Ephes. [Pentalogus]*); no. 6216 (*De theol. s. trin. et de oeconomia*); no. 6220 (*Pro Diodoro et Theodoro*); in addition nos. 6226-30 (*Ex serm. Chal. c. Cyrill. habito*) and 6240, among many more.

(3) Ibas of Edessa: CPG 6500-1.

(4) To be added are:

(a) CPG 9332-66 (*Concilium Constantinop. II: 553*)

(b) R. Schieffer, *Index Generalis Tomorum I-III, Index prosopographicus, sub nom. Ibas*, ACO IV,

into the history of councils. The adequate working through of this question would completely transcend the framework of this study, above all of this volume. Consequently we must choose the simpler way and establish only the end-result of this condemnation: namely a renewed condemnation after 122 years (since Ephesus [431]) of Nestorianism and of its main theses: of the teaching of two *hypostases* or persons; of the denial of the *theotokos* title to Mary; of the teaching of two sons and of other teachings, this time only with the difference that with these teachings three particular names were incriminated. These were Theodore of Mopsuestia, not only with the condemnation of his works, but also of his person *post mortem*; Theodoret of Cyrus, on account of his special individual works; and Ibas of Edessa or an anonymous letter with Nestorian teachings 'allegedly' circulating under his name. On account of the last two names the Council of Chalcedon was also drawn into the dispute. It was finally a question of whether the Council could be completely cleared of the suspicion of encouraging Nestorianism, which now called for positively defined terminology in the *sententia synodica* and in the canons of the Fifth Ecumenical Council. In these the positive dogmatic outcome of the Council was expressed, and it is to this that we now wish to turn.

(a) *Analysis: Chalcedonian christology in the dogmatic interpretation of the Council of 553*

In the eighth *actio* of the Council on 2 June 553 the assembly was closed with the *Sententia Synodica* and the approbation of fourteen canons.<sup>515</sup>

(i) *The Sententia Synodica*

To our disappointment, in the twenty-eight paragraphs there was hardly one positive dogmatic explanation, as for instance the *horos* that Chalcedon offers; rather that 'Nestorianism' which was said to threaten

3, 2, 1, 227-9; Theodorus Mops.: *ibid.*, fasc. 2, 460-2; Theodoret: *ibid.*, 452-4.

II. CPL: 1694-7 (Vigilius); 1698-1703 (Pelagius I); 866-8 (Facundus of Hermiane).

III. Facundus, Bishop of Hermiane, *Pro defensione trium capitulorum* l. XII = CCL 90A (Turnhout, 1974), 1-398.

On Facundus of Hermiane see L. Abramowski, 'Reste von Theodorets Apologie für Diodor und Theodor bei Facundus', in *StudPat* 1 = TU 63 (Berlin, 1957), 61-9.

On Pelagius: *Pelagii Diaconi ecclesiae Romanae 'In Defensione trium capitulorum'*, ed. R. Devreesse = ST 57 (Vatican City, 1932); R. Devreesse, *Essai sur Théodore de Mopsueste* = ST 141 (Vatican City, 1948), 243-58; on this see L. Abramowski, 'Die Zitate in der Schrift "In Defensione Trium Capitulorum" des römischen Diakons Pelagius', *VigC* 10 (1956), 160-93.

515. See CPG 9362; *Sententia Synodica*: ACO IV, 1, pp. 208,1-215,7 (Latin); Greek (*ex parte*): *ibid.*, 239-40. On the canons see below.



to penetrate the Church secretly through the writings and teachings of the three bishops, Theodore of Mopsuestia, Theodoret of Cyrus and Ibas of Edessa, was warded off in a more negative manner. From a council of the early Church we should not expect any historico-critical investigation of suspect texts. No modern hermeneutic was applied to them. What was pondered were in particular the 'impious *capitula*' from Theodore's writings (nos. 8–10), which were read out; but also counter-writings from the Fathers against him and all heretics; in addition *historiae et leges imperiales illius impietatem ab initio divulgantes* (no. 11), that is, reports and imperial laws which bore witness to Theodore's 'impiety'.

Then the question was discussed whether anybody should be anathematized after death. The Council replied affirmatively to this question, referring to the scriptural passages (Jn 3,18; Gal 1,8–9; Tit 3,10–11; nos. 12–13) and Fathers like Cyril, Augustine, other bishops from Africa and Roman Popes (nos. 13–17). Positive judgements on Theodore by Cyril and Proclus, which his friends adduced, were of no avail,<sup>516</sup> that is, they did not exonerate him, but rather incriminated him. Forgeries and excerpts pieced together from Cyril could not save him either (no. 18).

It was only briefly that Theodoret was reproached with those writings which, in the opinion of the members of the Synod, he had written against right faith, against Cyril's twelve *capitula*, the Synod of Ephesus and in the defence of Theodore and Nestorius. They were read out and included in the *acta*, so that the legitimacy of their condemnation can be investigated (no. 19). The 'alleged' letter of Ibas — this fiction was maintained — was also read out, and its impiety was clear to all (no. 20). Chalcedon had not acknowledged this letter, as the supporters of Theodore and Nestorius claimed (nos. 21–23); rather it had based its definition on the letters of Cyril and Leo of Rome, for which reason the definition was also read out at the Synod (of 553). In this way its contrast to Theodore-Nestorius and to the letter of Ibas was patent (nos. 24–26). By way of recapitulation the confession of the first four synods as the foundation of the catholic Church was highlighted. Whoever did not confess this, like the 'Three Chapters' whose heretical teachings were once again listed to some extent in an even more detailed manner (no. 27), were subjected to the anathema. With the consciousness of having performed a thorough job,<sup>517</sup> the members of the Synod

516. ACO IV, 1, p. 212,17: *apparent enim patres non liberantes anathemate Theodorum.*

517. ACO IV, 1, p. 214,35: *his ita cum omni subtilitate dispositis.*

confessed that they had fulfilled their service to right faith in the spirit of the scriptures and the Fathers (no. 28).

Thus from the *Sententia Synodica* as such we can extract no positive contribution to the theological understanding of Christ's person.

(ii) *The christology of the canons of 553*

Appended to the *Sententia Synodica* were fourteen canons<sup>518</sup> or anathemas, which in part find their explanation from the edict *On right faith*. We shall present a word for word translation for the most important canons only.

Canon I:<sup>519</sup>

This contains a confession of the divine Trinity with the distinction of the concepts *physis-ousia* (*natura-substantia*; the Lateran Council [649] says here: *essentia*) on the one hand, and *hypostasis-prosopon* (*subsistentia-persona*) on the other. The Cyrillian-Severan synonymous use of *physis-hypostasis*, however, is consciously abandoned.<sup>520</sup>

Canon II:<sup>521</sup>

Two births are ascribed to the God-Logos: the eternal, incorporeal one and the birth according to the flesh from the virginal *theotokos* Mary.

Canon III:<sup>522</sup>

The God-Logos who works miracles and the Christ who suffered should not be separated as 'each and other' (*alius et alius; allos kai allos*); they are not distinguished as God-Logos (born of the Father) and as 'Christ' (born of the woman); not as one who dwells in another. Rather it is a question of one and the same Jesus Christ, our Lord, the Word, who became flesh and a human being. To him as one and the same belong the miracles and the sufferings voluntarily borne in the flesh.

518. ACO IV, 1, 215-20 (Latin); 240-5 (Greek). Cf. CPG 9362 and 9401 (7), according to which *secretarius* IV of the Lateran Council (649) offered another Latin version of the canons. See R. Riedinger, ACO ser. 2, Vol. I, 225-33 (beside the Greek version, 224-32). The fourteen canons of 553 are in part the literal repetition of the thirteen *capitula* of the imperial edict of 551. See the comparative table in J. Straub, ACO IV, 1, XXXII, who is inclined to accept the same author for the Latin rendition of the canons and of Justinian's *capitula* (in Schwartz, *Drei dogmatische Schriften Justinians* (Munich, 1939), pp. 91,16-95,32) (cf. the Greek text, pp. 90,16-94,34).

519. ACO IV, 1, p. 215,9-13 (Latin); p. 240,3-7 (Greek). Translations of the Greek are based on DEC, but with modifications.

520. Cf. Justinian emp., *Conf. fidei*; Schwartz, *op. cit.*, p. 86,23-26 and p. 87,24-27 respectively.

521. ACO IV, 1, p. 215,15-18 (Latin); p. 240,8-11 (Greek).

522. *Ibid.*, p. 215,20-24 (Latin); p. 240,12-16 (Greek).

Canon IV:<sup>523</sup>

Both for the rejected Antiochene christology and for the canonized Justinianic christology this canon is highly informative, and for this reason should be rendered verbatim.

If anyone declares that it was only in respect of grace, or of principle of action (*energeia, operatio*), or of dignity or in respect of equality of honour (*isotimia*), or in respect of authority (*authentia*), or of some relation, or of some affection (*schesis, affectus*) or power (*dynamis, virtus*) that there was a unity (*henosis, unitio*) made between the Word of God and the man; or if anyone alleges that it is in respect of good will (*kata eudokian*), as if God the Word was pleased with the man, because he was well and properly disposed (*kalos dokein; quod bene visum est ei de ipso*) to God, as Theodore claims in his madness; or if anyone says that this union is only a sort of synonymity (*homonymia*), as the Nestorians allege, who call the Word of God Jesus and Christ, and even designate the human separately by the names 'Christ' and 'Son', discussing quite obviously two different persons, and only pretending to speak of one person and one Christ when the reference is to his title, honour, dignity or adoration; finally if anyone does not accept the teaching of the holy Fathers that the union occurred of the Word of God with human flesh which is ensouled by a rational and intellectual soul, and that this union is by synthesis or by person, and that therefore there is only one (Latin: composite) person, namely the Lord Jesus Christ, one member of the holy Trinity: let him be anathema.

## Explanation:

## (a) The negative statement of Canon IV

In this *Kephalaion* (thus the edict) or canon the classical interpretation of Antiochene christology, which was developed in the Nestorian-Cyrrillian controversy, is repeated; according to this interpretation the unity of 'Christ' is understood as only accidental and not substantial. The union would then be effected either from above through an act of assuming the (already existing) human being Jesus in grace, or through a continuous directing or leading by God; it remains a unity based on behaviour, whether it be from above (God *vis-à-vis* Jesus) or from below in an affective and ethical *adhaesio* directed completely towards God, of the human being Jesus *vis-à-vis* the Logos. Despite the many citations of Theodore's works in opponents and defenders (Vigilius, *Constitutum* I of 14 May 553; Facundus of Hermiane [547-548] [250 citations] and Pelagius [553]),<sup>524</sup> at the most we may make historico-critical demands only in some details, but in no way for the whole, and we should also not expect any judgement on the Three Chapters which is illuminated by the historical situation.<sup>525</sup>

523. *Ibid.*, pp. 215,26-216,15 (Latin); pp. 240,17-241,15 (Greek).

524. CPG 3827-69 give an excellent overview of the evaluation of Theodore's writings in the context of the Council of 553; see also 3871 (inauthentic symbol).

525. On the question of authenticity see above n. 514.

## (b) The positive statement of Canon IV

Christ's unity as 'union of the Word of God with human flesh which is ensouled by a rational and intellectual soul' is understood as *secundum compositionem sive secundum subsistentiam facta*,<sup>526</sup> or as *unitio dei verbi ad carnem secundum compositionem . . . , quod est secundum subsistentiam*.<sup>527</sup> In the combining of both terms, of 'union, *unitio*, *henosis*' and 'composition, *compositio*, *synthesis*', the canon sees the guarantee of excluding both mingling and division. The Council thus appropriated completely Justinian's terminology from 551.<sup>528</sup> We should note that the formula *henosis kath'hypostasin* — in contrast to the usage in Cyril of Alexandria — is not interchangeable with the other formula *henosis kata physin*. It was precisely this latter formula that the moderate Antiochenes had taken umbrage to, because such a 'nature unity' would have expressed the necessity of the incarnation, although this was the free action of God's grace.<sup>529</sup> The synonymous use of *physis* and *hypostasis* in Cyril also caused among the Antiochenes the rejection of the *henosis kath'hypostasin*, even when the *henosis kata physin* was unacceptable to them. The distinction of *physis* and *hypostasis* in Justinian's edict with its consequences should have led the Fathers of 553 to a historical meditation on the time between 431 and 451 when these concepts were used synonymously.

Canon V:<sup>530</sup>

If anyone understands by the single subsistence of our Lord Jesus Christ that it covers the meaning of many subsistences, and by this argument tries to introduce into the mystery of Christ two subsistences or two persons, and having brought in two persons then talks of one person only in respect of dignity, honour or adoration, as both Theodore and Nestorius have written in their madness; if anyone falsely represents the holy synod of Chalcedon, making out that it accepted this heretical view by its terminology of 'one subsistence', and if he does not acknowledge that the Word of God is united with human flesh by subsistence (*secundum subsistentiam*), and that on account of this there is only one subsistence or one person, and that the holy synod of Chalcedon thus made a formal statement of belief in the single subsistence of our Lord Jesus Christ: let him be anathema. There has been no addition of person or subsistence to the holy Trinity even after one of its members, God the Word, becoming human flesh.

526. ACO IV, 1, p. 216,5–6; Greek: p. 241,6: κατὰ σύνθεσιν ἡγουν καθ'ὕπόστασιν γεγενῆσθαι.

527. *Ibid.*, p. 216,12–14.

528. Cf. E. Schwartz, *Drei dogm. Schriften* (Munich, 1939), pp. 86,21–88,3 and 88,15–26.

529. See the evidence in *JdChr* I<sup>3</sup>, 695–6. The distinction between the concepts *hypostasis* and *physis* in the decree of 551 (E. Schwartz, *op. cit.*, pp. 86,18–88,26; Latin: pp. 87,19–89,26) makes it impossible for Justinian to equate the formulas: *henosis kath'hypostasin* and *henosis kata physin*, and in addition the expressions *hypostasis synthetos* and *physis synthetos*. The section indicated is very significant.

530. ACO IV, 1, p. 216,17–27; Greek: p. 241,16–26.

### Explanation:

An old reproach made by the Monophysites maintained that through the assumption of the one *hypostasis* in two natures a *tetras*, a quaternity, was introduced into the Trinity.<sup>531</sup> The like-sounding reproach which is expressed in Canon V does not target this notion, but rather the assumed teaching of two *hypostases* by the two Antiochenes named.<sup>532</sup> In any case the canon conceives the incarnation in a sense which can refute both reproaches, for the incarnation is conceived entirely from the one *hypostasis* of the Son, who is 'one of the Trinity'. The incarnation consists in the union (of the ensouled flesh) with this one subject *secundum subsistentiam*, so that it receives in it for the first time subsistence and existence.

### Canon VI:<sup>533</sup>

This canon needs no further analysis. It applied to Theodore what at Ephesus (431) had been said against Nestorius with regard to the *Theotokos* — in contrast to *Christotokos* — but referred to Chalcedon for the heretical nature of this conception.

### Canon VII:<sup>534</sup>

If anyone, when saying 'in two natures', does not confess a belief in our one Lord Jesus Christ, understood in both his divinity and his humanity, so as by this to signify a difference of natures of which an ineffable union has been made, without confusion, in which neither the nature of the Word was changed into the nature of human flesh, nor was the nature of human flesh changed into that of the Word (each remained what it was by nature, even after the union, as this has been made in respect of subsistence); and if anyone understands the two natures in the mystery of Christ in the sense of a division into parts, or if he expresses his belief in the plural natures in the same Lord Jesus Christ, God the Word made flesh, but does not consider the difference of those natures, of which he is composed, to be only in the onlooker's mind, a difference which is not compromised by the union (for he is one from both and the two exist through the one [*di'henos*]) but uses the number to suggest that the natures are separated and have a subsistence of their own: let him be anathema.

### Explanation:

Through this canon the Council wants to maintain the confession of the

531. And precisely because the one *physis* of the God $\gamma$ Logos is said to be now united with a second *physis* and the *trias* to be changed into a *tetras*.

532. For according to the assumption of the Fathers of 553 Theodore and Nestorius taught that Christ's human nature was also a *hypostasis* in its own right. Thus to the three divine *hypostases* would be added as a fourth the human being Jesus.

533. ACO IV, 1, pp. 216,29–217,5 (Latin); p. 241,27–37 (Greek). See E. Amann, art. 'Théodore de Mopsueste', in *DTC* 15 (1946), 262. *Theotokos* is mentioned in Theodore Mops., *De Incarn.* XV: PG 66, 991B.

534. ACO IV, 1, p. 217,7–16 (Latin); p. 242,1–11 (Greek). Canon VII corresponds to Keph. 7–8 of the decree of 551. See E. Schwartz, *Drei dogm. Schriften*, 93.

two natures in the sense of Chalcedon, but from the Cyrillian stock of ideas formulates the conditions for the application of the number two to the two natures, which is not used by Cyril and is detested by Severus. We must note this framework: 'Confession of the number [two] of the natures'. In the Second Letter to Succensus, in contrast, it is a question of defending the *mia-physis* formula against the attacks of those who confess two natures (cf. PG 77, 245A). To explain the relationship of the two natures which results in only one Christ, Cyril used the analogy of body and soul, and thus placed his explanation on the level of a *unio in natura et secundum naturam* (cf. PG 77, 245AB). Justinian's edict and Canon VII of 553 omitted this analogy, introducing in contrast the expression *synthesis*, which had the purpose, as we know, of stating both union and distinction. What really had to be warded off was the *synchysis*, mixing, as the annulment of the distinction which should not be deduced from the '*diaphora* which is there purely according to *theoria*' (ACO IV, 1, p. 242,8) on the one hand, and that in speaking of the number (two), which is permissible, no separation or teaching of two *hypostases* (*idihypostatos*) results on the other. One should affirm distinction, but deny separation.

#### Canon VIII:<sup>535</sup>

If anyone confesses a belief that a union has been made out of two natures, divinity and humanity, or speaks about the one nature of God the Word made flesh, but does not understand these things according to what the Fathers have taught, namely that from the divine and human natures a union was made according to subsistence, and that one Christ was formed, and from these expressions tries to introduce one nature or substance made of the deity and human flesh of Christ: let him be anathema.

In saying that it was in respect of subsistence that the only-begotten God the Word was united, we are not alleging that there was a confusion made of each of the natures into one another, but rather that each of the two remained what it was, and in this way we understand that the Word was united to human flesh. So there is only one Christ, God and man, the same being consubstantial with the Father in respect of his divinity, and also consubstantial with us in respect of our humanity. Both those who divide or split up the mystery of the divine dispensation of Christ and those who introduce into that mystery some confusion are equally rejected and anathematized by the church of God.

#### Explanation:

If the *mia-physis* formula is introduced here,<sup>536</sup> this is not meant to grant it equal rights with the fundamental Chalcedonian formula or to put it forward as the latter's necessary dialectical correction. It is probably

535. ACO IV, 1, p. 217,18-29 (Latin); p. 242,12-23 (Greek). This canon VIII corresponds to *Keph.* 9 of the decree of 551; cf. E. Schwartz, *op. cit.*, 93.

536. The acknowledgement of the 'from two natures', which was rejected at Chalcedon, longer creates any difficulties, because it goes together with the 'in two natures'.

with respect to Cyril and his followers that its orthodoxy is attested on one important condition, viz., that the duality of the natures remains inviolate.

#### Canon IX (Summary):<sup>537</sup>

The worshipping of Christ in two natures should not be interpreted as two separate acts of worship, with respect to the Logos on the one hand and with respect to the human being on the other. What, however, is the correct object of the one act of worship? It is not the one *physis* or essence (*ousia*) which would be attained by removing the flesh or by mixing divinity and humanity. Rather the one act of worship is directed to the incarnate God-Logos with his flesh. This is a formula acceptable to Chalcedonians and anti-Chalcedonians. It has to be understood in a manner contrary to that of Theodore.

#### Canon X:<sup>538</sup>

If anyone does not confess his belief that our Lord Jesus Christ, who was crucified in his human flesh, is truly God and the Lord of glory (1 Cor 2,8) and one of the members of the holy Trinity: let him be anathema.

#### Explanation:

'One of the members of the holy Trinity', a consistent theme in Justinian's christology, emerges here (together with *Keph.* 6 of the edict of 551) probably for the last time in one of his texts.

#### Canon XI:<sup>539</sup>

If anyone does not anathematize Arius, Eunomius, Macedonius, Apollinarius, Nestorius, Eutyches and Origen, as well as their heretical books, and also all other heretics who have already been condemned and anathematized by the holy, catholic and apostolic Church and by the four holy synods which have already been mentioned, and also all those who have thought or now think in the same way as the aforesaid heretics and who persisted (Latin: or persist) in their error even unto death: let him be anathema.

#### Explanation:

The phrase 'persisted in their error even unto death' probably intimates the imminent condemnation of a dead person, namely Theodore of Mopsuestia. Canon XI is a brief catalogue of heretics.<sup>540</sup>

537. ACO IV, 1, pp. 217,31–218,3 (Latin); p. 242,24–29 (Greek). Nothing corresponds to canon IX in the *capitula* of the edict of 551.

538. ACO IV, 1, p. 218,5–6 (Latin); p. 242,30–31 (Greek). To canon X there corresponds *Keph.* 6 of the decree of 551 (Schwartz, *op. cit.*, 93).

539. ACO IV, 1, p. 218,8–13 (Latin); p. 242, 32–37 (Greek). This is to be compared with *Keph.* 10 of the edict of 551, where the condemnation of Origen is missing.

540. Cf. *JdChr* II/1, 89–93; *CCT* II/1, 78–82.

(iii) *The condemnation of the Three Chapters in canons XII–XIV*

There now follows in three canons the anathema on the Three Chapters, on account of whom the whole dispute, the final result of which was the Council of 553, broke out. Because of the heresiological significance of these canons, we shall present substantially their unabridged text.

Canon XII:<sup>541</sup>

If anyone defends the heretical Theodore of Mopsuestia, who said that God the Word is one, while quite another (*allon . . . allon*) is Christ, who was troubled by the passions (*pathe*) of the soul and the desires of human flesh, was gradually separated from that which is inferior (*cheironon*),<sup>542</sup> and became better by his progress in good works, and could not be faulted in his way of life, and as a mere (*psilos*)<sup>543</sup> man was baptized in the name of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, and through this baptism received the grace of the Holy Spirit and came to deserve sonship and to be adored, in the way that one adores a statue of the emperor, as if he were God the Word, and that he became after his resurrection immutable in his thoughts and entirely without sin (*anhamarteton*). [In a long interpolation further false christological interpretations of Theodore are listed which we can summarize briefly: (1) comparison of the unity in Christ with the joining together of husband and wife in marriage in Eph 5,31; (2) the misinterpretation of the confession by Thomas the apostle in Jn 20,28: he is said to have confessed Christ not as God, but only to have extolled God on account of Christ's resurrection; (3) in his commentary on the *Acts of the Apostles* Theodore is claimed to have Plato, Manes, Epicurus and Marcion on a par with Christ as founders of schools or religions.] If anyone offers a defence for this more impious Theodore, and his impious books in which he throws up the aforesaid blasphemies and many other additional blasphemies against our great God and saviour Jesus Christ, and if anyone fails to anathematize him and his heretical books as well as all those who offer acceptance or defence to him, or who allege that his interpretation is correct, or who write on his behalf or on that of his heretical teachings, or who are or have been of the same way of thinking and persist until death in this error: let him be anathema.

Canon XIII:<sup>544</sup>

If anyone defends the impious writings of Theodoret which were composed against the true faith, against the first holy synod of Ephesus and against holy Cyril and his Twelve Chapters, and also defends what Theodoret wrote to support the impious Theodore and Nestorius and others who think in the same way as the aforesaid Theodore and Nestorius and accept them or their impiety; and if anyone, because of them, shall accuse of being impious the doctors of the Church who have stated their belief in the union according to subsistence of God the Word; and if anyone does not anathematize these impious books and those who have thought or now think in this way, and all those who have written against the true faith or against holy Cyril and his twelve chapters, and who persist in such impiety until they die: let him be anathema.

541. ACO IV, 1, pp. 218,15–219,11 (Latin); p. 243,1–30 (Greek); canon XII corresponds to *Keph.* 11 of the edict of 551; Schwartz, *op. cit.*, 92–4 (Greek); 93–5 (Latin).

542. This is an expansion of *Keph.* 11 of the edict.

543. This word is missing in *Keph.* 11 of the edict.

544. ACO IV, 1, p. 219,13–21 (Latin); pp. 243,31–244,6 (Greek); see *Keph.* 12 of the edict of 551; Schwartz, *op. cit.*, p. 94,14–24 (Greek); p. 95,13–23 (Latin).



Canon XIV.<sup>545</sup>

If anyone defends the letter which Ibas is said to have written to (Latin: the heretical) Mari the Persian, which denies that God the Word, who became incarnate of Mary the holy mother of God and ever virgin, became man, but alleges that he was only a man born from her, whom it describes as a temple, as if God the Word was one and the man someone quite different; which condemns holy Cyril as if he were a heretic, when he gives the true teaching of Christians, and accuses holy Cyril of writing opinions like those of the impious Apollinarius; which rebukes the first holy synod of Ephesus, alleging that it condemned Nestorius without going into the matter by a formal examination; which claims that the twelve chapters of holy Cyril are impious and opposed to the true faith; and which defends Theodore and Nestorius and their impious teachings and books.

If anyone defends the said letter and does not anathematize it and all those who offer a defence for it and allege that it or a part of it is correct, or if anyone defends those who have written or shall write in support of it or the impieties contained in it, or supports those who are bold enough to defend it or its impieties in the name of the holy fathers of the holy synod of Chalcedon, and persists in these until his death: let him be anathema.

(iv) *The conclusion of the Sententia Synodica*<sup>546</sup>

Such then are the (Latin: correct) assertions we confess. We have received them from holy Scripture, from the teachings of the holy fathers, and from the definitions about the one and the same faith made by the aforesaid four holy synods. Moreover, condemnation has been passed by us against the heretics and their impiety, and also against those who have justified or shall justify the so-called 'Three Chapters', and against those who have persisted or will persist in their own error. If anyone should attempt to hand on, or to teach by word or writing, anything contrary to what we have regulated, then if he is a bishop or somebody appointed to the clergy, in so far as he is acting contrary to what befits priests and the ecclesiastical status, let him be stripped of the rank of priest or cleric, and if he is a monk or lay person, let him be anathema.

(b) *Synthesis of the Council's christology*

The Second Council of Constantinople belonged to the subsequent history of the Council of Chalcedon, and the adjective 'subsequent' was so strongly stressed that it was only with difficulty that in large parts of the entire Church this Council succeeded in overcoming the barrier of the 'fourfold number' of councils.<sup>547</sup> The history of its reception was just as much interlaced with troubles as its prehistory and its course. It was felt to be a betrayal of Chalcedon. The balancing out of win and loss for this ecclesiastical assembly is not easy to accomplish. In this regard we shall make a distinction between the positive efforts to furnish

545. ACO IV, 1, pp. 219,23–220,5 (Latin); p. 244,7–21 (Greek); canon XIV corresponds to *Keph.* 13 of the decree of 551: Schwartz, *op. cit.*, p. 94,25–34 (Greek); p. 95,24–32 (Latin).

546. ACO IV, 1, p. 220,6–14 (Latin); p. 244,22–30 (Greek); abbreviated in the Fourth Lateran Council: Mansi X, 1060AB.

547. See the informative article by R. Schieffer, 'Das V. Ökumenische Konzil in kanonistischer Überlieferung', *ZSavSt K* 90 (1973), 1–34.

a new expression of Chalcedonian faith and the purely negative, condemnatory judgements on the Three Chapters. None of the previous councils used such caustic language with regard to opinions to be dismissed and the proponents of these. There was no attempt to give an objective assessment of them. Consequently, no account at all was taken of the positive significance of these theologians, in particular of Theodore of Mopsuestia.

(i) *The relationship of the Council to the definition of Chalcedon*

In the *horos* of Chalcedon one must distinguish between two levels of statement: the proclamation of the message of God's incarnation in Christ in the non-technical language of the confessions of the early Church (Nicaea, Constantinople, the Symbol of Union of 433), and in conceptually technical language.<sup>548</sup> As we have established, in the definition of 451 the latter was not intended to be in the foreground, but was squeezed into the *horos* by the back door, as it were. Nevertheless the agitation about the Fourth Council occurred precisely because of it: one *hypostasis* in two natures. Was Chalcedon then secretly a concession to the dreaded Nestorianism? We have seen what efforts had to be made at Constantinople to destroy this suspicion definitively. In a certain regard with relation to language and concepts this should have succeeded, but perhaps, and this is our question, only with the alteration or at least the continuation of Chalcedon.

(1) *The 'one hypostasis' in Chalcedonian understanding*

That the Council of 451 still did not furnish the technical expression 'one *hypostasis* or person' with a profound, speculative content should be regarded as the outcome of research. What did the Council understand by 'one *hypostasis*' or 'one *prosopon*'? The 'one Christ, the one *hypostasis* in two natures' is the end-product — Leontius of Byzantium had coined the expression *apotelesma* for this — of a process of union, in which 'one and the same', that is, the eternal, consubstantial Son of God assumed to his own complete divine being also a complete human nature so that he is both, although he is both before and after one and the same — God and human being. Chalcedon calls this 'end-product' of the process of union the 'one *hypostasis* or the one person' which, however, maintains both divine and human natures unmingled and undivided in their unity, these being manifested also in this one concrete

548. One is reminded of the distinction between *piscatorie* and *Aristotelice* in the *Codex Encyclius* of Emperor Leo I; cf. *JdChr* I<sup>3</sup>, 765–8; *CCT* II/1, 223 with n. 96.

subject; for it is discernible that Christ is at the same time God and human being. The concept *hypostasis* is thus not applied specifically and exclusively to the pre-existent Logos as subject, although for Chalcedon too the Logos is the ultimate subject. What we have just established holds for the technical use of the concept, even if this is still rather indeterminate. On the basis of the fundamental structure of its kerygmatic statement, Chalcedon, as we have said, allows one to see clearly where the one *hypostasis* in Christ is already realized: in the one who 'one and the same' is 'perfect in divinity, but one and the same is also perfect in humanity'. In brief, as we have ascertained, there then arose the custom of identifying the 'one *hypostasis*' in Christ with the *hypostasis* of the pre-existent Logos (Patriarch Gennadius, Diadochus of Photike). In this manner the way was opened for further reflections on what constituted the difference between the 'concept' of *hypostasis* and that of 'nature', and finally on what could lead to the elaboration of a definition of *hypostasis*.

## (2) *Competing languages*

The greatest impediment to a general and untroubled acceptance of this formula of Chalcedon by the entire Church lay in the old-Alexandrian-Cyrrillian *synonymous* use of *hypostasis* and *physis* for the *oikonomia*, that is, for the order of the incarnation, in contrast to the *theologia*, for which both terms had another content. It is for this reason that Chalcedon with its two-natures formula was suspected of Nestorianism by the old-Oriental tradition. The Council, however, had already taken a step forward by abandoning the synonymous use of the two concepts *hypostasis* (*prosopon*) and *physis* (*ousia*). There were now two opposed formulas: (1) 'the one incarnate nature (*physis-hypostasis*) of the God-Logos', and (2) 'the one *hypostasis* (or person) in two natures'. The subsequent history of Chalcedon to Justinian's time and even beyond that suffered from the competition between these two linguistic usages. The rift became increasingly deeper.

Where did Justinian and the Council of 553 stand with regard to this problem?

## (3) *Emperor Justinian*

As his edict of 551 shows, Justinian created clarity in two respects.

(I) Terminologically: the Emperor decided clearly for the identical usage of the concepts *physis* and *hypostasis* in both the *theologia* and the *oikonomia*. Both terms were now expressly distinguished. The decisive passage reads:

Thus after we have shown that it is impious to speak of one nature (*physis*) or essence (*ousia*; Latin: *substantia*) of the divinity and flesh of Christ, we shall also say this: it is not possible to speak of the one nature of Christ in a similar way to how we talk of the one subsistence (*hypostasis*) of the divinity and humanity of Christ, because nature (*physis*) and *hypostasis* are not the same.<sup>549</sup>

(II) From this explanation and from the conditions which the Emperor set for tolerating the use of the *mia-physis* formula, if the worst came to the worst, it follows that he himself was not a supporter of the demand for a simultaneous use of the two formulas discussed here. He decided unambiguously for Chalcedon.

(4) Constantinople II (553)

This was also the position of the canons of the Fifth Ecumenical Council.

(I) The members of the Synod did not use *hypostasis* and *physis*, or *subsistentia* and *natura*, synonymously (cf. Canon V).

(II) In Canon VII the Council, like Justinian, distinguished between a *unio secundum subsistentiam*, that is, a 'union according to the *hypostasis*', and a 'union according to the nature' which tended to annul the distinction of the natures (Canon VII, part one; above all Canon VIII). For the use of the formula 'from two natures' too the Council put forward the same demand, that this had to be understood in the sense of 'union according to the *hypostasis*'.

(III) Nowhere in the canons can be found the demand for a simultaneous use of the two formulas of incarnation, the Chalcedonian and the Cyrillian-Alexandrian. As in the decree of 551, *Keph. 9*, in Canon VIII the boundaries were demarcated within which the *mia-physis* formula had in fact to be understood.

(IV) Because of this purified use of formulas the Fifth Ecumenical Council was not a weakening of Chalcedonian terminology, but its logical continuation. With regard to the basic formula 'one *hypostasis* or person in two natures', the canons of 553 belonged to the history of strict Chalcedonianism, because they were not set in competition with the *mia-physis* formula. Nevertheless the use and application of the main concepts were clearer and more unambiguous than at Chalcedon. The one *hypostasis* or *subsistentia* as such was anchored in the pre-existent Logos; to him, as the ultimate subject, Christ's human nature was united *sub ratione subsistentiae*,<sup>550</sup> the assumption into this one *hypostasis* of the human nature which did not exist in itself was formally the event of

549. Justinian emp., *Conf. fidei* (CPG 6885): Schwartz, *Drei dogm. Schriften*, p. 86, 15–18.

550. Cf. canon V: ACO IV, 1, p. 216, 23: *dei verbum carni secundum subsistentiam unitum*.

the incarnation or, seen from above, the self-communication of this Logos hypostatically to the ensouled flesh, by the Logos creating this flesh for himself.

(ii) *The 'neo-Chalcedonianism' of 553*

In spite of the facts previously established, the Council of 553 has the reputation of representing what, since J. Lebon, is termed 'neo-Chalcedonianism', and because of this having created the christological system that is said to be still ours.<sup>551</sup> We must take into account here that the extreme neo-Chalcedonian synthesis in the sense of M. Richard was no longer attempted. The *mia-physis* formula was discussed briefly, but no longer integrated. However, the Cyrillian renaissance had not yet been nullified. The Council of 553 in fact had recourse to that Cyril who between 431 and 451 gained a hearing from the Fathers, but was not taken into the actual conciliar decisions. In this context two groups of writings have to be distinguished: (1) the twelve anathemas and (2) other 'anti-Nestorian works'.

(1) *Cyril's twelve anathemas in Constantinople II*<sup>552</sup>

The twelve *capitula*, appended to Cyril's third letter to Nestorius from the year 430, were read out at Ephesus (431) and at Chalcedon (451). From that time on they received as a whole ceremonial recognition from the Council.<sup>553</sup> Individual themes and formulations, however, were also extracted.

Individual formulations:

(i) Cf. A. 12 (DS 263) with Canon X (ACO IV, 1, 218; 242; DEC 118; \*118) in which the contentious so-called theopaschite formula, expanded only by the *unus ex trinitate*, is acknowledged by the Council. On this cf. Canon V, conclusion.

(ii) Cf. A. 2 (DS 253) with Canon V (ACO IV, 1, 216; 241; DEC 116; \*116): *henosis kath'hypostasin*. Through the adoption of this formula the agreement between Chalcedon and Ephesus was stressed. While Cyril, however, was able to replace *henosis kath'hypostasin* by the equivalent *henosis kata physin* (on account of the synonymous use of both words),<sup>554</sup> Constantinople (553) still said only *henosis kath'hypostasin*

551. Cf. C. Moeller, 'Le chalcédonisme et le néo-chalcédonisme', in *Chalcedon I*<sup>5</sup>, 648.

552. Cf. DS, nos. 252-63; DEC, 59-61, \*59-\*61.

553. See the *Sententia Synodica*, no. 19 (condemnation of the works of Theodoret against the twelve *capitula*): ACO IV, 1, 212-13, and no. 27 (summary): *ibid.*, 214.

554. Cf. An. 3: DS 254: *καθ'ένωσιν φυσικῇν*.

(and rejected a *henosis kata physin*).<sup>555</sup> This linguistic purification was just as much old-Chalcedonian as neo-Chalcedonian, for through it Cyril's language was compared with the Chalcedonian distinction of *hypostasis* and *physis* and was also brought into agreement with the conceptual explanation of the decree of 551.<sup>556</sup> Thus not only was the language of the anathemas clarified by reference to Chalcedon, but Chalcedon too was enriched by Cyril's *capitula*.

(iii) Cf. A. 8 (DS 259) with Canon IX (ACO IV, 1, 217–18; 242; DEC 118; \*118): the one worship of Christ, the incarnate Logos, which is demanded in both texts, should not be justified, however, according to Canon IX on the basis of 'one *physis* or one *ousia*'.

## (2) Other texts of Cyril and the canons of 553

The concepts *θεωπία*<sup>557</sup> and *ἐννοια* pertain to the most important notions which were adopted from Cyril to interpret Chalcedon's teaching of two natures.

### (i) 'Only in intellectual vision'

As we have seen (cf. the explanation of Canon VII), Justinian's edict (*Keph.* 8) and Canon VIII of 553 adopted these concepts, but with limitations which Cyril had not yet applied. According to Canon VII the use of the formula 'in two natures' was positively acknowledged as right confession (with the almost verbatim citation of the Chalcedonian text) (ACO IV, 1, p. 242,1–2; DEC 117; \*117). The 'only according to *theoria* or thought' was intended to exclude the *real* separation or *idihypostasis* of Christ's humanity.

As *Keph.* 9 of the edict (Schwartz, 92–3) and Canon VIII of the Council show, Justinian's purification of terminology, that is, the distinction of *hypostasis-prosopon vis-à-vis physis* and *ousia*, was essential for the application of this 'according to *theoria*'. If this distinction were not taken into account for Canons VII and VIII, then too much strain would be put on this 'purely according to vision'. The unmingled would be endangered. The command to take the 'duality' only 'according to *theoria*' was related above all to the *hypostasis* (ACO IV, 1, p. 242,17–19). The *henosis kath'hypostasin* no longer fell under the suspicion of *synchysis*, because *mia hypostasis* was placed in opposition to the *mia physis* and the *mia ousia* (*ibid.*, 15–16). Hence we should not relate the 'pure *theoria*' to a nature unity and in this way succumb to a false neo-Chalcedonian mysticism. It is only a new way of rejecting the teaching of two *hypostases*.

### (ii) Synthesis or compositio

The Christian mystery of the *oikonomia* as the union of God and human being, undivided and unmingled, demanded linguistically the expression 'composition' (*synthesis, compositio*). Even in pre-Chalcedonian christo-

555 Or more exactly: *henosis . . . kata synthesin* or *kath'hypostasin*. Cf. canon IV: ACO IV, 1, 241.

556. Justinian emp., *Conf. fidei* (CPG 6885): Schwartz, *op. cit.*, pp. 86,29–88,3 (Greek); pp. 87,30–89,3 (Latin). With this is to be compared canon VIII (ACO IV, 1, 217 and 242).

557. Cyril Alex., *Ep. 46 ad Succens.* II (CPG 5346): PG 77, 245A.

logy we find the beginning of the history of this group of words, consisting of verbs and gerundives with the noun *synthesis* at the centre. However, this group of words was extremely suspect and at first remained so even in the post-Chalcedonian period, until it was made presentable at court by Justinian and finally was given a conciliar blessing. We shall classify briefly the major variants of the applications of this group of words in the service of christology.

(A) A first christological use of *synthetos* is found in Origen:<sup>558</sup> the union of the believer with the Lord brings it about that the one so united (*synthetos*) becomes 'one spirit' with him (1 Cor 6,17): 'how much more divine and better will then be the one united to the Logos of God'. Origen means the divinizing union of Jesus' humanity (with body and soul) with the Logos

(B) *Synthesis* in the heretical Logos-sarx christology<sup>559</sup>

Provided the *acta* can lay claim to authenticity, this history begins as early as the Synod of Antioch against Paul of Samosata.<sup>560</sup> The Arian Eudoxius of Antioch (357-359; from 359 to 369 bishop of Constantinople) speaks of Christ, the human being without a soul, and says 'the whole is one nature after the composition' (Hahn, *Bibl. d. S.*, § 191).

Apollinarius of Laodicea: Christ is 'a *synthesis* of the human type' (*σύνθεσις ἀνθρωποειδής*), that is, what the body-soul unity is in the human being is in Christ the exclusive Logos-sarx unity. It is a question of a strict *synthesis* between two incomplete natures, so that a genuine 'nature unity' in Aristotle's sense comes into existence.<sup>561</sup>

(C) Cyrillian usage

Cyril Alex., *Ep. 46 ad Succens.* II (CPG 5346): PG 77, 241BC: 'Unity (*to hen*) is truly expressed not only of simple things according to nature, but also of things which are united according to composition (*ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ σύνθεσιν σύννημένων*).' He says this in relation to the *mia physis* in Christ and refers to the body-soul analogy.

558. Origen, *C. Celsum* II, 9: Koetschau, p. 137,3. On this see F. Loofs, 'Die "Ketzererei" Justinians', in *Harnack-Ehrung. Beiträge zur Kirchengeschichte* (Leipzig, 1921) (232-48), 239

559. Cf. *JdChr* I<sup>3</sup>, Greek index: *synthesis*, Latin: *compositio*.

560. According to M. Richard it is a matter of later Apollinarian forgeries. See *JdChr* I<sup>3</sup>, 296-9; F. Loofs considers them authentic: *art. cit.*, 239. In a thorough investigation M. Simonetti, 'Per rivalutazione di alcune testimonianze su Paolo di Samosata', *RSLR* 24 (1988), 177-210, now defends with H. de Riedmatten the authenticity of these fragments of this synod of 268. According to H. de Riedmatten, *Les actes du procès de Paul de Samosate = Parados* 6 (Fribourg, 1952), Malchion defends the *synthesis* in Christ against Paul of Samosata (*op. cit.*, 147, Frag. S, 22): Malchion asks: 'Le Verbe et son corps ne sont pas composés? Paul: Qu'à aucun prix il ne soit composé ni mélangé! Malchion: Si tu ne veux pas admettre la composition, c'est pour ne pas devoir dire que le Fils de Dieu a été substantifié (*οὐσιώσθαι*) dans son corps.' Cf. also Frag. S, 23 (*ibid.*): The Logos is substantially united with his human body, 'étant le même de par la composition et l'union substantielle à lui' (while Paul does not consider the Logos as *hypostasis* and does not accept any substantial unity between Logos and body, any *synthesis*). M. Simonetti (197) draws attention to the fact that in fragments 30 and 36 Malchion interprets Christ as a unity of Logos and *sarx* (without Christ's soul); if the fragments are authentic, as Simonetti accepts, Malchion is the first proponent of the strict Logos-sarx schema. The term *synthesis* here gains already the meaning which it would subsequently have in Apollinarius. See H. de Riedmatten, *op. cit.*, 154-5 (Frag. 30); 156-7 (Frag. 36). Simonetti (197-8) stresses, however, that in spite of the same Logos-sarx schema the terminology of the Apollinarians is different from that of Malchion.

561. See I. R. Torrance, *Christology after Chalcedon* (Norwich, 1988), 65 with further examples

Cyril knows that *synthesis* at the same time also expresses distinction: 'although in the concept of composition the difference of the things, which are brought together *according to nature*, is expressed at the same time' (241C). We must note that (1) the concept *synthesis* is rare in Cyril and (2) in the example adduced he remains in the domain of the *unio in natura et secundum naturam*, which remains the major handicap of the Cyrillian-Severan *mia-physis* teaching.

(D) Severus of Antioch

(1) Letter 25 to the Emesans: PO 12, 222–48: Severus describes the incarnation as a '*synthesis from two elements*', which in the Emmanuel are present unmingled (he speaks in this way to fend off monophysite misunderstandings among some Christians in Emesa).

(2) Against John the Grammarian he still rejects the expression 'one composite nature' (C. imp. Gr., Or. II, 10: CSCO 112, p. 81,23–26). He is also opposed to the equation by the Grammarian of 'two united natures' = 'one composite nature' (*mia physis synthetos*). In this he smells the Nestorian division.

(3) The most severe rebuff was suffered by Sergius Scholasticus for his infelicitous idea of the *ousia synthetos*, that is, the composite essence which is called 'Christ'. See *Ep. III ad Sever. Ant.*: CSCO 120, pp. 114,25–115,2 (the main text for *synthesis*).

(4) According to J. Lebon, finally, even if cautiously, Severus did use, however, the formula 'one composite nature and *hypostasis*' (*Le monophysisme sévérien*, 319).

(E) *Synthesis* in its use among the Chalcedonians

(1) Justinian and the Scythians

From the very beginning Justinian comes into contact with the idea of the 'christological *compositio*' through the Scythian monks<sup>562</sup> and their theological sources, to which the *acta* of the Synod of Antioch (268), and additionally Euthymius, belong. For the Scythians (John Maxentius) the main christological formula says: 'composition from two realities'. It is claimed that by this expression both Nestorius and Eutyches are excluded.

In Justinian we have the unhindered adoption of *compositio*, thus of the Latin terminology, but also of *synthesis* and the whole associated Greek semantic field. Does Justinian have other sources?

(2) Leontius of Jerusalem<sup>563</sup>

In the sixth century he is the strongest advocate for the christological application of *synthesis*.

Negatively: he rejects the expression 'composite nature' (PG 86, 1485D3–4) as much as that of the 'composite *hypostasis*'.

Positively: his formula states that 'the natures are composed according to the *hypostasis*' (1485D).

His presupposition is the explicit distinction of the concepts *physis* and *hypostasis*. The two words are no longer synonymous.

His interpretation of Christ's one *hypostasis* before and after the incarnation is strange. Here is an incriminatory element in his christology, with which Leontius in fact remains isolated. Because of this he cannot produce the *Canon of Orthodoxy*, as he claims (PG 86, 1568A8–C10). In Emperor Justinian we do not find this concrete interpretation, based on the Basilian teaching about *idiomata*, of the *enhypostasis* of Christ's humanity in Christ's *hypostasis*, but certainly we do find the frequent use of *synthesis* in the framework of a clear demarcation of the main christological terms. Can Leontius be considered as a source for Justinian? It is not to be ruled out, particularly if we are to assume that Leontius of Jerusalem also wrote in Constantinople.<sup>564</sup>

562. See above, Chapter One, pp. 317–43.

563. See above, Part Two, Chapter Three, pp. 271–312 (Leontius of Jerusalem).

564. See P. T. R. Gray, *The Defense of Chalcedon in the East (451–553)* (Leiden, 1979), 122–41. Gray draws attention to the fact that M. Richard considered this Leontius of Jerusalem as a participant in the doctrinal dialogue of 532, in M. Richard, 'Léonce de Jérusalem et Léonce de Byzance', *MSR* 1 (1944), 35–88 = *Op. Min.* III, no. 59; against this position see D. B. Evans, *Leontius of Jerusalem: An Original Christology*, DOS 13 (Washington, 1970), 156–83. According



This question, however, can remain open. It is important that the true title of the work *Contra Monophysistas* reads: 'Aporiai against those who say "one composite nature" of Our Lord Jesus, witnesses of the saints, and an analysis of their teaching' (PG 86, 1769).<sup>565</sup>

### Summary

Just like Justinian's edict of 551, the christology represented in the canons of the Council of 553 proves to be moderate neo-Chalcedonianism (in the sense delineated above).

### Concluding judgement on the Second Council of Constantinople (553)

The Council did not originate from the best of motives, and in various respects it remains historically suspect. In spite of this it is accorded a positive function in the subsequent history of Chalcedon up to the present; this needs to be demarcated clearly.

1. The fact that the Three Chapters dispute was conceived by Theodore Askidas as a 'diversionary manoeuvre' in the face of Emperor Justinian's anti-Origenist action remained concealed from the majority of the members of the Synod; nevertheless it was detrimental to the atmosphere of the Council. Positive christological and theological work was pushed too much into the background in favour of the negative task of expressing condemnations of writings (or persons) from the distant past which, as can be proved, caused no discernible damage in the Imperial Church of the East at that time nor in the Latin West. Development had already passed beyond the weaknesses of a Theodore of Mopsoestia. A neo-Nestorianism within the Imperial Church was not a threat.

2. We should not overlook the fact that the relatively widely spread 'anti-Chalcedonian affect' used the Three Chapters dispute for its own purposes; in particular African and Roman theologians of this time recognized this. For this reason at the Council itself little energy was expended to develop the major christological document of the early Church, namely the definition of Chalcedon, from the potential material and language present in the definition itself, which until then had been too little exploited.

3. Emperor Justinian made the most valuable contribution in this direction by giving prominence in his *Confessio rectae fidei* of 551 to a uniform terminology in the spirit of Chalcedon (with the distinction of

*hypostasis*-person from *physis-ousia* = nature-essence). In this way he also removed from the *mia-physis* formula its innate ambiguity and advanced the guiding principles for an interpretation that a Chalcedonian could also accept.

4. In this interpretation of his the Emperor also excluded that theologically contestable suggestion of the 'neo-Chalcedonians' who, through the simultaneous use of two formulas of different origin and direction of thought, wanted to shut out heresies like Nestorianism and Eutychianism more unequivocally than Chalcedon had already done in all clarity.

5. The Council unfortunately did not address the real task at that time of presenting a definition of *hypostasis*-person in contradistinction to that of nature-essence. Without such a conceptual clarification the tension between the Chalcedonians and non-Chalcedonians could not be eliminated, as long as one still moved on the level of formulas that sounded contradictory. The Council also did not open people's eyes to the necessary distinction between the *unio in hypostasi et secundum hypostasin* on the one hand, and the *unio in natura et secundum naturam* on the other. Justinian's edict on faith could have been of some assistance in this regard.

6. What was incorporated from Cyril's language to ward off Nestorianism and was proclaimed in general as universally valid for the future (Cyril's twelve anathemas) certainly focused the Church's reflection on its faith in the direction of the *henosis* in Christ, but a full integration of these elements was hardly achieved. The best synthesis between Cyril and Chalcedon still remained the definition of Chalcedon itself, especially if it was read against the background of the old Symbols and Cyril's *Laetentur* letter.

7. To set Constantinople II (553) as 'neo-Chalcedonian' over the Council of 451 may generate some advantages ecumenically. It will be only conditionally conducive to a pure, uniform development of Chalcedonian christology.

## THE FINAL THEOLOGICAL ACTIONS OF EMPEROR JUSTINIAN

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With its condemnation of the Three Chapters the Council of 553 did not fulfil what Theodore Askidas had painted for the Emperor as a utopian dream: the restoration of ecclesiastical unity which had been shattered on account of Chalcedon. In the East nothing changed, except that the division consolidated itself in Syria through the building up of an anti-Chalcedonian hierarchy; in the West a part of the Latin Church ended up in schism; the Severan or Julianist South (Egypt) took no notice of the Council of 553. The victims who were most affected were the three accused and condemned teachers: Certainly there were some deficiencies in them which can be explained historically; these were rightly excluded. Through the purely negative and undifferentiated condemnation, however, the positive contribution of these men to the Church's theology in general would from then be discredited. In a palpable manner the relations between the Greek-Chalcedonian and the Persian Churches now suffered.<sup>566</sup> The establishment of their dogmatic and canonical autonomy would only be accelerated by the unbelievably harsh judgements passed on their real teacher, Theodore of Mopsuestia.<sup>567</sup> It is as though the Emperor was conscious of the harshness of the actions against this Church from 543 to 553, which indeed during his reign under the direction of Abraham of Beth Rabban (510-569/570) expanded the school of Nisibis to make it a theological centre, the like of which Byzantium did not possess. All the higher clergy was trained there. Happily the connections of the Old-Oriental Church to Byzantium and to the West were nevertheless not interrupted. One of the most

566. Cf. the important study by A. Guillaumont, 'Justinien et l'Église de Perse', *DOP* 23/24 (1969), 39-66, esp. 54. We shall discuss this study in more detail in the treatment of the christology of the Persian Church.

567. A. Guillaumont, *art. cit.*, 55, n. 75 cites the following as particularly significant from *actio V*: ACO IV, 1, 83, no. 14: 'Il y eut un homme pestilentiel, ou plutôt une bête sauvage, un diable ayant forme humaine, appelé de façon trompeuse Théodore [= Don de Dieu], qui porta le vêtement et le nom d'évêque, caché dans quelque recoin et lieu inconnu de la terre, à Mopsueste, bourg sans importance de la Cilicie seconde.' In any case the beginning of the *Libellus ad Procl. Const.* (CPG 5775) of Basil archim. Const. is involved here. Filled with hatred, Basil had written this document against Theodore (cf. above, p. 414 and n. 388). The Council

significant *catholicoi* of the Persian Church, Aba I (540–552), a convert from Mazdaism, before his elevation to this office made a long journey to Palestine, Egypt and Greece in the company of a certain Thomas of Edessa, his teacher of Greek. In Alexandria he was even allowed to explain the scriptures using Theodore's commentary. He seems to have made contact there with Cosmas Indicopleustes, who shortly after 543, the year of the first condemnation of the Three Chapters, wrote his *Christian Topography* and regarded Mar Aba as his teacher.<sup>568</sup> Finally Mar Aba and his companion Thomas came to Constantinople where, according to his biographer,<sup>569</sup> he proclaimed 'the true faith'. Emperor Justinian heard of this and wanted to see the Oriental teacher, who, however, avoided the encounter and immediately left Constantinople. According to the 'Chronicle of Se'ert',<sup>570</sup> Justinian wanted to compel Mar Aba and Thomas to condemn Diodore, Theodore and Nestorius. When these refused, the Emperor supposedly ordered their mutilation, but this was not carried out. Nevertheless this (questionable) report, together with a series of others,<sup>571</sup> shows that Justinian, inspired completely by the Constantinian idea of unity, wanted to extend his religious-political activity to the Church of Persia as well.

#### I. THE DOCTRINAL DIALOGUE WITH THE PERSIAN CHURCH IN 561

We have two testimonies from ecclesiastical historians about a doctrinal dialogue between Justinian and representatives of the Persian Church which relate to the same event, but differ in their dating.

##### 1. The report of Barḥadbešabba of 'Arbaya (from the end of the sixth century)

According to the report of this Nestorian ecclesiastical historian the Emperor attempted to move Abraham of Beth Rabban, the head of the

568. See A. Guillaumont, *art. cit.*, 45, n. 26, with reference to the *Christian Topography* II, 2: Wolska-Conus, SC 141, 306–307. The name Patrikios, which appears there, is the Greek translation of Mar Aba.

569. Cf. *Vie de Mar Aba in Histoire de Mar-Jabalaha*, ed. Bedjan (Paris, Leipzig, <sup>2</sup>1895), 221–222; A. Guillaumont, *art. cit.*, 45, n. 27.

570. Chron. of Se'ert: Scher, PO 7, 156. A. Guillaumont, *art. cit.*, 45–6 with n. 29. We should note that this sojourn in Constantinople is to be assigned to about 532, when Justinian was dealing with the Severans and did not wish the activity of 'Nestorians' in the capital. In 532 Mar Aba returned to his country.

571. See A. Guillaumont, *art. cit.*, 46–8, where in conclusion he writes: 'Malgré l'autonomie ecclésiastique et la séparation dogmatique, les rapports restaient donc encore étroits entre les chrétiens de Perse et l'Empire byzantin.' We shall return to this.

school of Nisibis, to present himself at court in order to defend his faith there and to answer a series of prepared questions.<sup>572</sup> With reference to his advanced age and his teaching commitments Abraham rejected such a journey, but forwarded a written confession and replied to the questions which had been directed at him. He refused to strike the names of the Three Chapters from the diptychs. In his stead, however, he sent Bishop Paul with some companions to Byzantium. According to Barḥadbešabba they appeared before the Emperor, 'defended the faith which they confessed and the Fathers which they preached; they then returned from there in great triumph'.<sup>573</sup>

## 2. The 'Chronicle of Se'ert'<sup>574</sup>

This chronicle compiled by a Nestorian completes the report of Barḥadbešabba:<sup>575</sup>

It is reported that Justinian, after establishing peace with Khosrau, asked him to send him some Persian sages. Khosrau sent him Paul, the metropolitan of Nisibis, Mari, the bishop of Balad, Barsauma, the bishop of Qardou, Išai, an exegete from Seleucia, Išo'yabb of Arzoun, who later became *catholicos* of the East, and Babai, the bishop of Shigar. He [Justinian] received them all with honour. The disputation which was written down lasted three days. They [the Persians] made the orthodox faith known. [After stating that the Emperor had questioned Babai about passages from scripture and the Fathers as proof, and the latter had obviously impressed the ruler, the report continues]: They gave him to understand that neither the nature could exist without *hypostasis* nor the *hypostasis* without nature, and that therefore logically the two natures could not be one single *hypostasis*. Justinian listened to them and sent them back overwhelmed with honour. As a consequence, however, he changed his viewpoint by anathematizing Diodore and his companions.

The conclusion of this report of the 'Chronicle of Se'ert' seems to suggest that the doctrinal dialogue took place before or during the Three Chapters dispute. However, there are good reasons for maintaining that the peace settlement alluded to is not that of 532,<sup>576</sup> but is to be placed

572. Barḥadbešabba of 'Arbaya, *Hist. ss. PP.*: ed. Nau, *PO* 9 (1913), 628–630. Cf. *CCT* II/1, *Ad Fontes*, 37.

573. Barḥadbešabba, *Hist. ss. PP.*: *PO* 9, 628–630 at 630.

574. See *CCT* II/1, *Ad Fontes*, 32; I. Ortiz de Urbina, *Patrologia Syriaca* (Rome, 1965), 24.

575. Chronicle of Se'ert: *PO* 7, 187–188; A. Guillaumont, *art. cit.*, 50–1.

576. A. Scher, in *PO* 7, 187, n. 6, and A. Vööbus, *History of the School of Nisibis* = *CSCO* 266 (Louvain, 1965), 153, wrongly argue for 532. Vööbus considers the Chalcedonian-Severan doctrinal dialogue of 532 (Letter of Innocent of Maronia and the Syrian report), which we have already dealt with, as identical with the conference we are discussing here. Only Nestorians, however, participated in it. Cf. A. Guillaumont, *art. cit.*, 51, n. 58.

in 561.<sup>577</sup> Consequently the Persian mission to the capital can be assigned to 562 or 563. This dating also brings about agreement with the report of Barhadbešabba, in particular with regard to the age of Abraham of Beth Rabban (d. 569). Thus it was Justinian himself, as the 'Chronicle of Se'ert' mentions, who asked the Persian king Khosrau to send Persian theologians — a request which Khosrau met with the delegation of 562/563. How the doctrinal dialogue in Constantinople proceeded is preserved in a fragment of an anti-Nestorian monophysite collection.<sup>578</sup> Its content will be presented later in the depiction of Nestorian christology.

The course of this initiative in making contact with the Persian Church and theology reminds us directly of the doctrinal dialogue of 532. On both occasions it ended in three days.<sup>579</sup> Just like the Severans, the Persian theologians did not condescend to any concession. The anathemas of 553 may have had their share in this negative result.

The fact that it is only the latest research that has produced a relatively complete picture of a further attempt by Justinian to realize his Eusebian-Constantinian ideal of unity of faith in the Imperial Church<sup>580</sup> also creates a prejudice in judging the Emperor's final action which, considered in isolation, seems to tarnish his memory significantly. What is in question is nothing other than a 'heresy' of the aging Emperor, which he allegedly confessed in his reputed 'Edict on Aphthartodocetism'<sup>581</sup> and to which he wanted to commit the Church.

577. See the whole argumentation of A. Guillaumont, *art. cit.*, 51–2. The Chronicle of Se'ert: Scher, *PO* 13, 568 and a note in the 'Catalogue of Christian Writers' of 'Abdišo' Bar Berika (= Ebedjesu) fit in with this. The latter mentions a *Disputatio adversus Caesarem* (I. S. Assemani, *BO* III/1, 88), which refers to the conference of 562/563. The Copt Abou'l Barakat confirms this report (Assemani, *op. cit.*, 632; A. Vööbus, *The School of Nisibis*: CSCO 266, 172).

578. A. Guillaumont, *art. cit.*, 52–3; the fragment is found in B. L. Add. 14535, fol. 16v–20r. Guillaumont (*art. cit.*, 62–6) gives a French translation and a facsimile copy of the Syriac text. Both are reproduced in Amelotti-Migliardi Zingale, *Scritti teologici ed ecclesiastici de Giustiniano* = *Subsidia* III (Milan, 1977), 179–192.

579. A. Guillaumont, *art. cit.*, 53, n. 70 (with a further example) highlights this circumstance.

580. This attempt of 562/563, however, now reached beyond the borders of the Imperial Church.

581. The expression 'aphthartodocetism' is just as unsuited to the (allegedly promulgated) decree of Justinian as it is to Julianism, and in particular to the Chalcedonian 'aphthartics' whom Leontius of Byzantium refuted. Hence it is to be recommended that one speak only of 'aphthartics' or of the 'aphthartic' interpretation of Christ's earthly reality.

## II. 'HERESY' OR THE EMPEROR'S FINAL INITIATIVE TO RESTORE UNITY OF FAITH

### 1. The state of research

It has been said that the series of theologico-political actions undertaken by Justinian I, which from beginning to end had been accompanied by many critical qualifications, ended with a document that has been described as 'caprice impérial',<sup>582</sup> namely with the decree which is claimed to have ordered the acceptance of the 'aphthartodocetist' interpretation of Christ's earthly reality. For a century the judgements passed by significant and less significant researchers have pointed in this direction.<sup>583</sup> E. Stein, in contrast, is much more differentiated in his judgement.<sup>584</sup> Indeed he establishes that towards the end of 564 the Emperor promulgated an edict which proclaimed that Christ's body was of an incorruptible and impassible nature.<sup>585</sup> He claims, however, that it was the Emperor's intention and conviction, as it was in his earlier decisions (on the theopaschite question, on Origenism, on the Three Chapters dispute), to remain personally in the framework of the norms of the (four) ecumenical councils. Stein argues that a decree of December 562 (CPG 6890) certainly bears witness to this attitude. A fragment of this decree is transmitted by the *Doctrina Patrum*, in which once again the teaching of the one *hypostasis* in two natures is stressed,<sup>586</sup> although

582. The expression stems from J. Pargoire, *L'Église byzantine de 527 à 847* (Paris, 21905), 41–2.

583. They are listed by F. Carcione, 'L' "aftartodocetismo" di Giustiniano: una mistificazione strumentale del dissenso politico-religioso', *StRiOrCr* 7 (1984) (71–8), 71, n. 1. The first is A. Knecht, *Die Religionspolitik Kaiser Justinians I.* (Würzburg, 1896), 140–4. On this cf. R. Haacke, in *Chalkedon* II, 152–3. Then there follow the well-known names: C. Diehl, J. Pargoire, J. B. Bury, J. Maspero, L. Duchesne, L. Bréhier (Fliche-Martin IV, 1937, 480–1), M. Jugie, as the scathing reviewer of the different opinion of W. H. Hutton, *The Church of the Sixth Century* (London, 1897) 303–9, in 'L'empereur Justinien a-t-il été aphthartodocète?', *EO* 31 (1932), 399–402. For all that, Jugie mentions (399–400) that in the third edition of the work of Pargoire (1923) an anonymous editor added a critical appendix to these earlier remarks (41–2). Nevertheless Jugie was still of the opinion that 'ce plaidoyer *pro Justiniano* [by Hutton] ne repose sur aucun fondement solide' (400). For a long time in German theology F. Loofs, 'Die "Ketzererei" Justinians', in *Harnack-Ehrung. Beiträge zur Kirchengeschichte* (Leipzig, 1921), 232–48, was decisive. The article still has value, even if some corrections and additions have to be made.

584. E. Stein, *Histoire du Bas-Empire* II (1949), 685–90.

585. In his treatment of Julianist teaching E. Stein, *op. cit.*, 233–5, presents this in more detail; on 686 he interprets this edict as 'opposed to the spirit, if not indeed the letter of Chalcedonian christology, even if this is interpreted in a Cyrillian sense'.

586. The text is in F. Diekamp, *Doctrina Patrum*, 134; Amelotti-Migliardi Zingale, *Scritti teologici*, 194, Greek and Latin. Here we give the Latin: *si quis, substantialem sive naturalem unitatem in mysterio Christi dicens, hoc modo non intellegit, quod stupenda incarnatio duas substantias [=ousias] sive naturas [physeis] in unam subsistentiam [hypostasim] univit, sed ex hoc unam naturam sive substantiam [ousiam] Christi factam esse dicit, talis anathema sit.*

the decree on *aphtharsia* would already have been in the drafting stage. The catholic world, it is claimed, should have been prepared 'sur la portée de l'innovation retentissante qui se préparait'.<sup>587</sup> E. Stein rightly establishes that the Severans were not affected at all by the condemnation of the Three Chapters in 553. The Emperor's hopes for union were dashed. His religious politics with regard to the Severans were a failure. Nevertheless he did not abandon his goals. He attempted to realize these now with the final, but very powerful party which regarded Julian of Halicarnassus as its leader. For, in the opinion of E. Stein, the Julianists would have behaved differently with regard to the new edict than the Severans would have done. At least they reacted, even if in a sense that ran counter to the Emperor. Instead of reconciling themselves with the Imperial Church, they took the edict of 562 as an opportunity to choose for their 'sect' a new patriarch by the name of Elpidius,<sup>588</sup> whom the Emperor immediately ordered to be brought bound to Constantinople. The deported patriarch, however, died while being transported to Sigris.

## 2. Evidence for an 'aphthartic' action by Justinian

The researching and interpreting of the sources<sup>589</sup> are still in a state of flux. According to Michael the Syrian, the occasion that prompted talk of the Emperor's turn to aphthartic teaching was his reception at the court of Constantinople of one of the leading Julianists, the bishop of Joppe (modern-day Jaffa).<sup>590</sup> This is certainly to be placed soon after 560. The first to react against Justinian's new attitude was Eustochius, the Patriarch of Jerusalem, whose subordinate the bishop of Joppe was.<sup>591</sup> In 563/564, however, he was deposed by the Emperor. It was maintained that it was suggested to the Emperor by the new adviser that through the acceptance of the aphthartic teaching a reconciliation with

587. E. Stein, *op. cit.*, 686 with n. 2. Cf. F. Carcione, *art. cit.*, 75.

588. Cf. Theoph., *Chron.* A.M. 6057: de Boor I, p. 241,6-10; J. Maspero, *Histoire des patr. d'Alexandrie*, 214.

589. C. W. F. Walch, *Entwurf einer vollständigen Historie der Kezereien, Spaltungen und Religionsstreitigkeiten, bis auf die Zeiten der Reformation*, 8 (Leipzig, 1778), 550-640, should still be regarded as an overview worthy of note.

590. Michael Syr., *Chron.* IX, 34: Chabot II, 272: 'Un évêque stupide, de la ville de Joppé en Palestine, s'attacha à lui et pervertit son esprit par l'hérésie des Phantasiastes. Il se mit à dire que le corps de Notre-Seigneur n'était pas passible et corruptible.' The Emperor is said to have disseminated this teaching by numerous writings.

591. E. Stein, *Histoire du Bas-Empire* II, 685, says that this bishop, whose name we do not know, became at the end of Justinian's reign 'le théologien le plus écouté de l'empereur'. Theodore Askidas died in 558. It is claimed that it was through the influence of the Bishop of Joppe that the deposition of the Patriarch of Jerusalem happened. Macarius took his place.



the Julianists was possible, even if already no unity with the Severans could be established.<sup>592</sup> According to various historians it was intended that this should happen by means of an 'edict'. According to Theophanes all bishops of the Empire were obliged to subscribe the Emperor's 'edict'.<sup>593</sup> Patriarch Eutychius of Constantinople (like Apollinarius of Alexandria) was said to have opposed this and was taken prisoner on 22 January 565. On 31 January he was deposed after he had refused to appear before a *synodos endemousa* which was completely in the Emperor's hand. Finally he was banished to Amaseia in Pontus, to the monastery from which he had been called in 552 to the patriarchal throne of the capital. His successor was John Scholasticus of Antioch, who for six years had been the *apocrisiarius* of the Patriarch of Antioch.<sup>594</sup>

Eustratius in his *Vita Eutychii* reports in detail on these events.<sup>595</sup> According to him the Emperor's main thesis stated:

The body of our Lord Jesus Christ became incorruptible from the very beginning of the union (*ἀφθαρτον τὸ σῶμα . . . ἐξ αὐτῆς ἐνώσεως γεγενῆσθαι*).<sup>596</sup>

Eustratius maintains that this teaching almost ruined the whole world. He interprets the Emperor's intention as strict docetism: 'fantasy, not truth, is the becoming flesh and a human being of the God-Logos'.<sup>597</sup> Together with the *Vita Eutychii* of Eustratius, the *Church History* of Evagrius is closest to the course of events in 565. Evagrius reports that Justinian wrote an 'edict' in the Roman mode of expression:

in which he called the body of the Lord incorruptible and unreceptive for the physical and blameless passions; thus he said that the Lord had already eaten before the passion as he did after the resurrection; that he experienced no change or alteration from his formation in the womb onwards, not even in the voluntary and physical passions, just as after the resurrection of his holy body.<sup>598</sup>

592. E. Stein, *op. cit.*, 685–6.

593. Theophanes, *Chron.* A.M. 6057: de Boor, pp. 240,31–241,15. Michael Syr., *Chron.* IX, 34: Chabot II, 272.

594. Cf. E. Stein, *op. cit.*, 687–8.

595. Eustrat., *Vita Eutychii* (CPG 7520), V–VIII: PG 86, 2316–2368; on the deposition of Eutychius see also Nicephorus Callistus, *HE* XVII, 29–31: PG 147, 292–301; in addition Michael Glykas, *Annal.* IV: PG 158, 509AB; finally Victor Tunnun., *Chronicon*, a. 565: PL 68, 962; Mommsen II, *MGH* 11, 205.

596. Eustrat., *Vita Eutychii*, IV, 33: PG 86, 2313B.

597. *Ibid.*, PG 86, 2313C. The Emperor's naïveté (*haplotes*) is said to have led him to be deceived by the study of the Origenists (Origen, Evagrius and Didymus) and by the word 'incorruptible' (PG 86, 2316A.C).

598. Evagrius Schol., *HE* IV, 39: Bidez-Parmentier, p. 190,16–23; cf. P. Allen, *Evagrius Scholasticus the Church Historian* (Louvain, 1981), 204–5. Evagrius stresses that the Emperor forced all bishops to subscribe to the edict and that Anastasius of Antioch was the leader of the resistance against this (Bidez-Parmentier, p. 190,23–26).

### 3. Modern discussion about the Emperor's apthartatic activity

There is great confusion among historians with regard to the Emperor's new development towards apthartatic teaching and a corresponding 'edict'. Up to the present no completely convincing solution has been found. We shall present here briefly two more recent attempts at a clarification.

(a) P. Van den Ven (1965):<sup>599</sup> this scholar begins in particular with a criticism of the chronological ordering of the course of events. He asserts that the major mistake consists in the fact that various phases which Justinian had gone through on the way to extreme measures *vis-à-vis* the Church are assigned to a time-span which is too short. Van den Ven claims that E. Stein, starting from a false interpretation of Eustratius' *Vita*, assumed that the edict had been promulgated towards the end of 564, but certainly before January, 565. But Stein, he says, did not consider that it was a question of a preparatory document, a *χάρτης*, which the Emperor had read out before a third party, namely Patriarch Eutychius, in order to be able to judge the reaction of his audience.<sup>600</sup> The Emperor broke Eutychius' resistance by having him brutally driven away from his see on trivial pretexts, not, however, on account of his refusal to subscribe an 'edict' which had not yet been published.<sup>601</sup>

He [the Emperor] also refrained from any coercive measure with regard to his [Eutychius'] successor, who was more astute than the old monk and from whom he knew that he would not receive (from him) a positive and official assent to his dogmatic ideas. Negotiations in various directions were conducted and pressure was exerted on bishops of the entire Empire, which only ceased with the death of Justinian.<sup>602</sup> L. Bréhier is perhaps not far from the truth when he writes that one is not sure whether the edict, the text of which one does not know at all, was promulgated and then sent to Rome; for one does not know of any reaction on the side of the Apostolic See.<sup>603</sup>

599. P. Van den Ven, 'L'accession de Jean le Scholastique au siège patriarcal de Constantinople en 565', *Byz* 35 (1965), 320-52.

600. *Ibid.*, 342. He refers to his statements on 325-8 and the course of events which he established there. Cf. PG 86, 2316C: *ὁ βασιλεὺς, ὃν ἐποίησεν χάρτην . . . λέγων*. After the reading out of the text, it is claimed that the Emperor demanded that Patriarch Eutychius accept this 'logos'.

601. Cf. *ibid.*, 342-3; 350-1 with 322: the *vita* of Symeon Stylites the Younger also points in this direction. Cf. *idem*, 'Les écrits de s. Syméon le Stylite le Jeune avec trois sermons inédits', *Mus* 70 (1957), 1-57 (cf. CPG 7365-7369).

602. Evagrius Schol., *HE* IV, 39-41: Bidez-Parmentier, pp. 190,23-192,3; P. Van den Ven, *art. cit.*, 343, n. 1, with 336-8.

603. P. Van den Ven, *art. cit.*, 343-4. In such an important matter there would certainly have been a Roman reaction.

An important fact is certainly stressed here, a fact which can also be expanded in a completely different way by the deposed Patriarch Eutychius. The work on the 'Distinction of nature and person'<sup>604</sup> which stems from the time of his exile in Amaseia, in spite of its christological terminology, contains no allusion at all to a text of Justinian and the apthartoc question.<sup>605</sup> Had the deposition of the Patriarch been caused in the main by his refusal to subscribe an edict, a critique of such an edict on the part of the Patriarch would have been expected.

(b) F. Carcione (1984):<sup>606</sup> the author of this article is of the opinion that Justinian's conversion to 'apthartodocetist teaching' is not to be accepted on objective grounds. This thesis could only arise because the ancient historians confused the dialogue with 'Julianism' really pursued by the Emperor with an actual acceptance of this heresy. On the basis of this interpretation, it is maintained, rested the 'orthodox' complaints about the Emperor when he opened the way for a final undertaking of his religious politics, which were orientated as always towards the restoration of unity of faith in the Empire. According to this scholar, we should note that the Emperor in the last years of his long rule was more and more unpopular and was the butt of repeated criticism. Such criticism could only be successful if it were expressed in religious terms, that is, when it was a question of his religious politics or questions of faith.

We should note in addition that in the last years of his rule Justinian established contact on two sides: with the Nestorians in the East on the one side, and with the Julianists in Egypt on the other. Carcione claims

604. Eutychius Const., *De differentia naturae et hypostaseos* (Armenian) (CPG 6940), P. Ananian, 'L'opuscolo di Eutichio patriarca di Costantinopoli sulla "Distinzione della natura e persona"', in *Armeniaca. Mélanges d'études arméniennes* (Venice, 1969), 316–82 (introduction with Italian translation).

605. P. Ananian, *art. cit.*, 355, refers, however, to a text of the Patriarch with the title: 'Anathema against those who characterize Christ's body as incorruptible before the resurrection' (not listed in CPG 6937–6940). Ananian adds: 'probabilmente scritto contro l'imperatore Giustiniano, che, verso la fine del suo regno, aveva emanato un decreto, ove esponeva la dottrina di Giuliano di Alicarnasso circa la incorruttibilità del corpo di Cristo. Eutichio, per aver negato la sua approvazione, fu deposto e mandato in esilio.' Grumel, *Regestes I*<sup>2</sup>, no. 260, nevertheless, places the anathema in the year 577, with recourse to Nicetas Choniates, *Thesaurus* 12: PG 140, 77BC. Ananian thus traces the deposition of Eutychius back to his refusal of the Emperor's decree on *aptharsia*; he also identifies the Emperor's teaching with that of Julian of Halicarnassus and does not take into account the dating of the anathema to 577, that is, to the second phase of the patriarchate. This date, twelve years after the death of Justinian, would indicate that the *aptharsia* teaching still had supporters in Constantinople, and that this, and no longer the Emperor, was the stimulus for the Patriarch's anathema. Cf. PG 140, 77D.

606. F. Carcione, 'L'"aftartodocetismo" di Giustiniano: una mistificazione strumentale del dissenso politico-religioso', *SiRiOrCr* 7 (1984), 71–8.

that a prospect of addressing contrary groups like this could only have existed if the Emperor preserved the Chalcedonian centre.

Carcione then refers to some special circumstances of Justinian's procedure:

(1) This is the reason for the deposition of Patriarch Eutychius which we have already mentioned. Questions about doctrine were not decisive.

(2) If the Emperor really wanted to engage the Julianists, it was extremely inept to imprison immediately Patriarch Elpidius, newly elected by the Gaianites, and to order his transportation to Constantinople. This must really have jolted the supposed dialogue partners, especially when the prisoner died while being transported. Nicetius, the bishop of Trier, shows just how badly Justinian's final religio-political activity could be misunderstood. In a letter (from the summer of 565) he accused the Emperor of having become at the end of his life a supporter of Nestorius and Eutyches, both of whom denied Christ's human nature.<sup>607</sup>

After all these reflections by researchers on Justinian regarding the Emperor's apthartism we cannot make a concluding judgement. Nevertheless the following assertions seem to be certain.

(1) The Emperor certainly did not succumb to 'Apthartodocetism', as this was understood by heresiologists in ancient times as well as in the modern period, that is, as the denial of Christ's humanity. The interpretation which R. Draguet worked out *vis-à-vis* Julian of Halicarnassus may also be applied *mutatis mutandis* to Justinian's possible 'apthartism'.

(2) Justinian certainly remained 'Chalcedonian' in the sense of that sentence transmitted by the *Doctrina Patrum* from the period of the 'apthartic' discussion: in this the Emperor denied the *mia-physis* formula and confessed Christ's two natures.<sup>608</sup>

(3) If he had really been an 'apthartic', then at the most it would have been in the sense of those Chalcedonians whom Leontius of Byzantium refuted in his writing *CA* (*Contra Apthartodocetas*).<sup>609</sup> Probably it is not to be excluded completely that the word *henosis* also played a special rôle, as this was the case among the apthartics that Leontius

607. Nicetius of Trier, *Ep. II ad Iustinian.* (CPL 1063): PL 68, 378–380.

608. See F. Diekamp, *Doctrina Patrum de Incarnatione Verbi* (Münster, 1907; <sup>2</sup>1981), 134. In the second edition 378 there is a comment on the text that Justinian here used the words of Proclus.

609. Cf. above, pp. 217ff.; Leontius Byz., *CA* (CPG 6813): PG 86, 1316D–1356C; esp. 1317CD: induced by the charm of this word *aptharsia* 'some of us' converted to the teaching of Severus and Julian of Halicarnassus and thus surrendered the whole mystery of the incarnation. With regard to Justinian too there is talk of the enticement of this word (cf. PG 86, 2316C).

dealt with who were to be found in Constantinople.<sup>610</sup> In fact this word is mentioned twice in the *Vita Eutychii*,<sup>611</sup> where it is used to establish the continuous *aphtharsia* in the body of the earthly Jesus. Such inferences could also appear in Justinian without his fundamental Chalcedonianism being called into question. Were we also to add the recourse to Cyril of Alexandria, which is apparent in the Three Chapters dispute and the Council of 553 (canons), then the parameters within which Justinian could be considered a 'Chalcedonian aphthartic' are delineated. He would then be at a great distance from that 'Julianism' which the ancient historians and many recent researchers ascribe to the Emperor. This 'Julianism' presupposes the *mia-physis* teaching and formula, which Justinian explicitly excludes in the fragment transmitted by the *Doctrina Patrum*.

#### EMPEROR AND THEOLOGIAN CONCLUDING COMMENTS ON JUSTINIAN I

Externally the sixth century received its structure probably more through Justinian's religio-political actions than through the works of theologians, whether they be Chalcedonian or anti-Chalcedonian. From 519 until the end of his reign we find Justinian in action. None of the larger or smaller religious groupings was spared his influence. Admittedly the result was slight; the damage for the whole Church, at least in part of his actions, was considered by many as greater than the benefit. The Three Chapters dispute convulsed the entire Empire. The real goal of restoring unity of faith in the Empire, which was to the fore in all undertakings, was not achieved. In particular he had success only in the insignificant question of the recognition of the formula 'one of the Trinity was crucified'; more significant was the overcoming of Origenism, which as such did not divide the Church, but was extremely confusing. Above all the Emperor foundered in his efforts to win over Severus and his supporters (532), namely that group which went into schism on account of Chalcedon. The condemnation in 536 did not prevent them from organizing their hierarchy and continuing their teaching. The Nestorians too, as the last ones summoned to dialogue, remained unmoved. It was almost as if the conclusion of his actions placed his whole theological work and reputation in question: the attempt to gain

610. Cf. PG 86, 1352CD.

611. Eustratius, *Vita Eutych.*, 33; PG 86, 2313B: the body of our Lord is incorruptible from the union itself; in addition *ibid.*, C.

victory for the teaching of Christ's *aphtharsia* before the resurrection.

Considered more from within, that is, from the christological perspective, in the course of his activity the Emperor without a doubt made considerable advances. His initial uncertainty with regard to the *unus ex trinitate* was quickly overcome. His last great edict, the *Confessio rectae fidei* of 551, is really a balanced document. It served as an introduction to the Council of 553 and offered more good christology than the many hackneyed anathemas of the Fathers of the Council of 553, with which they rejected the Three Chapters. It was only in this main phase of his theologizing that the Emperor developed from a 'Chalcedonian' into a moderate 'neo-Chalcedonian' and committed the Council to this form of the christological dogma. We have made clear that it was one of the merits of this edict of 551 that it officially created terminological clarity for the use of the terms *hypostasis* and *physis*, *ousia* and *prosopon*. Without adopting the *mia-physis* formula, the Emperor acknowledged the orthodox usage of this formula within determined limits, and thus built a bridge of understanding to the Old-Alexandrians, which as a contribution to ecumenical dialogue has continued to have an effect up to the present day.

Which theologians or advisers stood behind his activities can only be recognized obscurely and fragmentarily. His evil spirit must have been Theodore Askidas, who could not hinder the condemnation of Origenism, but who brought on the Three Chapters dispute. Which of the Leontii present in Constantinople influenced the Emperor? There are certain traces and fingerprints of Leontius of Byzantium on the one side, if we look for instance at the letter to Zoilus; on the other and even more intensely are those of Leontius of Jerusalem, whose neo-Cyrrillianism appears to correspond exactly to that of the Emperor (the evaluation and interpretation of the *mia-physis* formula; stressing the concept *synthesis*; and other aspects).

Finally there remains a question about the place of the Emperor in the theological structure of the Patriarchate of Constantinople. That he was the leading figure, even *vis-à-vis* the patriarchs, no one can deny in regard to his religio-political activities. The most significant patriarchs were certainly Menas (536–552) and Eutychius (552–565; 577–582). For the Emperor, however, greater authority was vested in the Popes during his reign, Hormisdas (514–523), John II (533–535) and Agapetus I (535–536). In contrast the rôle of Pope Vigilius (537–555) in the contention between imperial and papal duty in questions of faith was a real tragedy. In a ruler such as Justinian the innate obscurity of the Emperor's sphere of competence in the Imperial Church and of the unsolved ques-

tion of Church and state in their reciprocal relationship had its consequences time and again in the whole series of his religio-political actions. Because of his behaviour *vis-à-vis* the bishops he receives a bad press from historians.<sup>612</sup>

Thus the Patriarchate of Constantinople in the whole of the sixth century was not able by its own efforts to achieve that consistency which Alexandria and Antioch, but Jerusalem too, not to speak at all of Rome, experienced. If nevertheless the real theological achievement of that century more or less showed itself as 'Byzantine', then the Ecumenical Patriarchate owed this to the presence and radiance of an emperor like Justinian (and his consort Theodora, cf. San Vitale, Ravenna) and to the attraction of the Imperial City, which, at least for a time, captured the greatest theologians of the century and drew them to the capital. This showed itself in several ways. (1) Severus, the monk from Majuma, first found in the Imperial City the stage which would make him the greatest theological player of the century, even if he resided there for only a few years. (2) Controversies like the Origenist dispute in Palestine or the Agnoetic conflict in Alexandria shifted to the capital and were essentially decided there. (3) In the monasteries, particularly in the monastery of the Sleepless Monks, libraries and work possibilities were created which allowed the historical and theological working out of the individual phases of the struggle for Chalcedon from the very beginnings, as the conciliar *acta* of the early Church show. (4) Finally, Constantinople became a conciliar site, where at the Fifth Ecumenical Council Chalcedon received those hermeneutical aids which confirmed it as the greatest theological event in the whole Church after Nicaea. 'Four gospels — four councils': this statement also retains its validity after 553, if one looks at the conciliar foundation of the message of Jesus Christ, 'one and the same in true divinity and true humanity'. It is only from Chalcedon that the Council of 553 drew its christological content, which its anathemas alone were not able to offer.

612. Cf. H.-G. Beck (ed.), *Byzantinisches Lesebuch* (Munich, 1982), 223: 'Emperor Justinian's despotism'; M. V. Anastos, *art. cit.*, above, p. 316, n. 4, 'Justinian's despotic control'.

## PART FOUR

### THE END OF THE JUSTINIANIC ERA AND AN APPRAISAL OF THE SIXTH CENTURY



## THE END OF THE JUSTINIANIC ERA

## I. POLITICO-RELIGIOUS ACTIONS UNDER JUSTIN II

By T. Hainthaler

Justinian's nephew, the *curopalates* Justin, as Justin II (565–578),<sup>1</sup> succeeded his uncle as Emperor. Together with his spouse Sophia, a niece of Empress Theodora, Justin II received a difficult inheritance. The financial and economic situation of the Empire had noticeably worsened through natural catastrophes (beginning as early as the years 543–558),<sup>2</sup> such as earthquakes, floods and starvation, and above all through the Great Plague (542–544),<sup>3</sup> which broke out repeatedly in the following decades, although not to the catastrophic extent of 543. In addition there were conspiracies, and a weakened and demoralized army.<sup>4</sup> Justin seems to have succeeded in giving the throne a new radiance,<sup>5</sup> in particular through religious symbolism: the Emperor as the image of Christ and Christ as *rex regnantium*. This conception of Justin is seen especially in the throne room, the so-called *chrysotriklinos*: the picture of Christ was

1. Cf. F. Dölger, *Regesten* I, 1–7. On Justin's religious politics see P. Goubert, 'Les successeurs de Justinien et le Monophysisme', in *Chalkedon* II, 179–92, esp. 182–5; Averil Cameron, 'The Early Religious Policies of Justin II', in *Studies in Church History* 13 (1976), 51–67 = *eadem*, *Continuity and Change in Sixth-Century Byzantium* (London, 1981), no. X; P. Allen, *Evagrius Scholasticus the Church Historian* (Louvain, 1981) = *SpicSlov* 41, 22–7, 212–14. On the sources concerning Justin II and Tiberius see Averil Cameron, 'Early Byzantine *Kaiserkritik*: Two Case Studies', *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies* 3 (1977), 1–17 = *eadem*, *Continuity and Change*, no. IX; cf. E. Stein, *Studien zur Geschichte des byzantinischen Reiches vornehmlich unter den Kaisern Justinus II und Tiberius Constantinus* (Stuttgart, 1919), esp. 19 with 26–9.

2. On this cf. the listing of events in E. Stein, *Histoire du Bas-Empire* II, 756–9. In addition see F. Verceleyen, 'Tremblements de terre à Constantinople. L'impact sur la population', *Byz* 58 (1988), 155–73.

3. Evagrius Schol., *HE* IV, 29; for details of this see P. Allen, *Evagrius Scholasticus*, 190–4. Evagrius reports that as a youth himself he had the plague and at a later outbreak of it he lost his wife, children and servants.

4. Cf. Averil Cameron, 'The Theotokos in Sixth-Century Constantinople', *JTS* 29 (1978), 81, 104–5, = *eadem*, *Continuity and Change*, no. XIII. In addition see A. Fotiou, 'Recruitment Shortages in VIth Century Byzantium', *Byz* 58 (1988), 65–77.

5. Cf. the building activity and the sponsoring of art under Justin II, which Averil Cameron, 'The Artistic Patronage of Justin II', *Byz* 50 (1980), 62–84 (= *Continuity and Change*, no. XII), demonstrates. It comprises various palaces, also the palace of the Patriarch, churches and social institutions, and testifies throughout to originality in some domains. so that the late sixth century

positioned above the Emperor's throne and thus the Emperor appeared as the embodiment of Christ on earth.<sup>6</sup> On this account Averil Cameron characterizes Justin's reign as 'a turning-point in the imperial ideology'.<sup>7</sup>

### 1. Efforts to secure unity for the Church

At the beginning of his reign Justin endeavoured to secure unity for the Church 'carefully and eagerly',<sup>8</sup> and for this purpose apparently attempted to be on good terms both with the 'Monophysites' and with the Chalcedonians, if one takes into account the reports of John of Biclar and of Michael the Syrian.<sup>9</sup>

The former reports that he destroyed everything which had been written against Chalcedon, and ordered that the Constantinopolitan Creed, which had been received by Chalcedon, was to be sung at Mass by all the people.<sup>10</sup> The latter indicates that Justin brought back Patriarch Theodosius with honour and, when the Patriarch died shortly afterwards, let him be buried with ceremony. On that occasion Anastasius (a monk from the imperial family) delivered a sermon, during which he openly anathematized Chalcedon. Justin allowed the bishops in Antioch to be free; he gathered the bishops who were in Constantinople into his palace and exhorted both parties to seek the truth and to unite. The dialogues in the palace lasted for a year, but were unsuccessful: 'on account of sins the Church was not pacified'.<sup>11</sup>

The desire for peace and for unity in the Church must have been present without doubt, both in Justin and generally.<sup>12</sup>

According to Averil Cameron, the decree on the introduction of the Constantinopolitan Creed is the background for the laudatory poems on Justin by Corippus and Venantius Fortunatus.<sup>13</sup> In the fourth book of his poem Corippus presents a *credo* which is intended to celebrate the

6. On this see Averil Cameron, 'Images of Authority: Elites and Icons in Late Sixth-Century Byzantium', *Past and Present* 84 (1979), 15-18 = *Continuity and Change*, no. XVIII; see as well the comments on the poem of Corippus on Justin, which gives expression to this thought of *imago Christi: eadem*, 'Corippus' Poem on Justin II', *ibid.*, no. VI, 151-2.

7. Averil Cameron, 'The Artistic Patronage of Justin II', *ibid.*, no. XII, 62.

8. John Ephes., *HE* I, 3: Brooks, p. 2,5.

9. Averil Cameron, 'The early religious policies of Justin II', in *op. cit.*, no. X, 54: '[Justin] was walking a tightrope.'

10. John Biclar, *Continuatio Victoris* (CPL 2261), a. 567?: ed. Mommsen, *MGH* 11, 2, p. 211, 13-17: . qui Iustinus anno primo regni sui ea, quae contra synodum Chalcedonensem fuerant commentata, destruxit symbolumque sanctorum CL patrum Constantinopoli congregatorum et in synodo Chalcedonensi laudabiliter receptum in omni catholica ecclesia a populo concinendum intromisit, priusquam dominica dicatur oratio.

11. Michael Syr., *Chron.* X, I: Chabot II, pp. 283b-284b ('à cause des péchés, l'Église ne fut pas pacifiée').

12. John Ephes., *HE* I, 22: Brooks, *CSCO* 106, 19-20, narrates impressively how much the monophysite bishops were oppressed, because they were reproached for being the ones who were delaying unity.

13. Averil Cameron, *op. cit.*, no. X, 54-6.

Emperor's decree. What is noteworthy in this is that it contains the two-natures formula: *una in naturis extans persona duabus*.<sup>14</sup> Moreover, we also find the formula: *ex tribus una ... persona*, a consistent element of Justinianic christology.

Venantius composed his hymn to Emperor Justin and Empress Sophia<sup>15</sup> on the occasion of the forwarding of a reliquary of the cross to the monastery of Radegundis in Poitiers. In this hymn he lauds the Emperor as a loyal adherent of Chalcedon,<sup>16</sup> and he also mentions that he allowed exiled bishops to return home.<sup>17</sup> Here we have one of the rare testimonies to contact between East and West, which nevertheless does not say very much in support of Justin's orthodoxy.<sup>18</sup>

Close, friendly relations<sup>19</sup> existed between the Emperor and Patriarch John III Scholasticus of Constantinople and the Stylite, Symeon the Younger,<sup>20</sup> both of whom were not on the anti-Chalcedonian side. According to the picture given by John of Ephesus, the Patriarch, who in the meantime had received the function of arbiter in the disputes

14. Corippus, *In laudem Iustini*, IV, 303: MGH 3, 2, 154.

15. Venantius Fortunatus, *Ad Iustinum et Sophiam Augustos* = *Appendix Carminum* (CPL 1036), II: MGH *auct. ant.* 4, 1, 275–278; PL 88, 431–434, with the refrain: *Gloria summa tibi, rerum sator, atque redemptor, qui das Iustinum, justus, in orbe caput*, or respectively, *quod tenet augustam celsa Sophia gradum*.

16. *Ibid.*, 25–26: MGH 4, 276; PL 88, 432B: *reddite vota deo, quoniam nova purpura quidquid concilium statuit Calchedonense tenet*.

17. *Ibid.*, 39–40.

18. Cf. the critical comments of Averil Cameron, 'Early Byzantine *Kaiserkritik*' = *Continuity and Change*, no. IX, 5: 'in part at least merely the expected reaction of a Westerner who saw the Byzantine Emperor making a pious gesture to the Catholic Franks'.

19. On the friendship of the three see P. Van den Ven, 'L'accession de Jean le Scholastique au siège patriarcal de Constantinople en 565', *Byz* 35 (1965), 320–2; *Vita Symeon Styl. iun.* (CPG 7369), chs. 202–207: Van den Ven, *SubsHag* 32 (Brussels, 1962), 176–9.

20. P. Van den Ven, 'Les écrits de s. Syméon le Stylite le Jeune avec trois sermons inédits', *Mus* 70 (1957), p. 2, n. 9 and p. 3, considers the *Epistula ad Iustinum iuniorem* (CPG 7366) authentic and stemming from Symeon Stylites the Younger, but addressed rather to Justinian. By the *Vita Symeon Styl. iun.*, ch. 207 (ed. Van den Ven, *SubsHag* 32, 178–179), however, it is attested that Justin corresponded with the Stylite on account of the healing of his daughter, who was possessed by a demon. *Sermo* 30 (CPG 7367 [30]): A. Mai, *Patrum Bibliotheca* VIII/3, 148–156 contributes nothing of significance to christology from our point of view. There is no special christological position discernible. *Sermo* 30 is probably also reworked. We shall indicate some of Symeon's thoughts: Jesus Christ is our example in everything, because he lived our life in the body without sin and without deception. *Deitatem praesentem in se habens, et tamquam index futuri saeculi, patienter expectat, benignitate utitur, cum ipse solus omnem bonitatem habeat* (no. 7, p. 154). The transformation into the immortal and incorruptible *sponsus* is impending for us who have fallen with Adam after the resurrection of the one who never fell. As God he is *pneuma*, spirit; nevertheless he became a human being. Thus we too should be spiritual (no. 8, p. 154). On the orthodoxy of Symeon Stylites the Younger cf. P. Van den Ven, *SubsHag* 32, Introduction, 167\*–170\*.

between Severans and Tritheists,<sup>21</sup> was the driving force in the later persecution of the 'Monophysites'.<sup>22</sup>

## 2. The two 'edicts' of Emperor Justin II

Through Michael the Syrian there are transmitted to us two 'edicts' from Justinian's successor,<sup>23</sup> by means of which the Emperor attempted to reach agreement with the Severans; however, this was done in a completely contradictory manner. Whereas the first 'edict'<sup>24</sup> is a testimony to an extreme concession *vis-à-vis* the 'Monophysites', almost amounting to the renunciation of Chalcedon, the second can be understood as an endorsement of Chalcedonian christology. What relationship do these initiatives of Justin have to Justinian's christology and religious politics? First of all we shall turn to the content of the first *edictum* and cite its text verbatim.

We accept only one unique definition of faith: the one that was promulgated by the three hundred and eighteen Fathers, which was confirmed by the Fathers assembled in Constantinople and Ephesus. We do not know of another definition than: we believe in one God, the Father . . . and the rest of the definition. We accept the two births of the God-Logos, that from the Father before time and that at the end of the ages from the virgin Mary. And we confess that he is truly the only (begotten) Logos, that he remained unchanged in his divinity, that he suffered in his flesh and as God worked miracles. (We do not confess) one and another, nor that Christ is one and God another; but (we do confess) one and the same (composed) of two natures, divine and human (natures); one *hypostasis* and one person, not two *hypostases* nor two persons, nor two sons; but one incarnate *hypostasis* of the God-Logos. We anathematize all heresies, above all Arius, Eunomius, Macedonius, Nestorius, who was deposed and anathematized by the Fathers, Celestine and Cyril. In the same way we anathematize Theodore, the letter of Ibas, the writings of Theodoret, and all those who think like them and resemble them in impiety. We accept the holy Patriarch Severus and annul the anathema imposed upon him in iniquity and without reason. We annul the anathemas which have been imposed from Cyril's time to the present.<sup>25</sup>

21. On this see P. Allen, 'Neo-Chalcedonism and the Patriarchs of the Late Sixth Century', *Byz* 50 (1980), 9-10.

22. John Ephes., *HE* I, 11-12: Brooks, *CSCO* 106, 6-8. Cf. also A. de Halleux, 'Trois synodes impériaux du VI<sup>e</sup> s. dans une chronique syriaque inédite', in *A Tribute to Arthur Vööbus*, ed. R. H. Fisher (Chicago, 1977), 302-7, who presents the fragment of a report on a synod in Constantinople, at which John of Constantinople anathematized Severus. The synod presumably took place in the early part of 571 and was summoned because the Severans 'did not behave calmly'.

23. Michael Syr., *Chron.* X, II: Chabot II, 289a-290a; and X, IV-V: 295-299. The second is also in Greek in Evagrius Schol., *HE* V, 4: Bidez-Parmentier, pp. 197, 28-201, 11.

24. The 'edictum' (Chabot, 289a) was apparently never promulgated, and it is for this reason that P. Allen, *Evagrius Scholasticus*, 212, also rightly speaks of a 'draft of an edict'.

25. Following the translation of A. Van Roey in his article: 'La controverse trithéite jusqu'à l'excommunication de Conon et d'Eugène (557-569)', *OLP* 16 (1985) (141-65), 157, who corrects that of Chabot II (289a-290a).

In this we have the acknowledgement of only the first three councils, whereby Constantinople and Ephesus are understood as an explication of Nicaea. Chalcedon itself is not named. In addition there is the anathema on the Three Chapters and, surprisingly, the recognition of Severus and the annulment of all anathemas that were imposed upon him.<sup>26</sup> The expressions 'from two natures' and the 'one incarnate *hypostasis* of the God-Logos' occur, but the *mia-physis* formula is explicitly missing. Nevertheless this proposal failed because of the resistance of the anti-Chalcedonians, for whom the formulations did not go far enough.

In a petition to the Emperor by the anti-Chalcedonian bishops the following were demanded:<sup>27</sup>

- the addition: 'one single nature or *hypostasis* of the incarnate God-Logos was formed from two natures or *hypostases*', that is the explicit *mia-physis* formula and the synonymous use of nature and *hypostasis*;
- the addition (after 'not two *hypostases*'): 'nor two natures', that is, the formal negation of the two natures;
- the condemnation of all who think otherwise and are of the opinion that is contrary to Cyril's twelve chapters — the 'edict' was seen as a confirmation of Cyril's twelve chapters.

It is interesting that, if these additions were too difficult, the bishops said they would be happy with Zeno's *Henoticon*, because this forbade any change.

These additions of the Severan bishops, however, did not satisfy the 'Monophysite' monks. It was because of their opposition that the Emperor's attempt foundered.<sup>28</sup> The reason for the monks' resistance was that the bishops had not explicitly anathematized Chalcedon, Leo's *Tomus* and all dyophysites.<sup>29</sup>

Michael the Syrian, however, does not let the affair stop there. He writes that the bishops who were distressed by the action of the monks requested Jacob Baradaeus to summon an assembly of bishops once again, and to draft a new *libellus* (concerning the position with regard to the imperial edict). Jacob (allegedly) met this demand. Together with Theodore of Arabia and the Tritheists Eugenius of Seleucia, Abouï and Phocas, he composed a new *libellus* which supposedly turned out not very different from the first (which was torn up). For this reason the reaction of the monks was the same as before. They now threatened to anathematize Jacob Baradaeus himself and to separate themselves from him as their bishop. Michael the Syrian reports that as a result Jacob anathematized this *charta*. Then the *patricius* John departed in great anger. Correspondingly he reported to the Emperor, who immediately replied with new persecutions of the anti-Chalcedonians.<sup>30</sup>

A. Van Roey doubts the historical truth of this report about a second letter from the bishops.

26. J. Maspero, *Histoire*, 168: 'Un pareil édit était purement et simplement la capitulation du catholicisme, représenté et trahi par le basileus.'

27. Michael Syr., *Chron.*, X, II: Chabot, 286b-287b.

28. *Ibid.*: Chabot, 287b-288b, relates that the writing of the bishops was torn up in a tumult by a monk Cosmas ('Bar-Hraniata') when it was read out in the monastery of Mar Zakai. When the Emperor's negotiator, the *patricius* John, learned of this he passed enraged to the other side of the Euphrates.

29. See the report of the archimandrites of the East, Mares of Mar Bassus (at Bītabō), Zenobius of Mar Bīzī (near Seleucia) and Constantine of Mar Eusebius (at Kafr Bartha) and other archimandrites to Jacob Baradaeus: *Documenta ad origines monophysitarum illustrandas*, ed. Chabot (Louvain, 1933) = CSCO 103, 120-123, esp. p. 122, 27-29.

30. Michael Syr., *Chron.* X, II: Chabot, 288b.

In any case, he maintains, it did not receive great publicity.<sup>31</sup> For in their writing just mentioned the Oriental archimandrites report to Jacob Baradaeus:

We know nothing at all of the fact that afterwards [that is, after the destruction of the first *libellus*] another *charta* with the same or a different content from the one torn up was handed over by certain people. Such a writing (*charta*) was not handed over in our name or with our assent, as you also attest.<sup>32</sup>

The Oriental archimandrites also let Jacob Baradaeus know that assent to the imperial edict, as this was expressed in the alleged *libellus*, would mean schism with him. As their writing to Jacob reports, they had a well-founded concern about the collapse of the monophysite front. They state that they had received reports from the imperial city that there some who considered themselves as 'ours' had suggested that Jacob Baradaeus and Mar Theodore should go there, in order to be able to move them to subscribe to the imperial edict under the pretext of a future union.<sup>33</sup> Michael the Syrian also reports that, in order to restore peace and the unity of the Church, the Emperor addressed a document to the *stratelates* Sergōna, to the effect that Jacob Baradaeus and Theodore should come into the residence on account of ecclesiastical matters. Only Theodore obeyed the imperial command; Jacob, however, 'followed the advice of the monks; he did not journey there. The emperor was very annoyed and fell into a rage.'<sup>34</sup>

The first edict of Emperor Justin II thus did not achieve the desired effect. The schism on account of Chalcedon still remained.

### *The edict of 571*<sup>35</sup>

The citation of John 14,27 at the beginning of the edict ('Peace I leave with you; my peace I give to you') indicates that it is an action directed explicitly at ecclesiastical peace. The Emperor immediately gives this interpretation:

This is nothing other than that those who believe in him come together in one and the same Church, and are of like mind with regard to the right teaching of the Church on the one side, and turn away from those who say or intend the opposite on the other. For correct confession of the faith was presented to all human beings as the highest benefit. Hence we also obey the evangelical commands and the holy *symbolum*, namely the teachings of the holy Fathers, and we request that all come together to one and the same Church and opinion.

On the basis of this call to unity in one and the same Church, which is established in scripture and tradition (teachings of the Fathers and confession of faith), the Emperor then cites verbatim a long excerpt

31. A. Van Roey, *art. cit.*, 159.

32. *Doc. monophys.*: Chabot, CSCO 103, p. 123,2-6.

33. *Ibid.*, p. 123,12-15: . . . *praetextu quidem unionis, quam praedicant futuram, sed revera quod cupiunt ut adhaereatis fidei in memorata charta propositae; et sic per vos scopum sibi intentum attingant.*

34. Michael Syr., *Chron.* X, II: Chabot, 289b-290b.

35. According to Dölger, *Regesten* I, no. 19, p. 3. On the dating cf. P. Allen, *Evagrius Scholasticus*, 214. We cite following Evagrius Schol., *HE* V, 4: Bidez-Parmentier, pp. 197,28-201,11.

from the beginning of Justinian's *Confessio fidei* of 551.<sup>36</sup> Into this text he inserts two passages and appends a conclusion.<sup>37</sup> What theological or christological position is expressed there?

In his comment on trinitarian theology Justin adopts Justinian's wording (with insignificant changes),<sup>38</sup> which he clearly regards as still valid in this time, when people were put on their guard by the tritheist dispute.

The christological confession likewise follows Justinian's formulations with some modifications which, however, do not alter the sense.<sup>39</sup>

There is one sentence omitted which contests that another than the God-Logos endured suffering and death, and confirms that the God-Logos assumed human flesh in order to fulfil everything (Schwartz, p. 74,2-3). The soteriological content of the statement, however, is not altered by this, especially when further on Justin adds: 'for the sake of our salvation . . . unchanged having become a human being, he who voluntarily took upon himself suffering and death for us in the flesh' (Bidez-Parmentier, p. 199,17.19-20). Also the omission (*ibid.*, p. 199,23) of three of Justinian's explanatory sentences (Schwartz, p. 74,11-14) does not alter the statement in Justin's edict, but appears more as a redactional abbreviation.

The first of the two longer additions, which Winkelmann explicitly records, renders in other words what was previously omitted.

The first addition in Justin's edict reads:

For when he became a human being for us he did not cease to be God. Certainly he did not refuse to be a human being, because he is God by nature and the similarity to us is not acceptable. As he had remained God in humanity, so he was also a human being in the superiority of the divinity, nothing less, both being in the same, and one God and at the same time human being, the Emmanuel. We confess the same, perfect in divinity and perfect in humanity, from which he is composed.

36. Justinian emp., *Confessio fidei* (CPG 6885): Schwartz, *Drei dogmat. Schriften*, pp. 72,13-74,16 and pp. 74,21-27; 76,37-78,1. We owe the observation that Justin's edict takes over parts of the *Confessio fidei* to F. Winkelmann, *Die östlichen Kirchen in der Epoche der christologischen Auseinandersetzungen* (Berlin, 1980), 104-6, esp. 105-6.

37. Evagrius Schol., *HE* V, 4: Bidez-Parmentier, p. 199,26-34 and p. 200,15-25; for the conclusion see pp. 200,26-201,11.

38. In the confession of the Trinity the phrase *logo kai pragmati* is added after the words 'one godhead, namely nature and essence'; furthermore the word *energeia* is added in the listing 'one strength and fullness of power'. The explanation that the properties separate the persons of the Trinity, but the divinity unites them, is omitted; in addition the sentences at the end of the trinitarian part about the rejection of the notion of Sabellius and Arius are absent.

39. Thus in addition Mary is denoted as lady and glorious (Bidez-Parmentier, pp. 199,2 and 200,11-12). The compiler of the edict attaches lines to the title 'one of the Trinity' which in Justinian's edict come later (Schwartz, pp. 76,37-78,1): 'co-glorified with the Father and the Holy Spirit. For the holy Trinity does not add a fourth person as an appendage; incarnate is one of the Trinity, the God-Logos.' This citation concludes with the words: 'but one and the same is our Lord Jesus Christ'.

In the last sentence the phrase 'perfect in divinity and perfect in humanity', familiar from Cyril and Chalcedon, is added. Immediately afterwards 'composed' is additionally expressed of the *hypostasis*, corresponding completely to Justinian's christology. The addition, however, replaces Justinian's sentence:

and when we discern in each of the two natures, that is, in divinity and humanity, the one Jesus Christ our Lord, the God-Logos become flesh and a human being,

and immediately after that the following sentence is omitted:

For if we confess the composition, then the parts are discernible in the whole and the whole in the parts. (Schwartz, p. 74,20-21)

Thus the statement about the discernment (*ginoskontes, ginosketai*) of the two natures in the whole of the *synthesis* is dropped. In the addition the discernment is changed into the confession of the one Christ.

Justinian is again clearly adopted, yet with the statement that the God-Logos united himself not to a previously existing human being, but created for himself from Mary a human being 'like us in all things, sin excluded' (cf. Chalcedon) — an addition. No doubt remains that the unity has to be sought in the *hypostasis*. This is clearly expressed in the explanation of the hypostatic union, which is taken over from Justinian:

The union according to the *hypostasis* is, however, that the God-Logos, that is, the one *hypostasis* of the three *hypostases* of the divinity, did not unite himself with a previously existing human being, but in the womb of the . . . *Theotokos* . . . Mary created [*edemiourgesen*] from her for himself a flesh in the one *hypostasis*, consubstantial with us and like us in all things [in suffering, *homoiopathe*], sin excluded, animated by a rational, spiritual soul.<sup>40</sup>

The second (longer) addition begins with a sentence which has no parallel in Justinian and expresses clearly in a noteworthy way that the *hypostasis* of the incarnate Christ is in the God-Logos:<sup>41</sup>

For in him he had the *hypostasis* and he became a human being, and one and the same is our Lord Jesus Christ, glorified with the Father and the Holy Spirit.

Then the edict reads practically as a summary.

Thus when we think of the unutterable union, we rightly confess one incarnate nature of the God-Logos in a flesh animated by a rational, spiritual soul. And when once again we grasp in *theoria* the distinction of the natures, we say that these are two, and in doing so we introduce no separation. For each of the two natures is in him.<sup>42</sup> Hence we can confess

40. Bidez-Parmentier, p. 200,8-15.

41. On this cf. similarly Leontius Jer., CN I, 49: PG 86, 1512B.

42. In Justinian this sentence occurs earlier as well: Schwartz, p. 74,20.



one and the same Christ, one Son, one *prosopon*, one *hypostasis*, God and at the same time human being.

In this way the *mia-physis* formula is explained as orthodox and the two natures are confessed in *theoria*. Thus in this edict Justin is once again in line with Justinian's (moderate) neo-Chalcedonianism.

We have the following elements of Justinian's christology: the 'one of the Trinity (became a human being)', 'in *theoria* two'; the formula 'in two natures' is missing, and in its place there is 'composed . . . from two natures' (p. 199,24.34), although it is not specially highlighted; 'composite' occurs often; the 'union according to the *hypostasis*' is understood precisely in Justinian's sense, as the act of creating the flesh from Mary in his [i.e. the Logos'] own *hypostasis*. *Mia hypostasis* clearly denotes the *hypostasis* of the Logos, not that of the *apotelesma*.

After the development of the confession in this way, the conclusion expresses the condemnation of all who do not think accordingly, and as well the fact that the customs and stance in the Church should be maintained.<sup>43</sup>

Thus in the edict of Justin II we have a slight shift of Justinian's christology towards the *mia-physis* formula, towards a position where the two natures are no longer stressed so strongly,<sup>44</sup> even though they are, however, expressed in fact. The unity in Christ is emphasized more than the distinction of the two natures, which nevertheless is constantly upheld (in *theoria*).<sup>45</sup> That the concepts *hypostasis* and *physis* are no longer used synonymously is not stated explicitly (as in Justinian), but the non-synonymous use occurs in practice.

In summary, with the excerpts from the *Confessio fidei* of 551 Justin II here takes over the elements of Justinian's christology. The simultaneous use of the two formulas (*mia physis* — *dyo physeis*) is not demanded, but it is certainly established that both can be rightly confessed.

With this edict, however, Justin II was not able to attain the union with the Severans for which he had persistently striven because they held

43. An addition which is missing in Michael the Syrian; cf. P. Allen, *Evagrius Scholasticus*, 25. On this as well John Ephes., *HE* I, 19: Brooks, p. 18,2: *et ipsi de suis in fine edicti haeretice inseruerunt Ecclesiae consuetudines ei conseruentur*, *quasi propter synodum, ut secundum consuetudinem suam eam proclamarent*.

44. In his edict Justin seems to want to circumvent the expression *physis*: the sentence in Schwartz, p. 74,16–18 (*ἐν ἑκατέροις δὲ φύσει . . . γινώσκοντες*) is paraphrased without employing *physis* (Bidez-Parmentier, p. 199,33–34), and the clause in Schwartz, p. 74,27 (*ὅπερ ἐστὶ φύσις ἀνθρωπίνῃ*) is omitted (Bidez-Parmentier, p. 200,15).

45. The characteristic adverbs in Chalcedon's definition also resonate: no transformation (*ἀτρέπτως*, p. 199,19), no mingling (*σύγχυσιν* . . . *οὐκ ἐπεισάγομεν*, p. 199,26), no separation (*διαίρεσιν* . . . *οὐκ ἐπιφέρομεν*, p. 200,1).

out for an annulment of Chalcedon.<sup>46</sup> He turned to coercive measures, and a period of persecution began for the 'Monophysites'. Both 'edicts', essential signposts in the six-year long efforts of the Emperor to restore ecclesial unity by dialogues and negotiations,<sup>47</sup> thus led to a dismal failure. Under the Emperors Tiberius and Maurice who followed Justin II there were no negotiations with the Severans. Dialogues and negotiations were conducted more and more by the Chalcedonian patriarchs.<sup>48</sup>

## II. THEOLOGICAL POSITIONS AT THE END OF THE SIXTH CENTURY

### 1. The testimony of Patriarch Eutychius of Constantinople

The Cyrillian extension of Chalcedonian terminology and of its major formula after 553 appears not to have been taken up everywhere with the same intensity. A writing of Patriarch Eutychius of Constantinople (552–565, 577–582), which is preserved only in Armenian, testifies to this. Eutychius was one of the presidents of the Council of 553 and their head. After his deposition and during his exile from the capital (565), which he spent in his home monastery in Amaseia,<sup>49</sup> he composed the

46. Cf. John Ephes., *HE* I, 19–20; Brooks, 16–18; see also Michael Syr., *Chron.* X, 6; Chabot II, 299–300. The edict was presented to anti-Chalcedonian bishops imprisoned in Constantinople, so that they could make their own improvements. Because of the resistance of the Patriarch of Constantinople and the Chalcedonians, only a few of these corrections were incorporated into the edict, although the additions were said to have pleased the Emperor. From the fear, however, that these *capita* would plunge the Church into great agitation, according to Michael the Emperor succumbed. As a result the 'Monophysites' did not accept the imperial edict. They demanded that Chalcedon be withdrawn so that automatically ecclesial peace would be restored: *causa offensae et perturbationis totius ecclesiae, synodus videlicet Chalcedonis, e medio tollitur* (Brooks, p. 18, 24–25). Cf. also John Ephes., *HE* I, 24; Brooks, p. 22, 14: *synodum Chalcedonis eicite*. John claims that the edict was written ambiguously, on the one side against, and on the other for the synod (= Chalcedon). According to John Ephes., *HE* I, 24; Brooks, 21–24, it came to the *communio* of the anti-Chalcedonian bishops with John of Constantinople, with the promise that Chalcedon would be anathematized. This promise, however, was not kept.

47. On the Emperor's efforts with regard to the Severans cf. P. Goubert, *art. cit.* Justin II intervened also in order to achieve a union between monophysites and the tritheist Athanasius, and a union in Egypt.

48. Cf. P. Allen, 'Neo-Chalcedonism and the Patriarchs of the Late Sixth Century', *Byz* 50 (1980), 5–17, esp. 8.

49. See R. Janin, art. 'Eutichio', in *Bibl.SS* V (Rome, 1964), 323–4; *Vita*, in *ASS Aprilis* I (Antwerp, 1675), 550–72; PG 86, 2273–2389; Grumel, *Regestes* I<sup>2</sup>, 177–181, 190–192.

writing on the major trinitarian-christological concepts 'nature' and 'hypostasis'.<sup>50</sup>

For his explanation of *physis* and *hypostasis* Eutychius embraces the *theologia* and the *oikonomia*, and elaborates for both the same conceptual content. His starting-point, however, is the *synonymous* use of nature and *hypostasis* by representatives of 'profane science'. His authority for the *distinction* of nature and *hypostasis* is Basil (*Ep.* 210.214.52 and especially *Ep.* 236 to Amphilochius). Naturally letter 38 also plays a special rôle; in the transmission of the text this letter is sometimes ascribed to Basil, and sometimes to Gregory of Nyssa. Eutychius decides in favour of Gregory of Nyssa.<sup>51</sup> The Cappadocian definition of *hypostasis* is adopted without any particular alteration, as is the transposition of trinitarian terminology to teaching about the incarnation.<sup>52</sup> In this way the holistic interpretation of Christ's person is expressed completely according to the state of the christology of 565, but with an emphatic recourse to Chalcedon which is striking.

(1) Eutychius speaks clearly of the insubsistence of Christ's humanity in the *hypostasis* of the Logos.<sup>53</sup> Christ, however, is a *synthesis* from two unequal natures in one person, not a nature unity from (incomplete) partial natures. If the term 'Christ' holds for the Logos only after the incarnation, he is still only one person and *hypostasis*.<sup>54</sup>

(2) Eutychius explained Cyril's *mia-physis* formula by its opposition to Nestorius<sup>55</sup> and his interpretation of the 'two natures' in the sense of 'two *hypostases*'. Eutychius attempted to construct a bridge from Cyril's

50. Eutychius Const., *De differentia naturae et hypostaseos* (CPG 6940): in the Italian translation of P. Ananian, 'L'opuscolo di Eutichio patriarca di Costantinopoli sulla "Distinzione della natura e persona"', in *Armeniaca. Mélanges d'Études arméniennes* (Venice, 1969), 355–82; for the Italian text see 364–82.

51. Cf. *JdChr* I<sup>3</sup>, 542–5, on CPG 2900. Eutychius produces a long extract: Ananian, 368–70, who notes the divergences of the Armenian text from PG 32, 325.328–329.336, which are in part considerable.

52. Eutychius Const., *op. cit.*, nos. 6–12: Ananian, 372–8; esp. in no. 8, p. 374, Eutychius investigates the major texts, which from Gregory Nazianzen on were decisive for standardizing trinitarian and incarnational terminology: *Or.* 30: PG 36, 113; *Ep. ad Cledon.* 102: PG 36, 180; *De nativ. Chr.*: PG 36, 328–329.

53. Eutychius Const., *op. cit.*, no. 6: Ananian 372: 'ma fu ordinato che il corpo, preso dalla santa madre di Dio e sempre vergine Maria, sia nell'ipostasi del Verbo'.

54. *Ibid.*, no. 7, p. 373: 'Quindi (Cristo) è uno *nella ipostasi e non nella natura*, colui che viene considerato in due nature . . . Quindi Cristo è due nature, . . . ed è composto da due nature; però è una l'ipostasi e una la persona di questo composto.'

55. *Ibid.*, no. 9, pp. 374–5.

terminology for *theologia* (where *hypostasis* and nature are clearly divided) to the terminology for *oikonomia*.<sup>56</sup>

What is important is that for Eutychius 'Christ' is not a *tertium quid*, a third product from the addition of two *homoousia*,<sup>57</sup> nor a third composite, as Peter and Paul are *composita* from body and soul.<sup>58</sup> A 'third' could not result from divinity and humanity in Christ, because the ensouled body assumed from the Virgin had its *hypostasis* in that it was in the *hypostasis* of the Logos.<sup>59</sup> The twofold consubstantiality in Christ, to God and to us, relates in contrast to the natures. This 'terzo risultato' should not be inferred from the univocal application of the body-soul analogy to Christ.<sup>60</sup> The result is thus that, corresponding to the Church's tradition, there are many distinctions between 'nature', 'essence' and *hypostasis*.<sup>61</sup> The unity of subject in Christ is clearly recognized and is present in the *hypostasis* of the Logos. This is the concern of Eutychius. The Patriarch had little to say in interpreting how the insubistence happens. It did not pertain to his theme.

In the second part of his treatise Eutychius discusses the (Cappadocian) teaching on properties (*idiomata*) with reference to Basil, Gregory of Nyssa<sup>62</sup> and the discussion about the formulas 'from two natures' and 'in two natures' which arose at the Synods of Constantinople (448), Ephesus (449) and Chalcedon (451).<sup>63</sup> It is worth noting that the Patriarch here rejects the 'from two natures' of Dioscorus just like the papal and imperial representatives at the Council of Chalcedon. In conclusion he summarizes the whole confession of the Council of 451<sup>64</sup>

56. *Ibid.*, no. 9: Ananian 375. Here Eutychius refers to Cyril's *Dialogue*, where he says that against the philosopher Hermias, Cyril stresses his knowledge of the distinction between nature and *hypostasis*. That the *mia physis*, however, is to be interpreted in the sense of 'one *hypostasis*', Eutychius attempts to prove from Cyril Alex., *Ep. 17 ad Nestor*. (III) (CPG 5317): PG 77, 116C: 'Tutte le voci del vangelo sono da attribuire all'unica ipostasi, (cioè) all'unico Verbo incarnato (ὁποσάδει μιᾷ τῇ λόγον σαρκακωμένη); perché è unico il nostro Signore Gesù Cristo, secondo le sacre scritture.' The fact remains, however, that Cyril also accepts *physis* and *hypostasis* as synonymous for the doctrine of the incarnation. He could also have used φύσει μιᾷ in the passage cited here.

57. *Ibid.*, no. 10: Ananian 375.

58. *Ibid.*, 376.

59. *Ibid.*

60. *Ibid.*, no. 11: Ananian 377. Eutychius cites Ps. Justin (= Theodoret), *Expositio rectae fidei* (CPG 6218), but as an authentic text of Justin. In the application of this analogy Theodoret distinguishes, as Eutychius comments, between what is pertinent and what is not.

61. *Ibid.*, no. 12, p. 377.

62. *Ibid.*, nos. 13-14: Ananian 378-80.

63. *Ibid.*, nos. 15-16: Ananian 380-2.

64. In this summary the Armenian text exhibits some lacunae, which Ananian (381) fills, not, however, with the text of the synod, but with words from Leo's *Tomus* to Flavian.

by referring to the 'in two natures' of Basil of Seleucia, introduced at the Flavian Synod of 448 and taken over by Chalcedon:<sup>65</sup>

The Synod of Chalcedon produced this same formula (with one omission) . . . and simply confessed Christ in two natures and in one *hypostasis* and in one person.

The whole is thought of as a justification of the main formula of Chalcedon. Through the sharp contrasting of *physis* and *hypostasis* and the location of the 'one *hypostasis*' in the pre-existent Logos, an interpretation of Chalcedon was arrived at which was beneficial for the Council. There are many elements here which recall Leontius of Jerusalem and Justinian's edict of 551. Not counting the expression *synthesis*, which is already found in the authors named, the Council of 553 left behind hardly any traces.

Did the president of the Council of 553 not return to a pure Chalcedonianism?

## 2. The Chalcedonian writing *De sectis*

By T. Hainthaler

The author of *De sectis*<sup>66</sup> is, according to the superscription, Leontius Scholasticus of Byzantium, who took notes in the lectures 'of the abbot, dearly beloved of God, and very wise philosopher, Theodore'.<sup>67</sup> The identification of the author of the writing has given rise to many difficulties, and we can also give only a negative response to it.

1. Leontius Scholasticus is not to be confused with Leontius of Byzantium. The hypothesis of F. Loofs that *De sectis* is only the reworking of a lost work (the *scholia Leontiou*) of Leontius of Byzantium can no longer be maintained after the works of Junglas, Richard and Rees.<sup>68</sup>

65. *Ibid.*, 381.

66. *Liber de sectis* (CPG 6823): PG 86, 1193–1268. A critical edition is not yet available. On text-critical questions see M. Waegeman, 'The Text Tradition of the Treatise *De sectis* (Ps. Leontius Byzantinus)', *AnCl* 45 (1976), 190–6. We shall cite the text with reference to the number of the *actio* (πρᾶξις) as well as to the number in the Latin translation.

67. According to M. Richard, 'ΑΠΟ ΦΩΝΗΣ', *Byz* 20 (1950), 191–222 (= *Op. Min.* III, no. 60), esp. 200–2, this is the correct interpretation of the title, against Loofs.

68. The 'hypothesis of an original lost writing' proposed by F. Loofs, *Leontius von Byzanz und die gleichnamigen Schriftsteller der griechischen Kirche* = *TU* 3, 1–2 (Leipzig, 1887), 136–63, was already criticized by J. P. Junglas, *Leontius von Byzanz* = *FCLDG* 7/3 (Paderborn, 1908), 5–20. F. Loofs, *ThLZ* 34 (1909), 205–9, esp. 207–8, however, continued to cling to it. In 1939 Loofs' thesis was opposed simultaneously and independently by M. Richard, 'Le traité *De Sectis* et Léonce de Byzance', *RHE* 35 (1939), 695–723 = *Op. Min.* II, no. 55, and by S. Rees, 'The

We shall briefly give the most important arguments.

(i) The expression *ἀπὸ φωνῆς* in the superscript must be correctly interpreted, not as 'the *σχόλια* of Leontius in the reworking [and after the dictation] of Theodorus',<sup>69</sup> but as notes of the lectures of Theodore which Leontius made (proof: Richard; cf. also Junglas).

(ii) The definition of concepts in *actio* I would not have satisfied Leontius of Byzantium. The concepts *enhyposstaton* and *hypostasis* (cf. *actio* VII) are sharply distinguished by Leontius, but in *De sectis* they are mixed; according to *De sectis* an accident can be *enhyposstaton*, but not according to Leontius (Richard, Rees).

(iii) *De sectis* had a detached view of the body-soul comparison (*actio* VII, VI-VIII; 1245C-1249C), whereas Leontius of Byzantium esteemed it highly (Richard).

(iv) It is striking that Theodore of Mopsuestia was defended by *De sectis*, while he was strongly attacked by Leontius of Byzantium (Rees).

2. The 'abbot and philosopher Theodore' is not Theodore of Raithu. Junglas was the first to suggest Theodore of Raithu as the author,<sup>70</sup> a thesis which Richard expressly attempted to support, but later, after the publication of the work of Elert, rescinded.<sup>71</sup>

In our opinion the following considerations tell against the hypothesis.

(i) *De sectis* defends a strict Chalcedonianism, whereas Theodore of Raithu in the *Praeparatio* is an explicit neo-Chalcedonian.

*De Sectis: A Treatise Attributed to Leontius of Byzantium*, *JTS* 40 (1939), 346-60. M. van Esbroeck has recently returned in two articles to Loofs' hypothesis in a modified form: 'Le "De sectis" attribué à Léonce de Byzance (CPG 6823) dans la version géorgienne d'Arsène Iqaltoeli', *Bedi Kartlisa* 42 (1984), 35-52; *idem*, 'La date et l'auteur du *De sectis* attribué à Léonce de Byzance', in *After Chalcedon*, *FS A. Van Roey* = *OLA* 18 (Louvain, 1985), 415-24. M. van Esbroeck advocates a dating of the text to 543-551 and sees in *De sectis* (by an Abbot Theodore) a continuation of the writings *CNE*, *CA* and *DTN* of Leontius of Byzantium, reworked to address the Gaianites; he suggests that the original form of the work could quite well stem from Leontius of Byzantium. Nevertheless, serious theological doubts (concerning tritheism, the works of John Philoponus, the Gaianites) stand in the way of this thesis. For more details the critical edition is to be awaited.

69. F. Loofs, *op. cit.*, 141-2.

70. J. P. Junglas, *op. cit.*, 16.

71. M. Richard, *Op. Min.* II, no. 55, 700-3. He indicates three similarities to the *Praeparatio* of Theodore of Raithu. (1) The introduction of the concepts *ousia*, *physis*, *hypostasis* and *prosopon* at the beginning of *De sectis* is quite consistent with *Praep.*, ed. Diekamp, 185-222, esp. 207-216. (2) At the end of *actio* I the position of the Church is characterized as the middle way (*μέσων χορευούσα*, 1200A) *vis-à-vis* the heresies, a conception which is very pronounced in Theodore of Raithu. (3) There is the introduction of Aristotelian scholasticism into theology (although we have to notice that this was previously present in the Leontii, and even more strongly in John Philoponus). S. Rees, *art. cit.* takes over the hypothesis of Junglas, but in his arguments refutes only the thesis of Loofs that *De sectis* goes back to Leontius of Byzantium. He brings no positive evidence for the fact that *De sectis* stems from Theodore of Raithu, whose authorship he nevertheless upholds: *idem*, 'The Literary Activity of Leontius of Byzantium', *JTS* 19 (1968), 220-42 (242: 'Theodore of Raithu, author of *De Sectis*, at the end of the sixth century'). C. Moeller, 'Le chalcédonisme et le néo-chalcédonisme', in *Chalkedon* I, 664-6, 685-6, continues to distinguish between Theodore of Raithu and the author of *De sectis*, cf. 699. After the work of W. Elert, 'Theodor von Pharan und Theodor von Raithu', *ThLZ* 76 (1951), 67-76, Richard, *Op. Min.* II, no. 55, Append., himself established that this identification had to be abandoned.

(ii) In the *Praeparatio* Theodore of Mopsuestia is unambiguously rejected as a heretic (ed. Diekamp, 188); *De sectis*, however, clearly harbours sympathy for him.

(iii) *De sectis* distinguishes itself by an unusual sense of historical developments, a sense which is certainly not documented in the *Praeparatio*. There, for instance, heretics are depicted purely schematically, and the *mia-physis* formula and the two-natures formula appear in the abstract with no historical anchoring.

Where did this writing originate? Speigl is of the opinion that 'it fits well into the framework of Chalcedonian orthodoxy in the area of Raithu-Pharan-Sinai monasteries at the end of the sixth century'.<sup>72</sup> In favour of this thesis one can adduce the fact that the arguments of the Hebrews and Samaritans against the Christian faith are treated first and in detail. However, that can also be explained satisfactorily by the author's chronological approach, which centres on the history of salvation. Furthermore, one is struck by the author's remarkable knowledge of Egyptian relationships;<sup>73</sup> thus the post-Chalcedonian developments are depicted only for Egypt with the production of a (complete) list of patriarchs. Three heresies receive detailed treatment: Gaianites, Agnoetai (*actio* X) and Tritheists (*actio* V), all of which had their origin in Alexandria. They were then, however, continually discussed in Constantinople and also combated there. We have no clear indications which would enable us to allocate the work to the Sinai region. In addition, on the basis of the christological thoughts expressed, it seems possible that it could have its origin in the Constantinopolitan area. Therefore we have decided to treat this important work at the end of the sixth century in the framework of the Patriarchate of Constantinople.

The dating of the writing, however, seems to be clear: *actio* V, V gives a list of the bishops (*τάξις τῶν ἐπισκόπων*) of Alexandria, which ends with Eulogius (581–608) (1232C). Accordingly this part of *De sectis* was not written before 581, and thus not after his Patriarchate, for then 'this' would not be the list of patriarchs.

*Actio* V, V is, however, not a singular piece, but is inserted into the author's plan to sketch the development of the dogmas of the Christians 'to the present' (*ἄχρι τοῦ νῦν*, *actio* III, I; 1212C).

The writing begins by explaining briefly the four concepts (*ousia*,

72. J. Speigl, 'Der Autor der Schrift *De Sectis* über die Konzilien und die Religionspolitik Justinians', *AHC* 2 (1970), 207–30, here 208. Speigl bases his thesis otherwise only on the arguments which Richard produces for Theodore of Raithu as the author of *De sectis*.

73. M. Waegeman, 'The Old Testament Canon in the Treatise *De sectis*', *AnCl* 50 (1981), 813–18, particularly on the basis of the Old Testament canon in *De sectis*, declares that the author belonged to the Alexandrian school (*ibid.*, 818).

*physis*, *hypostasis*, *prosopon*)<sup>74</sup> and then proceeds to trinitarian teaching and tells the story of creation (I, II); subsequently it follows biblical chronology: the flood, the story of Joseph, the exodus from Egypt, Moses, the giving of the commandments. After a brief reference to the activity of the prophets, who nevertheless did not move the people to conversion ('They were admonished by many prophets, but they remained the same'), the incarnation is related with an explanation of three attributes: unmingled, true, undivided. The brief characterization of the life of Jesus ends with the confession of Christ's resurrection, ascension and return. We shall render this *regula fidei* verbatim.

Then the Son and Logos of God dwelt for our sake in the *Theotokos*, clothed with an ensouled body, rational, intelligent, and simply human, united to the human body, *unmingled*, *true*, *undivided*. True, because *one hypostasis* resulted [*apoteleo*] from the God-Logos and the human body. Unmingled, because after the union the united are preserved, and have not been changed essentially. Undivided, because their *hypostasis* is one. All this is entrusted to us by holy scripture (for us to believe). For it speaks of one and the same, as if works happened from different natures, now from God, now from the human being. For everything that a human being must endure, he endured. For he was born, and was nourished with milk and reared, and he grew, and when he was thirty years old he was baptized, and after the baptism he began to do signs and to teach the Jews. And at the age of thirty-three he was crucified, and, as crucified, he arose on the third day and was taken up into heaven with his body, and now with it he sits at the right hand of the Father, and he is the one who will judge the living and the dead at the resurrection. This is the faith of Christians.<sup>75</sup>

After this beginning, which is clearly orientated to the history of salvation, a type of history of heresies is offered in *actiones* II–V: as a prelude to this we find at the end of *actio* I a crude confrontation of extreme positions: Sabellius–Arius and Nestorius–Eutyches. Then in connection with the listing and characterization of the books of the Old and New Testaments there follows a depiction and refutation of the 'heresy' of the Hebrews and Samaritans (relating to trinitarian theology and christology). For the period after Christ, on each occasion the teachers and Fathers as well as the heresies are named, divided up into the time between Christ's birth and the beginning of the Constantinian Empire, and from then up to the time of the author, with the last period being once again subdivided by Chalcedon.

That the author is an unreserved defender of the Council of Chalcedon is shown especially in *actiones* VI–VIII, in which he presents and refutes arguments against Chalcedon of a historical (VI), philosophical (VII)

74. *De sectis* establishes that both *ousia* and *physis*, as well as *hypostasis* and *prosopon*, are used synonymously by the Fathers. The same argument is also found in John Philoponus, *Diaetetes* 7,21: Sanda 56.

75. Leontius Schol., *De sectis* I, III: PG 86, 1197BD.



and patristic (VIII) nature. Thus a third<sup>76</sup> of his writing is concerned exclusively with the justification of Chalcedon. It is perhaps in the historical part of this justification in particular that 'his feeling for historical developments' is clearly evident, whereby his tone remains 'calm, sober and measured', and hence 'a sense of peace and objectivity' is communicated.<sup>77</sup>

In *actio* VII, which is devoted to philosophical arguments, two objections in particular are discussed, which are proposed from the 'Monophysite' side and which are also to found again in John Philoponus, the Alexandrian philosopher and theologian. Indeed, John Philoponus is named in the *De sectis*, but as an (Aristotelian trained) heresiarch of the Tritheists,<sup>78</sup> not as a Miaphysite. The two objections of Philoponus read:

1. If you speak of two natures in Christ, then you also teach two *hypostases*. If (you teach) two *hypostases*, (you teach) also two persons and two Christs, and two sons, and thus you turn out to have the same opinion as Nestorius.<sup>79</sup>
2. If you speak of two natures, you introduce a separation. For you introduce a number; a number, however, is a discrete dimension.<sup>80</sup>

The author responds to this with a conceptual explanation of *hypostasis* and discusses the claim that number is a discrete dimension.

First of all he points out to the opposition that the proposed conclusion produces more dangerous contradictions for their own mode of expression, viz. Christ is *ἐκ δύο φύσεων*, than for that of the Chalcedonians. For then there would be actually two *hypostases* and two persons, and it follows that the humanity existed at some time without the divinity, which is absurd and which the opposition certainly does not want to affirm. If one says 'from two natures', then one already presupposes the existence (of those to be united), whereas 'in two natures' speaks of them only after the union.

What is essential, however, is the indication that *hypostasis* can have a twofold meaning: something that exists, and something that exists for itself. Depending upon what the questioner understands by *hypostasis*, one will give a (different) answer to the question about whether Christ's natures are hypostatic or anhypostatic. If *hypostasis* simply means something that exists, then Christ's two natures are to be called

76. Thirteen of the thirty-seven columns in PG 86 are devoted to the discussion of Chalcedon.

77. J. Speigl, *art. cit.*, 230 and 212 respectively. Speigl works out carefully the conception which the author of *De sectis* had of the councils and of Justinian's religious politics.

78. Leontius Schol., *De sectis*, V, VI: PG 86, 1232D-1233B.

79. Cf. John Philoponus, *Diaetetes*, VII, 28-29; X, 35: Sanda 63-64, 70.

80. Cf. *idem*, *op. cit.*, IV, 17: Sanda 52-53.

hypostatic, for they are real. Should *hypostasis* in contrast characterize something that exists for itself, then one will answer that Christ's natures are anhypostatic, since they do not exist for themselves. One cannot imagine such a conciliatory manner of speaking in Leontius of Byzantium.

With regard to the second question, at first the author directs the opponents' argument again to their formula, and shows that, with their claim that number would separate, they introduce a separation into their own mode of expression (from two natures) in exactly the same way.

Philosophically, however, the author contests that number is a discrete dimension. One can use number both for discrete things as well as for things that belong together (for example, a log five metres long). Again, as in the first objection, he allows a double linguistic usage:

Number is also a double (meaning) dimension, which is stated both of discrete things and of continuous things. (1244A)

In a second approach, *De sectis* then attempts a new explanation: one must distinguish between whether one affirms the two according to number or according to kind (*τῷ ἀριθμῷ*, *τῷ εἶδει*). For this distinction the author refers to Aristotle, who 'openly said that matter and form are one according to number and two according to kind' (1244C). Consequently one can then say of Christ that he is one according to number, and two according to kind. Once again *De sectis* seeks a solution here by distinguishing the different respects under which each statement is made, a solution which admittedly is not participated in by the opponents. In the christological question this was presumably caused by the identification of nature and *hypostasis* (cf. Philoponus), which no longer allowed a distinction.

### *The body-soul analogy rejected*

In *De sectis* the body-soul paradigm is first mentioned by the miaphysites as a reply to the Church's objection that two natures are introduced of necessity, if after the union the united are distinguished.<sup>81</sup> The human being's body and soul are united unmingled, and yet there is *one* nature of the human being. The 'Synodists' (that is, the Chalcedonians), however, also call upon the comparison for their own purposes. *De sectis* nevertheless exhibits a more reserved position.

81. *De sectis*, VII, V: PG 86, 1245A. Cf. John Philoponus, *Dialetes*, X, 36-37: Sanda 70-71, who in justification adduces the body-soul analogy as the first example (X, 37).

The Theodosians are reproached with wanting to apply the anthropological example to Christ in everything (VII, VI; 1245C). In the 'repetition' (from VI, VII) then comes the detailed discussion of the body-soul model. First of all *De sectis* dissociates itself from the reference of the 'Synodists' to the fact that the human being too is composed of two natures: 'the Synodists are driven into the corner by this example' (1248C). In addition Leontius Scholasticus defends the Theodosians against the claim that they for their part must confess 'from three', if they want to force the Synodists to a confession of Christ 'in three natures'. Thus he clearly finds fault with the indication as an excuse that the human being is also said to have two natures. Immediately after this he states that a human being has one nature, but Christ has two. (1248D)

At the end of VII, VI we find a proposition which is central to the christology of *De sectis*:

For Christ's two [natures] have the same basis [relationship] with regard to the *hypostasis* as the [human being's] one nature has to a human being's *hypostasis*. (1248B)

This proposition forms the background for the entire presentation of VII, VIII and can be heard echoing here. *De sectis* explains that if one remains on the level of the natures and wants to interpret the 'end-product' (*ἀποτέλεσμα*),<sup>82</sup> Christ, by means of the body-soul analogy, then one cannot maintain the scriptural confession (*ὁμολόγηται*; 1248D) of true God and true human being. *De sectis* formulates this scriptural confession of faith in the following way:

It is confessed that he was God and a human being and that he himself was completely God and completely human, and God according to nature and human according to nature, and consubstantial with God and consubstantial with us, and one of the Trinity and one of us, and that the God-Logos vouchsafed to become a human being.<sup>83</sup>

The confession also contains the phrase *unus de sancta trinitate*, but without further addition, simply to express the identity of the second divine person and the human being. Against this *homologia* the teaching of the *mia physis* or the two natures is tested.

Assuming that one takes a body and soul and forms a human being, then this human being is consubstantial neither with the soul nor with the body. If one now wants to apply this paradigm to Christ and puts the divinity in the place of the soul and the humanity in the place of the body, then the *apotelesma* is neither consubstantial with the Father nor consubstantial with human beings, and thus the confession is violated. If in contrast one assumes two natures in Christ, then all the statements of the confession are present. This is because the *hypostasis* allows the concept of two natures.<sup>84</sup>

*De sectis* rightly sees that the understanding of the unity of divinity

82. This word that is used so frequently in Leontius of Byzantium finds application remarkably often in *De sectis*, but it is introduced as a term of the Theodosians, whose formula runs: *διάφορα τὰ μέρη, τὸ δὲ ἀποτέλεσμα ἓν* (1245C).

83. *De sectis*, VII, VII: PG 86, 1248D-1249A; cf. VII, VIII: 1249BC.

84. *De sectis*, VII, VIII: PG 86, 1249AD.

and humanity in Christ as a *mia physis*, which is then interpreted with the body-soul paradigm, is mistaken. The reason for this is that the unity in Christ is seen as a nature unity and not as a *unio hypostatica et secundum hypostasin*. The similarity of the unity in Christ to the unity in a human being does not consist in the unity of body and soul, but in the unity of human nature and *hypostasis*. *De sectis* rightly and clearly indicates this state of affairs. However, it lacks an exact terminology to express this precisely. *De sectis* contributes nothing to an explanation of how the relationship of *hypostasis* and nature (or two natures) in Christ is to be understood.

### *The mia-physis formula*

It is only in *actio* VIII, in the discussion of patristic arguments, that there is talk of the *mia-physis* formula. Then it is used against the charge of the opponents of the Council of Chalcedon that the Council did not mention this formula of Cyril. *De sectis* responds that the formula is Cyril's, but it is not opposed to the Council's teaching. For he does not speak of the one incarnate nature of Christ, but of the God-Logos, so clearly of another nature. And in order to indicate another nature he says precisely 'incarnate'.<sup>85</sup> A confession of the *mia-physis* formula is found again further on (VIII, IV), in connection with an inauthentic citation of Athanasius:

We do not teach two natures, one of which is adored and the other not, but we say one nature of the incarnate Logos. (1256C)

*De sectis* shares this understanding of the formula also with Theodore of Raithu,<sup>86</sup> but here nevertheless, in contrast to the *Praeparatio*, it is in no way a tessera of orthodoxy.

### *The picture of Christ*

The christology of *De sectis* gains more profile in the rebuttal of heresies. Against the Gaianites, *De sectis* holds that Christ voluntarily subjected himself to the laws of the body and suffered like us. The difference is only that he was not necessarily subjected to the laws of nature. Christ's body was not incorruptible before the resurrection, and afterwards it was incorruptible through grace and not according to nature (X, I-II; 1260B-1261D). In the position it takes on the Agnoetic question, as we

85. In justification *De sectis* offers a long citation from Cyril, *Ep. 46 ad Succens.*: PG 77, 244A1-B11.

86. As well with John the Grammarian, Justinian in *Contra Monophysitas*, Leontius of Byzantium; cf. M. Richard, *art. cit.* (*Op. Min.* II, no. 55), 711.

have already indicated, *De sectis* shows itself remarkably circumspect and completely orientated towards Chalcedon's definition.

How should we define the christological position of the writing characterized by C. Moeller as 'a kind of résumé of the theology of the epoch'?<sup>87</sup>

We are not able to find any re-Cyrrillization. Saint Cyril, one of the holy Fathers, appears particularly as the authority to whom the opponents have recourse, and *De sectis* shows that Chalcedon does not stand in opposition to Cyril's main formulas, such as 'union according to the *hypostasis*' and the *mia-physis* formula, if these are understood in the sense of the two natures. How does it stand with regard to the elements which Justinian and the Council of 553 included?

'According to *theoria*' plays no rôle in *De sectis* (cf. VII, I-II); of the two formulas 'from two' and 'in two', the 'in two' receives hefty support in contrast to the 'from two' (cf VII, I and III). *Synthesis* does not occur. 'Union according to the *hypostasis*' is explained as being in agreement with Chalcedon (VIII, I). 'One of the Trinity' indeed occurs, but without further additions.

On the whole the writing shows a remarkable abstinence *vis-à-vis* typical neo-Chalcedonian terminology. The attitude it displays towards the Council of 553 is also surprising; Constantinople II is not even mentioned by *De sectis*. It represents the Three Chapters in the following way: Justinian condemned (*kat'oikonomian*) Theodoret and Ibas in order to win over the *Diakrinomenoi*.<sup>88</sup> There is no word of the fact that, apart from the condemnation by Justinian's edict of 543, the Council of 553 also explicitly anathematized the three names, Theodore of Mopsuestia, Theodoret and Ibas; nothing is said about the condemnation of Theodore of Mopsuestia.<sup>89</sup>

*De sectis* demonstrates that it is a persistent defender of the Council of Chalcedon also in the treatment of patristic authorities, as a florilegium in *actio* IX once again underscores.<sup>90</sup>

87. C. Moeller, *art. cit.*, 665.

88. Leontius Schol., *De sectis*, VI, VI: PG 86, 1237CD.

89. This is researched in detail by J. Speigl, *art. cit.*, 224-30.

90. The florilegium accords with nos. 19, 24, 25, 27, 37, 41, 42, 50, 80, 86, 87 of the florilegium in CNE of Leontius of Byzantium (ed. Daley). The same numbers appear as in the description by R. Devreesse, 'Le Florilège de Léonce de Byzance', *RSR* 10 (1930), 545-76, apart from: 31 instead of 27, 81 instead of 80, 87 instead of 86 and 88 instead of 87. In detail the contents are:

19: Athanasius (?), *Contra Apollinarem* I, 7: PG 26, 1105A14-B5.

24: Gregory Naz., *Orat.* 38, 15: PG 36, 328C11-14.

25: *Idem*, *Orat.* 30, 7-8: PG 36, 113A6-B10.

27: Gregory Nyss., *Adv. Apollinarem* 40: PG 45, 1213D5-1216A9.

37: Ambros., *De Fide ad Grat.* II, 9, 77: CSEL 78, 84, 32-85, 38; PL 16, 576B13-15.

Because the Chalcedonian 'basic formula' of one *hypostasis* in two natures is clearly highlighted (the two aspects being treated separately, with the *mia hypostasis* occurring in particular in *actio* I in a type of *regula fidei*,<sup>91</sup> and the 'in two natures' in detail in *actio* VII), *De sectis* shows itself to be a strict-Chalcedonian writing.

41: *Idem*, *Ep. 46 ad Sabinum*, 6: PL 16, 1147B15–C4.

42: *Idem*, *Expositio Fidei*, frag.

50: Augustine, *Tractatus in Ioannem* 78, 3: PL 35, 1836; CCL 36, 524,4–8.

80: Cyril Alex., *De adoratione in Spiritu et Veritate* IX: PG 68, 637A7–B2.

86: *Idem*, *Ep. 50 ad Valerianum*, 2: PG 77, 257B11–15; ACO I, 1, 3, pp. 91,31–92,1.

87: *Idem*, *Ep. 39 ad Joannem Antiochenum*, 5: PG 77, 177A13–B3; ACO I, 1, 4, p. 17,17–20.

Thus among these there are four passages from Latin Fathers (Ambrose, Augustine), and three from Cyril. According to CCT II/1, *Ad Fontes*, 58, the numbers are from sections II ('two natures in the one *hypostasis*') and III ('Texts from Cyril' among others 'as witness for the dyophysite position'). Cf. *ibid.*, 60.

91. Cf. PG 86, 1197B: 'one *hypostasis* perfected (*ἀπετελέσθη*) from the God-Logos and the human body'. The *Regula fidei*: 1197BC, cf. above, p. 496.

## CHAPTER TWO

### APOTELESMA – AN APPRAISAL OF THE SIXTH CENTURY

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Time and again in the Justinianic period we have encountered the word *apotelesma* in a christological application. Jesus Christ as the eternal Logos and Son of the Father undergoes the historical process of incarnation and stands in his God-human reality as 'end-product', as it were, before the eyes of believing human beings. An *apotelesma* will be attempted in this final chapter on the christology of the Patriarchate of Constantinople between 500 and 600 – a concluding holistic consideration of the christology of the sixth century in Byzantium. Naturally, reflective theology, that is, the discussion about the Christ of Chalcedon which to a greater or lesser extent works with concepts and formulas, attracted attention.

In the sixth century in Byzantium, however, we have a special opportunity to expand this reflective view by a kerygmatic, hymnodic, liturgical vision of rare consistency, namely by the poems of Romanos Melodos. In terms of chronology, with him we encompass the Justinianic era once again, but now on a more popular, spiritual level, on which as well, and in full union with it, liturgical life is carried out. *Here* we must forgo a separate description of the christology of the Byzantine liturgy, but we shall return to this task and perform it adequately by analysing the Coptic version of Gregory's *anaphora* in the context of Alexandrian christology.<sup>92</sup>

#### I. THE REFLECTIVE CHRISTOLOGY OF THE SIXTH CENTURY IN BYZANTIUM

Our attempt to depict the development of faith in Jesus Christ in the Patriarchate of Constantinople during the post-Chalcedonian period to roughly 600, despite the many names and an understanding of the extant writings which is as complete as possible, cannot make the claim of offering an evenly developed picture for the Patriarchate as a whole. Naturally the imperial and patriarchal city itself captured our attention, like a brightly lit stage with its players and supernumeraries, while the

audience, that is, the provinces, the *chora*, remained with its own life in the shadows.<sup>93</sup>

We have also accepted a narrowing of content. Our description covers two domains of the history of faith only partially: (1) that of theological reflection on the dogma of Chalcedon in both its affirmative and negative modes, and (2) that of the politico-religious activity of the rulers of the Byzantine Empire during this period. There are many questions which still remain open. Of what type was the Church's baptismal kerygma of Jesus Christ? What did the spiritual life of this period look like in liturgy and asceticism, given that two orientations sought christological dominance in the Patriarchate? At the end we shall attempt to sketch the missing pieces of this picture in broad strokes. But before that we should sum up what we have analysed previously.

The post-Chalcedonian period in Byzantium to the year 600 was not an era of theological awakening or breakthrough, but rather of a tenacious wrestling with a responsible transmission of faith in Jesus Christ. In the Patriarchate of Constantinople in the period up to 600 Chalcedonian faith received a form which it retains to the present. Nevertheless the development in 600 had not yet come to a conclusion; in the seventh century the discussion of Chalcedonian faith would again be taken up anew.

With the two main formulas — 'one *hypostasis* in two natures' and 'the one nature (*hypostasis*) of the incarnate Word' — the two poles of post-Chalcedonian christology were present. Naturally this antithesis demanded a constant discussion which probed ever deeper into the content of the main concepts being used, viz. *hypostasis* and nature. The

93. On the development of this relationship, or misrelationship, see H. Ahrweiler, 'L'empire byzantin. Formation, évolution, décadence', *RSJB* 31 (1973), 181-98 = *idem*, *Byzance: les pays et les territoires* (London, 1976), no. I. That the Asiatic regions of the Patriarchate were not forgotten Emperor Justinian shows in calling the monk John of Amida to carry out missionary work in Asia Minor, with the commission of bringing the newly converted to the acknowledgement of Chalcedon. John loyally carried out this commission, although he himself was an opponent of Chalcedon. For this reason he received the name John of Asia. He is the author of the *History of the Oriental Saints* (E. W. Brooks, PO 17-19) and the *Church History* (E. W. Brooks, *Iohannis Ephesini Historiae ecclesiasticae pars tertia*, CSCO 105.106 [1935/36]; fragments in CSCO 104 [1933]); J. Schönfelder, *Die Kirchengeschichte des Johannes von Ephesus* (Munich, 1862). On the mission of John of Ephesus and his colleagues and their decisive success cf. L. Duchesne, *L'Église au VI<sup>e</sup> siècle* (Paris, 1925), 276-80. Their base was the monastery of Zooras on the other side of the Golden Horn (*HE* III, 36.37). Critical comments on the actual expansion of Christianity are found in K. Holl, *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Kirchengeschichte, II. Der Osten* (Tübingen, 1928), 245-6. Furthermore, see E. Honigsmann, *Évêques et Évêchés monophysites d'Asie antérieure au VI<sup>e</sup> siècle* = CSCO 127 (Louvain, 1951), 207-15; F. Winkelmann, *ByzSlav* 37 (1976), 182-3; P. Allen, 'A New Date for the Last Recorded Events in John of Ephesus' *Historia Ecclesiastica*, *OLP* 10 (1979), 251-4.



four familiar adverbs of the Chalcedonian definition had to form the tracks, as it were, along which the movement of thought would have to advance. This happened only slowly, and really haphazardly. We shall summarize the results from a Chalcedonian viewpoint.

### 1. The question of Christ's one *hypostasis* in the duality of the natures

It is well known that the struggle in the fourth century about the trinitarian formula led to the distinction between the concepts of *hypostasis*-person on the one side, and *physis*, *ousia*, and substance on the other. This was due to the Cappadocians, Basil and Gregory Nazianzen. What they had worked out for the *theologia*, Gregory Nazianzen in particular transferred also to the *oikonomia*, that is, the teaching on the incarnation. In the former one spoke 'theologically' of three *hypostases* in the one *ousia* (*physis*), and in the latter 'economically' of the one *hypostasis* in two natures, to summarize briefly the development up to Chalcedon.

Nevertheless this application of the *theologia* to the *oikonomia* was not accepted either by Cyril of Alexandria and his supporters, among whom the Severans above all counted themselves. Even in the sixth century a Severan says in Leontius of Byzantium:

There is agreement about the fact that *hypostasis* and *ousia*, or *physis*, are not the same in the *theologia* [trinitarian theology]; in the *oikonomia* [teaching about the incarnation], in contrast, they are identical [i.e. synonymous].<sup>94</sup>

Two linguistic and conceptual systems run side by side. Thus the Chalcedonians had to reflect intensively on the distinction between *hypostasis* and nature, while their opponents could more or less dispense themselves from this.

### 2. The question about the unity of the natures in Christ

Among all the parties there was unanimity that in Christ divinity and humanity were connected in a way which could be termed undivided and unmingled (*asynchytos* — *adihairetos*) and which continued to exist permanently. If one holds fast to the synonymy of nature and *hypostasis*, then these two concepts are unavailable for an interpretation of the 'unmingled' and 'undivided' in Christ. In any case one could use

94. Leontius Byz., *Epil* (CPG 6815): PG 86, 1921B.

periphrases and stress the perfection of divinity and humanity in the one Christ alternately. Nevertheless the perfection of the humanity seems to be endangered by the formula of the 'one *physis* (*hypostasis*)'. The claim that adding 'incarnate' dispelled this suspicion was either not taken seriously by the Chalcedonian side, or regarded as an implicit recognition of the two-natures formula. In fact, among some supporters of the *mia-physis* formula, the Apollinarian understanding of the Logos and *sarx* as a nature unity continued to shine through repeatedly (as for instance in the Agnoetic question). This is expressed already in the understanding of the concept *hypostasis*. To understand this fact we need to have recourse to the fourth or third century.

(a) Christ's 'one hypostasis', 'one physis', in Apollinarius

While in the third century the concept *hypostasis* had been used to express the 'substantial reality' of Father, Son and Holy Spirit in the one God, that is, in the Trinity, Apollinarius in his christology gave this concept a new christological function: *hypostasis* now had the task not of denoting the pre-existent Logos in his substantial reality, but 'of representing the one Christ as composed of divinity and humanity'<sup>95</sup> or, more exactly, as unity 'from Logos and *sarx*'. Christ's one *hypostasis* is the 'synthesis of Logos and *sarx*'. In this 'anthropological *synthesis*' the divine Logos takes over the spiritual, intellectual and volitional functions which are ascribed to the human soul. The body-soul analogy is thus transferred univocally to the relationship of divinity and carnal nature in Christ. It is precisely for this reason that Christ is only one *hypostasis*, one *physis*, one *prosopon*; in him there is only one *energeia* (activity).<sup>96</sup> The unity in Christ is conceived absolutely as a *henosis* 'in the nature and according to the nature', understood in an Aristotelian sense as a synthesis of incomplete, partial principles which results in one nature-*hypostasis* as a whole.

Accordingly, in the first instance the new content of *hypostasis* does not say 'subject' or 'substantial reality', but the physical unity of the one concrete reality from two natures, which Christ is. To refresh our memory we shall cite as the clearest statement of this a text from the 'speech on faith' which was ascribed to Pope Julius:

95. Cf. M. Simonetti, 'Per la rivalutazione di alcune testimonianze su Paolo di Samosata', *RSLR* 24 (1988) (177-210), 191.

96. Summarized most clearly in the *Kata meros pistis* 30: Lietzmann, 178-179.

... we confess that God the Logos became flesh from the holy virgin Mary, and we do not separate him from his flesh, but he is one *prosopon* and one *hypostasis* and one nature of God the Logos, who became flesh ...<sup>97</sup>

### (b) *Corrections to the Apollinarian system*

Although both Cyril and Severus clearly distinguish themselves from Apollinarius by often stressing the reality of the human soul in Christ, they still take over his *mia-physis-hypostasis* formula. Because both terms were synonymous for them, they were not able to use these same terms to establish the distinction in Christ. Other distinctive terms were not at their disposal.

## 3. The Chalcedonian way

The Chalcedonian synthesis is based:

- (a) on the Cappadocian acceptance of the trinitarian, theological distinction between *hypostasis* (*persona*, *prosopon*) and *physis* (*ousia*) for the teaching about the incarnation;
- (b) on the interpretation of the unity and difference in Christ with the help of this new terminology: the unity is on the level of the *hypostasis*, while the difference is on the level of the 'nature'.

Therefore, three things are demanded of Chalcedonian theologians:

- (i) a new definition of the content of *hypostasis*;
- (ii) the contrasting of their understanding of the unity in Christ, which proceeds from the 'subject' to the 'nature', with the Apollinarian 'nature unity'; and
- (iii) the interpretation of this event of union, firstly in a concrete way and then conceptually.

### (i) *What does hypostasis mean?*

For Chalcedonian christology after 451 a great deal had already been achieved with the knowledge that the one *hypostasis* was not to be considered as the end-product (*apotelesma*) of the union. Rather it is already present in the person of the Logos who exists in the divine nature, but who now in the incarnation assumes a complete human

97. Apollin., *De fide et incarn. contra adversarios*, 3 (CPG 3647): Lietzmann, p. 194,8–12. Cf. the Apollinarian writing *Encyclion* (CPG 3735): Lietzmann, p. 292,19–20: 'one *hypostasis* and one *prosopon* of the God-Logos and the flesh (taken) from Mary'; *Quod unus sit Christus* 3 (CPG 3737): Lietzmann, p. 296,7–8.12; *ibid.*, p. 298,1; *ibid.*, p. 299,9: 'one *hypostasis* of the Logos and the *sarx*'; p. 300,9–10.

nature. What does *hypostasis* of the Logos mean in relation to his human existence, if the dreaded 'Nestorian' teaching of two *hypostases* is to be avoided? Leontius of Byzantium occupied himself intensely with a definition of *hypostasis* in contradistinction to nature, without arriving at a convincing result.<sup>98</sup> He remained trapped in the Cappadocian metaphysics of *hypostasis* which discovered only the *individuum*. On the basis of his formulation Leontius of Byzantium had to deny 'individuality' to Christ's humanity, if he did not want to make it a second *hypostasis*. He did not address this problem quite openly. Hence he did not attain the breakthrough to the solution sought for, though it has often been maintained that he did.

Leontius of Jerusalem advanced a step further than his namesake, although he still had the same starting-point, the Basilian concept of *hypostasis*. He circumvented the barrier against finding a new definition which resulted from that starting-point by considering things concretely. For him incarnation was an event of God's omnipotence, which he described as the 'transposition of one nature into another *hypostasis*'.<sup>99</sup> Furthermore, he was so open that he conceded an individual being for Christ's humanity by which, seen from a Basilian point of view, it would have been *hypostasis*, but was not, because 'the transposition' had happened. For this process he was able to use the expression 'to make or to allow to insubstist'. Hence he left behind Leontius of Byzantium and his *enhypostatos*, which was often not understood. *Hypostasis* thus gained the meaning of independence,<sup>100</sup> or of the final monadic being-oneself.

What Leontius of Jerusalem proposed beyond that as an *ontology* for the explanation of *enhypostasis*<sup>101</sup> was only an application of the Basilian teaching on *idiomata*, but thought through with a good deal of intellectual show. This was forced into a new framework. It would have been much more promising to have thought through the existential start that Leontius of Jerusalem discovered with his idea of the Logos-subject's creatively taking possession of Christ's humanity: in his own *hypostasis* the Logos created for himself his own human being. Emperor Justinian took over this insight almost literally. There were two advantages in this.

- (1) The idea of the one subject was clearly highlighted.
- (2) For Leontius of Jerusalem there was no more profound possibility

98. It was shown that the expression *enhypostaton* should not be used in the search for this definition without further clarification.

99. Leontius Jer., CN II, 35: PG 86, 1593C.

100. *Idem*, CN II, 13: PG 86, 1561C7-9.

101. For example, in *ibid.*, CN I, 20: PG 86, 1485D4-7.

for explaining the *henosis* than the creative intervention in the being of Christ's humanity. This intervention consisted in an act of divine omnipotence which in *one* single action effected two things: the coming into existence (*ousiosis*) and the unification (*synousiosis*) of the human nature with the divine *hypostasis*.<sup>102</sup> In this way a good biblical start was given (cf. Rom 4,17) which far surpassed a constrained ontological interpretation of *henosis*. Only the divine *hypostasis* of the Logos, in unity with the Father and Spirit,<sup>103</sup> could so dispose of created being that it remained utterly created ('unmingled') yet did not belong to itself; it was and remained the 'undivided' existence and being of the divine Logos-subject. Leontius of Jerusalem spoke of *demiourgikon* as the characteristic of God.<sup>104</sup> Thus a valuable element in the interpretation of Christ's unity was recognized: incarnation was only possible to God's creative power.

(ii) *Unity in the hypostasis — as opposed to unity in the nature*

In the sixth century, Leontius of Jerusalem was successful in contrasting most clearly the Chalcedonian sense of a union in the *hypostasis* and according to the *hypostasis* with the nature unity introduced so disastrously by Apollinarius.<sup>105</sup> Through God's creative unifying act a complete human nature becomes the earthly, finite existence of the *hypostasis* of the Logos. The *hypostasis* of the Logos becomes, is and remains a complete human being and at the same time guarantees Christ's inseparable unity. The *mia hypostasis* now has a completely different sense from what it had for Apollinarius. *Hypostasis* is now formally the final subject.

This union 'in the *hypostasis*' permits an undiminished individuality to be awarded to Christ's human nature, as Leontius of Jerusalem explicitly does, although admittedly this is poorly categorized ontologically. Nevertheless it is the human existence of the divine Logos.

(iii) *On the interpretation of the event of union*

In addition Leontius of Jerusalem attempted to explain the 'singularity' of the *hypostasis* in Christ by means of his Basilian ontology. He could have dispensed with this — in fact he should have — because he then

102. *Idem*, CN IV, 17: PG 86, 1684B.

103. In this context the Fathers already emphasized that every creative action of God *ad extra* is common to the three persons. In Justinian's time this was expressed by Romanos Melodos, *Hymn.* 24,19: SC 114, 128 (here related to the multiplication of the loaves).

104. Leontius Jer., CN I, 19: PG 86, 1480A.

105. Cf. *idem*, CM: PG 86, 1865B.

falsified the biblical picture of Christ. By overwhelming Christ's human nature with divine *idiomata* in order to prove that it was united with the Logos, he endangered the biblical thought of *kenosis* (Phil 2,5-7). Above all he employed the 'proof in power', that is, the miracle, as indispensable for the revelation of the *kenosis*, something that brought Leontius of Jerusalem close to the Chalcedonian apthartics. If one takes the two main thoughts of Leontius of Jerusalem together, namely (1) the appeal to God's divine creative power and (2) the conception of Christ's humanity as orientated in its very existence to the *hypostasis* of the Logos, then a great deal was achieved for the Chalcedonian understanding of the one Christ.

(1) Because the union happened creatively, but without change for the divinity and the humanity (*atreptōs*), the *kenosis* in the event of the incarnation is finally assured fundamentally. The Julianists (in the traditional interpretation) and the Chalcedonian apthartics were on the wrong track. The creative union and assumption of Christ's humanity left the latter not in its own hypostatic being, but decidedly in the being of a human nature.

(2) As a result of this the acceptance of a 'theopaschism' was also possible without suffering being ascribed to the divine 'nature', as was the case with Apollinarius. For the human being Jesus who suffers and dies is the existence of the divine *hypostasis* of the Logos. God really suffers, in his human nature.

(3) The correct understanding of the Chalcedonian unity of natures in the subject needs no subsequent improvement. Neo-Chalcedonian approaches must guard against falling back into the schema of a 'nature unity' or of adopting individual ideas from it. In particular a 'divinization' of Christ's humanity in a qualitative respect exposes itself to the danger of becoming once again a *kenosis* understood naturally.

#### 4. Christ's humanity in the Constantinopolitan christology of the sixth century

'Created for itself' also says that Christ's humanity must be considered as a perfect work of God: 'one and the same, perfect in divinity, the same also perfect in humanity', that is, with the *sarx* and a spiritual, rational and all-human vitality. All parties stressed this against Apollinarius. But how seriously did they take Christ's humanity, especially his rationality, his human knowledge and volition?

We have established that within the fundamental acceptance of Christ's true divinity and true humanity there still existed quite different

notions about the relationship of both natures in the one Christ. There were very different 'pictures of Christ', both in the opposition of Miaphysites and Dyophysites, as well as within both groups. Imitating Cyril, Severus of Antioch resolutely constructed his picture of Christ 'from above'. He was followed above all by Theodosius of Alexandria, Anthimus and the Severans in general. Because in Christ there was only one *hypostasis* (*physis*), no 'duality' at all should be accepted in him. There was only one *energeia*, one *thelema*, one knowledge, as it were, only the one flow of energies from above. John Philoponus of Alexandria admittedly reflected on how this 'one *energeia*' also moved Christ's psychic powers.<sup>106</sup> Only in the final effect of the one *energeia* could and should a 'duality' be accepted, thus *outside* the reality of the one Christ, God and human being.

It is also only in individual representatives that the two-natures christology of the Byzantines was successful in considering and acknowledging Christ's human activity in the domains of both intellect and senses. Really it was only Leontius of Byzantium in his discussion with the Chalcedonian apthartics who took an important step forward.<sup>107</sup> Of all the Greek theologians of the sixth century, he was no doubt the one who understood best the 'consubstantial with us' (*homoousios hemin*) and the 'unmingled' of the Chalcedonian definition.<sup>108</sup> He knew of the distinction between what Christ as a human being can do from his natural powers, which as such he also ascribed to the divine subject, the *hypostasis* of the Logos, and what signifies the supernatural elevation of the natural powers. Here he discovered important facts and formulations for the relationship of nature and supernature, which were to be a model for the Latin Middle Ages. In his writings there were also approaches for a pneumatology of Christ's humanity or for the acceptance of a life of grace in Jesus which is borne by the Pnuma. In the Byzantine theology of the sixth century these insights unfortunately found little response. It was perhaps Emperor Justinian who adopted them the most in his letter to Zoilus. Some Byzantine theologians dared even to refer to Leo I's *Tomus* to Flavian and to speak of a twofold activity in the one Christ.

These approaches to an acknowledgement of Christ's humanity and his powers would have been of the utmost significance for a Chalcedonian soteriology, because this still seemed to reflect Apollinarianism.

106. John Philoponus, *Diaetetes* (CPG 7260), nos. 3-4: Sanda 38-39 (see also T. Hainthaler in *JdChr* II/4, 129-31).

107. Cf. Leontius Byz., CA: PG 86, 1336BC, 1336D-1337A.

108. Cf. CA: PG 86, 1332D6-1333B5.

The acts which were decisive for the redemption of humanity, that is, Christ's knowledge and freedom, Apollinarius anchored by nature in a divine-spiritual principle and thus arrived at an absolute 'impeccability' of the redeemer (an 'invincible *nous*'). This *nous*, however, was the divinity. What was the purpose, then, of the incarnation? The fundamental soteriological proposition was rightly raised against him: 'what is not assumed, is not redeemed'. This had as well to hold for human knowledge and freedom.

Even though important approaches for a Chalcedonian soteriology can be established, Byzantine christology on the whole was still not successful in developing a convincing appreciation of the knowing and willing of Christ the human being, and of his freedom. In particular with regard to Christ's knowing or not knowing, the Severan-Theodosian reaction to the theses of the deacon Themistius no longer left any scope for the unmingled development of human knowledge and free human willing. The dread of introducing a second person into Christ by such an approach was too great for the anti-Chalcedonians to venture accepting a certain autonomy of Christ's human psychic life.

The Chalcedonian and neo-Chalcedonian interpretation of the human knowledge and its participation in the divine knowledge (Eulogius, Gregory the Great) did not advance in that period beyond the Theodosian approach. The limitation of Christ's human knowledge which had been accepted in the fourth century was no longer gladly called to mind in the struggle against the Agnoetism of Themistius. Fundamentally, up to the present there has been no elaborated teaching on Jesus' human knowledge that is generally accepted and without conceptual contradiction.<sup>109</sup>

Consequently many questions remain open. In the interpretation of soteriology in the sixth century, was Christ's humanity properly seen in its cognitive and volitional power? What task did Christ's human knowledge have as the receiver and mediator of the Father's revelation to human beings? What significance did Christ's human act of obedience before God have? The fear of 'Nestorianism' hindered the utilization of the Leonine *agit enim utraque forma quod proprium est* for soteriology.

The time had still not come to grasp the christological and soteriological questions systematically in their totality. The christological corpus of the sixth century and of the post-Chalcedonian period in general was

109. Cf. R. Moloney, 'The Mind of Christ in Transcendental Theology: Rahner, Lonergan and Crowe', *HeyJ* 25 (1984), 288-300.



still all too much an occasional product of polemical, didactic or also of a politico-religious type. A systematic christology first began to develop embryonically not so much on the ground of speculation, but rather on that of the baptismal kerygma. The *Summa theologica* developed from the *symbolum* which had been formed as the summary of the baptismal kerygma, and to this the sixth century made its own special contribution, but on Latin soil.<sup>110</sup>

## II. CONCRETE CHRISTOLOGY: THE MYSTERIES OF THE LIFE OF JESUS IN ROMANOS MELODOS

In the cathedral homilies of Severus of Antioch we have already found access to this way of comprehending Christ's person by way of the life of Jesus.<sup>111</sup> Even if these were not delivered in the capital, they are still a model of the combination of reflection and kerygma which is transferable to the Imperial City, not taking into account naturally the Patriarch's anti-Chalcedonian stance. Through the poetic works of Romanos Melodos the concrete christology in the sixth century is represented much closer to the people than is the case with Severus. These found their inspiration in Syria and Palestine. Romanos offered a relatively comprehensive supplement to the reflective theology that was dominant to a large degree in the sixth century. Without his *kontakia* we would not be able to complete the picture of christological spirituality in the Imperial City; admittedly the liturgy must also be incorporated into this.<sup>112</sup>

Romanos was born towards the end of the fifth century in Emesa in

110. Cf. A. Grillmeier, 'Vom Symbolum zur Summa', in *Mit ihm und in ihm* (Freiburg, 1978), 585-636; *idem*, 'Fulgentius' von Ruspe "De Fide ad Petrum" und die "Summa Sententiarum", in *ibid.*, 637-79.

111. On homiletics in the Justinianic period cf. F. Halkin, *Bibliotheca hagiographica graeca III = SubsHag 8a* (1957) III, Appendix VII: *Orationes et homiliae de festis Christi*, 215-49, no. 1-277. In addition see C. Walter, *Art and Ritual of the Byzantine Church* (London, 1982), 67-72 (homilies).

112. On the following see J. Grosdidier de Matons, *Romanos le Mélode et les origines de la poésie religieuse à Byzance* (Paris, 1977); on this see A. de Halleux, 'Hellénisme et syrianité de Romanos le Mélode', *RHE* 73 (1978), 632-41. In five volumes Grosdidier edited and translated: *Romanos le Mélode. Hymnes* I: SC 99 (Paris, 1964); II: SC 110 (1965); III: SC 114 (1965); IV: SC 128 (1967); V: SC 283 (1981). On the christology of the hymns of Romanos see J. Grosdidier, *Romanos le Mélode* (1977), 247-84: ch. VI, La religion de Romanos. Important for the christology are also the introductions to the individual hymns in the five volumes of the SC. In his work from 1977 Grosdidier presented corrections and expansions to the four volumes which were published before 1977. On Byzantine hymnography see J. Szövérfy, *Guide to Byzantine Hymnography I-II* (Brooklyn, Leiden, 1978-1979).

Phoenicia Libanensis. The exact date of his birth is disputed. He was probably brought up bilingual. For some time he was active as a deacon in Beirut. Under Emperors Anastasius I (491–518), Justin (518–527) and Justinian (527–565) we find him in Constantinople, where he remained to the end of his life. As a deacon in the church of the *Theotokos* in the part of the city called Kyros, he is reported to have had an apparition of the Virgin Mary, who conferred on him the gift of poetic talent.<sup>113</sup> He seems to have died before 565, but after 555, because his famous Hymn 51 on the ten virgins (SC 283) demands this *terminus post quem*.<sup>114</sup>

## 1. General characterization of the historical significance of Romanos

In all his productivity Romanos was highly receptive with regard to his presentation of Jesus Christ. He did not want to execute an outstanding, historically significant work, but to present the dogma 'in a lively and dramatic form'.<sup>115</sup>

### (a) Typical hymns

J. Grosdidier highlights the following hymns as especially typical: (1) the first hymn on Christ's birth (*Hymn*. 10: SC 110, 43–77 with introduction); (2) the *kontakion* on Christ's presentation (*Hymn*. 14: SC 110, 163–197 with introduction); (3) Mary's hymn at the cross (*Hymn*. 35: SC 128, 143–187). In the last-named *kontakion* the poet unfolds a dialogue between Christ and his mother (following Jn 19,25–27 and Lk 23,27–31). Apart from Ephraem the Syrian and Symeon Metaphrastes, this is unique in Oriental hymnody (SC 128, 146). In this *kontakion* the inspiration is highly original; what is striking is the didactic interest and the literary quality of the text. J. Grosdidier (SC 128, 355) highlights in addition *Hymn*. 40, the first on the resurrection (SC 128, 355–421 with introduction); it is an apologetic hymn, which is rare in Romanos; here, however, the subject is the foundation of Christianity (cf. 1 Cor 15,13–14). Hence the poet is at pains to reconcile the differences between the reports of the gospels (cf. the table in SC 128, 357–358).

The form selected in *Hymn*. 40 is found in other very successful *kontakia* (apart from *Hymn*. 10).

(i) the 'temptation of Joseph of Egypt' (*Hymn*. 6: SC 99, 247–293 with introduction); (ii) the beheading of John the Baptist (*Hymn*. 59: yet to be published in SC).<sup>116</sup>

113. J. Grosdidier, SC 99, 14. On Kyros see *idem*, *Romanos le Mélode* (1977), 186–7.

114. Cf. W. L. Petersen, *The Diatessaron and Ephrem Syrus as Sources of Romanos the Melodist* = CSCO 475, Subs. 74 (Louvain, 1985), 3.

115. J. Grosdidier, SC 110, 325; cf. SC 128, 355–356 on *Hymn*. 40: the peculiarity of Romanos consists in the fact that he is more a preacher than an exegete.

116. Cf. J. Grosdidier, *Romanos le Mélode* (1977), 331–2.

(b) *The special character of his poetry*

The closeness of homily and hymn is striking. Romanos is a 'real preacher' ('un véritable prédicateur') (SC 128, 57); in many texts, however, he is also a type of pamphleteer, as in *kontakion* 33 on Judas (SC 128, 55-97 with introduction). He relishes moralizing, in part more than the corresponding homilies in Fathers like Chrysostom.<sup>117</sup> The *kontakion* in the sixth and seventh century represented the poetic version of the great Byzantine homily, in narrative and dramatic form.<sup>118</sup> In Romanos, however, the poetic charism seems to be subordinate to his activity as a preacher.<sup>119</sup>

## 2. The sources of Romanos

(a) *The patristic sources*

It is striking that J. Grosdidier names the Fathers first and only then the Bible,<sup>120</sup> this procedure being based on the difference in the way Romanos deals with both sources.

Romanos was familiar with two homilies of Basil of Seleucia,<sup>121</sup> who was of particular significance for the formula of Chalcedon. He was inspired by him for his hymns on Elias and on 'Jonah and Nineveh'.<sup>122</sup> He read whole homilies of Basil of Seleucia. Whether apart from these Chrysostom was also used directly cannot be established precisely. Certainly there are reminiscences of Chrysostom, Ps. Chrysostom, but also of Dorotheus of Gaza, Cyril of Jerusalem, Ps. Eusebius of Alexandria, Severian of Gabala and Hesychius of Jerusalem. In short, Romanos did not deny his origin in the Syro-Palestinian cultural circle. He had his roots in a homogeneous tradition which was represented by

117. J. Grosdidier, in SC 128, 58-59: 'Romanos n'est pas un coeur tendre, et on ne trouvera guère chez lui les effusions du Chrysostome. L'anathème lui est plus familier que la consolation, et il y a peu d'épisodes évangéliques qui ne lui aient fourni un prétexte à maudire un homme ou une communauté humaine, qu'elle soit juive, païenne ou hérétique . . . Médiocre théologien, médiocre psychologue, il est cependant obligé de dogmatiser et de moraliser . . . ' Grosdidier says that the *kontakion* became for him a 'strait-jacket', 'en définitive un genre faux, aussi incommode pour le poète que pour le prédicateur'.

118. Cf. A de Halleux, *RHE* 73 (1978), 633.

119. J. Grosdidier, *Romanos le Mélode* (1977), 247. Romanos adopted the *kontakion* (like the homily), but then popularized it. On the peculiarity of the poetry of Romanos in general cf. H. Hunger, 'Romanos Melodos, Dichter, Prediger, Rhetor — und sein Publikum', *JÖB* 34 (1984), 15-42.

120. J. Grosdidier, *Romanos le Mélode* (1977), 248-55: Sources patristiques; 255: S scripturaires; he reports that there is still no definitive work on the sources of Melodos (249, n. 7). In his edition of the hymns, Grosdidier takes great pains to give references to the sources where possible. But his concluding judgement states disappointingly (255): 'L'étude de ces sources, dans son état présent, ne nous permet ni d'affirmer, ni de nier l'originalité de l'oeuvre de Romanos.'

121. Basil Seleuc., *Hom.* 39, *In s. deiparae annuntiat.* (CPG 6656[39]): PG 85, 448AB; SC 110, 179, n. 1.

122. Cf. CPG 6656 (10, 11, 12, 13); J. Grosdidier, *Romanos le Mélode* (1977), 244

the 'Oriental theologians of Greek tongue, but also by the Christian literature in Syriac'.<sup>123</sup> One can contest J. Grosdidier's statement that Romanos evidently had no access to the Syriac works of Ephraem, but that there is evidence of his knowledge of the Greek writings. It is correct that there is a relationship to Ephraem (Greek) in the hymns on the last judgement<sup>124</sup> and on Abraham's sacrifice.<sup>125</sup> Grosdidier's conclusions were corrected by the thorough studies of W. L. Petersen,<sup>126</sup> who showed that Romanos knew the Syriac *Diatessaron* at first hand, and not only through Ephraem the Syrian. Romanos cites the Standard Text of the New Testament forty times, and the *Diatessaron* at least twenty-eight times, probably according to the Syriac text. Romanos also knew the prose commentary on the *Diatessaron* (cited probably nine times verbatim). In short,

Romanos owes a tremendous debt to Syriac literature; it is for others to determine to what — if any — degree the same may be said of the *kontakion* as well.<sup>127</sup>

(b) *Connections with Justinian's politico-religious actions*

One source, however, is of particular interest to us: J. Grosdidier established connections with the court and Justinian's writings. The poet probably moved in a circle of ecclesiastics with whom the Emperor was in the habit of discussing theology, although they did not have an official function at the court.

Beyond Constantinople and the court Romanos also had connections with the Latins, who during this period were more numerous in the capital than is usually accepted.<sup>128</sup> With these Westerners and above all with the Emperor himself the poet shared respect for Peter's See in Rome.<sup>129</sup> Romanos belonged to a generation which had experienced much, 'the killing and destruction of the Nika revolt [532], the spec-

123. J. Grosdidier, *Romanos le Mélode* (1977), 254.

124. *Hymn*. 50: SC 283, 209–267 with introduction.

125. *Hymn*. 3: SC 99, 129–165 with introduction; see as well Ephraem's hymn in S. I. Mercati, *S. Ephraem Syri opera* I, 43–83; also in PG 56, 537–541 (Ps. Chrysostom); SC 99, 132–133.

126. W. L. Petersen, *The Diatessaron and Ephrem Syrus as Sources of Romanos the Melodist* = CSCO 475, Subs. 74; *idem*, 'The Dependence of Romanos the Melodist upon the Syriac Ephrem: Its Importance for the Origin of the *Kontakion*', *VigC* 39 (1985), 171–87.

127. W. L. Petersen, *op. cit.*, 200.

128. Cf. Averil Cameron, 'The Theotokos in Sixth-Century Constantinople', *JTS* 29 (1978) = *eadem*, *Continuity and Change*, no. XVI, 83. According to M. Salamon, 'Priscianus und sein Schülerkreis', *Philologus* 123 (1979), 91–6, in the first half of the sixth century in Constantinople a group of Latin speakers, mostly of noble origin, rallied around Priscian, who stemmed from the West.

129. Cf. J. Grosdidier, introduction to *Hymn*. 47, in SC 283, 63–75, esp. from 73, where the various opportunities for contact, but also the friction (*Vigilius*), are discussed.

tacular success and reversals of Justinian's wars, that had seen the new Hagia Sophia built and then collapsing, that had experienced the trauma of plague and earthquake ...<sup>130</sup> He acknowledged also, however, the Emperor's encroachments on the Imperial Church as these were presented, for example, in forced baptisms. In these he saw a 'coercion to freedom' of which he approved, because it annihilated the endangerment of salvation which was present with the impending end.<sup>131</sup>

Do we have any concrete allusions to the major christological texts of Justinian? According to P. Maas, the fourth hymn of the resurrection<sup>132</sup> is inspired in certain strophes by the decree of faith of 551.<sup>133</sup> This opinion is endorsed by J. Grosdidier. In strophe 1 Romanos invokes the '*mysterium* of the *oikonomia*',<sup>134</sup> which is 'unutterable and inconceivable',<sup>135</sup> we should 'know (Christ) clearly as from both in unmingledness';<sup>136</sup> for 'he remained what he was and became what he was not';<sup>137</sup> 'he was God in truth, and a human being not only according to appearance, one and the same took suffering on himself in the *oikonomia*'.<sup>138</sup> Of the further allusions to the Emperor's edict of faith and other documents<sup>139</sup> in this hymn we shall highlight only strophe 4, which seems to betray a special closeness to the formulas most used at that time:

130. Averil Cameron, *art. cit.*, 107; on Romanos as 'an established poet' see E. Topping, 'The Apostle Peter, Justinian and Romanos the Melodos', *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies* 2 (1976), 1-15.

131. Roman. Melod., *Hymn. ad Neoph.* 52, 14: SC 283, 360-361: 'Peut-être aussi est-ce par crainte des lois aujourd'hui en vigueur que tu t'es approché du baptême et que tu es devenu ce que tu es devenu, intimidé par le temps présent. Et que t'arrivera-t-il quand viendra le temps du Jugement (*ho kairos tes kriseos*), et que tout sera dénoncé, et que notre Résurrection rétribuera tous les hommes?' On this see J. Grosdidier, *Romanos le Mélode* (1977), 282. 'Ce qui signifie: la contrainte présente n'est rien par rapport au risque qu'elle épargne au néophyte.'

132. Roman. Melod., *Hymn.* 43: SC 128, 485-541 (with introduction).

133. Cf. P. Maas, 'Die Chronologie der Hymnen des Romanos', *ByzZ* 15 (1906) (1-44), 16-18; J. Grosdidier, *Romanos le Mélode* (1977), 179.

134. Roman. Melod., *Hymn.* 43, 1: SC 128, 502; where Grosdidier refers to Justinian emp., *Conf. fid.*: Schwartz, pp. 88, 28 and 92, 22: τὸ τῆς θείας οἰκονομίας μυστήριον.

135. Cf. Schwartz, p. 76, 16: ἀρρήτως ἀφράστως ἀκαταλήπτως.

136. Roman. Melod., *Hymn.* 43, 1: SC 128, p. 502, 4: εἰς ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἀσυγχύτως; cf. Justinian emp., *Conf. fid.*: Schwartz, p. 84, 23. The text is from Cyril Alex., *Commentary on Leviticus* (CPG 5201): PG 69, 576.

137. Justinian emp., *C. Orig.*: according to Mansi IX, 500B; *idem*, *Conf. fid.*: Schwartz, p. 76, 3; see the details in SC 128, 503, n. 5.

138. Justinian emp., *Conf. fid.*: Schwartz, p. 88, 20-21, attributes the teaching of 'Christ's humanity as appearance' to Apollinarius and Eutyches; the edict says in addition: 'Being true God he became truly a human being': Schwartz, p. 76, 7.

139. J. Grosdidier, in the apparatus of the text and translation of the *Hymn.* 43: SC 128, 504ff.

When your faith, O human being, is this: the Logos from God the Father was crucified bodily, you do not err at all; for the unity of the natures is not divided . . .<sup>140</sup>

The opinion that Romanos composed a hymn in which the Second Council of Constantinople is mentioned and even defended is not to be accepted. The hymn in question is *The Kerygma of the Apostles*, the quality of which is certainly noteworthy, but it is claimed that it cannot stem from Romanos.<sup>141</sup> In strophe 10 the poet uses the image of the human being's five senses for the five councils between 325 and 553, as earlier the four councils were compared to the four gospels.<sup>142</sup>

(c) *The conciliar terminology and problematic in Romanos Melodos*

Only a few places can be found in which Romanos refers to the history of christology. He distances himself from the expression 'Christ, mere human being' (*psilos anthropos*), and emphasizes 'not split into two'.<sup>143</sup> The poet hardly investigates the technical language of the councils, and when he does it is mostly in the *theologia*, that is, in the proclamation of the Trinity.<sup>144</sup>

In the teaching of the *oikonomia* Paul of Samosata and above all Apollinarius (doctrine of the heavenly human being, the assumption of the *sarx* without a human soul, even of a mock body)<sup>145</sup> are addressed.

140. SC 128, p. 506,7-9: . . . οὕτε γὰρ διαίρεται ἡ τῶν φύσεων ἐνότης. In the apparatus (n. 1) Grosdidier cites from Justinian emp., *Conf. fid.*: Schwartz, p. 86,30: δύο φύσεων ἐνωσιν λέγομεν καὶ μίαν ὑπόστασιν. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 74,22-24. Together with P. Maas, however, Grosdidier considers the verse of 'Romanos' just cited as a later insertion. In the extant texts we do not find explicitly in Romanos himself the whole formula of the 'unity of the *hypostasis* in the duality of the natures'. For the use of the word *physis* for Christ's humanity one can perhaps refer to *Hymn.* 37, 17: SC 128, 254-255: 'Christ is invincible in a vanquished nature'. Here, however, *physis* denotes being human as such, not so much Christ's individual human nature.

141. J. Grosdidier, *Romanos le Mélode* (1977), 209-12, esp. 211; text (Greek), 210 (French): 'A cause de tout cela, la grâce, rassemblant aux temps qu'elle a choisis les cinq conciles des Pères en nombre égal à nos sens, a rendu claire pour eux la connaissance de la vérité.'

142. Cf. CCT II/1 336 with n. 49. In the Western fight against the Fifth Council people had recourse to this image; cf. A. Grillmeier, in *Chalkedon II*, 815 (on Isidore of Seville).

143. Roman. Melod., *Hymn.* 36 on the passion, 19: SC 128, 226.

144. See J. Grosdidier, *Romanos le Mélode* (1977), 264-71. In *Hymn.* 20 (on the leper) Romanos distinguishes between *prosopon-hypostasis* and *ousia* in the Trinity: SC 110, 378. Grosdidier indicates a possible reference to the tritheists. However, he finds the use of Basil Caes., *Hom.* 24: PG 31, 605B as a source more probable. In the same *Hymn.* 20 is also found the formula 'one of the Trinity', which is so often employed by Justinian, but here occurs without addition.

145. Cf. *Hymn.* 14, 12 (*Hypapante*): SC 110, 188-190 (*sarx apsychos* — *empsychos*); J. Grosdidier, *Romanos le Mélode* (1977), 333; *Index s.v.* Apollinaire de Laodicée.

It is striking how little reference there is to Nestorius<sup>146</sup> and Severus of Antioch. In the inauthentic hymn *The Kerygma of the Apostles*, the Synod of Constantinople (536) with its condemnation of the Patriarch as 'the enemy of orthodox faith' is mentioned.<sup>147</sup> In spite of his apologetic stance Romanos hardly looks into the christological heresies of the pre- and post-Chalcedonian period.

### 3. The concrete picture of Christ in Romanos Melodos

According to the logical and systematic division in the Oxford edition of the hymns, Romanos composed thirty-four hymns to the 'person of Christ'.<sup>148</sup> However, it is not so much a question of the person of Jesus in the framework of a two-natures teaching, as of the history of Jesus in the mysteries of his life, as they were celebrated in the Byzantine church year.<sup>149</sup> They are depicted more or less dramatically.

These mysteries of the life and deeds of Jesus begin with the proclamation of his birth (*Hymn.* 9: SC 110; on 25 March). Jesus' infancy is sung in six hymns (10–15: SC 110). *Hymn.* 10 for the feast of 25 December (SC 110) was very famous; it was sung at the imperial table and had been composed as early as 518. *Hymn.* 14 (SC 110) was composed for 2 February (the feast of the *hypapante*) and belonged to the most popular of Romanos' hymns.<sup>150</sup> The depiction of 'Christ's *ministerium*', or of his public life, begins with the hymns for the feast of Epiphany on 6 January and its sequel on 7 January (*Hymn.* 16 and 17: SC 110), in which Christ's baptism is celebrated with recourse to the Gospel of the Ebionites and with the depiction of the turning back of the waters of the Jordan and the appearance of a heavenly light.<sup>151</sup> The arrival of the Magi is already incorporated in detail in *Hymn.* 10 for the feast of Christmas (*Hymn.* 10: SC 110, 50–76).<sup>152</sup> The hymn about the marriage at Cana (*Hymn.* 18: SC 110) opens a series of six poems which deal with Christ's miracles and which are spread over the

146. On Nestorius see *op. cit.*, *Index*, p. 336. To what extent the *Theotokos* title in Romanos is also anti-Nestorian cannot be determined. Here he will have held on to the love of the Byzantines for the *Theotokos*. See Averil Cameron, *art. cit.*; cf. J. Grosdidier, *Romanos le Mélode* (1977), 174–5. According to Grosdidier, the famous *Akathistos-Hymnus* was originally composed to celebrate the old feast of 26 December in honour of the *Theotokos*. See *op. cit.*, 34–5.

147. Cf. J. Grosdidier, *Romanos le Mélode* (1977), 209–11.

148. P. Maas/C. A. Trypanis, *Sancti Romani Melodi Cantica*, vol. I: *Cantica genuina* (Oxford, 1963), nos. 1–34. See the overview in J. Grosdidier, *Romanos le Mélode* (1977), 330–1.

149. On the *kontakia* of Romanos and the liturgical calendar of the Greek Church see J. Grosdidier, *Romanos le Mélode* (1977), 74–93. On the Byzantine Church year and calendar of feasts see N. Nilles, *Kalendarium Manuale utriusque Ecclesiae Orientalis et Occidentalis* T. I (Innsbruck, 1879): calendar 2–25; further information in T. II (Innsbruck, 1881).

150. On this see J. Grosdidier, SC 110, 164: '... un interminable discours théologique où sont définies la dualité des natures du Christ et leur union, où est dressé le répertoire des hérésies qui sont commises à ce sujet'. The expression 'two natures', however, does not occur. The topic is the real divinity and humanity of Jesus, in non-technical language.

151. See SC 110, 271, n. 2.

152. Christ's circumcision on 1 January, as far as I can see, is not dealt with in any of the hymns edited in the SC. Nor do we find a hymn on Christ's transfiguration (6 August)

period between the second week after Easter and the Wednesday before Pentecost. In the hymn about Cana (strophe 8) the poet allows Mary herself to praise the virgin birth of Christ as the greatest of all miracles (SC 110, 308–309). Indeed he alludes to the infancy gospels. For him it is a proof of Christ's divinity, as is stressed in many verses. It is clear that mariologically the dignity of Mary's virginity was highlighted more than her title of *Theotokos*, which nevertheless from 431 played a great rôle in Constantinople and did so again at the end of the sixth century.<sup>153</sup>

Christ's passion is interpreted in five hymns for Holy Week (for Palm Sunday, *Hymn*. 32; the washing of the feet and the betrayal of Judas, *Hymn*. 33; Peter's denial, *Hymn*. 34; Mary's dialogue with the cross, *Hymn*. 35; Christ's trial, *Hymn*. 36: all in SC 128). For the suffering, death and resurrection, J. Grosdidier distinguished two types of description of redemption: (a) with a more historical stance, with an eye to the earthly Jesus of the gospels or of the earthly Jerusalem, and (b) with an action which takes place in the upper (heavenly) world (thus in the hymn for the adoration of the cross [*Hymn*. 39: SC 128]), or in the netherworld (Hades). *Hymn* 35 represents a middle form (SC 128, 143–144). Christ's descent into the netherworld becomes a favourite theme of Romanos (*Hymn*. 37: SC 128).<sup>154</sup> He develops a far-reaching soteriology, with special emphasis on the rôle of the demon in human history, within which the Jewish people have a very negative share (cf. *Hymn*. 36 and 38) (Grosdidier in SC 128, 236–238).<sup>155</sup>

The theme of Easter begins already with *Hymn*. 37 on the powers of the netherworld, and is then expressed in the hymn about the triumph of the cross (*Hymn*. 38: SC 128) and the adoration (veneration) of the cross (*Hymn*. 39: SC 128); six hymns on the resurrection form a block on its own (*Hymn*. 40–45: SC 128; *Hymn*. 45 has the title: The ten drachmas). To these also, however, belong *Hymn*. 46 (appearance before Thomas) and 47 (sending of the apostles). The series closes with *Hymn*. 48 (ascension) and 49 (Pentecost) (all in SC 283). *Hymn*. 50 (last judgement) (SC 283) describes the end of the history of salvation.

If we attempt to argue from the dramatically depicted event to Romanos' conception of Christ's being, notwithstanding his realistic understanding<sup>156</sup> of the happening, he still retains a christology 'from above'. He is not a Severan, but for him the whole intellectual movement in Christ's humanity has its origin in the Logos. It is there that the free decision to suffer occurs: 'In your voluntary death we have found

153. See Averil Cameron, *art. cit.*

154. On the various depictions of the descent see J. Grosdidier, in SC 128, 566–567 (on *Hymn*. 45). The theory of the contest in Hades (*agôn*) and of Satan's jurisdiction are intended to reinforce the definitive liberation of the human being from the power of the netherworld.

155. According to J. Grosdidier (SC 128, 270–276), one finds in *Hymn*. 38 similar themes (with regard to the descent into Hades) to those in Ps Eusebius of Alexandria in four of his homilies (CPG 5522–5524, 5526). On this anonymous author at the end of the fifth century or the beginning of the sixth cf. S. J. Voicu, art. 'Eusebio di Alessandria', in *DPAC* I (1983), 1284–5.

156. For example, the statement that Christ ascended into heaven in the body and not in the divinity is important: *Hymn* 48 in *Ascens.*, 9: SC 283, 154–155. What ascended above was the 'flesh', 'the visible body'. The divinity filled everything; in it there was no movement. Romanos acknowledges the twofold *homoioustos* in Christ: *Hymn*. 43, 1: SC 128, p. 502, 3–4.



immortal life, all-powerful, sole God of the universe.<sup>157</sup> This free acceptance of suffering is a favourite theme of Romanos, however he understands it.<sup>158</sup> Christ's suffering is true suffering, as is expressed particularly in *Hymn. 35* (Mary at the cross).<sup>159</sup> In this the poet develops his soteriology, which is intended to give an answer to the question *Cur deus homo?* The question: 'Would God have been able to save Adam without Christ's suffering and death?' occupies him in fourteen poems.<sup>160</sup> He takes seriously Christ's *kenosis*, or, expressed in Chrysostom's terms, the *συγκατάβασις*, God's condescension to us.<sup>161</sup> Nevertheless Romanos systematically avoids speaking of Christ's humanity. The accent is always on the divinity. It is not only Christ's divinity, but also the *Christus triumphans* (against the hellish powers) that is in the forefront. For this reason there is also a heavy emphasis on the miraculous in the life of Jesus.<sup>162</sup> For him it is the pantocrator who freely accepted humiliation and overcame it completely.<sup>163</sup> This way of considering Christ on the basis of his divinity, which, it is clear, alone receives the denotation *physis*, is genuinely Cyrillian, even though Cyril himself or his *mia-physis* formula are not even mentioned.<sup>164</sup>

157. Roman. Melod., *Hymn. 43*, passim: SC 128, p. 500,1. It was the Trinity which decided that the incarnation should take place. Thus J. Grosdidier, *Romanos le Mélode* (1977), 264–5. Romanos strongly insists on this. He combines the *theologia* very closely with the *oikonomia*. It sounds strange when he says in *Hymn. 35, 14* (Mary at the cross): SC 128, 181: 'c'était dès l'origine mon décret et celui de mon Père, et mon Esprit n'a pas refusé que je me fasse homme et que je souffre pour celui qui a failli'. One can dispute the translation of J. Grosdidier. See *loc. cit.*, n. 3.

158. Cf. Roman. Melod., *Hymn. 47, 19* (the sending of the apostles): SC 283, 115, with n. 2; J. Grosdidier, *Romanos le Mélode* (1977), 272–3. If the Son of God wanted to become flesh, it was in order to be able to die for human beings. It is, however, the 'death of God'

159. SC 128, 160–186.

160. Cf. J. Grosdidier, *Romanos le Mélode* (1977), 273. Grosdidier investigates the soteriology of the Melodos in considerable detail. Cf. *loc. cit.*, 271–7.

161. J. Grosdidier, *Romanos le Mélode* (1977), 273; cf. on *Hymn. 20*: SC 110, 357

162. J. Grosdidier, *Romanos le Mélode* (1977), 268–70.

163. J. Grosdidier, on *Hymn. 20*: SC 110, 357.

164. Romanos is probably to be considered a neo-Chalcedonian, in the same sense as Emperor Justinian. In comparison to him one cannot discern the effort to incorporate more of Cyrillian language. The Emperor carried out this process for him. But more than Justinian he highlights Christ's divinity almost in an Alexandrian manner. The stressing of Mary's virginity or Jesus' birth and of the miraculous in Jesus' life in general reminds one of Leontius of Jerusalem. Was Romanos close to the apthartics with whom Leontius of Byzantium did battle?

## SUMMARY

Without a doubt Romanos Melodos offers an impressive supplement to the reflective christology of the theologians and Justinian's politico-religious decrees. He is the mediator between on the one side the more critical theological discussion based on concepts and formulas, and the celebration of the Church and its people in the Byzantine liturgy on the other, which had its centre in the Hagia Sophia;<sup>165</sup> but he is also the great comforter of all levels of the Imperial City in their great trials, especially since the Nika revolt of 532. Romanos supports a sacralization of everyday life and offers texts for all occasions.<sup>166</sup> Daily life has a series of liturgical acts which accompany the individual hours of the day. The great feasts of the church's year were centred on Christ's person and his work of redemption.<sup>167</sup>

Just how closely membership of the state and the Church were related is expressed by G. Downey as follows:

To be a member of the orthodox Church was to be a citizen of the empire, and to be a citizen was to be a Christian; and so the participation in the Church's most important service of worship was at the same time an expression of social and political community.<sup>168</sup>

Poetry and music in the liturgy filled the eyes and ears of the Christian with a 'physical radiance';<sup>169</sup> to this Romanos Melodos made a significant contribution. The fine arts, which in the Hagia Sophia had created their greatest work to venerate Christ, the divine Wisdom, became in Constantinople the splendid expression of the content of faith. Here unfortunately we cannot make even the slightest attempt to sense this experience of faith from religious art by the Byzantines, in either its

165. See H.-J. Schulz, *Die byzantinische Liturgie. Glaubenszeugnis und Symbolgestalt* (Trier, <sup>2</sup>1980), esp. 45-55: the liturgy of Constantinople in the period of the struggle against Monophysitism; 57-90: the liturgy of the Justinianic period and its interpretation by Maximus Confessor. See too G. Downey, *Constantinople. In the Age of Justinian* (Oklahoma Press, <sup>3</sup>1980), esp. V: The Emperor as Builder: St. Sophia, 92-113; VI: Empire and Body of Christ: The Divine Liturgy, 114-35.

166. Cf. G. Downey, *Constantinople*, VI, 114: 'In the age of Justinian, every step of human life was blessed, strengthened, and aided by the Church', referring to the sacramental life and the many sacramentals, with which 'the believer's mundane affairs' too were endowed.

167. *Ibid.*, 114-15.

168. *Ibid.*, 117-18. On the liturgy of Chrysostom see *ibid.*, 118. Downey, 120, rightly comments: 'The Divine Liturgy was the same everywhere. The same words, whether in Greek, Syriac or Coptic, would be said or sung in the humblest village in Syria or Egypt, and in St Sophia.' The course of the liturgical day is described on 122-35.

169. *Ibid.*, 121.

possibilities or its realities. It must suffice to refer to some points of access which can introduce one to this spiritual world.<sup>170</sup>

The sacralization of private and public life in Byzantium is still not at its zenith. Even Emperor Justinian could be exceeded in this.<sup>171</sup>

170. See H. Hunger, *Reich der neuen Mute* (Graz, Vienna, Cologne, 1965), III.5: The fine arts as an expression of the Christian world-view, 202-28. S. Runciman, *Kunst und Kultur in Byzanz. Ein Überblick* (Munich, 1978), esp. 46-82 (on the sixth century); A. Effenberger, *Frühchristliche Kunst und Kultur. Von den Anfängen bis zum 7. Jahrhundert* (Leipzig, 1986), esp. 285-310 (Constantinople and the art of the East).

171. Cf. the increase of religious symbolism under Justinian's successor and the development of a theocratic system; see above on Justin II; Averil Cameron, *art cit.*